








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
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


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THE NORTH AMERICAN

FOUNDED IN 1771

The Oldest Daily Newspaper in America

DESCENDANT OF THE
WEEKLY PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE

FOUNDED BY
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN IN 1728

Issued Every Day in the Year

THE NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY

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PHILADELPHIA

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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

A SECOND VOLUME

EDITORIALS
FROM
THE NORTH AMERICAN
PHILADELPHIA

FEBRUARY, 1915—JULY. 1916

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J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
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FOREWORD

WHEN this newspaper, in April, 1915, issued a book containing some of its principal editorials on the war up to that time, the experiment seemed of doubtful value. A daily journal's comments upon current news, necessarily produced in haste and before the full significance of events is made clear, seldom call for permanent preservation. But these articles, dealing with fundamental issues of the conflict and its historical, political and economic aspects, rather than with isolated incidents, aroused unusual attention, and, in response to many suggestions, they were put forth in collected form for ready reference.

Requests for publication of a second series of the editorials have been even more numerous and urgent, and it is believed that the present volume will be as acceptable as the first, in that it supplements and extends the earlier survey of the great conflict and illuminates later developments.

The first volume covered events from the beginning of the war to the operations at Gallipoli. The accompanying articles, presented in chronological order, deal with the record from that time down to the opening of the present phase, at the Battle of the Somme.

THE NORTH AMERICAN.

Philadelphia, August 10, 1916.

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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

A SECOND VOLUME

AN UNFORTUNATE OLD GENTLEMAN

February 11, 1915.

TO SUCH readers as possess bowels of compassion we present an appeal for sympathy. We have in our mind's eye an old gentleman who, although innocent, is one of the chief sufferers by the war. His life, happily, is in no immediate danger, his fortune is not in peril of destruction and his sacred honor is unsullied. But he is bereft of the regard of his neighbors. Despite the best intentions in the world and conduct scrupulously correct, he is inferentially isolated, morally marooned. He is rather a noble-looking old party; lean, keen, white-haired, hawk-nosed, but with a youthful gleam in his eye and a whimsical kindliness lurking in the corners of his mouth. While not famed for the modesty of his deportment or the suavity of his demeanor, his irascibility is never mean; his heart leaps at the cry of distress and responds instantly to an appeal for justice. He has been known to be very generous, even to his enemies, and very patient with his detractors; and his hospitality is a trait honored around the world.

Thus it is that in normal times he enjoys the cordial respect of all who know him. They admire his perennial vigor, his shrewd sense, his constant endeavor to do the right thing. But this conflict has worked grievous hurt to his repute. The quarrel is none of his, and he has sedulously kept himself apart from it. Yet he is singled out for suspicion and contempt. His belligerent

acquaintances hold him in low esteem. Differing passionately upon every other issue of peace or war, they are rapidly arriving at unanimity in condemning his conduct and distorting his purest intentions into motives of depravity.

Being an exceptionally intelligent person, the reader has long ago identified our venerable and misjudged friend. We think we might all spare a little of our sympathy for the really pathetic figure of Uncle Sam, whose utmost endeavors to preserve the friendship of all nations have left him friendless. And because the president of the United States is the spokesman for us all and the responsible custodian of our interests in this matter, let us set down here an acknowledgment of his incomparable devotion to his ideal of official impartiality.

This rigid attitude has been dictated largely by the president's desire to be selected as mediator when the war ends. Events have shown that his purpose, as well as the interests of the United States and of humanity, would have been served better by an active than a passive neutrality. The low estimate of America held by the allied nations is due wholly to her failure to protest against violation of the conventions of The Hague. But, aside from this, it was evident early in the war that strict neutrality would create special difficulties for the United States. Both sides strenuously wooed American public opinion through official and literary advocates, and each was hurt and surprised when Americans showed a disposition to give the other a hearing. Each belligerent group charged the enemy with unbridled atrocity and perfidy, and this country's disinclination to enter the quarrel mystified and exasperated both. It was so perfectly clear to Germany that the war had been wickedly forced upon her and that Belgium was a treacherous foe of civilization, that she bitterly resented

American condemnation. France was chilled by our official aloofness. And England, although gratified by evidences of moral sympathy, has not failed to admonish us that our attitude would have been more worthy of a great nation if it had been the same as her own.

The reason is obvious: Nations at war are naturally in an abnormal state of mind. Fighting for their very lives, neutrality becomes to them inconceivable; moral sympathy only exasperates them, and, as an eminent German has remarked, "foreigner means enemy." We have already quoted many influential persons and newspapers to the effect that American mediation is impossible. Some further expressions will be enlightening as to European opinion of this country. Let us take Germany first. Ten days ago the Cologne Gazette said it was "boiling with rage at England's despicable conduct," and added: "Some neutral countries, too, including the United States, have forgotten what fair play means." A week later it remarked that "American neutrality is only a thin curtain, behind which zealous, loving service to England conceals itself."

French opinion is more polite or more effectively censored, but former Premier Clémenceau has bitterly condemned American favoritism toward Germany. As for England, we find the London Express complaining that the administration "is ready to buy votes by a show of tail-twisting," and the Morning Post charging that "the only points on which the American government has officially expressed itself are those in which the allies stand to suffer and Germany to benefit." Even in this country the views of neutrality are in just as sharp conflict. One American diplomat declares that our policy touching the war is "weak and unwise," while another criticises the "extraordinary partisanship on the side of Germany." Meanwhile German-Americans are holding

noisy mass meetings to denounce American "subservience to England" and to demand their special kind of pro-German "neutrality." So we see that our pitiful picture of Uncle Sam is not overdrawn.

Most of the criticism leveled against us is due to the inevitable unbalancing effects of the war upon the minds of belligerent peoples. But much of it arises from our refusal to utter a word in behalf of the dishonored agreements of The Hague, to which we had pledged our support. There the United States has been faithless to its duty, and has lost the chance to gain a moral ascendancy that would have been a powerful influence for peace and for the best interests of humanity. The fact is that Uncle Sam, who is actually losing sleep over his responsibilities, is suffering the proverbial fate of the peacemaker and the innocent bystander.

There really ought to be established an international course in this supremely difficult profession of neutrality. Its subtleties are quite beyond the capacities of the American people. If some nations can spend untold millions to fit themselves for war, we could well appropriate a liberal sum to train ourselves for the intricate duties of keeping out of it. Senator La Follette's resolution calling for a conference of neutral nations is a move that should be carried through. For, after all, that proposal touches upon the biggest issue of the war. The world has seen, and is seeing every day, a constant extension and encroachment of the rights of belligerents. It is by no means too soon to prepare for a united declaration which will establish the rights of neutrals, whose task it is to preserve the institutions of civilization, and to maintain those rights against the assumption of nations at war that military necessity justifies the violation of every principle of international law.

THE WAR ZONE DECREE

February 15, 1915.

A FAMILIAR passage in Scripture tells how Agur, the son of Jakeh, acknowledged himself baffled by the mysteries of existence. The record runs:

There be three things which are too wonderful for me,
yea, four, which I know not:

The way of an eagle in the air, the way of a serpent upon
a rock, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea and the way
of a man with a maid.

Had he lived until this time he might have added a fifth marvel—the way of Germany in making war. That is a system which defies logic and mocks at understanding. The newspapers of the empire now admit that the world's opinion is hostile to it; but the acknowledgment is less singular than the air of surprise with which it is made. Germany is amazed, as well as incensed, that other countries have not recognized the rape of Belgium as an evidence of the highest civilization and the most exacting morality. But the imperial decree making all of the waters surrounding the British isles a "war zone," and threatening to destroy ships and crews found therein after February 18, whether they be English or neutral, is surely the maddest proposal ever put forth by a civilized nation. The interest of the United States lies in the fact that the threat is aimed emphatically at neutral shipping. The decree says:

Neutrals are warned against further intrusting crews, passengers and wares to such (English and French) ships. Their attention is called to the fact that it is advisable for their

ships to avoid entering this area, for, even though the German naval forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships in so far as they are recognizable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British government and the contingencies of naval warfare, their becoming victims of torpedoes directed against the enemy's ships cannot always be averted.

As plainly as words could state it, this is a warning that American and other neutral vessels may be sunk by German submarines under "misapprehension," and that Germany will repudiate responsibility therefor. Neutral nations were loath to accept this sinister meaning of the order when it was first published; but five days later the intent was emphasized by Herr von Jagow, the imperial minister of foreign affairs. In a formal statement to the Associated Press he declared:

Neutral ships, even without taking into account the unavoidable accidents of war, run the risk of being mistaken for hostile merchant ships and of falling victims to attacks intended for these ships. Neutral ships, therefore, are urgently warned again, as in the earlier announcements, to avoid the indicated war zone until further notice.

Still more frank is Bismarck's old organ, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

Beginning on February 18 everybody must take the consequences. The hate and envy of the whole world concern us not at all. If neutrals do not protect their flags against England, they do not deserve Germany's respect.

The misuse of the American flag is annoying to this country as well as exasperating to Germany, but no government in its senses would seriously threaten to make that an excuse for piratical operations. A merchant ship has a right to fly any flag the skipper has in his locker, particularly if thereby he can deceive an enemy and evade capture. The custom is as old as maritime warfare and has been resorted to numberless times by every nation.

But this issue is trifling compared to the German effort to exclude neutral shipping from an arbitrarily decreed "war zone." It is officially admitted that this does not comprise a formal blockade, but it is clear that Germany is attempting to achieve the benefits of a blockade without its heavy responsibilities. Says the *Koelnische Zeitung*, organ of the admiralty:

It is sufficient that the facts be told to those concerned. The consequences must then be borne by the skippers themselves, if they venture into the mine field. In the same way the announcement that the German submarines blockade the English coast must suffice.

It requires something more than imperial decrees and threats, however, to establish a blockade. There are three absolute requirements for a recognized blockade: First, reasonable notice must be given; this Germany has done. Second, the blockade must be effective. And third, a neutral ship can be seized only upon attempting an actual breach of the blockade. The vital point is that the blockade must be uninterrupted; if it be raised temporarily, for any cause, new diplomatic notice must be given. And it "must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the blockaded coast." The penalty provided for the captured blockade-runner is seizure. But the law, as interpreted even by German authorities, is explicit upon the point that no lives must be destroyed. Even merchant ships belonging to an enemy may be sunk only in case of "pressing necessity," and "before such destruction the persons on board must be transferred to a place of safety." The same rules apply, but of course with greater emphasis, to neutral vessels.

A lawful blockade by means of mines and submarines is therefore an utter impossibility, for two reasons: First, they cannot exert the required "continuous force"; and second, their use would necessitate the sinking of

captured craft, without provision for saving passengers and crews. This is exactly what Germany threatens, explicitly in the matter of English vessels, and as a possible result in the case of American ships. Her war upon merchantmen therefore becomes a frank reversion to piracy. It is to be understood that she has a perfect right to hold up and search neutral ships in her declared "war zone" and to make prizes of such as carry contraband. But it is the possession of this very right which forbids the inhuman policy she proclaims. She cannot plead ignorance of a vessel's identity, nor attack it unless it refuses to stop when signaled. The burden of proof is upon the submarine, and to torpedo a vessel on suspicion merely would be unredeemed piracy.

These facts are stated with convincing clearness in the official protest sent from Washington to Berlin, a state paper which is a model of terseness, lucidity, dignified courtesy and force, an irrefutable presentation of the relevant principles of international law and justice. No loyal American wants trouble, but the blood of the most pacific citizen must move a little faster on reading the German decree and the restrained but perfectly straightforward reply sent by our government.

THE POSITION OF ITALY

February 24, 1915.

THERE are only two great Powers not involved in the war—the United States, which is determined to keep clear of the conflict, and Italy, which is equally resolved to take part. The position of Italy is one of the strangest developments of the whole upheaval. A member of the Triple Alliance when the war began, her first act was to declare neutrality. Still a party to that agreement, she is preparing, unless all signs are misleading, to make an attack on her allies. The reasons for this remarkable situation present an interesting subject of inquiry.

Like all other phases of the tremendous controversy, Italy's position carries the student back into history. The conquest by Napoleon left the country under the sway of a military despotism tempered by insurrection. When the French were expelled by the Allies in 1814 Austria claimed jurisdiction over the peninsula; and a year later the Congress of Vienna, after the manner of such tribunals, set up in Italy a conglomeration of kingdoms and duchies which were based solely upon dynastic reasons and had no relation whatever to the wishes of the people. The result was more than half a century of turmoil. The growing spirit of liberalism and nationalism, that received its greatest impetus under the brilliant leadership of Mazzini, in 1831, produced endless conspiracies and revolts. The great democratic year, 1848, saw Austria expelled for a brief period, but autocracy

regained nearly all that it had lost, and liberalism found its last refuge in the kingdom of Sardinia, which was later to be the nucleus of united Italy. In 1859 France aided Sardinia to overthrow Austria at Magenta and Solferino. She paid herself by annexing Savoy and Nice, but Austria relinquished her hold on Lombardy. A year later Garibaldi and the king of Sardinia undertook to free southern Italy, and in 1861 Victor Emmanuel became king of all Italy except Austrian Venetia and Papal Rome. Italy joined Prussia against Austria in 1866, and, although defeated, succeeded in recovering Venetia at the peace. After these gains the cause of united Italy could not be stayed. France defended the Papal kingdom for a few years, but her war with Germany compelled her to withdraw, and in 1871 the people of the peninsula became one nation under their own king.

By this time gratitude for France's aid against Austria had been replaced by hostility. There were three reasons for this: First, the pronounced sympathy of France for the Papal See; second, her seizure of Savoy and Nice, and, third, Italy's aspirations to acquire the ancient Roman possessions in northern Africa. Between 1870 and 1880 the territory she most coveted—Tunis—was so thoroughly colonized that it became Italian in all except name. But at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, Italy's ambitions there and elsewhere were ruthlessly ignored. Austria was encouraged to extend her dominions down the eastern shore of the Adriatic, where the population was largely Italian, and France was recognized as the heir of Tunis. Four years later she seized the vast territory. Italy was so embittered that Bismarck, the adroit originator of all these moves, was able with little difficulty to induce her to join Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance. No partnership could have been more unnatural—Latin with Teuton, democ-

racy with autocracy, the promoters of a greater Italy with the country which held vast numbers of Italians in unwilling political servitude. But Italy was desperate. She feared to face France and England, the Mediterranean Powers, alone, and, moreover, felt safer with her ancient enemy, Austria, as an ally. She was too wise, however, to commit herself absolutely to the support of Germany's world ambitions. Her part in the alliance was defensive only; she was not required to assist her allies in any schemes of aggression.

Italy, therefore, provides the most conclusive evidence of the guilt of Germany and Austria in forcing the great war. In 1913, as was made known recently, Austria proposed to attack Serbia, but Italy formally gave notice that she would not take part. Again, last August, she examined all the documents in the controversy and declared herself neutral, thereby proclaiming, on behalf of one member of the Triple Alliance, that the other two were the aggressors. Germany has used her utmost endeavors to keep her ally neutral; and this is the task that now engages the seductive skill of Prince von Buelow in Rome.

Strong forces, however, are pushing Italy nearer and nearer to war. Chief among these is the passionate desire of a large part of the people to bring under the Italian flag the Austrian provinces on the Adriatic. This policy, known as irredentism, is based upon the theory that each nation should control contiguous territory inhabited by the same race, speaking the same language. It inspired the first Balkan war, against Turkey; the second Balkan war, among the allies, and the aim of Serbia to expand at the expense of Austria-Hungary. Italian irredentism, for years regarded as the fanatical scheme of patriotic jingoes, looks to the "redemption" of territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, which,

it is asserted, are Italian in language and ideals and political ambitions. Since the outbreak of the war the movement has greatly increased in vigor. Its supporters declare that the quarrel with Austria is as irreconcilable as that between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine. It is true that irredentism theoretically should demand the restoration by France of Savoy and Nice, and of Malta by England. But the irredentists are willing to forego these ideas, because, they say, it is only in the Italian territories held by Austria that their countrymen are oppressed and persecuted.

Despite the obligations of the Triple Alliance, therefore, Italian aid to her Teutonic partners in a war of aggression was inconceivable. The legal reasons against it were that the terms of the compact did not require it and that Italy had not been informed in advance of Austria's ultimatum to Servia. But far stronger than these were the national reasons, the historic enmity toward Austria and the historic purpose of the Italian people to "redeem" their brethren across the Adriatic. Any move to put the army under the Teuton banners would have been a signal for revolution.

But why should not Italy remain neutral? Why should her inhabitants be forcing the government not only to desert her allies but to join the Triple Entente? Five reasons are given. The first is sentimental—the Italians are drawn to the English and French just as strongly as they are repelled from the Germans and Austrians and the Turks. Second is the racial instinct—the crushing of France by Germany would mean subjugation of the Latins by the Teutons. Third is the territorial ambition to which we have referred. Fourth is the instinct of self-preservation—a victorious Germany would exact a bitter price from the ally that deserted her. Last, and most powerful of all, is the

fundamental antagonism between the Italian ideal of democracy and the Prussian ideal of militaristic autocracy. Thus it is that the Triple Alliance still exists on paper while ignored in fact and that Italy insists on maintaining her "freedom of action." The situation is strangely involved. Guglielmo Ferrero writes:

We certainly find ourselves in one of the strangest and most paradoxical of situations, with our interests and ideals in conflict with our pledges, in a tragic struggle between national sentiment and the sentiment of honor. How difficult at once to save the country's honor, to defend its interests and not to expose it to mortal risks!

Felice Ferrero, a brother of the eminent historian and himself a noted journalist, discusses with explicit candor the probable result, in an article in the Outlook:

Should Italy go to war she will take the part of the Triple Entente, not that of her late partners. Of this there can be no doubt whatever. Italian intervention in favor of Germany and Austria would not be tolerated by the masses of Italy; their sympathy for the Allies is too strong. Germany is only a secondary consideration in shaping the policies of Italy, whose quarrel is with Austria. But if Germany has seen fit to back Austria, she must inevitably share the ill feeling that is running against Austria. * * * Opinion is divided as to the next possible move. Broadly speaking, this division has three distinct currents: First, that neutrality should be maintained regardless of events; second, that Italy should immediately join the Allies; third, the largest majority upholds the position of the government—watchful waiting. There is really no distinction between the war party and the conditional neutrality party, the issue dividing them being merely a consideration of time, whether the occasion for intervention has already or has not arisen. * * * For her own sake, Italy cannot make a "scrap of paper" of her treaty unless the provocation is irresistible. The provocation is, notwithstanding, rapidly approaching the irresistible. The entrance of Turkey, with its echo of rebellion in Tripolitania, has vexed Italy almost more than have the belligerent Powers. * * * Italy cannot insist on a policy of neutrality. A successful Austria would be undisputed mistress of the Balkans and

would make an end of Italian opportunity to gain the Italian provinces of Austria. Second, isolation will be the fate of Italy if she does not take sides. It is costing her \$1,500,000 a day to keep neutral. Such a burden, without hope of some political return, could hardly be borne by any country with continued equanimity.

Italian patriots can make out a moving case for the "redemption" of the provinces on the eastern shore of the Adriatic; but it is difficult, nevertheless, to see the justice of the ambition. As Herbert Adams Gibbons points out in his illuminating work, "The New Map of Europe":

Realization of the dreams of Italian irredentists would give to Italy the ports and coast line of the northern end of the Adriatic, with no hinterland, and the Slavs, Hungarians and Germans an enormous hinterland with no ports. Only thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change by which fifty million people would be cut off from the sea to satisfy the national aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians.

Italy's entrance in the war will thus present a strange anomaly. It will mean the triumph of the ideals which inspire the opponents of German autocracy, but its main purpose will be territorial aggrandizement. Servia, Austria, Russia, Germany, Belgium, France and England can all plead, with some show of reason, that they were dragged unwillingly into the conflict. Italy alone will take part after long deliberation and in response to popular sentiment. Yet this does not wholly dispose of the paradox. For despite the fact that Italy will fight for spoils, it is equally true that she dare not contemplate the possibility of a final victory for Germany, and therefore goes to war for self-preservation.

AMERICAN MUNITIONS

February 26, 1915.

WE CANNOT give full credence to the report we printed the other day, that "President Wilson is considering the advisability of asking congress for authority to impose an embargo upon the shipment of all supplies to belligerent nations." We cannot conceive of his adopting a course so unpatriotic, so dangerous and so immoral. The demand for the congressional action described has won the support of a few heedless citizens, who deceive themselves with the theory that it would promote the cause of peace. But chiefly it is the propaganda of German-American agitators.

Their favorite argument is that the plan would "hasten the end of the war." They accuse this country of prolonging the strife, of adding to the awful suffering and waste of life, by what Representative Bartholdt calls "America's shameful traffic in arms." But even in putting forth a humane plea they cannot conceal their real purpose. For Mr. Bartholdt's complaint is not that the traffic is "shameful," but that it "makes us silent partners of the Allies"—a disgrace which he proposes to remove by making us the open partners of Germany. The official pro-German organ, the Fatherland, speaks even more plainly:

Were the war material from the United States withheld, the war would come to an end in sixty days or less. The size of the contracts placed by the Allies in this country is proof that they are without facilities for carrying on a contest on such a large scale. England finds herself in a difficult posi-

tion, and could not go on enlarging her forces without the munitions being shipped to her from the United States. As for Russia, she would be immediately at the end of her resources were the American markets closed.

Nothing could be more explicit than this. The war could be stopped—by American intervention, by this country's abandonment of neutrality. It could be stopped in sixty days—by the simple expedient of throttling the adversaries of Germany so that she might complete the subjugation of Belgium, France and Great Britain. It could be stopped—if the United States deliberately took the side of Germany and assisted her to crush opponents that would be left "without facilities"—that is to say, unarmed. These agitators, while campaigning openly in behalf of a foreign nation, urge that they are advocating "true neutrality." Yet the legality of the supplying of arms to belligerents by neutrals is impregably established by statutes, by judicial decisions, by proclamations, by the universal custom of generations and by the unanimous consent of the nations of the world, including Germany herself.

So far as the United States is concerned, we quoted the other day the official utterances of Jefferson, Hamilton and the federal supreme court; and, for the rest of the world, the agreements signed at The Hague. As to this war, the American position, in compliance with the strictest rules of international law, was stated in the president's proclamation of August 4. That document reaffirmed that the laws of the United States do not interfere "with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war," and provide that "all persons may lawfully and without restriction manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war." If, however, the advocates of an embargo want

European authority for the American position, they can find it in the course of Germany itself, which supplied arms to both Japan and Russia in 1905; to both Turkey and the Balkan States in the recent wars, and at various times to every important country in the world. And when they hiss the name of Secretary Bryan at their meetings they should remember that he holds a note handed to him on December 15 last by the German ambassador, which says:

The imperial German government agrees that under the general principles of international law no exception can be taken to neutral States letting war material go to Germany's enemies from or through neutral territory, and that the adversaries of Germany are authorized to draw from the United States contraband of war, and especially arms.

But if the legality and propriety of the traffic are conceded and appeal is made against it on moral grounds, or in behalf of humanity and peace, the case is even more conclusive, for it is rooted not merely in the decisions of governments and the rules of international law, but in logic and the fundamental principles of justice. The most obvious answer to the demand is that an embargo would be a flagrant, inexcusable and malignant breach of neutrality. In the beginning, in accordance with custom, the American markets were declared open to all the belligerents on equal terms; they are still, so far as this country is concerned, as open to Germany as to England or France. The reason Germany cannot now obtain American war supplies is that her adversaries bar the way through control of the sea. For the United States now to reverse its declared position would be to nullify the advantages won by England and France at the cost of many lives and vessels. By so doing, this country, in effect, would confer on Germany the power of a great Atlantic fleet, for it would arbitrarily deprive her opponents of an advantage they have achieved through supe-

rior naval power. The act would be not only unneutral in principle, an intervention in behalf of one group of belligerents against the other, but it would be an indefensible violation of an explicit provision of one of the conventions of The Hague, to which the United States is a party:

The rules impartially adopted by the neutral Powers shall not be altered in principle during the course of the war by one of the neutral Powers, except in the case where experience shows the necessity for such action in order to safeguard a nation's rights.

So far as the rights of the United States are concerned, they irresistibly demand strict adherence to the rule of free export of war munitions. Violation of it would not only be dishonorable, but would create a precedent of the most perilous kind. No matter how distant may be the next war of the United States, the country is certain to be unprepared; and if it must then depend upon its own resources for arms and ammunition, the result will be disaster. We keep no large war supplies on hand, and before American manufactories could meet the demand the nation would be at the mercy of the enemy. This is precisely the reason why the nations are agreed that the selling of munitions by neutrals should be unrestricted except by the liability to capture on the high seas.

The most notable example now in view is Belgium, which is buying arms and ammunition in the United States. The Germans are operating for themselves the huge Belgian arms factories at Liege; and the German-American agitators, in the face of this, would have the United States help Germany to crush Belgium by refusing to sell to her the weapons needed for self-defense. It is true that Germany is entitled to use the military advantage she has won in Belgium, just as the Allies are entitled to enforce their control of the sea. If the United

States had refused from the beginning to permit the export of arms, it would be unneutral to reverse that attitude for the benefit of Belgium. But, having declared our markets open and having supplied Germany with materials as long as she was able to transport them, we cannot justly close those markets to her opponents.

Most of the advocates of the embargo are frankly pro-German. But its pacifist supporters should realize that the plan, far from promoting peace, would be the strongest possible stimulus to militarism. Germany for years has had the greatest manufactory of arms in the world, and the changing of the rule that neutrals may supply weapons to belligerents would mean that every other nation would be impelled to adopt her system of piling up vast armaments in times of peace. Those who urge the embargo as a measure of humanity and civilization are fatally in error. They ask that the United States should arbitrarily make new international law—not for the benefit of the world, but for the benefit of a single belligerent. What they demand would amount to active intervention in the war. It would be dangerous, destructive and dishonorable. It would be neither justifiable nor effective. It would make us false to our obligations, false to neutrality, false to the duty of guarding our future security and false to the cause of peace.

LAWLESS WARFARE

March 4, 1915.

ALL who have thoughtfully studied the causes and the progress of the war must have been struck by the fact that each important development was an almost inevitable result of preceding actions. Civilization has become involved in an intolerable condition, not through any single act, but through a sequence of events linked one to the other. The successive violations of international law, resulting in the present condition of anarchy, form a similar chain. Germany violated Belgium, dropped bombs on sleeping non-combatants and scattered mines in open waters. Britain declared the entire North Sea a military area. Germany bombarded undefended English towns from warships and balloons. Britain decreed that foodstuffs destined for German civilians should be held as contraband. Germany threatened submarine war on British commerce, and British ships began to use neutral flags for protection. Germany proceeded to sink merchantmen on sight, in defiance of the rules of war, and now the allies lawlessly prohibit all commerce to and from Germany, even through neutral ports. This policy, defended as a reprisal against Germany's submarine campaign, which "substitutes indiscriminate destruction for capture," is thus outlined in the British statement:

Germany's opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French

governments without risk to neutral ships or neutral or non-combatant lives, and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity. The British and French governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into ports ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes, unless they would otherwise be liable to confiscation.

Certain similarities between the German "war zone" decree and the retaliatory effort to strangle all German commerce will be noted. Both projects aim to achieve the results of a blockade without accepting its responsibilities; both are designed to distress the enemy by cutting his food supply; both menace neutral commerce and invade neutral rights; both are excused as necessary reprisals against a law-defying opponent; both are frankly illegal, unprecedented, judicially indefensible. Both countries express regret that neutrals must suffer, but each complains that neutrals have not forced the other to conform to the rules, and both announce that their purpose is to hasten the end of the war.

Quite as striking are the differences between the two systems employed. German submarines sink enemy ships on sight; there are no enemy ships for the allies to operate against. Germany gives notice that neutral ships may be sunk by accident; the allies will detain such ships, with intention. Germany will take no prizes; the allies will send captured craft to port. Germany will save neither crews nor passengers; the allies will carefully protect them. Germany will destroy ships and cargoes; the allies will merely detain them.

Both policies are flagrantly in violation of established international law. This is so clear that the New York World, usually careful in its statements, is misled into denouncing as equally monstrous the methods employed, in which there is a vital difference. "If, as Britain maintains, German submarine war is piracy,"

declares the World, "then this lawless British warfare is also piracy." We doubt it. To destroy peaceful merchantmen on sight is unquestionably piracy. To stop, search and detain a merchantman without the authority of a declared blockade is plainly unlawful, but as plainly is not piracy. The difference is about the same as that between highway robbery with violence and unlawful detention or between assassination and trespass.

The allies have disregarded the method provided by international law for the accomplishment of the purpose at which they aim. That method is a blockade of Germany's coast. They deliberately avoid such a declaration. This evasion of law they find convenient. A blockade would require the vigilance of an immense naval force, to guard not only the approaches from the Atlantic, but the sea lanes around Scandinavia. It would subject the fleets to a serious strain and to constant peril from submarine attacks. Finally, it would necessitate the capture and confiscation of neutral ships and cargoes, and the allies are determined not to give neutrals such cause for complaint and bad feeling. No pretense is made that the measures adopted are lawful. In announcing the policy, the British premier charged that Germany had resorted to "pillage and piracy," and that in reprisal the allies would likewise go outside the rules, but with due regard to the requirements of humanity. Mr. Asquith said:

The words "blockade" and "contraband" do not occur in this declaration. And why? Because Germany has forfeited all right to diplomatic terms. Nor is the alliance to be strangled with a network of judicial niceties. But we did not initiate the new warfare, and we promise the neutrals that we shall not assassinate their seamen or destroy their goods.

This is remarkably frank. The repudiation of "judicial niceties" provides an epigram that compares in interest with Germany's immortal phrase about "a scrap

of paper." The meaning of the policy is thus clearly stated by the London Chronicle, a government organ:

The step cannot be classified under either of the accepted terms of international law, namely, contraband or blockade. The course proposed is, then, without sanction in international law. How is it justified? By the conduct of our adversary. But we shall not pursue it by the same barbarous methods. The object is to obtain the same advantages against Germany that she claims against us, but to claim it without outraging humanity and without inflicting upon neutrals any particle of avoidable hardship. Admittedly the whole development is an excursion into what has hitherto been disallowed by international law, but we only follow reluctantly where the enemy have led.

Despite these mitigating pleas, it is the duty of the United States to protest vigorously. Neutral commerce has absolute rights at sea, which are paramount to those of belligerents, and interference with it, without a formal, effective blockade, is an invasion which the world cannot afford to have established as a precedent. The controversy reveals once more the loss of moral influence which this country suffered by failing to protest against the first and most flagrant violations of international law, from which the present dangerous condition has resulted. Civilization asks why, if we did not raise our voice in behalf of a murdered nation, we should trumpet the wrongs of interrupted trade. Our protest will be just, but it will not excuse our silence while Belgium was being trampled to death. By successive acts of the belligerents, international law has been broken down, and the rights of nations at peace have been violated with ruthless pertinacity, to a certain extent because neutrals ignored their moral obligations and acted only upon infractions of their commercial privileges.

ONE GREEK AND EUROPE

March 11, 1915.

IT WAS Nicholas I, czar of Russia, who conferred upon the Ottoman empire its grisly title. "The Sick Man of Europe," he said, in 1844, "is dying, and we must never allow such an event to take us by surprise." The unlovely patient rallied enough to help England and France defeat Russia ten years later, and has outlived the eminent diagnostician for sixty years. But now, it seems, the prophecy is to have belated fulfillment. Soon the Turk will return to the land of his fathers, which he left nearly six centuries ago. *Kismet!*

Signs of the coming change may be read not only in the fall of the outer forts of the Dardanelles, but in the ferment that is spreading throughout all eastern Europe. Wheresoever the carcase is, as of old time, there shall the eagles be gathered together. From the Danube to the Aegean sea they are whetting their talons for the prey.

Historically and sentimentally, the most interesting of these countries is Greece. The very name awakens echoes of romance, legend and antiquity. But there is another reason why the turmoil among the fiery Hellenes has focused world-wide attention. It centers in one man—not a prince, not a soldier, but a plain, bearded, spectacled citizen who looks like a mild-mannered family physician and sways his nation like another Garibaldi. When the streets of Athens swarm with cheering crowds it is his name that they shout, his opponents whom they denounce. He has delivered an ultimatum to the king

in his palace. His decision has overturned the government. And a few years ago he was an obscure country lawyer.

Eleutherios Venizelos, who resigned as prime minister of Greece this week, was born a Cretan. It was as recently as 1910 that he went from his native island to the mainland, just as a young Corsican once went to France—a benevolent Napoleon in a frock coat and string tie. In less than three years he had made a new government and a new nation and had doubled the territory of the Hellenic kingdom. In defiance of the great Powers, he had redrawn the map of eastern Europe. To know the meaning of the influence of this one man one must know the history he made before he became the leader of the Greeks. Born about fifty years ago, he was educated in Athens and Lausanne, Switzerland, and in young manhood practiced law in Crete. That island, the most southerly point in Europe, with about twice the area of Long Island, was settled originally by Phoenicians, and passed successively under the sway of Greeks, Romans, Saracens, Byzantines, Venetians and Turks, the last named holding it from 1715 and maltreating it with true Ottoman perversity.

The nineteenth century saw Crete torn again and again by insurrections and cruel reprisals. The great Powers, selfishly determined to keep Turkey intact, refused to permit Greece to annex the land where her countrymen suffered. The Berlin congress, in 1878, confirmed Moslem rule in the island, although compelling certain reforms; but in 1889 Abdul Hamid tore up this "scrap of paper," and for seven years the little country was a scene of anarchy and bloodshed. Venizelos was the chief leader in the final revolution. A peculiarly atrocious massacre in 1897 stung Greece to action, and she entered her hopeless war with Turkey. She was

crushed, but the cry of Crete was answered at last. The island, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, came under the joint protection of Italy, Great Britain, France and Russia, and in 1898 they named Prince George of Greece as high commissioner. Naturally, this encouraged the people to hope for union with Greece, and after a few years Turkey virtually conceded her loss of sovereignty. But in 1909 the Powers prepared to withdraw their protection. Venizelos, then premier of the island, announced that he would forthwith annex it to Greece. When he raised the Grecian flag the Powers sent marines ashore and cut it down. Then and there was born in the leader's mind the idea of a Balkan alliance that would drive the Turk out of Europe. The great Powers, he said contemptuously, were "a parcel of old women." Turkey boldly announced that unless her ownership of Crete were recognized and Greece renounced formally the purpose of annexation she would declare war against the Hellenes. That very day the Cretan liberator set sail for Athens—and his coming was the beginning of the end of Moslem rule in Europe.

We are accustomed to think of the processes of history making as being slow. But once in a century or so nature fashions a man like Eleutherios Venizelos, and the machinery is speeded up. Within a few months he had made a party for himself and was in the Greek parliament, a single-chamber legislature. He faced a government honeycombed with graft and rotten with factionalism and incompetence, and saw that he must make it over from the ground up. Called to the premiership in August, 1910, he said to King George: "Let me have five years of office, and I'll give you a new Greece." He did it in something less than three. His first act was to endow the country with a new constitution embodying progressive ideas. He reformed the entire administra-

tion of finance, justice and internal affairs. He called in naval experts from England, military experts from France and Italian experts in police affairs. He worked such miracles that the dynasty, the most unpopular in Europe, became the object of national veneration.

But the great achievement of Venizelos was the creation of the Balkan alliance—Greece, Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro—which overwhelmed the German-trained Moslems at Janina, Kirk Killisse and Lule Burgas and reduced the Ottoman empire in Europe to a meager strip of territory around Constantinople. Greece obtained more than any of her allies, extending her borders far to the north and along the Aegean and reclaiming large groups of islands in that sea. These facts explain the remarkable influence of the ex-premier over his countrymen, greater even than that of the king. He was a product of the Cretan question, that problem which for a century cried aloud for humane solution, but which was bungled by the incompetence and selfishness and callousness of the great Powers.

For one cause of the great war, therefore, we may look to the turbulent history of the island that gave Eleutherios Venizelos to Greece. And while there remains a foot of Turkish territory in Europe to be divided, or a Greek Christian in peril of Moslem persecution, we may expect his countrymen to demand participation in the conflict.

ITALY'S PERILOUS COURSE

March 23, 1915.

IN DAYS of old, we believe, the harshness of a declaration of war was mollified by ceremonious courtesy. Gorgeously appareled heralds conveyed the news and announced the general reasons for the impending slaughter with punctilious politeness. Nowadays the final notice of warlike intention on the part of a Christian government is to tag its soldiers with the metal disks, which simplify the identification of mangled bodies on the battlefield. This grim precaution has just been adopted in Italy; and the fact is more significant, perhaps, than the rumored purpose of that country to denounce its alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Italy is to make war upon her formal ally but her historic enemy. For nearly eight months the Italians have remained neutral, but with the greatest difficulty. Now they exult in the prospect of combat. And, lest the world should misinterpret the reasons for the delay and credit them with motives of altruism, they proclaim the truth, as in this frank statement by the *Giornale d'Italia*, the premier's organ:

Since the beginning of the war Italy has preserved her neutrality only until her own interests are in question. The forces of the belligerents are wearing out, while our energies are augmented. Foreign countries have abandoned the strange idea that they would be able to enlist Italy in the name of sentimentalism, like a romantic knight-errant, or in the aid of great Powers aspiring to the domination of the world. Now that the configuration of Europe, perhaps of a great part of the world, is about to be decided, we must and

will obtain a frontier which politically and from a military viewpoint is in no sense a menace. The nation needs expansion beyond the seas, especially on the Mediterranean.

What all this eloquent circumlocution means is that Italy is about to fall upon Austria-Hungary and rend her limb from limb; is determined to seize some thousands of square miles of territory, including the only seaports the dual monarchy possesses. Yet Italy is still a member of the Triple Alliance. If she defies the coercion and resists the seduction of her partners, if she not only refuses to join them, but turns against them, it would seem that she must have some powerful reasons. Her case is remarkably interesting.

National unity, the great fact in Italian history, she owes not only to the valor of her own people, but to the aid of France and Prussia. In 1859 France helped her to overthrow Austria at Magenta and Solferino, paid herself by taking Savoy and Nice and partially satisfied Italy by winning Lombardy for her. Seven years later Italy joined Prussia against Austria, and although defeated both on land and sea, acquired Venetia. Welcome as these additions were, they fell far short of meeting the aspirations of Italy. The terms left Austria in possession of what is called the Trentino, a triangle of territory in Austrian Tyrol lying near the junction of the borders of Austria, Switzerland and Italy, the apex extending southward and giving Austria command of her neighbor's northern lands. Also the peace confirmed Austria in possession of the peninsula of Istria and the Dalmatian coast, comprising the eastern shore of the Adriatic from the head of that sea more than half way to the strait of Otranto. For half a century this arrangement has rankled in the hearts of Italian patriots. The Trentino, particularly the lower part, is Latin in population, language and sympathy, and the same may be said of much of the eastern

Adriatic coast, which for centuries belonged to the republic of Venice, so long the chief maritime Power in Christendom. Istria has an area of 1910 square miles and a population of 360,000, of which 34 per cent is Italian. Dalmatia, 4940 square miles in extent, has 600,000 inhabitants, mostly Serbo-Croats. Both of these territories were held by Venice until Napoleon made over the map of Europe. He extinguished the Venetian republic, and at the peace of Campo Formio, in 1797, gave Istria and Dalmatia to Austria in return for Lombardy and the Belgian Netherlands. Dalmatia he took back in 1805, when he assumed the iron crown of Lombardy as king of Italy, but at his fall in 1814 it reverted to Austria.

Baffled in her ambition to make the Adriatic an Italian lake, Italy turned her attention to colonization, and in the seventies put her mark deep on northern Africa. She chiefly coveted Tunis, and dreamed of reviving there the glories of the ancient Roman province. At the congress of Berlin, however, her claims were ignored. Austria was encouraged to extend her influence in the Balkans and France to colonize in Africa. Three years later, in 1881, the French protectorate over Tunis was proclaimed, and Italy felt she had been shamefully tricked on both sides of the Mediterranean. She did not know that Bismarck had instigated France's adventure in Tunis in order to divert some of the republic's military strength from Europe; and the chancellor had little difficulty in persuading Italy that she should join Germany and Austria in a Triple Alliance, thereby protecting herself against France and at the same time guaranteeing herself against aggression from Austria. For both racial and political reasons the partnership was unnatural, and although it has continued for more than thirty years, the Italians have never taken either pride or satisfaction in the association. Their racial sympathies are with France,

their political sympathies with Great Britain; and there is an instinctive hostility between Italian and Teuton.

Being obligated to join her allies in the field only in case they were attacked, Italy was quite free in this war, since the aggressors were Austria and Germany. But she has been restive from the beginning as a neutral, and has declared with increasing emphasis that she reserved the right to act in accordance with her own interests. Those interests are simply to enlarge her boundaries. To her allies' offer of a compromise she returns an indignant refusal. To the suggestion that she should make good her neutrality until the end of the war, in consideration of a positive undertaking that her frontier will then be "rectified," she proudly answers that she is not seeking compensation for neutrality, but territorial justice which has been too long delayed. Moreover, she asserts a moral claim to consideration. For fifty years, she says, she sacrificed her national aspirations out of regard for the peace of Europe—to preserve the balance of power. It was not she who created the existing crisis, but Austria and Germany. The attack on Serbia, made without Italy's knowledge, seriously compromised her interests; the war was not of her making, and she would be false to herself if she postponed any longer the realization of her just hopes.

In such terms do the Italian statesmen applaud their own moderation and patriotism. What they seem not to consider at all is the extent of the demand they make. A good case can be made for the "redemption" of the Trentino, and it is possible to sympathize sentimentally with the aspiration for Italian control of the eastern Adriatic littoral, which is so strongly Italian in character. But, regardless of the humiliation and immediate loss such an arrangement would inflict upon Austria, it would do violence to economic principles. The plea for oppressed

Italians in Istria has undoubted merit, but the proposed remedy seems worse than the disease. Italy, in a word, demands the entire seacoast of Austria-Hungary; her only two considerable ports, Trieste and Fiume, and her naval base, Pola, at the southern extremity of the Istrian peninsula. In order to bring under her flag territories which were Venetian a hundred years ago Italy would take all the coastline of the northern Adriatic and shut 50,000,000 Austrians and Hungarians from the sea.

The idea is economically unsound. Further than that, its realization, as the well-informed expert of the New York Tribune has remarked, would plant seeds of strife which would surely bring a deadly harvest. One of the causes of the present war was the arbitrary action of the Powers in keeping Servia from her hard-won place on the sea; for Italy to wrest from Austria-Hungary that country's only maritime outlets would inevitably lead to a bloody struggle. Austria could not yield without a fight; to allow herself to be imprisoned behind a strip of Italian territory would be to commit economic suicide. But, regardless of this, in the action would lie a graver peril to Italy and to Europe in the future.

Austrian defeat would snap the bonds holding Hungary, and that State would assert its independence, leaving no recourse for Austria but to become a part of the German empire. This would extend the German empire until it bordered the new Italian possessions on the Adriatic. And the Italian statesman who imagines that that nation would always submit to being shut in from the sea must be singularly optimistic. The next great world war may be traced to the breaking up of Austria-Hungary, just as the present conflict had its beginnings in the collapse of the Ottoman empire.

THE PUZZLE OF THE BALKANS

March 31, 1915.

IT WAS in the Balkans that the great war began, and there, in all likelihood, it will be decided. The battles on the plains of France and in the mountain passes of Hungary are hardly more vital than the grim struggle which diplomacy is waging for control of the little States whose explosive politics has kept Europe's nerves on edge for half a century. That side which wins the Balkans wins the war. Their action has become the prize of tremendous negotiations. Russian, German, Austrian, French and British agents swarm in the capitals; Dual Alliance and Triple Entente bid furiously one against the other with loans, with promises and with threats, and the map of southeastern Europe is redrawn every day as one side or the other gains ascendancy.

In the narrowest sense, the war began last June, when a Bosnian student killed the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. But that incident was merely the spark which was to hasten the explosion; the powder train had been laid for generations, in the irreconcilable race antagonisms of the Balkan peninsula, which were irritated, instead of allayed, by the heartless and unintelligent diplomacy of the great Powers. As the Ottoman empire decayed, the hardy peoples who had suffered for centuries under the Moslem yoke gradually won their freedom, but never were permitted to establish the boundaries of their new States so as to give free play to their national aspirations. The Powers shifted territory from

one sovereignty to another without any regard to the rights and desires of the inhabitants, their only purpose being to save the Turkish empire from extinction and preserve the perilous condition of a "balance of power." The final phase of preparation for the great crash began in 1908, when Austria repudiated the treaty of Berlin, signed thirty years before, and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia protested, but the kaiser threatened war, and the other Powers, for the sake of peace, condoned the crime. Italy, already the victim of diplomacy which had prevented her from achieving complete unity, was further incensed by the aggression of her historic enemy, but determined to pay herself in another direction. So she fell upon the Turk and wrested Tripoli from him. The menacing possibilities were foreseen by those familiar with the Eastern Question. "If Italy declares war on Turkey," said an Ottoman diplomat, "the cannon will not cease to speak until all Europe is in flames." And this prediction was almost literally fulfilled.

It was not Italian expansion in Africa that overturned the delicately adjusted balance of power, but the revelation that the Moslem empire in Europe was in the last stages of senility. This aroused the Balkan peoples, and in the first and second Balkan wars the Turkish dominions in Europe were reduced to a small section of the peninsula around Constantinople, while Serbia, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria enlarged their boundaries. But once more the Powers intervened, the enforced settlements left all the belligerents dissatisfied, and the problem remained to confront the nations in the midst of the continental war which it produced. Disregarding ancient history, we may derive a fair understanding of it by noting the main events of the last forty years. Russia, in pursuance of her inexorable purpose to reach the

Mediterranean, drove her armies in 1877-78 almost to Constantinople, and by the treaty of San Stefano compelled the Turks to relinquish immense territories, the main provision being the erection of Bulgaria as an independent State, reaching from the Danube to the Aegean sea. Alarmed by the tremendous Russian advance, Great Britain and Austria declared the arrangement unsatisfactory. Bismarck thereupon made Germany for the first time a party in the Eastern Question by inviting the Powers to a conference.

The congress of Berlin annulled the treaty of San Stefano and drew a new Balkan map. It decreed that the status of Turkey should thereafter be determined by all the Powers jointly. Rumania, Servia and Montenegro were declared independent principalities, while autonomy, under Turkish suzerainty, was granted to Bulgaria. But the main foundations of future trouble were laid in the giving back of Macedonia to Turkey, under guarantees of just treatment. There followed a generation of turbulence throughout the whole peninsula, the Greek and Servian and Bulgarian Christians in Macedonia and elsewhere fighting despairingly against Moslem oppression and stirring their kinsmen to sullen fury against the impossible situation created by the intriguing Powers. The future of Macedonia has ever been the chief source of conflict between Austria and Russia, and also among the Balkan States. In the complicated struggles of diplomacy Austria was backed by Germany, and Turkey by England and France, while Russia has played her own game by assisting the Slavic countries. Bulgaria worked out her own emancipation. In defiance of the Powers she annexed eastern Rumelia in 1885 and proclaimed her independence in 1908. In the same year Austria seized Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the great map-making was in 1912 and 1913.

The instrument was the Balkan league. This was the creation of Russian diplomacy—a master-stroke in answer to the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, backed by Germany. The alliance seemed impossible. Greece and Bulgaria were rivals for Salonica and the rest of the Turkish coast on the Aegean, while Serbia and Bulgaria both coveted the heart of Macedonia. But Serbia agreed to leave Macedonia to Bulgaria in return for Russian assurance that she might realize her dream of a port on the Adriatic, and Greece joined without any written agreement, but upon the understanding that her “interests” would be recognized. The contest was hopeless for Turkey from the start, and on May 30, 1913, the sultan ceded to the Balkan allies all of his European territories north of a line drawn from Enos, on the Aegean Sea, to Midia, on the Black Sea. The triumph of the league was overwhelming—so great that a quarrel over the spoils was inevitable. By easily won victories Serbia had taken the coveted part of Macedonia, and Greece had acquired Salonica and the Aegean coast, while Bulgaria, which had supplied two-thirds of the troops and suffered two-thirds of the losses, found herself in possession of Thrace, which she did not want, and shut out of Macedonia and Salonica, for which she had spent her blood and treasure.

Serbia refused to fulfill her arrangement with Bulgaria, because if she had done so she would have been left empty-handed, Austria and the other Powers having robbed her of her chief fruits of her victory—an Adriatic port—by erecting the absurd kingdom of Albania between Serbia and the sea. When the situation began to look ugly Serbia and Greece pooled their interests. Bulgaria, despairing of getting any reward for her heavily bought victories over the Turks, was driven to commit an act of treachery—a night assault, without

warning, against the lines of her allies. Thus began the second Balkan war, the settlement of which still further complicated the problem of the warlike peninsula, for it made Rumania an active participant. In the agreement ending the war with Turkey, Rumania had insisted upon compensation from Bulgaria for having remained neutral, and also for having given invaluable aid in winning Bulgaria's independence. A concession was made, but it was grudging and insufficient, and did not allay Rumanian anxiety over Bulgaria's rise as a Balkan Power. When the allies quarreled Rumania saw her chance, and took it; she declared war, too, and invaded Bulgaria. The end was inevitable. The Bulgarians were overwhelmed as the Turks had been, and the treaty signed in the Rumanian capital inflicted upon them terms as humiliating as ever were forced upon a vanquished nation. Rumania took a slice of Bulgarian territory on the Black sea; Servia consolidated her position in Macedonia, and Greece carried her frontier far eastward along the Aegean. Meanwhile, the Turks had taken advantage of the preoccupation of their conquerors and had retaken Thrace, and in the final settlement took back most of what Bulgaria had spent so much to acquire.

All these conflicts and maneuvers had their influence in bringing on the great war; and since it has approached the crucial stage they have become of tremendous importance. German and Austrian diplomacy has aimed, of course, to gain the assistance of Bulgaria and Rumania, which had been considered pro-German States; or, failing that, to hold them neutral, in spite of the German employment of Turkey, their historic foe. Every effort has been made to persuade Bulgaria that now is the chance for her to take revenge upon Servia and Greece—to gain her coveted place in Macedonia and Salonica. Teutonic influence upon Rumania has been

exerted chiefly through the court. King Charles, who died in October, was a Hohenzollern, and naturally followed a pro-German policy, while his nephew and successor, Ferdinand, was educated by his uncle to the same view. The sentiment of the people, on the other hand, is for the Triple Entente.

Great Britain, France and Russia are urging Servia to give Bulgaria what she wants in Macedonia, in return for a guarantee that she herself will get Bosnia, Herzegovina and a corner of Dalmatia—a considerable Adriatic coast line. Bulgaria is to have Thrace, also, and perhaps a wider “window” on the Aegean. Rumania is to add Austrian Transylvania and Bukowina to her kingdom. And Greece is to be permitted to extend her territory to include northern Epirus, which Italy compelled her to relinquish after the second Balkan war.

The extinction of the Ottoman power will mean a readjustment of the lines, perhaps over the whole peninsula. Every country there has a material interest at stake. None dares to be left out of the reckoning when the distribution of the spoils takes place, and only those which help the victors will participate.

"THIS IS WAR !" BUT IS IT ?

April 7, 1915.

TEN days have elapsed since the German admiralty introduced in its submarine campaign the novelty of sinking passenger ships and drowning hapless civilians, men and women. The procedure was so astounding in its gruesome details that we reserved comment until the imperial government should have had full opportunity to justify or explain what seemed to be acts of deliberate savagery. No palliating statement having been offered—the innovation, on the contrary, is declared to have established a valuable precedent—it becomes necessary to examine the facts, as recorded in the statements of survivors and sworn testimony taken at the inquest upon the victims. Both attacks were made on Sunday, March 28. The British steamship *Aguila*, bound from Liverpool to Lisbon, was overtaken by a submarine when about twenty miles west of Milford Haven, Wales. The German commander gave those aboard the ship five minutes to escape. At the expiration of four minutes, however, he torpedoed the vessel, the explosion killing the chief engineer, the boatswain and a sailor. Furthermore, survivors declared, the submarine used its rapid-fire gun while the passengers and crew were lowering the boats. A woman passenger was killed and a stewardess and seven seamen were drowned.

Fifty miles southwest of the scene of this tragedy the British steamship *Falaba*, bound from Liverpool to West African ports, was sunk. She carried a crew of

90, with 160 passengers, 8 of them women. The submarine commander signaled that he would allow five minutes for the 250 persons aboard to be taken off. The passengers were immediately served with lifebelts, and the work of lowering the boats begun. Because of the haste commanded, the first boat capsized, throwing twenty-two persons into the icy water, several of whom were lost. The second and third boats were smashed against the ship, spilling the occupants. Ten minutes after the first warning, while some passengers were drowning and while scores of others, with officers and seamen, were on the decks of the steamship, the submarine torpedoed the vessel. The total loss of life was one hundred and eleven.

American comment upon these harrowing incidents has been naturally severe; among the expressions in conservative newspapers we have noted "horror," "inhuman atrocity," "ruthless savagery," "monstrous crime," "sheer brutality," "cold-blooded murder," "abhorrent cruelty," "wanton destruction of life," "homicidal proceedings," "reckless slaughter," "wanton barbarity," "assassination" and "inhuman depravity." The reader may decide for himself which of these phrases best fits the acts described by those who escaped. What we have particularly sought, however, is German opinion upon the extension of submarine activity. The evidence is interesting. The *Koelnische Zeitung* indignantly repels the British suggestion that submarine crews should not be granted honorable captivity, and adds:

Can any one deny that the accused officers are honest and brave soldiers from head to foot, or say that they are doing anything else than the performance of their iron duty as soldiers, under dangers threatening them from a hundred directions?

Dr. Bernhard Dernburg charges—presumably upon

secret evidence—that the Falaba was sunk because she was using her wireless to call assistance, and says:

Much as I regret personally the loss of civilian and innocent lives, all the passengers had ample warning that by taking passage in the steamship they would expose themselves to danger. * * * If women were lost, it was most unfortunate. But, then, nobody is forced to travel in times like these. One should stay at home. * * * It is very regrettable that an American was among the passengers lost. But if a citizen or subject of a neutral country unnecessarily sojourns in the zone of war, he must take the consequences. It is ridiculous to call "murder" or "piracy" the death of people who unnecessarily get in between the fighting lines.

A wireless dispatch from Berlin declares the submarine had "to withdraw quickly because of the approach of other vessels," and complains of "the malicious and hostile attitude of English merchantmen toward our undersea boats," which "forces us to be prudent." It is perfectly clear, therefore, that the German government and its supporters sustain the calculated butchery of the unarmed passengers and seamen of these ships.

Careful study discloses three arguments offered in defense of the new policy. First is the "war-zone decree," effective February 18, which threatened the sinking of "every enemy's merchant ship found in this area," "without its always being possible to avert peril to persons and cargoes." This admittedly illegal measure was declared to be a justified reprisal against the virtual blockade of Germany. It was charged that the Allies were attempting "through starvation to doom the entire population of Germany to destruction," and that therefore Germany would inflict starvation pressure upon England. But both the Aguila and the Falaba were outward bound, one for Lisbon, the other for West Africa. Therefore, their destruction did not affect England's food supply, and accomplished nothing but the

slaying of 120 non-combatants. The second excuse is that the Falaba called for help by wireless. The common instincts of humanity would suggest that a vessel about to be sunk should be encouraged to do this, rather than that wholesale slaughter should be inflicted as a penalty, since the submarine could easily accomplish its purpose and escape after a hostile warship was sighted, even if one were nearby. But the greatest emphasis is laid upon the pathetic weakness of the submarine. It is so vulnerable that it dare not take the risk of being caught at its deadly work and is so small that it cannot engage in rescue work. These facts are offered in complete justification. The logical development of this plea would produce in time a dispatch running like this:

BERLIN (By wireless).—A gallant charge at Café Noir, in the Argonne district, captured the village and adjoining trenches. We took 250 prisoners, most of them civilians, including several women. Our attacking force, however, was small, and was unable to escort the prisoners to the rear. Moreover, there was danger that a large detachment of the enemy might come to the rescue. Therefore we ordered the prisoners to escape, if they could, and shot those who did not move fast enough. The killed numbered 111.

These deaths are very regrettable, but civilians should not sojourn unnecessarily in the zone of war. Moreover, our force was so small that it could not afford to risk the arrival of overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

The parallel is complete. There would be just as much excuse for cutting the throats of those prisoners as for the torpedoing of an unarmed vessel while the occupants were struggling to lower the boats. The real tragedy is not that a few score helpless human beings have been cruelly slain, but that a great nation should have reached a point in its moral development where it defends and glories in such causeless and profitless deeds of blood.

NOT YET TIME FOR PEACE

April 13, 1915.

IF THE belligerent Powers of Europe had used one-half as much caution in their policies last July as they will employ in arranging to terminate the conflict, there would have been no war at all. There could hardly be a more striking and significant contrast than between the headlong diplomacy which precipitated the struggle and the deliberate maneuvers with which each side will endeavor to make the other seek peace. Our account, published last Friday, of Germany's tentative statement to Washington of terms she would accept naturally evoked scornful denials from both groups of contestants. Nevertheless, it was quite accurate, and undoubtedly the move will be followed from time to time by more definite proposals. Immediate results are not to be expected. The relative positions of the warring Powers, on the sea and in the western and eastern fields of operations, present a complicated situation, from which partisans may argue ultimate victory for either side; and there are other than military forces at work to induce a settlement. Actual negotiations must await some more decisive actions in the field.

The close student of the war will ask whether it is possible that Germany is ready to abandon her presumed purpose to dominate Europe, if not the world, and to agree to a restoration of political conditions as they were before she forced the war. With her armies entrenched on foreign soil and her own territory virtually

free from invasion, would she disregard the loss of a million men and immeasurable wealth and be content with preserving her own boundaries intact, while surrendering all the ground she has gained? When one recalls the defiant proclamations, official and unofficial, that have embodied the German view during the last nine months, the theory does not seem credible. Spokesmen for the empire have repeatedly declared that its people were unanimously resolved never to lay down their arms until a crushing victory had been achieved. They have proscribed all neutrals as "enemies," and in particular have insisted that American mediation would never be acceptable. So noted a representative of German thought as Professor Haeckel announced in December that Germany would not even discuss peace until England had been invaded and humbled and that the terms must include the acquirement by the empire of parts of Belgium, France, Russia and the British colonies in Africa. At the same time, the leader of the National Liberals in the reichstag said in a speech that the German motto was "Through bloody war to glorious victory," and insisted that all territory then conquered or yet to be won should be retained. "We will stay on hostile ground until the enemy is vanquished or has collapsed," declared the kaiser on January 31. Three weeks later the king of Bavaria publicly proclaimed that no settlement was possible "until our enemies have been thrown to the ground and sue us for peace." *Der Tag*, an influential Berlin newspaper, held that in making peace the empire "must act in the spirit of Bismarck, who threatened our enemy to 'bleed him white.'" Even so late as March 26 Foreign Minister von Jagow answered a speech by Sir Edward Grey with the declaration that Germany would wage "war to the hilt." Despite these utterances, however, there are unmistakable

signs that the German government and people have greatly modified their expectations as to the results of the war. Socialist members of the reichstag and of the Prussian diet have dared to criticise the military administration, while the Berliner Tageblatt, one of the leading journals of the empire, published ten days ago an article in this significant vein:

We see how tremendously difficult it is made for us to preserve our national unity and freedom. Many dreamed too easily of victory over our enemies. We have become more modest, and it becomes clear to us that even with the greatest self-sacrifice it will be only with difficulty that we shall be able to conquer. Everybody has long since abandoned the expectation that between today and tomorrow the world could be healed by the German spirit. We have had to be convinced by hard facts that in this war it is not a question of putting through a fantastic world policy, but of protecting our house and home. Little as was the war begun to lay a new yoke upon the world, it certainly will have to be carried on for the self-preservation of the empire. It would be idle to try to fix the details of what the final peace will be, but, in any case, our object must be the making certain of our national existence for the longest possible time.

It is impossible to ignore the meaning of such incidents as these. Germany is rapidly arriving at a realization that the best she can hope to do is to wage a defensive war. Because of her military and economic strength she is confident of being able to withstand invasion so obstinately that her enemies will tire of the struggle; and this she evidently purposes to do, making known from time to time the terms upon which she is willing to call the conflict a draw. For this is not the first time Germany has professed herself ready to close the account. As long ago as August 31 Ambassador Bernstorff made this public statement:

The war has been fought and won. Germany did not begin the war; she did not want the war, and she is ready for peace at any moment.

At that time, it should be observed, Germany was everywhere victorious. She held three-fourths of Belgium, she had checked the invasion of East Prussia, and her armies, driving the forces of French and Joffre before them in what seemed disastrous defeat, were almost at the gates of Paris. It was a triumphant Germany that gave notice of her willingness to announce the fate of Europe. Two weeks later the situation had radically changed. The British and French had stiffened their lines at the Marne and had thrown back the invaders to the Aisne and beyond, even into northwestern Belgium. When the United States, in the middle of September, inquired informally whether mediation would be accepted, the imperial chancellor answered that to do so would be regarded as a sign of weakness and that this government should approach the Allies first. The recent outline of Germany's demands is offered, of course, as a maximum. But it is interesting to note what she considers a fair basis upon which to begin negotiations:

The definite proposal must come from the other side. Restoration of the status quo in Europe, no belligerent enlarging its boundary except as noted. Redistribution of the belligerents' colonies, particularly in Africa, Germany purchasing the Belgian Congo. Evacuation of Belgium, without indemnity. An agreement establishing the freedom of the seas and the immunity of commerce from attack in time of war. Partition of Servia between Austria and Bulgaria. Cession of Austria's Italian provinces to Italy.

There are three features of this tentative plan which make it unlikely that it will be seriously considered by Germany's opponents. First is the proposal regarding Belgium—as though any treaty, even though providing for a colossal indemnity, could “restore the status quo” in a country whose cities have been destroyed, whose population has been brought to the verge

of famine, whose commerce and industry have been destroyed by pitiless invasion and whose resources have been subjected to enormous forced levies. Second is the plan for new boundaries in the Balkans—more of that arbitrary map-making which has kept Europe on the edge of a volcano for half a century. And third is the demand for “freedom of the seas.” In the abstract, this is an ideal which the whole world wants to see attained. But what the German proposal amounts to is that Great Britain and France should surrender their naval power, while leaving Germany a nation in arms, the most formidable military force in the world. Obviously, this is a suggestion that will receive scant consideration.

In attempting to forecast the attitude of the Allies, several factors must be weighed. There is, first, the strategical situation. Germany's sea power is virtually paralyzed, except for the desperate forays of a few submarines. On land, it is estimated, she has reached the maximum of her strength and efficiency. The Anglo-French campaign at the Dardanelles has been checked, but in the western field a steadily increasing pressure is being exerted by the marvelously efficient armies of France, and Britain is consolidating her great new forces for a tremendous assault. There remain only the Zeppelins, still a phantom fleet of destroyers, which have yet to demonstrate that they have any military value whatsoever. Economically, Germany has shown remarkable ability to accommodate herself to a virtual state of siege, but undoubtedly she is feeling the silent pressure of her antagonists' overwhelming sea power. Above all, there is to be considered the temper and purpose of the Allies. They are just as profoundly convinced that Germany started the war and that her foreign policies are an intolerable menace to the peace of the world as she is that she is the victim of envy and

jealous hostility. And they have solemnly agreed not to make peace until this threat has been permanently removed.

Plainly, Germany's hope is that she can carry on a defensive war so costly to her enemies that there will arise among them an irresistible demand for compromise. For there is a force—public opinion—with which all the belligerent governments must reckon. When the people of the warring nations make up their minds that the dreadful sacrifices they have made are enough, there will be no further proclamations about fighting "to the last man and horse and gun." The one sure thing is that peace now would be impossible; there must be, on one side or the other, a victory approaching decisiveness. Moreover, to call the conflict a "draw" would be merely to postpone final settlement of issues that have confronted Europe for half a century. It would settle nothing, and would inflict upon the next generation a renewed struggle, with accumulated horrors excelling even those that now afflict the world.

UNPREPAREDNESS A HABIT

April 17, 1915.

FORTY-EIGHT fathoms deep in Honolulu harbor, coffered in the steel shell of a worthless submarine, lie the bodies of an American naval lieutenant and twenty-one seamen. How they died, and why, will not be known until the wrecked craft is raised and the secrets of the corpse-laden hull are laid bare. But a voice, as if from the dreadful deeps, has already reached the living world. Three days before the disaster Lieutenant Ede, commander of the vessel, wrote to his brother that there had been a hydrogen explosion and several engine breakdowns, and he added, grimly jesting with the perils he sensed:

Take a mere trifle like today—down fifty feet and no bottom below, and water trickling in through one of the valves. It doesn't even give us a thrill any more. In fact, if the whole boat should vanish in smoke, I don't think I would be ferribly astonished.

In response to alarms and demands, to the testimony of experts and the reports of trained officers, Secretary Daniels has repeated the well-worn phrase that "ship for ship and man for man, our navy has no superior in the world"; and at the launching of the *Pennsylvania* he eulogized the entire navy equipment, including the undersea craft, as more "powerful, ready and efficient" than ever before. Against these utterances put the unimaginable horrors of that incident at Honolulu—a war vessel, representing presumably the most advanced ideas of constructive science, in placid

maneuvering in time of peace, sinking helpless to the ocean bed, carrying imprisoned her crew to agonizing death. Much acrid humor has been directed against President Wilson's conclusive utterance upon national defense. Our young men must not be trained as soldiers, he said—"there is another sort of energy in us, and it will know how to declare itself and make itself effective should occasion arise." But the serious wrong he committed was in this statement:

What is it that is suggested we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attacks? We have always found means to do that.

President Wilson is an historian, exceptionally familiar with the records of the country's past. And he must be aware that the United States has never gone into a war well prepared and has never "found the means" to defend itself except after suffering the most needless and shameful losses. How much eloquence, how many reams of poetry, have been expended upon the valor of the minute men of 1776, the gallant seamen of 1812, the victors at New Orleans and Buena Vista, the armies that won renown in the Civil War, the picturesque heroes of Santiago and San Juan! Well deserved the eulogies are. Yet the truth is that in every one of these wars the nation exhibited colossal incompetence, ghastly unreadiness and confusion so calamitous that it seemed as if only the mercy of a patient providence permitted this careless people to outlive their fathomless blundering. Take the war of independence, which most of us picture as a succession of triumphs of "embattled farmers" over the picked troops of tyranny. Eighteen months after he had been made commander-in-chief General Washington officially reported:

To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. The evils to be apprehended from a

standing army are remote, but the consequence of wanting one is certain and inevitable ruin. For if I were called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been more serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter.

Had it not been for unpreparedness and a half-hearted policy, he wrote, four years later:

We never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware, trembling for the fate of America; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at the enemy's mercy; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterward seeing Philadelphia fall; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the forces of the enemy, destitute of everything; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines; we should not have seen our country ravaged, our towns burned, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity.

The bloodstained snows at Valley Forge will ever remain a picture of American heroism—but also an indelible indictment of the national heedlessness which condemns the country's defenders to such inexcusable suffering through unpreparedness. The war of 1812-14 furnished a record far worse. Although the increasing tyranny and criminality of the British government during six or seven years had made the conflict inevitable, there was an utter lack of preparation. Unreadiness was not an accident; it had become a habit. The country actually stumbled into war with the leading Power of the world without an army or a navy. On paper the land forces consisted of 35,000 men, but hostilities began with 6744 under arms. Large numbers of militia were summoned, but some of the States refused to send their quotas. Those who did take the field lacked arms, ammunition, uniforms and blankets. The great plan of the government was the capture of Canada, but only one of

the four campaigns of invasion yielded even a trifling success. The force that was to move from Detroit surrendered without firing a shot. Reluctance among the militiamen who were to cross the Niagara river led to humiliating defeat at Queenstown. Mutiny rendered abortive a proposed expedition against Montreal. York, now Toronto, was raided and burned, and that was almost the sole victory. Up to the end of 1813 the United States had had in service 19,000 regulars and 130,000 militiamen, yet they had accomplished virtually nothing, although there were in all Canada only 4500 regular British troops. Meanwhile, the navy had acquitted itself with extraordinary gallantry. The vessels could outsail and outmaneuver the lumbering British war craft, and swarms of privateers were let loose against the enemy's commerce, one of these raiders capturing no fewer than twenty-three prizes in the English Channel. Perry's historic triumph on Lake Erie and a notable victory on Lake Champlain furnished other bright chapters for a dismal record of futility and failure. In 1814 came the great disgrace. Two years after the beginning of the war, with British naval forces raiding the settlements along Chesapeake bay, the national capital was still left undefended, except for 2200 men, without forts or artillery. The invaders at their convenience made a leisurely march on Washington, burned the Capitol and the White House and departed without molestation. The shame was partly wiped out by the splendid victory of New Orleans; but the truth is that America won the war of a hundred years ago chiefly because the enemy was preoccupied with the great Napoleonic contest.

It is not necessary to recall the disasters caused by unpreparedness in the early days of the Civil War; even men still young can recall the almost incredible

incapacity and the criminal carelessness which made the Spanish-American war a scandal as well as a military triumph. For months it had been clear to every intelligent public man that war with Spain was inevitable, yet when the fateful resolution was passed, on April 19, 1898, hardly a move had been made to prepare for action. The regular army consisted of 20,000 men, but hardly a company was fully officered. There was no general staff, and no complete plan of operations had been determined upon. Arms and ammunition were pitifully lacking. Thirty days before the declaration the government advertised for bids for 2,000,000 rounds of rifle cartridges—enough to supply 20,000 troops for one day's brisk fighting. Untrained volunteers were hurried into camps without rifles or uniforms or tents, and supplies were transported with such prodigality and lack of foresight that they lay in gigantic heaps at various points, while the troops went unfed. Inspectors reported that in one camp one-half the men had never even fired at a target. Regiments were sent to Cuba armed with an obsolete rifle which an expert called "a begrimed and suicidal blunderbuss." Some detachments received their tents only after they had returned to this country. Food was short, medical supplies in the camps were "grewsomenly inadequate." The horrors of "embalmed" beef and of murderously insanitary conditions have not been forgotten. Thousands of untrained men were herded in camps for weeks without even a test having been made of the water supply, and disease raged among the country's defenders as if they had been imprisoned in a foul slum. Eight times as many died from fever as fell by the bullets of the enemy. The navy, with its disciplined fighters, did its work with comparative precision. But even in that department the condition was pictured in the fact that Schley's famous flying squadron consisted

of six ships, no two of which had the same armament, speed or steaming radius. And the lack of adequate provision for transport compelled the government to expend millions of dollars for vessels, many of them grotesquely unfit and purchased at grossly inflated prices. Despite the conspicuous incidents of gallantry and efficiency displayed in the various engagements, every intelligent historian will agree that the United States won the conflict only because its antagonist was somewhat more inefficient than this country.

What is the lesson? Certainly it is not that we should plunge headlong toward a policy of militarism; but just as certainly it is that we should devise and steadily follow a rational program of preparedness. We all desire peace. But history and logic and the irrefutable facts of life teach that peace is not always within our control. It depends not only upon us, but upon others. Either we must adopt the ingenious doctrine of non-resistance—there are noted Americans who urge that this country should “serve humanity” by submitting to the “vicarious sacrifice” of conquest—or we must be ready for the test that will come, when it does come, with suddenness. For this reason we believe that the most pernicious folly possible is the theory promulgated in high places that “we have always found the means” to defend ourselves. This is true. But we have found them, as history shows, chiefly in the weakness of the enemy, and have perfected them only at the cost of bitter humiliation, national peril and unnumbered lives sacrificed to sloth, ignorance and baseless self-confidence.

GERMANY'S TERMS

April 23, 1915.

TEN days ago, in discussing our Washington correspondent's exclusive account of tentative German proposals of peace terms, we remarked that from time to time other moves in the same direction might be expected. We were not prepared, however, for action so early as the formal statement put forth on April 17 by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg. Both the fact of its issuance and the tone with which it is pervaded verify our report from Washington that Germany has abandoned hope of winning an overwhelming victory, and while confident of her power to resist invasion, believes that she can get better terms now than at any future time.

"With full authority," writes Doctor Dernburg, "I can disclaim any ambition for my country for world dominion. She is much too modest, on the one hand, and too experienced, on the other, not to know that such a State will never be tolerated by the rest." The announcement is welcome and worthy of a nation which has achieved its most signal triumphs through constructive genius benefiting all mankind. None the less, it signifies an astounding change from the audacious national policy expressed in the phrase, "World power or downfall!" and proclaimed to the world for twenty years with all the threatening emphasis of an aggressive militarism. The terms suggested are naturally outlined in the vaguest manner, since their purpose is merely to evoke discussion; and it is impossible to pass definite

judgment upon them. But certain broad features are clear enough to yield some informing ideas as to Germany's conception of conditions she has a right to exact. The first important demand is this:

The aim of Germany is to have the seas kept permanently open for the free use of all nations in times of war, as well as in times of peace. Personally, I would even go so far as to neutralize all the seas and narrows permanently, by a common agreement guaranteed by all the Powers.

Freedom of the seas in time of peace has never been called in question. It is so secure, indeed, that Germany within a generation has become the second maritime nation of the world. Her merchant shipping grew from 215,758 tons in 1881 to 2,500,000 tons in 1914; her great passenger and cargo lines girdle the earth and touch at every considerable port, and it has been her boast that within a few years she would surpass Great Britain's tremendous commercial navy. In what seas or narrows has she ever been hampered? But the seas must be free also in time of war, she says. The demand would be more impressive if it came from a nation which had not been virtually imprisoned by the fleets of its foes; one can hardly conceive such a proposal emanating from Germany if it were she who had bottled up the warships of her antagonists and swept their merchantmen from the ocean highways. In plain terms, Doctor Dernburg suggests the abolition of sea power—that the defensive weapon which she lacks shall be declared unlawful. "The plan," he said distinctly in a supplementary interview, "was meant to be one by which the seas would be disarmed." And there is not the remotest hint in all his utterances that any modification should be imposed upon the development of land forces. Germany, in a word, is ready to consent to the dismantling of the fleets of Great Britain and France and the United States, with

her own, provided she remains the greatest military Power in the world. In default of free seas and free intercourse, he warns us, a dreadful condition would arise:

The only alternative would be a Chinese wall around each country. This policy would mean very high customs barriers, discriminations, unbounded egotism and a world bristling in arms.

It is worth noting that the protest against high tariffs comes from a country which has practiced all the wiles of protection and discrimination, and is directed against Great Britain, whose policy approximates free trade. It is Germany that has raised barriers against imports by means of duties and freight rate discriminations, while for years her manufactures have flooded the English market. The complaint that preferential tariffs favor the British colonies against her is equally unfounded. She pays no higher duties at English ports than does Canada. The most startling passage in the Dernburg statement, however, is the following:

Germany does not strive for territorial aggrandizement in Europe. She does not believe in conquering and subduing unwilling nations.

Surely this is a remarkable assertion, from the country that defies Frederick the Great and Bismarck; that has grown great in territory and power through conquest; that seized through ruthless war Silesia, Poland, Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, and that at this moment occupies nine-tenths of a neighboring country of whose integrity it was a trustee. But concerning Belgium the statement becomes quite painfully explicit:

Belgium commands the main outlet of western German trade, is the natural foreland of the empire and has been conquered with untold sacrifice of blood and treasure. It

offers to German trade the only outlet to an open sea, and has been politically established, maintained and defended by England in order to keep these natural advantages from Germany. So Belgium cannot be given up. However, these considerations could be disregarded if all the other German demands, especially a guaranteed free sea, were fully complied with and the natural commercial relations of Belgium to Germany were considered in a just and workable form.

Let us take these assertions in their order. It is true that Belgium "commands the main outlet of western German trade," but when was that outlet ever closed to her? As a "natural foreland of the empire," was it any less useful while peaceful, prosperous and independent than it would be devastated, ruined and enslaved? Is it any more a "natural foreland" than is Holland? Is the world to understand that Germany proposes to absorb that "outlet" also? It would seem so; for Antwerp, the great Belgian port, lies far from the sea, and shipping to and from it must pass through the Dutch waters of the Scheldt. It is conceded that Belgium has been "conquered with untold sacrifice of blood and treasure," but the sacrifices which the world weighs are those of Belgium, not of Germany; and these are the sacrifices, not Germany's, which demand reparation. And Doctor Dernburg is not happy in his reference to the history of the unhappy country. True it is that Belgium has been "politically established, maintained and defended by England"; but just as truly it was "politically established and maintained"—and not defended—by Germany. These two great Powers were equally responsible guarantors of Belgium's integrity; and the one which defaulted is the one that claims compensation! As a whole, then, the terms outlined are characteristically German, and are framed in the spirit of a conqueror—which Germany, thus far, indubitably is not. The demand for recognized ownership of Belgium can be

dismissed; that will be settled by force of arms. As for the "freedom of the seas," that implies a millennial condition which all civilized nations ardently desire, but it remains outside the realm of discussion so long as militarism rules Europe, with Germany its chief exponent. Naval disarmament is a glorious vision; but nowhere save in Germany would it be expected that England would consent to yield her sea power, when she has evidence that but for it German troops would today be occupying London and dictating peace terms in the palace of St. James.

For two reasons the offer of Germany invites rejection at this time. It pleads for idealism, while the government is pursuing a policy of "frightfulness"; and it pretends to aim at a permanent settlement, whereas it would settle nothing. It seems to be the general American opinion that the proposal is made chiefly to convince the public in this country that Germany is ready for an honorable peace and that further bloodshed will be chargeable to her foes. The effect is more likely to be to popularize the judgment of Dr. Charles W. Eliot:

Were peace declared now, Germany would be in possession of Belgium and German aggressive militarism would have triumphed. I cannot conceive of a worse catastrophe for the human race.

THE BLINDNESS OF THE ENGLISH

May 11, 1915.

FOR many years, and especially during the modern age of inquiry and skepticism, the supposed degeneracy of the British race has been an intermittent theme of lugubrious prophecy by British and foreign observers. Scientists and pseudo-scientists have expatiated upon the failing physical and moral stamina of the island people, and have foretold collapse of the world empire in a day of supreme trial. This gloomy theory seemed to be disproved during the early days of the war. The demonstration of governmental efficiency was not more remarkable than the evidences of national sanity, sobriety and determination. The navy entered upon its great task with precision, and performed it with conspicuous success. The army, almost lost amid the battling millions on the continent, covered itself with glory, and has now been swelled to a force which in other days would have been considered of colossal magnitude.

It was, indeed, the entrance of Great Britain into the conflict which made it of true world scope and turned the balance against the otherwise overpowering might of Germany. Her sea power was a gigantic weight in the scale; and to this were added her vast wealth and her historic spirit of dogged determination. Even in her wars of conquest against weaker peoples she had exhibited relentless purpose. When she was brought face to face with her most powerful and implacable enemy, it was deemed certain that government and people would reveal

a still greater capacity for concentrated effort and would sacrifice everything to promote the one vital aim of national defense. So acute an observer as Guglielmo Ferrero, the eminent Italian historian, was profoundly impressed by these factors in the struggle. Early in September he predicted that England would win, for he said:

She is prepared for a war of years rather than months. She is able, for geographical, military and moral reasons, to prolong the war almost at her pleasure. England is not impotent by land, and may give Germany a mortal blow by sea. The war may possibly end in a titanic duel between England and Germany. In that case, England will go through with the struggle grimly and regardless of losses.

Yet for several weeks previous to the Lusitania massacre there had been ominous signs, visible to the most casual student of the news reports, that the British nation had not developed the vision or the capacity or the resolution without which it is doomed to endure the most disastrous and humiliating punishment ever inflicted upon a great people. It now faces the test long foretold, and faces it without even a realization of the threatening truth, unless, indeed, this last hideous instance of German "frightfulness" has galvanized the British spirit into real life. The unity of half a year ago had disappeared, and on all sides there were carping criticism and confusing controversy and recrimination. Among the troops in the field there were splendid bravery and uncomplaining sacrifice, while thoughtful Britons at home were appalled by the slackness, inefficiency and selfishness of the nation at large. And with these evidences of weakness there is what appears to be a benumbed intelligence, or at least an enfeebled vision. Incredible as it may seem, the great mass of the British people do not yet realize that the very life of the nation and the liberties of its citizens are imperiled. The greatest battles in history are being fought within three or four hours' dis-

tance from the capital, and a break in the line will be the almost certain prelude of disaster; yet the people pursue their businesses and pleasures in careless self-confidence and exhibit a passionate determination that not even the most menacing situation in the annals of the empire shall be permitted to curtail their comforts or their indulgence. If the picture we have sketched seems overdrawn, we can justify it by British evidence. William Watson is preposterous as a poet, but as an observer and interpreter of the character of his own people his testimony has some value. This is what he wrote a few days ago:

It is high time that the people of this country had it driven and hammered into their somewhat slow minds that it is very doubtful, indeed, whether we are going to beat the Germans at all. Our allies and we ourselves are in imminent and grievous peril. Germany is supremely formidable with the spirit that makes her an unprecedented menace and terror to us and to the world. Yet we are acting, so far as our land forces are concerned, a secondary part in the gigantic drama of the nations; and it will be the fault of our own apathy, sluggishness and fatal optimism if the drama darkens at last into a tragedy both for us and for the truest interests of mankind.

Even more significant was the warning of Sidney Low, written five months ago:

Bitter as is the conflict we are waging, one sees signs even now that there are many Britons who do not grasp the full significance of it. I am appalled at the lack of seriousness with which it is treated. To call this war a fight for our existence is no exaggeration, but the most sober and rigorous truth.

For nine full months the resources of the empire in men and ships and money have been taxed to help resist the mightiest military force the world has ever seen. British troops have been slain by tens of thousands, British merchantmen have been sunk within sight of the nation's proudest harbors, towns within thirty miles of London have been bombarded. Yet reports indicate that

there is no adequate realization of the threat of absolute destruction that hangs over the nation. Tory politicians scheme to discredit the party in power, and furnish the German press with columns of news about partisan dissensions. Business men and financiers devote themselves to money-hunting. Labor is more insistent upon its demands than in times of peace. So inveterate is the spirit of selfishness that a proposal to stop the sale of intoxicants during the war, because of their demoralizing effects, threatens to overturn the government. Despite the great deeds of the army and navy and the resolute efficiency of the national leaders, the general impression derived from the attitude of the British public is one of sloth, indulgence and self-seeking controversy. In a time of the gravest national peril less attention is given to the problems of defense than to insistence upon individual rights and personal liberty.

"This war," said David Lloyd George months ago, "is not going to be fought mainly on the battlefields of Belgium and Poland, but in the workshops of France and Great Britain." Every expert realizes that the safety of the nation depends upon the development of extraordinary energy in the production of war materials and the maintenance of the fleet at full strength. Yet some of the labor organizations have taken advantage of the nation's necessities to force new demands and even to threaten strikes that would disastrously reduce production; and extra wages have made many of the workers so indifferent that they refuse to work even full time, and in consequence, war work is being dangerously delayed. But the most ominous incident of all has been the tumult over the liquor question. It is unnecessary to repeat the official declaration of David Lloyd George, that "drink is doing England more damage than all the German submarines," or the statement presented by

shipbuilders showing the deplorable conditions in their trade. The whole story is outlined in these findings of military and naval experts, published a few days ago in a white paper:

"Labor conditions on the Clyde are most disquieting. Repairs to destroyers are delayed in every case and take twice as long as they need to."—Vice Admiral Jellicoe.

"While the country is at war, the men are doing less work than would be regarded as an ordinary week's work under peace conditions. The most potent reason is the facilities that exist for the men to obtain beer and spirits."—Rear Admiral Tudor.

"Work on one ship was so bad that it could not have been done by men who were sober. It had to be condemned."—Superintendent of the Clyde.

"Yesterday the crew of a transport deserted; the same thing happened the day before. Firemen go aboard drunk, thus reducing speed and endangering the lives of thousands of troops by making vessels a target for submarines. The cause of the trouble is drink."—Director of Transport.

"The evidence is overwhelming that the main cause for the alarming loss of time is the lure of drink."—White paper.

The peril of the labor situation is obvious; but there is a worse form of degeneracy than failure in productive efficiency, and that is a deadening of patriotism, a pertinacious insistence upon the maintenance of selfish privileges. And this, it should be observed, is an evil by no means confined to the working men. The bitterest opposition to the project of stopping the sale of liquor as a measure of defense has not come from the sodden victims of the habit, but from the wealthy and well-to-do holders of brewery stock—families of title, small investors and members of the clergy from bishops to curates. It is, no doubt, a deplorable circumstance that working men should hold their right to drink beer and gin as more important than supplying the navy and army with the materials needed for defense. But what shall be said of distillers and brewers and rumsellers who make war upon

the government in time of national peril, and of leaders of the church who publicly refuse to indorse the restriction of drinking, or even to give up private tippling?

In Germany all classes are inspired with the most perfect unity, and there is no imaginable sacrifice which would be resisted if it were demanded by the government. Workmen who would attempt to put their private wishes above the public welfare, or clergymen who would dare to insist upon "personal liberty" to the extent of endangering the nation, are unthinkable among that people. The contrast between the two countries is, in a measure, due to the effects of the rigorous discipline imposed by autocracy and the development of individualism fostered by democracy. But the real cause lies deeper, for democratic France has revealed a unity and a devotion as intense as those exhibited in Germany. There is no question that the British people have misinterpreted and misused the liberty they have so long enjoyed, in that they have lost the spirit of self-denying patriotism and put a selfish limit to their sacrifices for the nation. They have a modest but comforting proverb to the effect that "England always muddles through." But this time they are not fighting a half million Boers, but 60,000,000 Germans; and their recent spirit is a precursor of disaster that may leave them in the end little else than their cherished right to drink.

THE OUTCAST NATION

May 12, 1915.

TO ALL human beings of normal mentality it must have seemed that the destruction of the *Lusitania* marked the apex of horror. There is, indeed, nothing in modern history—nothing, at least, since the Black Hole of Calcutta and some of the indescribable atrocities of Kurdish fanatics—to supply the mind with a vantage ground from which to measure the causeless and profitless savagery of this black deed of murder. It is to be conceded that during war stern measures are justified against an enemy's forces; that this ship, carrying contraband, was subject to capture and, in certain contingencies, to destruction. Yet the facts remain untouched in all their diabolical barbarity—that an unarmed vessel laden with nearly 2000 non-combatants was attacked without an instant's warning; that not even a minute's grace was allowed for the removal of the passengers or crew; that the murderous thrust was given with full knowledge that it meant the slaughter of hundreds of women and children, and that this butchery was the deliberately planned act of a government which but recently was accepted as an exemplar of national sanity and humane civilization.

The world was soon to learn, however, that the premeditated act did not sound the depths of soulless ferocity of which the dehumanized mind of man is capable. There has been manifested something more revolting than the sickening murder of 1150 helpless men and

women and children, and that is the frightful chorus of jubilation which burst from German throats to greet the news of massacre. The newspapers of the empire "hail the act as a new triumph for Germany's naval policy." The announcement was received "with enthusiasm." "The news," says the Cologne Gazette, "will be welcomed by the German people with unanimous satisfaction." A German-American editor prints the list of dead—including women and babes by the score from the country of his adoption—and accompanies it with the declaration that the wholesale slaughter was "justifiable." Another comments upon the grisly list by boasting that it shows "Germany is not bluffing; she means business." A German military attaché says the "crime" of carrying passengers on the ship was justly punished. A German-American leader flings in the faces of grieving men and motherless children the sneer that "nothing is to be gained by Americans shooting off their mouths; war is war." It is such demonstrations as these, we repeat, that reveal the real horror of the thing that humanity faces—a passion so perverted that even the blood of children will not sate it nor still the fury of its exultation.

To realize the unique infamy of the act one must try to imagine its being perpetrated by any other nation existing in this age. Let the most daring poet of hate in the German empire attempt to picture a German passenger vessel torpedoed by a British or French or Russian or Japanese submarine and its defenseless occupants flung in dreadful heaps into the sea—he could not pen the words to describe a scene so unthinkable. And he would know in his heart that if, by some incredible madness, men of those nations were to commit such a monstrous crime, they would be hanged by their own governments for the miscreants they were. But the Germans' proudest boast is that their deed was unique—a supreme dem-

onstration of naval efficiency and individual daring. Far from deploring it, they glory in it and declare that it marks but the beginning of "frightfulness." Even now they are waiting with trembling eagerness for news of another bloody triumph; and if today or tomorrow the world should be shocked by the slaughter of more women and children, we should hear again the cries of obscene jubilation over the "victory." No discussion can add to or detract from the dreadful record as it is written, but Americans owe it to themselves to study the new testimony of what the German attitude is toward this unforgivable act of calculated malignity. In nowise as an excuse, but as an absolute justification, which is presumed to enfold the wholesale assassination with the mantle of virtue and tender mercy, German spokesmen declare that the stealthy, instant destruction of the passenger-laden ship was an act of war, a legal and perfectly correct measure of reprisal, against which Americans not only have no right to complain, but which as humane persons they should applaud. The reason most emphasized is that it was right to murder these hundreds of civilians because England has stopped food imports into Germany, and therefore is "starving" the people of that country. No bloody-handed slayer ever offered a more bare-faced falsehood in extenuation of his crime. Not only is there no starvation in Germany, but there is no hunger, no lack of food whatever. The witnesses to this are the officials and the newspapers of the country and all travelers who have visited it since the war began; for their unanimous testimony is that there is no scarcity, and restaurant menus showing an increase of only 10 or 15 per cent in prices are proudly exhibited as evidence of Germany's ability to sustain herself indefinitely.

It is averred, next, that the *Lusitania* was armed. This flagrant invention was put forth by the German gov-

ernment and repeated by every newspaper defending the attack. The answer is that the United States authorities in New York saw to it that the ship carried no guns, mounted or unmounted. The submarines that launched their torpedoes against her and drowned 1150 of her defenseless company sank a vessel that was no more armed than a Delaware river ferryboat. Then there is the fact that the Lusitania carried contraband of war—some tons of copper and about 2000 cases of small arms ammunition. This, say the Germans, justified blowing the ship to pieces without giving the passengers the smallest chance to escape. The plea is as false in law as it is heartless in conception. No principle in the customs of warfare is more securely held than that a captured ship may be destroyed only as a last resort, and, above all, only after all seamen and passengers have been removed to places of safety. Conclusive authorities for this were cited by William J. Conlen, an admiralty lawyer, in our news columns on Monday, including an official statement from Germany herself, as follows:

In exceptional cases ships or merchandise may be sunk or destroyed if their preservation would endanger the security of the warship or the success of its operations. Before the destruction of the ship its crew must be placed in security. * * *

The German plea that the development of the submarine has canceled these rules is utterly worthless. Germany has a powerful fleet, and her reliance upon the murderous submarine is due not to necessity, but to fear of risking her battleships and cruisers. But even if she had no war craft but submarines, her course would be none the less criminal. Prof. Ellery C. Stowell, who studied international law for years at Berlin and Paris, has taught that subject at the University of Pennsylvania and at Columbia, who was secretary of The Hague peace

conference of 1907 and an official of the international naval conference at London a year later, thus declares:

There is much confusion in some quarters, due to the belief that the advent of the submarine has made it necessary to modify the principles of international law. Those principles cannot be changed by adventitious circumstances, although the application may vary. There is no principle better recognized than the right of a neutral to travel in a belligerent merchantman on the high seas. If the ship should be captured, it may not be destroyed until his safety is provided for. To pursue any other course is the clearest possible violation of the most firmly established principle of international law. It is an act of war against the country of the neutral.

Finally, Germany has the audacity to proclaim that the wholesale murder of Americans was not a crime, because "warning" was given through the insolent advertisement of the embassy. This warning was an aggravation, not a palliation, of the offense, since it showed foreknowledge and premeditation of the act. But for adequate comment upon this infamous plea we turn to the New York Evening Post, which says:

There is, indeed, puerile talk of "warning" having been given on the day the Lusitania sailed. But so does the Black Hand send its warnings. So does Jack the Ripper write his defiant letters to the police. Nothing of this prevents us from regarding such miscreants as wild beasts, against whom society has to defend itself at all hazards.

Why, then, has Germany resorted to a policy of insensate butchery? The answer is plain. In the ordinary methods of warfare she is beaten, and knows it. Those of her warships that were at sea when the war began have been destroyed, while the bulk of her fleet she keeps in safe seclusion. The invincibility of her armies has been proved a myth, for, while they have won against Russia, they have suffered defeats again and again from Belgian, French and British troops, and are no nearer Paris or Calais than they were six months ago. Politics

demands, therefore, some proof of military supremacy; and it is the governmental idea that that can be supplied by indiscriminate shedding of blood, even though it be of women and children.

Next to the naked horror of the deed, its most striking phase is its psychological testimony regarding the German mind. Months ago this newspaper and others discussed the probable effect of the teachings that for the last half century have been instilled into the German people, and gave warning that the poisonous philosophy must eventually produce wholesale savagery. Now, it is possible to survey in retrospect the steps in the reversion. The government which violated Belgium could not consistently stay its hand from the destruction of Louvain, Malines and Aerschot. Extorting huge levies from helpless cities was but a preliminary to the hurling of bombs upon the sleeping homes of Antwerp and the defenseless watering places in England. The use of machines to pour deadly gases into the trenches of an enemy, dooming men to death of torture or a life of invalidism, smote the world with horror; but the adoption of the device had been preceded by the spraying of opponents with streams of burning oil. Truly, the real "warning" of systematic murder by submarine attacks on passenger ships was not given by advertisement, but by the grisly record of the German strategists in Belgium and France.

Yet the most convincing evidence of distorted judgment is found in the German belief that the sinking of the *Lusitania* embodied a military victory. The advantage won consisted solely in the destruction of a ship and cargo valued at some millions of dollars; but no military purpose whatever was served. The act did not shorten the war by a single hour; it did not weaken to the extent of a man or a gun the relentless forces that mock at the fury of a maddened militarism; if a score of *Lusitanias*

and their human freight were to be treacherously destroyed, it would not affect the ultimate outcome of the conflict.

The outstanding result has been simply to load upon Germany a burden of infamy, to wring from neutral nations around the globe one universal cry of execration which is a sentence of outlawry. She boasts that she has taught England and America and all other nations a "lesson." Truly, she has. She has taught the world that a nation drugged with the spirit of militarism is a menace not alone to its neighbors, but to all humanity, and that until that mad delusion is swept away there will be no peace or security on this earth. Germany is no longer a nation at war, but a nation urged by blind savagery. She has put herself beyond the pale of civilization. And the most dreadful prospect to contemplate is that even war may not expiate her blood-guiltiness, but that for a generation the races of men will shrink from her name as at the cry "Unclean!"

WHY ITALY IS AT WAR

May 25, 1915.

WHEN the history of the great war comes to be written, long and laborious will be the chapters devoted to Italy. Of all the nations involved, her policies have been the most bewildering, her actions the most paradoxical. Bound for thirty-three years by a treaty of alliance, she is making war upon her partners in the agreement. Freed from the obligation to assist them, and thus blessed with the opportunity to remain at peace through blood-reeking days, she chooses war, deliberately and with enthusiasm. The decision is due not to the intrigues of a militaristic autocracy, but to the imperative demands of a democratic populace. The uprising has paralyzed the influence of the most powerful statesman in the kingdom and made a fire-eating poet the national hero. The spirit of the people reveals the loftiest sentiment and the most sordid materialism. The gravest crisis in the country's history is welcomed with a delirium of joy. Confronting the most appalling war the world has ever seen, the nation plunges into it as into a blithe adventure, singing exultantly of a phantom glory.

At the outbreak of the war the Italian government declared its neutrality, and in this was supported by the people; any attempt to aid Germany and Austria would have caused a revolution. It was impossible, however, for Italy to dissociate herself entirely from the tremendous events that were shaping the future of her neighbors. The upheaval in the Balkans, and particularly the

embroiling of Turkey, made her realize that she must put herself in a position to become a factor in the final settlement. From this situation developed a diplomatic duel almost without a parallel. Germany and Austria on one side, and Great Britain, France and Russia on the other, exhausted their resources of statesmanship to obtain ascendancy in Rome. Whatever may have been the effect in official quarters of these seductive campaigns, their influence upon the national mind was only secondary. Italy was moved by a force from within. The clamor of the world war had awakened anew the spirit of nationality, and half-forgotten dreams of a greater Italy returned with brighter vividness as each day's developments brought nearer and clearer the opportunity for realization. It must not be supposed that because the nation divided itself into two parties there was any serious conflict of purpose. The "interventionists" and the "neutralists" have been perfectly agreed upon what was demanded for Italy's happiness; they have differed only as to the easiest way of obtaining it.

The historical background to the present situation is familiar to most of our readers, but its main features will bear emphasis. With the help of France in 1859 and Prussia in 1866, the Italians achieved the unification of the kingdom and acquired Lombardy and Venetia from Austria. The peace, however, confirmed Austria in possession of a wedge-shaped territory extending into the northern part of Italy, and also of almost the entire eastern shore of the Adriatic. Partly for historical reasons, but chiefly because the territories are populated to a great extent by Italians who complain of Austrian misrule, Italy has never abandoned the hope of "redeeming" them; and for a generation or more the "irredentists" have been a faction of increasing power in the kingdom. Austria's calamitous part in the war presented

Italy's opportunity. The most radical of the promoters of "irredentism," whose project had been decried by the conservatives as visionary, became popular leaders, and there arose an insistent cry that Italy take advantage of the upheaval to realize her "national aspirations." All the rancorous anti-Austrian feeling of a half century ago was invoked to strengthen the demand. The result appeared in the aggressive negotiations which lasted from mid-December until May 4, when Italy formally withdrew from the Triple Alliance and prepared to utilize the enormous military strength which she had been perfecting.

She makes war to enforce the "irreducible minimum" of her demands, outlined in her official statement as follows: Cession by Austria of the Trentino, certain territories on the eastern frontier and a group of islands along the eastern Adriatic shore; renunciation of Austrian sovereignty over Trieste and adjoining territory, that to become an independent state; recognition of Italian sovereignty over part of Albania. Italy could hardly base her claims upon prior possession. The Trentino has not been a part of Italy since 1027, and has been Austrian since 1814. Trieste belonged to Venice from 1203 to 1382, but for more than 500 years has been held by Austria; while the Istrian peninsula, lying southward from the city, and the Dalmatian islands Italy demands have been under Hapsburg sway since 1797. A stronger case can be made on the ground of race; but even here the Italian claim is not conclusive. The southern part of the Trentino is distinctively Italian, but the entire concession would bring under Italian rule scores of thousands of Germans. The rectification of the eastern frontier would add a large population of Germans and Slavs, while three-fourths of the inhabitants of Istria are non-Italian, and Dalmatia is populated almost wholly by Serbo-Croats. In spite of the facts, "irredentism" is

implacable, and insists upon depriving Austria of her only seaport, Trieste.

The other great factor in the Italian problem is, or was, the Triple Alliance. This was the achievement of Bismarck, and under his guidance might have endured; but it became the nemesis of the maladroit statesmen who succeeded him. After she had accomplished her unification in 1871, Italy aspired to become one of the great Powers, and centered her ambitions upon reviving the glories of an ancient Roman province in northern Africa. She expended enormous energy in colonizing and establishing her influence in Tunis; but at the congress of Berlin, in 1878, her claims were ignored, and three years later she was compelled to look on in helpless chagrin while France took over the coveted territory. Austria, meanwhile, had been encouraged to extend her sphere southward through the Balkans and along the eastern Adriatic shore. Italy, isolated and weak and conscious of the control of the Mediterranean by Britain and France, was flattered by an invitation to form an alliance with Germany and Austria. It was a wholly unnatural arrangement—Latin with Teuton, a country of forward-looking democracy with empires committed to the advancement of autocracy. But acceptance was a measure of defense not only against the Mediterranean Powers, but against aggression by her historic enemy, Austria. And the alliance was faithfully upheld by Italy until its terms were flagrantly violated by the other nations subscribing to it. The very act of declaring neutrality, on August 1 last, was a declaration from Italy that she was absolved from compliance with the instrument; for it stipulated that one member should help the others only when they were attacked, and, upon the plain facts, Italy gave judgment that Germany and Austria were the aggressors in the war. Premier Salandra's measured words

to the Italian parliament last week constituted a devastating indictment. He declared:

The Austrian ultimatum to Servia annulled at one blow the effects of a long-sustained effort to maintain peace, by violating the pact which bound us to that state. It violated the pact in form, for it omitted to conclude a preliminary agreement with us or even to give us notification; and violated it also in substance, for it sought to disturb, to our detriment, the delicate system of territorial possessions and spheres of influence which had been set up in the Balkan peninsula. But it was the whole spirit of the treaty which was wronged, and even suppressed; for by unloosing in the world a most terrible war, in direct contravention of our interests and sentiments, the balance which the Triple Alliance should have helped to assure was destroyed, and the problem of Italy's national integrity was irresistibly revived.

The reasons for Italy's entrance in the war, therefore, are based upon both material and moral considerations. Sentiment inclines her people toward England. Racial instinct turns them to Latin France and against Teutonic Germany. Historic hatred and territorial ambition, as well as the desire to free oppressed countrymen, inflame them against Austria. Self-preservation forbids that the possibility of a triumphant Germany and Austria be contemplated by a former ally which deserted them. And there is the fundamental antagonism of democratic ideals to autocratic principles. But behind all these causes is the just resentment Italy feels over the betrayal of her interests by the governments with which she was allied. Forgiving the trickery practiced upon her in 1878, she suppressed for forty years her dearest aspirations in order to preserve the tranquillity of Europe. And the reward for her sacrifice was an act of aggression which overturned the arrangement she had faithfully observed, and irrevocably compromised not only her international ideals, but her safety. Her interests in the Balkan peninsula and the eastern Mediterranean are

quite as important as those of Austria, yet her pleas for peace were ruthlessly ignored in the assault upon Serbia, while the embroiling of Turkey threatened her commercial and political policies in neighboring territories.

Many Americans are profusely shocked by the utterly selfish appearance of the Italian attitude. But they fail to realize that frankness is the outstanding characteristic of Italian politics. Italy tells the world what she wants with as much candor as a child will ask for a sugar plum. There is no beating about the bush, no attempt to pose as a benefactor of mankind. Search all the Italian speeches and state papers of the last nine months, and you will find in them no appeal to anything save "national aspirations," national interests, the advancement of the prosperity and glory of Italy. The truth is, of course, that every other nation involved in the war is actuated in just the same way, by the spirit of nationalism, which is simply selfishness on a sublime scale. Italy alone is bold enough to declare that she fights to advance her own interests, and not from motives of altruism. But while this is true of the national spirit as a whole, it is also true that the masses of the people are moved by a generous indignation against the perjured policy and the inhuman warfare of Italy's late allies. So the circle of Germany's condemnation ever widens. What effect the entrance of Italy will have upon the course of the conflict cannot be accurately predicted. But her attitude is a just punishment upon the nation that has destroyed international law and resorted to systematic savagery in war, and is daily approaching closer to isolation as the common enemy of mankind.

WHAT IS PEACE ?

May 28, 1915.

LITERATURE on the war and related subjects has reached such a stupendous volume that statements which ordinarily would arouse vigorous controversy are passed over, in these stirring times, with slight attention. Thus only languid interest was aroused a few months ago when Prof. William Lyon Phelps, of Yale, put forth the following remarkable suggestion:

Would it not be fine if in the future the United States should make some actual sacrifice to prevent war? Would it not be splendid if we actually sustained insults and material damage from some other country, and did not fight? A faith is no good unless one is willing to suffer for it. Peace will never come to this uncivilized planet until some nation shows, not by its professions, but by its behavior, that it believes in peace. Some nation will have to suffer in the cause of peace, as so many nations have suffered in the cause of war. Will it not be fine if that nation should turn out to be our own?

A good many of those who readily adhere to general proposals for arbitration and reduction of armaments, and who favor what they think are radical measures to prevent war, would be surprised, and perhaps a little shocked, to know what doctrines are advanced by notable representatives of the peace propaganda. To be quite frank, it was only recently that we realized ourselves that the astounding aspiration we have quoted was anything more than a curious production of one type of the professorial mind. This was when we heard it repeated and amplified by an American peace advocate of national prominence, a thinker for whose judgment we have had

profound respect. During a conversation, which inevitably touched upon the war, a remark we made about Belgium brought forth substantially this reply:

Belgium got what she deserved. I do not mean that I do not sympathize with her terrible sufferings; but the people were badly served by their government. Unfortunately, the country had an army, and resistance was offered. Devastation followed as a matter of course. If Belgium had yielded, as she should have done, her people would be living in peace and security, as are those of Luxemburg.

We protested against this view, and asked whether the speaker would apply the doctrine of absolute non-resistance to our own country. Should the United States abandon its fleet? we demanded. "Of course it should," was the answer. But what if some foreign Power, regardless of our peaceable intentions, should send a great armed force against us, should seize our coast cities, levy tribute upon us, threaten our liberties, even seek to destroy our government and our institutions and reduce this nation to a condition of servitude—what then? We solemnly declare that our friend gave this reply:

It would be the duty, the privilege, of the American nation to submit. War will never be eradicated by war; it will be made impossible only by some supreme sacrifice. This nation is the most highly civilized on earth; its ideals and institutions most nearly approximate the principles laid down by the Founder of the Christian faith. If it were to reveal in international affairs His spirit, that very act, I am persuaded, would not only avert war from us, but prove an example to inspire the world. If, however, the effort failed, and if our submission brought upon us destruction, what more magnificent service could be rendered to humanity than the voluntary, vicarious sacrifice of a strong people? Our nation might pass away, but it would leave a world regenerated, freed from the curse of war; and the name of America would be held in veneration throughout the ages as another savior of mankind.

There was an intense seriousness and exaltation about this utterance that revealed the depth of convic-

tion behind it. We had not the heart to pursue the discussion. It seemed to us a bewildering and a saddening thing that a mind capable of lofty thinking and noble service should conceive that the obliteration of the ideals of Christian nationhood and the enslavement of a hundred million people could advance the cause of civilization and humanity. Yet the fact is to be faced that there are a considerable number of influential Americans who sincerely hold and assiduously preach this astonishing doctrine. And they are, of course, impervious to fact or argument; for they are ready to admit the certainty of all the consequences that would follow its adoption, and take their stand upon the assertion that the sacrifice of life, liberty and nationality, even to the forces of a lower civilization, would be a blessing to the world. The same fantastic theory, in another phase, is put forth by Andrew Carnegie. It is a descent from the sublime to the ridiculous to read his cure of war:

What if the invaders should come? My plan of operation would be to bid them welcome as our visitors, to take them to our great interior, say, as far west as Chicago, and there to say to them: "Here we shall leave you. Make yourselves at home, if that thought pleases you; fight us if it does not. If you think you can conquer us, try it." It is not a joke, but a statement of the probable fact, to say that the invading soldiery would not want to fire its first volleys, but would want to file its first papers. They would not ask for cartridges, but for citizenship.

Will it be believed that these preposterous words were uttered in December, 1914, four months after the outbreak of the European war, with all its revelations of what an invasion means? Happily, the American mind is not only resolutely opposed to anything approaching militarism, but lacks the extravagantly distorted imaginative sense which produces such false and dangerous conceptions as those we have quoted. Happily, too, it has representative spokesmen whose sound reasoning

and lofty humanity will counteract the vaporings of visionaries. Dr. Lyman Abbott for years has been a leader among those who believed that the era of universal brotherhood was near, when the Golden Rule would regulate the intercourse of nations and armies and fleets would melt away before the coming of the federation of the world. Yet he has the sanity to read aright the signs of the times and the intellectual courage to declare a revision of his creed. A few days ago he said:

Recent events have shown myself and a great many others that the era of the appeal to reason is a great deal further off than we thought. The first fundamental of government is protection of persons and property. If it does not protect, it has no right to be called a government. I respect the men of the peace societies, but I do not respect their opinions. They are not preaching peace, but anarchy. I am not for war, but we do want to be prepared for war if it comes to us.

No less significant was the address of President Hibben, of Princeton, at the recent Lake Mohonk peace conference. The future for this country, he said, was dark and mysterious; the most insignificant accident might precipitate a national catastrophe:

And in the great emergency, if it should come, what will we say? Peace? Peace at any price? By all means, let us pay any price which can buy peace—restraint of passion, long sufferance, sacrifice of material wealth or of every personal convenience and comfort. But let us not forget that there are some things which cannot buy peace. If we sacrifice them to secure peace, then the peace thus sought becomes for us the veriest torment of a living hell. We dare not trade honor for peace; we dare not betray duty that we may bargain for peace. We dare not indulge ourselves in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace while we turn deaf ears to the cry of distress or to the summons of a righteous cause.

Although half the world is at this very hour shaken by bloody conflict, and although there never was a time in the history of mankind when the horror and fright-

fulness of war were more vividly revealed, these words are soberly and irrefutably true. Peace has been the dream of men for nineteen hundred years; it is the loftiest ideal of the human mind, and toward its establishment throughout the earth all peoples should unceasingly strive.

But what is peace—the peace which inspires the hope of lofty souls, which glorifies the vision of prophets and the teachings of the Man of Galilee? Is it mere absence of war, a tranquillity due to a craven spirit or a love of selfish ease and indulgence? Is it slavish submission to brutal wrong or callous indifference to the martyrdom of the weak? Blessed, we read, is the peacemaker; but we have yet to learn that blessings rest upon the peace-lover, the peace-wisher, the pleader for peace at any price. The price of true peace is justice; without that, peace is a dishonor to mankind and an affront to his Creator. Unconsciously, the writer whom we first quoted has set forth the truth:

A faith is no good unless one is willing to suffer for it. Some nation will have to suffer in the cause of peace, as so many nations have suffered in the cause of war.

He and his kind, when they read these words, think of Luxemburg, a country wrapped in peace, yet doomed to unending humiliation and despair. But the world thinks of Belgium, a nation whose body is wounded unto death, but whose soul shines forth with the luster of supreme devotion to the cause of humanity. Truly, the peace of righteousness comes through vicarious sacrifice—not a debasing surrender to a wrong, but such sacrifice as glorifies the names of Valley Forge and Waterloo, of Gettysburg and Liège.

RESTLESS RUMANIA

May 31, 1915.

THREE weeks ago a German-American correspondent of the New York World interviewed Take Jonescu, former premier of Rumania and one of its most influential politicians, upon the attitude of his country. Some of his words will have a familiar sound to students of European statesmanship:

It is impossible for Rumania to remain neutral in the war. For her to join Germany and Austria is even more impossible; therefore, no choice remains to us. Just when we will give up our neutrality and march against Austria-Hungary I cannot say. The question of a few weeks earlier or later does not matter in this war, which is bound to be long. Rumania must and will participate in this world struggle, in order that she may obtain her rights and fulfill her manifest destiny. Her national aspirations must be satisfied.

All the great Powers of Europe being now involved, the pendulum of speculative war interest swings back to its starting point—the restless Balkan peninsula, which the perverse and selfish diplomacy of the dominant nations has made the most volcanic region in European politics during the last half century. No one familiar with the turbulent history and proclivities of that region would expect one of the Balkan peoples to be moved by an abstract desire for peace. And they are just as unlikely to be affected by the horrors of war. They are moved by what is essentially the universal inspiration in this ever-expanding war—the spirit of nationality. Rumania has her “national aspirations”; she, like others, must enlarge her boundaries and her prestige, must

redeem her expatriated sons from alien oppressions, must be reckoned with in the final settlement.

Competent students of the situation have predicted that the entrance of Italy was the signal for Rumania to join. There have been, indeed, quite definite reports of a secret alliance, or, at least, an agreement upon co-ordinated movements. Whether there exists a formal understanding or not, there is a sentimental bond between the two countries. The Rumanians firmly believe that they are transplanted Italians; that is, that they are lineal descendants of Roman colonists planted in Dacia by the Emperor Trajan in the second century of our era. Ethnologists are skeptical about this; but it is a fact that, despite the blood admixtures resulting from later conquests, certain Latin characteristics persist, notably in the Rumanian language.

To understand the strange readiness of these people to embroil themselves some geographical and historical facts should be noted. Let us be encyclopedic for a moment. Rumania comprises the ancient principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. It is roughly of a crescent shape, the northwesterly or inner side of the crescent being bounded by the Carpathian mountains, beyond which lies Transylvania, a province of Austria-Hungary. On the east is Bessarabia (Russian) and the Black sea, including the delta of the Danube. On the south the Danube separates Rumania from Bulgaria, while the western point of the crescent touches Servia. The area is 50,000 square miles, somewhat more than that of Pennsylvania; the population is about equal to that of this state. Ninety per cent are Rumanians. The state church is the Orthodox Greek. Nearly nine-tenths of the people are illiterate, while the University of Bucharest has more than 4000 students, indicating that political affairs are probably controlled by a small educated

minority. There is a striking parallel with the situation in Italy. In Rumania, as in the Latin peninsula, the war spirit emanates from the people, driving the government to action. There has been a similar long-standing alliance, or understanding, with Germany and Austria, counteracted by a like anti-Teuton racial prejudice.

Above all, there is manifested the same intense nationalism and the same policy of "irredentism"—a passionate desire to "redeem" adjacent territories inhabited by people of the same race and speaking the same tongue. This ambition is complicated by the fact that Transylvania and Bukowina, where some 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 Rumanians suffer Magyar oppression, are Hungarian territories never held by Rumania; while Bessarabia, where another large group of Rumanians groans under Russian tyranny, was wrested from its rightful owner by one of the group of Powers which Rumania would like now to join. Thus "irredentism" is rather distracted. M. Ionescu, who seems a delightfully plain-spoken statesman, is for annexing Transylvania and Bukowina. "Because," he says, candidly, "anything we might take from Russia she would take back again; but what we take from Hungary we have a good chance of keeping." There is a good deal of sentiment in "irredentism"; but not, we take it, an excessive amount.

Half a century covers all the history that one need survey to grasp the essentials of the Rumanian problem. When the Powers distributed the spoils by the treaty of Paris (1856), after the Crimean war, they organized the united principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, adding thereto nearly 4000 square miles of Bessarabia. For a few years the consolidated territories were ruled by native princes, but the factions could never agree upon one of the two groups of leaders. In 1866, therefore, they elected a foreigner, Prince Karl, of Hohenzollern-

Sigmaringen, the idea being that he would govern impartially. Charles, best known in this country as the consort of "Carmen Sylva," one of the most capable of royal poets, had in him some of the genius of his family and a great deal of the efficiency of his race. He Prussianized the army and made it one of the most dangerous in Europe. In 1877, when Russia made one of her periodical assaults upon Turkey, the Rumanians, Russia's allies, bore the brunt of the battle of Plevna, where they exhibited desperate and victorious gallantry. When it came to the award of the prizes, however, the callous Powers thrust little Rumania aside and restored to Russia the Rumanian part of Bessarabia. Bismarck's skillful hand was surely in this, for it created intense distrust of Russia in Rumania and resulted in making the principality—which, in 1881, announced itself a kingdom—a satellite of the Triple Alliance.

Yet, even with this favorable beginning, the arrogant and blundering diplomacy of Berlin and Vienna succeeded in steadily alienating Rumanian confidence. In the first Balkan war Germany and Austria backed Turkey, whose power collapsed before the onslaughts of the Balkan league—Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro. This was enough to alarm the Rumanians, but worse followed. Instigated by Austria, Bulgaria, which had done most to crush Turkey, but had obtained least, suddenly attacked Serbia and Greece, her allies. Rumania promptly joined with them, invaded Bulgaria and forced that unhappy country to accept the humiliating terms of the treaty of Bucharest, while helping herself to a slice of Bulgarian territory and becoming the most powerful of the Balkan states. When the great war began, King Charles and his court naturally turned their sympathy to his Hohenzollern kinsman in Berlin and succeeded in balking the popular leaning toward the

anti-Teutonic allies. He died on October 10; his successor, Ferdinand, is as strongly Hohenzollern in sympathy, but lacks force of character.

Against the forces urging her to war for the allies must be placed Rumania's economic dependence upon Germany and Austria. Those two countries are her best customers, and almost her entire equipment of transportation and industrial enterprises has been financed by Berlin. She is vitally concerned, too, in the fate of Constantinople. Her control of the lower stretches of that mighty highway, the Danube, would be of little use to her if the gateway to the Mediterranean were to be held by Russia, an overshadowing competitor. Strategically, her adherence to the cause of the allies would almost complete the hostile circle around Germany and Austria, leaving them neutral borders only where they touch Switzerland, Holland and Denmark. But it would have quite as much significance as an indication that, from the impartial point of view of a businesslike nation, the star of Teutonic supremacy is setting.

WARFARE BY POISON

June 17, 1915.

IN ONE of those fevered tales of horror which we used to read with a comfortable skepticism, H. G. Wells pictured the descent upon the earth of monstrous creatures from another planet—soulless beings compounded of mechanical strength and force, directed by an incredible knowledge of scientific destruction and animated by a calculating ferocity. No doubt the author was merely testing his own inventive powers. But his fantastic book had hardly passed out of vogue before the Germans, by their methods of making war, undertook to approximate his wild fable. For the most marked feature of their strategy has been a sort of inhuman ingenuity, the employment of methodical means of inflicting pain and death according to scientific formulae, the very nature of which revolts normal minds. The real German strategists are not soldiers, but engineers and chemists. Battles may be planned behind the trenches, but they are won with weapons devised in workshops and laboratories. Every German victory thus far has been due to scientific supremacy, to inventive genius stimulated by fanaticism and unrestrained by any considerations of humanity. The huge airship bombs which slay the people of a city in their beds and the submarines which destroy passenger ships unwarned are, no doubt, merely ordinary developments of destructive skill. But the latest achievement of German ingenuity is a pure triumph of applied chemistry inspired by a remorseless and soulless cruelty.

Secret preparations for the newest savagery took several months, but the first open move occurred early in April, when the German press, obedient to official orders, began to denounce the British and French for using "asphyxiating shells." The charge was wholly false—the allies are still under the disadvantage of being unable, or unwilling, to duplicate the German method. Incidentally, the use of such devices is expressly forbidden by the conventions of The Hague, that particular prohibition having been ratified by every one of the belligerents, including Germany. But those familiar with German psychology might have known what to expect. The baseless accusation against the enemy was merely a routine preparation for the indicated "reprisal." On April 23 the British and French in certain districts were overwhelmed by poisonous gas sent from the German trenches. The Belgian official report stated:

Clouds of gas were projected and descended on the trenches occupied by the allied troops. The gases formed a low-lying cloud of dark greenish color, which turned yellow as it streamed upward. A minute and a half after the gases reached them the men were seized with vomiting and spat blood, their eyes and the inside of their mouth grew sore, and they were then stricken by a sort of stupor, lasting for hours.

Details of the new form of attack were learned later. The gas was brought to the German trenches in cylindrical retorts and released when a gentle breeze was blowing toward the enemy. The soldiers operating the generators wore helmets like divers, while those who waited to charge and kill the helpless victims were protected with respirators. The fumes rolled across the ground in dense clouds and poured into the opposing trenches. "Soon strange cries were heard through the green mist," writes an eye-witness, "and unwounded men staggered out, bearing upon their faces marks of agony." Those who are curious in matters of science may be inter-

ested to know that the gas used is chlorine, an element derived from muriatic acid and used in the making of bleaching powder. Being nearly three times heavier than air, it rolls like water into the trenches, suffocating all whom it reaches with its strangling fumes. Every normal human being, we suppose, regarded this kind of warfare as merely scientific savagery, and the world shuddered at the refined malignity of it. The Germans, however, with characteristic efficiency, had ready a whole sheaf of justifications. First, they said, the allies had used the gas previously; this was palpably false, for they have not used it yet. Second, the device was not illegal, because The Hague convention forbade only the use of asphyxiating "projectiles," whereas the Germans employed generators. And, third—this being the most vehement plea—killing by poison fumes was no worse than killing by explosives; was, in fact, more merciful.

Some American newspapers, unwilling to believe that any nation would resort to wholesale killing by poison involving slow torture, argued comfortably to the same effect.

The essential fallacy of all this reasoning was the ignoring of the fact that this particular kind of murder was explicitly barred, by common consent, from the warfare of civilized nations. The possible use of poisonous gas was foreseen and expressly prohibited, Germany agreeing; and her adoption of it was not only an act of ferocious barbarism, but of shameless perfidy.

As if these offenses were not enough, she has added to them a revolting hypocrisy. Just as the atrocities committed against the Belgians were defended upon the plea of "military necessity" and as part of a "merciful" plan to discourage resistance, so the wholesale poisoning by gas is pictured as a sort of tender-hearted anesthesia, which German science has charitably devised so that

enemy soldiers may be bayoneted while in a helpless stupor or else pass away in painless oblivion. The answer to this is written in the records of the Red Cross hospitals, where even surgeons and nurses who are inured to the horrors of mangled and tortured bodies shrink from the unutterable anguish suffered by the victims of the newest "frightfulness." Sir John French, in an official dispatch, thus describes it:

The effect of the poison is not merely disabling, or even painlessly fatal, as suggested by the German press. Those of its victims who do not succumb on the field and who can be brought into hospital suffer acutely, and, in a large proportion of cases, die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a permanent character and reduces them to a condition which points to their being invalids for life.

The Bishop of Pretoria, after a visit to a hospital where several victims were, wrote:

A more cruel and diabolical method of conducting war than this damnable invention would be impossible to conceive. It kills by a slow and torturing death. No language that I am master of can express what I have seen of the agonies of men and lads under the effects of this poison. In that one hospital were scores of men suffering in varying degrees from suffocation—the worst cases fighting desperately for every breath in ghastly pain, and many of them had been going through this torture for days.

More explicit information is furnished by Major General Edward Stuart-Wortley, a corps commander. To refute the German pretense that the poison "results in a swift and painless death," he writes:

I have seen the victims in the hospitals. There is no need to ask for the ward in which they are, as their groaning is a sufficient direction in itself. In one ward there are eighteen cases. They are all sitting bolt upright or swaying backward and forward gasping for breath, their faces, hands and neck a shiny, gray-black color, their eyes glazed; they are absolutely unable to speak or eat. It takes two days for these men to die. During those two days they are in the

most acute agony. And if by the slightest chance they recover from the poison, they will in all probability be rendered useless for life, as the effect of the gas is to turn the tissues of the lungs into liquid. There is nothing to be done. It is the most hopeless, helpless, sickening sight imaginable.

Another officer has described the same scene:

It was a most appalling sight, all these poor black faces struggling for breath. There is nothing to be done for these cases except to give them salt and water to try to make them sick. The effect of the gas is to fill the lungs with watery froth, which gradually increases and rises until it fills the whole lungs.

It is an unpleasant task to discuss scenes so shocking to a belief in humanity, but we have not hitherto avoided any recital necessary to an understanding of the horrors of this war, and we shall not shrink now. The importance of the German poison warfare lies not in its singular atrocity, but in its revelation of what may be expected in the future. Is there any hope that the government which would deliberately employ such methods as this will be restrained from proceeding to logical developments of the idea—the poisoning of water supplies and the scientific dissemination of disease germs?

THIS "TIRESOME" WAR

June 26, 1915.

FROM a reader whose affairs, we hope, are as important as he believes them to be, but whose mental attitude is more singular than inspiring, comes this heartfelt wail of weariness and distaste:

When are you newspapers going to realize that the senseless fighting in Europe has lost interest for rational beings? I am sick of news about the war, sick of the monotonous, meaningless and contradictory reports, sick of the unending and futile controversy about "rights" and "wrongs," sick of the accounts of aimless slaughter. If you can't drop it altogether, for pity's sake reduce it to a minimum, and give more space to news that means something to those interested in the practical affairs of life.

That the dreadful story which unfolds itself day by day should move men to horror and painful sympathy can be understood; but we find it difficult to appreciate a sentiment of revulsion due to mere indifference. Strange and uncouth must be the processes of a mind which idly dismisses as of no concern forces which are remaking the map of the world, recharting the courses of civilization and shaping the destinies of all mankind to remote ages. The curious thing is that this parochial type of intelligence, which is accustomed to measure the importance of matters by their magnitude, should affect to be careless of events of such staggering immensity. The very statistics of the conflict reveal factors so colossal that the dullest imagination must be stirred by them.

This "uninteresting" war, in the year that will end a few weeks hence, will have consumed \$25,000,000,000 of

the world's wealth. It is costing the belligerents more than \$50,000,000 every twenty-four hours. One country, Great Britain, is spending \$15,000,000 a day, or \$173 a second, day and night. The number of troops engaged and the territory involved make the great wars of history seem trivial. More than 15,000,000 men are under arms, most of them locked in furious combat that knows almost no cessation. Nearly 2000 warships, with a total tonnage of more than 7,000,000, are in action or ready for it. The battle lines in Europe alone extend for nearly 1800 miles. Seven great Powers and twelve nations in all are involved in the struggle, while three more are almost certain to be drawn in. The peoples subject to the belligerent governments number more than 1,000,000,000, or 60 per cent of the inhabitants of the earth, and they control nearly three-fourths of the territory of the globe. Every continent has its forces in battle, and the most distant seas have felt the shock of contending squadrons. For eleven months the most sanguinary fighting ever known has soaked in blood the plains of Belgium and northern France, the hills of the south and the marshes and mountain heights of east-central Europe. There have been battles in Russia, East Prussia, Poland, Galicia, Servia, the Alps and the Caucasus. Four nations are struggling for possession of the gateway between Europe and Asia. Persia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor have heard the thunder of guns, and campaigns are being waged in eastern, southern and western Africa. Naval engagements that might rank with Trafalgar have been fought in the North sea, the south Atlantic and the south Pacific. Science and invention have created new weapons of destruction and brought upon the earth new horrors. They have conquered the depths of the sea and the viewless spaces of the air, yet have not overcome the dauntless spirit of man nor his powers of resistance. In less than a

year 2,146,000 men have been slain, 5,000,000 wounded, 2,000,000 taken prisoner; yet there is not a sign that the fury of combat is soon to subside.

More vital than all these things are the changes that have been wrought in the fundamental relationships of the peoples of the earth. The very foundations of international law have been shaken, ancient landmarks of precedent and justice have been submerged and two irreconcilable systems of civilization have entered upon a life-and-death struggle for existence. For generations, for centuries, this mighty upheaval will be a subject of enthralling study; its lessons will instruct and inspire ages still remote. Yet there are human beings so self-centered and unimaginative that they are indifferent to the privilege of being favored observers of the most tremendous spectacle the human race has ever witnessed. To rebuild civilization from the vast wreckage of this conflict will require all the resources of the world's genius. One might despair of the result if any considerable number of men were so dull of comprehension and so immersed in the small affairs of existence as to find the world war beneath their notice.

IRISHMEN AND THE WAR

July 2, 1915.

THOSE students of public opinion who wisely inform themselves by reading the "letters to the editor" need not be told that our criticisms of German policy have called forth some rather pungent protests from citizens of German birth or blood. The most ardent son of the fatherland, however, might envy the incisive vigor of the non-German correspondent who sends us the following:

To the Editor of The North American.

The truest word spoken by Mr. Bryan in his speech the other night was that which put the brand of "assassins" upon the American press. One need not look for justification of that term to the malignant pursuit of that high-souled statesman; for eleven months most of the newspapers of this country have earned it by conducting a vicious campaign against the character of a great people, treacherously seeking to destroy the good name of Germany at the bidding of the cruelest and most corrupt oligarchy on earth. Happily, the frantic mendacity of her assailants from the rear is as powerless as the might of the enemies she faces in the field, and men of sense and humanity turn with disgust from their Anglicized frothings.

True to their traditions, the members of my race are helping their American brothers of German descent to withstand the torrent of falsehood and enmity. The astounding thing is that there should be any Irishmen anywhere so faithless to Erin and so forgetful of the hideous wrongs inflicted upon her by perfidious England as to condone her policy of selfish aggression and aid her unscrupulous designs.

For the part The North American is taking in this disgraceful campaign there is the less excuse, because a few years ago it was prominent in the fight for Irish freedom.

You printed columns of articles exposing the horrors of English tyranny—even published a book about it—and won a good deal of prominence by your championship of an oppressed people against conscienceless exploiters.

Now you prostrate yourself before England, traduce those whom she would wrong and labor to defend her indefensible record. Have you so soon forgotten the story of Ireland, that once roused your righteous indignation? Was your solicitude for her sufferings a pretense? What has influenced you to regard the ravagers of Ireland, the murderers of Emmet, the assassins of Boer nationality and the most ruthless organization of political pirates on earth as the custodians—God save the mark!—of “international honor” and “free institutions”? * * *

And so on. Let us say at once to our intensely earnest correspondent that we have forgotten nothing of the story of Ireland, to which we have devoted more attention and more space than to any other single department of history. Not a word that we wrote against the policy of England toward that country have we ever retracted, and any deviation from the contract of justice lately signed would find us once more ranged against Toryism and tyranny. But we have not forgotten, either, that the people of England, through their government, have striven to undo, as far as may be, the wrongs of other generations. Nor have we forgotten another Ireland, which is suffering in the broad light of the twentieth century what Ireland suffered in the dark days of unbridled autocracy—Belgium, the victim of wrongs which transcend even those of the Elizabethan and Cromwellian record, and the bravest of whose defenders are the sons of emancipated Erin. We fear, however, that our friend's mind is made up about The North American. He has acquired, in his new and singular alliance, a thoroughly Prussian rigidity of opinion. Yet, while we deplore his low estimate of our sincerity, we take satisfaction in the fact that we have adopted a policy which has

the indorsement of some not unrepresentative Irishmen. William Redmond, for example, has written:

By every consideration of honor, sentiment and interest, Ireland is heart and soul with the allies in their struggle against Germany. The Irish people believe that the passing of home rule is, in fact, a treaty of peace. The British have kept faith. Does any one imagine we are going to repay that trust by aiding the enemy?

T. P. O'Connor, we think, is not likely to have forgotten the past, yet he declares that Ireland's policy "is the support of the democracy and civilization of small nations against the medieval barbarism of militarism." And John E. Redmond, whose life has been one long battle to win justice from England, says:

After centuries of misunderstanding, the democracy of Great Britain has finally and irrevocably decided to give back to the Irish people their national liberties. It has kept faith with Ireland; it is now a duty of honor for Ireland to keep faith in return. This is a war for high ideals of human government and international relations, and Ireland would be false to her history and to every consideration of honor, good faith and self-interest did she not willingly bear her share in its burdens and sacrifices.

But these, it may be said, are "conservative" Irishmen; their vision has been dulled and their patriotism corrupted by association with Englishmen and by the necessities of politics. Let us, then, quote a more uncompromising advocate, an Irish-American, one bred and nurtured in consuming hatred of English misrule. No more natural exponent of the beliefs of our correspondent could be imagined than Michael Monahan, poet, essayist and pioneer of radical thought. His father lived through the horrors of the great famine, and taught his son from childhood to hope and work for vengeance upon the oppressor, so that the boy, as he himself says, "was a ripe Fenian at 9 and a confirmed dynamiter at 15":

Our house was filled with the literature of treason. I adored all the "force" men and hated all the peaceful agi-

tators, the moral suasionists. I dreamed, boylike, of one day doing something for the cause that should merit the recognition of the Head Center himself.

No milk-and-water Irish patriot is this man, then; he has a right to be heard when the wrongs of his father's land and the destinies of her living people are discussed. Yet what is his thought? No more powerful or inspiring Irish oration was ever heard in this city than that he delivered to the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick a few weeks ago; and its theme was not vengeance, but good will; not hatred, but brotherhood. We can quote but a few paragraphs:

I know there are those loving Ireland well who in this hopeful moment refuse the offered hand, the plighted faith of the English people. I think they do wrong—the reconciliation never believed in will surely never arrive. * * *

We are fallen on better days, and the obligation to forget—to forget—cannot be denied. The renunciation of the spirit of hatred, of revenge—what can be worthier of a people than this? Let us not make a fetich of race. And let us not seek to eternize our historical grievance; there can be no future for those who live but in the past. Let us make the best of the gift of freedom offered and press on! The ages are behind us, and no human power shall keep us from our own. * * *

We of this generation will have a right to call ourselves blessed if we are, indeed, witnessing the end of the age-long duel between Saxon and Celt in Ireland. And thrice blessed shall we be if we refuse not to help further and complete this reconciliation. Let us fling our grudges upon the fire. Doubt not that it will be a grand and holy and acceptable sacrifice for Ireland!

I said that we should beware of making a fetich of race. The point is one that need not be argued, in view of what is now happening in Europe. We must not push a virtue unto a vice. We dare not forget that above race is humanity! This, indeed, marks a great advance of the human spirit of our time—the willingness to sacrifice or subordinate the claims of race to the good of mankind.

One of the chosen heroes of the speaker's youth died three days ago in New York. Irishmen the world over—even those “parliamentarians” whom he was wont to rail against—will pay tribute to the lifework of O'Donovan Rossa, whose turbulent spirit a dungeon could not quell and who carried with him to the grave his fantastic conviction that only dynamite could free Ireland from the Saxon oppressor. Those familiar with the tragic story of Irish misrule half a century ago may not approve of Fenianism, but they can understand it. There was a time, a long and weary time, when nothing but violence could loosen the grip of privilege that was slowly strangling the nation. But in these days, when a resolute democracy is healing the wounds of other times and honestly endeavoring to establish justice, the O'Donovan Rossas are pathetic rather than heroic figures. It is the Redmonds and the Michael Monahans who speak with the true voice of the Irish race, and from them it will draw the inspiration that will make the coming of Irish liberty a blessing to all the earth.

THE HEROINE OF NATIONS

July 7, 1915.

THERE are twelve nations engaged in the war. Some fight because they have willed it, some because they must; some are driven by the urge of political or commercial ambition, some by the instinct of self-preservation, some by calculating self-interest. The romance of the battlefield was shattered by the roar of the first rude cannon; the vision of glory to be won by treading the bloody paths of war faded a century ago. Yet glory there will be, even after this welter of savage strife. When the dreadful storm has died away and the tranquil light of peace once more bathes the devastated earth, mankind will justly apportion the rewards of honor and of infamy. Which nation is assured of the unfading guerdon of the admiration of the ages? Which has most signally proved its patience with its valor, the fidelity of knighthood with the grim tenacity of martyr-like conviction?

We have studied with close attention the unfolding of the great drama, and our judgment is that the supreme heroine among the nations is France. Whether she emerges triumphant or is doomed to suffer defeat her honor will shine resplendent and the story of her devotion will inspire the sons of men for all time. To this generation, privileged to witness the most tremendous spectacle in history, the most striking feature of France's revelation has been the unexpected nature of her virtues. Despite the theory of physical degeneracy among her

people, all the world looked for them to display gallantry and intrepidity and such audacity in attack as has made their military annals glorious. Of these brilliant qualities there has been no lack. But the stirring thing is that France the frivolous, France the *débonair*, France the carefree and laughter-loving, has met the supreme ordeal of her existence in a manner to teach the whole world lessons of steadiness, of sobriety, of dogged courage, of concentrated efficiency and of uncomplaining sacrifice.

It was inevitable, when the upheaval came that rocked the very foundation of human society, that the mind of the observer should revert to the bluster and braggadocio of Louis Napoleon's tinsel empire, and fear that the collapse of 1870 was to be repeated. The utter malignity of the assault committed upon France made it seem more certain that she would be roused to outbursts of furious execration and boastful defiance. To such expectations the result was a rebuke. Overtaken unprepared, despite her resolute acceptance of the crushing burdens of a vast military establishment based upon universal conscription, France braced herself for the shock and began instantly the mobilization of all her human and economic resources. And the most remarkable exhibition of solidarity was given, not in the quiet, business-like efficiency of the government and the army, but in the cheerful obedience of the people, the serene unity of spirit with which they confronted the most searching test ever put to a nation's soul. It was the "phlegmatic" English who celebrated the bursting of the war cloud with exultant street parades and the cheering of mobs at the gates of the royal palace. It was the "stolid" Germans who prostrated themselves before the altar of imperialism and lashed themselves into stage fury with reverberating proclamations and chants of hate. It was

the "emotional" French who met the most menacing crisis in their history with self-command, restraint and flawless dignity.

This was neither a pose nor evidence of imperfect understanding of the peril. The armies of the republic were hurled back by the first onslaught of the invaders, the capital itself was in danger of siege and the seat of government had to be hastily moved. Yet through all these dark days the nation was resolutely calm. The forces that were expected to break in retreat closed their torn ranks and fought against overwhelming odds with a steadiness that made the world marvel; and when the order came to advance they flung themselves upon the foe with such impetuous ardor that his hosts were rolled back fifty miles in three days. From the beginning the people have exhibited a Spartan resolve. The ever-mounting lists of dead have been received in stern silence. Victories have caused no boastful exultation; defeats have occasioned no panic or despair. It seemed as if the furnace blast of war had consumed all the dross in the national character and left only the pure gold of an inspired idealism. No finer declarations have been made in the war than those of France. On August 4 the premier ended a statement of her case with these words:

A free and strong nation, strengthened by venerable ideals, firmly united in defense of its existence; a democracy which has known how to discipline its military acts, an armed nation fighting for its life and for the independence of Europe—that is the spectacle which we are proud to show the witnesses of this great struggle. We are without reproach; we shall be without fear. France has often proved, under less favorable conditions, that she is the most formidable adversary when she fights, as now, for liberty and right.

Again, on December 22, he invoked the heroism of the nation to bear "the greatest burden of glory that any people can carry," and said:

Nothing greater has ever appeared before the vision of man. Against barbarity and despotism; against the system of provocation and methodical menaces which Germany called peace; against the system of murder and pillage which Germany calls war; against the insolent hegemony of a military caste which loosed the scourge, France the emancipator, France the vengeful, at the side of her allies advanced to the fray. And she will not sheathe her sword until it be possible to reconstruct, on a basis of justice, a Europe regenerated.

These are resounding words, which mean much or little, according to the deeds which follow them. The achievement of France has been to make good the pledges of her leaders and to show in her serenity, her daring initiative and her stoical courage the character of an heroic people. And it must be remembered that, except for Belgium, her sufferings have been the most cruel, her losses the most terrible. No other nation has been compelled so to extend its resources and strain its powers of resistance. While the great British empire holds forty miles of trenches, France holds four hundred. Her killed number nearly half a million, and her total losses, including wounded and prisoners, reach the staggering total of 2,125,000. No less serious is the economic crippling she has endured. Germany holds only one-twentieth of the territory of France, but that small strip is the very treasure-house of the nation. It contains nearly one-half of her industries, 70 per cent of all her coal, 90 per cent of her iron, her richest agricultural lands and three-fourths of the metal-working plants, which are so vital in time of war. It is under this crushing burden that France is prosecuting the war and giving day by day fresh proofs of devoted self-sacrifice and of the sober reality that underlies the exalted picture drawn recently by Jules Bois, a noted philosopher and poet:

There is a joy of dying among our soldiers, a divine spirit of sacrifice. The French on the battlefields are dying with

ecstasy; in the hospitals they are suffering with happiness. For they know that they are the chosen ones; they are the instruments selected to bring about this great step in the development of the race.

There is no hatred in France. A minority want revenge, but the armies and the people are animated by a passion for justice. France has been misjudged by those who have seen her only in times of peace, when virtue sometimes is asleep; dominant among her people today is the sentiment of sacrifice.

This is not a war of revenge; it is a conflict between the ideals of democracy and liberty and of autocracy. And because of this ideal the soldier dies with his face radiant with joy. There have of late been two faiths in France—the traditional religion and the secular religion of humanity and justice in human relations. These have now been magnificently united by the war. I know my countrymen well. They desire only one thing—to finish this war, and, with it, all wars. For an enduring peace is the most sacred aspiration of true democracy.

Sobered by suffering, strengthened by trial, sublimely calm, France reveals the lofty idealism of the Crusader and the serene devotion of the martyr. She has sacrificed herself in defense of international honor and civilization; but her supreme service has been her demonstration, at incalculable cost, that the highest expression of human thought in government is democracy.

THE AWAKENING OF BRITAIN

July 14, 1915.

A SENSELESS optimism about the war, bred of lack of knowledge, has become a nuisance in Great Britain and a menace to the nation. The mass of the people refuse to believe that they face a resolute opponent, whose resources are organized for war to a finish, whose efficiency is unimpaired and whose repulse, to say nothing of decisive defeat, will require vastly more effort and sacrifice than have yet been made. The lack of seriousness, the indifference, the levity, the complacent mottoes proclaiming that business, pleasure and victory are to "go on as usual," are appalling. The security of the empire is in imminent and grievous peril. It is very doubtful whether Great Britain and her allies can overcome Germany. Yet false confidence persists, and the need for warning against it has lately increased rather than diminished.

Lest it be supposed that we are going out of our way to criticise a friendly nation, we may explain that the words given above are not ours. They are accurately quoted or paraphrased from recent utterances by leading British newspapers and publicists. They indicate more surely than would any abstruse military evolutions the arrival of a new phase in the war. The sober truth is that Great Britain, like her illustrious American foe of old time, has "just begun to fight"—or is getting ready to begin, after having observed for eleven months the racial tradition of first trying to solve the problems

by ignoring them. It is wholly characteristic of the British nature that for nearly a year there should have been no intelligent realization that the most colossal war in history is in progress and that nothing short of supreme endeavor and sacrifice can avert destruction.

The most ardent British patriot must admit that his country has suffered in prestige during this war. Morally, its position and its ideals have been inspiring to the supporters of international honor and free institutions; practically, it has failed to make good. Let it be understood that our opinion is not offered in idle depreciation. The citizens of this country, enjoying ease and tranquillity, cannot begin to estimate the burden which the British people are bearing with admirable fortitude. It would be the sheerest brutality and hypocrisy to sneer at a nation which has lost 120,000 soldiers by death in action and has a list of wounded, prisoners and missing totaling 320,000 more. Those figures represent a weight of grief which no words can measure and which must command respect. There has been less outcry in England over the great mounds of slain than there was in this country over the few hundreds we lost in Cuba; the sinking of battleships has been received more stoically than we met the killing of nineteen sailors at Vera Cruz. But it is when Great Britain's contribution to the allies' cause is compared with that of France that she appears a laggard. Against her casualties of 440,000 the world puts the French losses of 2,120,000; against her national spirit of self-centered heedlessness, the silent, serious and intent devotion of the French.

In criticising the lamentable failure of the country to make full use of its resources, it must not be forgotten that Great Britain's pitiable unreadiness affords incontestable proof that she did not instigate the war. To believe that she, still struggling to put herself in

posture of defense, plotted and created this titanic conflict is a feat beyond the capacity of any save a German mind. But nothing ever illustrated more clearly than England's course the axiom that a virtue may be pressed to the point of becoming a vice. Courage may easily become hardihood; pride, arrogance; coolness, a sodden stolidity; cheerfulness, a silly levity. It was well that the people should endeavor to maintain the conditions of normal life; but the pretense that the war must not be allowed to interfere with "business as usual," or with football or horse-racing or the guzzling of liquor, was a monstrous travesty upon steadiness of temperament. It was well that the people should have confidence in their troops; but when this was carried to the extent of expecting them to win battles without adequate artillery and ammunition it became ghastly.

In an ordinary war such splendid feats as the retreat from Mons and the storming of Neuvechappelle would furnish the military annals of any nation with records of glory. But when it is considered that the British hold fewer than 40 of the 440 miles of the western battle front, their condescending praise of the French is rather disconcerting. Many complacent articles have been written about the "good moral effect" which the presence of British troops has upon their allies, and not long ago a London newspaper referred to the British army as "the force that has withstood the greatest military machine in the world." Considering the losses suffered, the capture of Neuvechappelle was a defeat; yet it was celebrated as a triumph, just as the first bombardment of the Dardanelles forts was accepted as almost equivalent to the capture of Constantinople.

The comparative failure in strategy and effectiveness in the field has been due largely to official enmities. But the peril lies deeper than these surface indications

of disunion. The spirit of the nation, despite the cheerful bearing of enormous burdens, has been a disappointment. The sense of liberty, so long enjoyed, had fostered a selfish individualism which manifested itself most unattractively in the resistance to the most obvious measures of national preparation and defense. Neither the sacrifices of France, nor the devotion of the British fighting men, nor the imminence of a devastating invasion has been able to arouse the mass of the people to a realization that life cannot go on "as usual," and that if an overshadowing danger is to be averted even the priceless right to drink must be restricted. All these influences have converged to produce the ominous halt in the British endeavor. For weeks the great army of France, with only a small section of the line to guard, has been almost motionless; not a regiment of the new armies, at the end of eleven months, has been sent to the front; there is not enough ammunition for effective assault, and the war office no longer denies that the nation must prepare for another winter campaign. The one hopeful sign is the wave of pessimism that just now is passing over the people. The spirit is in nowise related to fear or despair; it is, rather, a healthy self-appraisal.

The most ominous fact of recent times for Germany has not been the steadfastness of the British troops nor the serene British contempt for the contortions of "frightfulness," but this belated realization of shortcomings. Great Britain, at once boastful and sluggish, at once confident and incompetent, has been able to accomplish great deeds. But Great Britain startled, Great Britain aroused, is likely to prove a terrible antagonist.

OUR LOST OPPORTUNITY

July 16, 1915.

THIS great war promises to be comparable, in its effects upon human society, to some of the geologic convulsions which, in remote ages, transformed the surface of the earth—engulfing continents, heaving up mountain ranges from the ocean depths and completely changing the evolutionary development of life on the planet. When the mind dwells upon the changes that must be wrought, the picture that comes most readily is of the physical alterations in the beautiful lands where the carnage rages—forests blackened, rich fields laid waste, villages and towns reduced to ruins, priceless monuments of art and antiquity destroyed, the earth and the very air pestilential with the odors of the charnel-house. Next one considers the new alignments of commerce, new directions to the currents of trade. And then the political changes—the possible shifting of boundaries and of sovereignties and the modification of ancient systems of government. But transcending all other results will be the effect upon the spirit of mankind. This we shall perceive only dimly. It will remain for distant generations to learn whether the struggle means the retrogression of the race or the birth of higher and better ideals.

No one thing will have a more potent influence in determining whether civilization is to halt or go forward than the fate of the system of international law, that great code of principles, policies and usages which has

been the supreme governing force in the interrelation of countries and peoples. International law is the product of the composite thought of the nations of the world. Its character and its maintenance are and must be the index of civilization. Today, as always, the standard of the time is revealed by the degree of deference paid to the code of ethics established by governments in their dealings one with the other. International law first emerged into being as a nebulous creation when belligerent governments framed certain rules of humanity which were to restrict the destructive impulses of mad-dened combatants. This was for their own military benefit. It was from motives of self-preservation, not of altruism, that they formally forbade unofficial murdering, enslavement and the slaughter of prisoners. In time the code was developed according to its true purpose—the preservation, in the midst of war, of the structure of civilization, through the protection of the rights of those not engaged in the conflict. For generations increasing enlightenment has given increasing emphasis to this principle—that upon the security of neutrals depends the stability of civilization; and every recent advance in international law has aimed to enlarge and buttress those rights, and thereby to abate the waste of war and hasten recovery from its ravages. It is self-evident, as a matter of logic, justice and human welfare, that those nations engaged in protecting and fostering the processes of orderly development have rights paramount to those nations which, be their motives good or bad, devote themselves to tearing down the fabric of civilization.

This unprecedented war, involving all the first-class Powers except the United States, has left this nation an overshadowing factor, in point of size and influence, in the world's affairs. And inevitably civilization looked

to it to stand forth as the guardian of international law, the code by which are regulated the dealings between the races of men. The United States was especially well equipped for this high mission. It was the logical champion of the fundamentals of civilization because of its political ideals; because of its freedom from all foreign ambitions and entanglements; because of its economic leadership and its friendship with all nations. The case was stated with admirable clearness recently in a letter written to Dr. J. William White by Lord Sydenham of Combe, a distinguished British engineer and administrator:

Civilized society depends upon the sanctity of agreements between individuals. The relations of states depend absolutely on treaties and conventions constituting international law. No force exists to insure observance of international law, which, therefore, rests solely upon the honor and good faith of the governments accepting it. It follows that every state has the strongest motive for upholding the sanctity of all formal international agreements. If such instruments can be set aside to suit the convenience or the exigencies of a single state, there can in future be no guarantee of good faith between nations.

When a treaty is deliberately broken by a single state, a deadly blow is struck against all treaties and the entire basis of international relations is shaken. Any state which accepts without protest violations of international agreements can only be regarded as acquiescing in a crime against the whole family of nations; and the more powerful the acquiescing state, the more dangerous to civilization and to public morality is its acquiescence. * * * A strong protest from the United States at least would have shown the world that it ranged itself on the side of humanity and did not view with unconcern the deliberate violation of agreements it had helped to bring about.

The war presented to the United States, then, not only an opportunity, but an imperious obligation, to champion and promote the rights of neutral nations. In addition to the instinct of self-interest, there was the

summons of duty, the appeal of threatened civilization. The opportunity was comparable in significance to that which confronted those who laid in this land the foundations of democracy, and that which, nearly a century later, led to the preservation of the republic. Need we recount the humiliating story of our defaulted trusteeship? Belgian nationality was assassinated; non-combatants were put to the sword; cities were destroyed and the survivors laid under crushing tribute; mines were strewn in the fairways of commerce, so that peaceful merchantmen by the score were destroyed and their crews slain; and even the neutral waters of this hemisphere were arrogantly invaded by the belligerents. But against these deeds of progressive lawlessness, of steady encroachment upon the rights of neutrals and humanity, the government of the United States was dumb. As we said just seven months ago:

The state department's one definite policy is to avoid, at all hazards, formulating any fixed rule or declaration. It requires that this government shall simply await each act of the belligerents affecting neutral interests, and then extend the interpretation of neutrality so as to concede that that act is a belligerent right.

A foreign critic has said that "President Wilson has made the fatal mistake of letting himself be governed by a word rather than by the actualities behind it. At the beginning he determined that he would maintain 'strict neutrality.' Unfortunately, he failed to think out clearly what was the true meaning of neutrality. He interpreted it to mean that he must hold the balance so evenly that the United States must express no opinion. This was an impossible position for a nation which holds special views on the sanctity of treaties and the need for modifying the rights of belligerents by the higher rights of humanity." It has steadily grown clearer that he never had any conception of the priv-

ileges, the rights and obligations implied by the term neutrality. His cloudy phrases about being "neutral even in thought" and about "days of perplexity" and "great, spiritual forces waiting for the outcome"; his insistence that we must think of "America first," as "the mediating nation of the world," and his fantastic complacency over our "national control and self-mastery," justify the stinging satire of Doctor Kirchwey, of Columbia University:

To President Wilson neutrality signifies a state of intellectual and moral atrophy, a nirvana of indifference to what is going on in the world.

But whatever his theory, the result has been to devote this government solely to the task of keeping itself clear of responsibility, while steadily sacrificing the rights which it and all other neutrals should have most sedulously cherished. This criticism, it is needless to say, does not originate with us. Neutral governments and people the world around have been amazed and dumfounded by the inertia and silence of the United States. Most of them were helpless, being either bordered by powerful belligerents or else too small to make effective protest. But as each new invasion of neutral rights occurred they expressed with increasing emphasis their disappointment and dismay that the United States did not take the leadership for which destiny had endowed it. Finally it was the republics of South America which took the initiative, and at a meeting of the Pan-American Union, early in December, enunciated the doctrine that the rights of neutrals must be held to be superior to those of belligerents. In this notable proceeding the administration took only a formal and perfunctory part. Later Venezuela proposed an international congress of neutrals in Washington, to define

and declare neutral rights; but the project received no encouragement.

President Wilson's patriotism, if narrow, is sincere; and the chief cause of his failure to rise to his duty is a belief that his course reflects the wishes of a majority of his countrymen. In this view he is probably right. Americans, in regard to this phase of the war, may be divided into three classes. First is the comparatively small group of believers in peace at any price—men and women who consider that peace is merely an absence of strife, without regard to justice. Much more numerous are those who do not disapprove, or are satisfied with, the administration's course. These are well-fed, complacent persons, who take a Pharisaic content in the fact that the United States is not involved in the war, who have a singularly narrow and imperfect conception of patriotism and who have no sense of obligation whatever toward the civilization whose benefits they enjoy. They are wont to plume themselves upon our peace as a reward for national wisdom and virtue. Their war philosophy is embraced in the oft-heard ejaculation, "Oh, let them fight it out," and their ideal of statesmanship in the fatuous phrase that "we mustn't rock the boat." The third group is made up of those who believe that we owe something to others as well as to ourselves and that we should develop such rational preparedness as will make our voice potent when we speak for the fundamental rights of humanity. All these classes, of course, stand for neutrality in the sense of non-intervention. And thus the president feels that he is right in declaring that we must "think of America first" and in devoting himself to preparation for the function of mediator, even at the cost of disregarding the slow strangling of international law and justice.

The failure of America in this crisis does not yet appear in all its significance. It will be realized some day that the nation has let pass the third great opportunity in its history for lasting service to the world. The founders of the republic established democracy; Lincoln reaffirmed and gave new vigor to the principle of representative government and the sacredness of human rights; and half a century after his time comes the third great test—determination of the conflict between belligerent and neutral rights. It was left for a Latin-American—Ambassador Naon, of the Argentine republic—to state in irrefutable terms what some day will be the judgment of mankind:

The interests of the countries not involved in conflict are as sacred as those which could be invoked by the countries which misfortune has led to belligerency. The mission of the neutral countries is to maintain the progress of the world and to conserve its moral and material energies as a nucleus for the re-establishment of the disturbed equilibrium. If neutral rights and the rights of the belligerents conflict, a spirit of justice, a sentiment of humanity and a reason of high practical policy determine that the rights of the neutrals must prevail, inasmuch as their mission is a mission of progress and preservation of life. The right of the belligerent ends where the right of the neutral begins.

The principle there enunciated is destined to become as vital a charter of humanity as the Declaration of Independence or the Gettysburg oration. Had it been uttered by the president of the United States, this nation's influence would have already carried it far toward realization; this country would not now be exposed to affront and injury, and the rights of neutrals, upon which the life of civilization depends, would not be trampled under the feet of maddened belligerency.

A BOER LESSON FOR GERMANY

July 20, 1915.

A FEW days ago Field Marshal Earl Kitchener telegraphed to one of the British leaders in the field a message such as he has had few opportunities to send. "I heartily congratulate you," he wrote, "upon your masterly conduct of the campaign and your brilliant victory." It is not so much the unusual praise as the occasion for it that gives interest to the incident. The message was sent to a man who less than fifteen years ago was the most formidable and most implacable foe of Great Britain—General Louis Botha, then the head of the armies of the Transvaal republic and the Orange Free State, now British prime minister of the Union of South Africa and commander-in-chief of its victorious forces; politician and patriot, soldier and statesman, Boer and Briton. Had it not been for the overshadowing events in Europe, General Botha's achievements would have stirred the world. Besides administering the affairs of the Union, he has quelled two small but vigorous rebellions, inspired the loyalty of his people, waged a daring and arduous campaign against a resolute enemy and added to the empire a territory larger than Germany and Britain combined.

The conquest of German Southwest Africa required not only audacious strategy, but masterful efficiency. Immediately on the outbreak of the war the Germans invaded the Union, while creating diversions elsewhere by fomenting sedition. The Boers had to raise and

equip an army, drive back the invaders and penetrate far into their territory. In twelve weeks the Boer columns traversed 1200 miles of almost waterless country, where even the few wells had been poisoned; fought three pitched battles, occupied eleven towns and, finally, forced unconditional surrender of the entire army and government of the Germans. There has not been in the whole war a series of events of more striking political significance. The relentless foes of Great Britain fifteen years ago have become her most ardent champions.

Steadily the shadow of disillusion and defeat has swept across that "place in the sun" which Germany sought to obtain, not by the peaceful genius of her people, but by intrigue and the sword. One by one her colonial possessions have been wrested from her. A year ago she held 1,000,000 square miles beyond the seas, with a total population of more than 12,000,000; now she has a precarious foothold only in German East Africa and Kamerun, West Africa, the coasts of both of which are blockaded and the capitals menaced. Togoland, West Africa, was captured by the British on August 26 last. A New Zealand expedition took German Samoa four days later. On September 11 Australian forces occupied New Guinea and the Bismarck archipelago, in the Pacific, while the Caroline, Solomon and Marshall islands were seized by Japan. The German colony in China was taken by siege of Japanese and Anglo-Indian forces, surrendering on November 7. The most noteworthy feature of this record is the part taken by the British colonies. It seems the irony of fate that Germany should be stripped of her overseas possessions chiefly by those whom she expected to join her in crushing "English tyranny." According to her wisest statesmen, the earliest and surest results of the war were to be another Mutiny in India, secession of the Union of South Africa

and annexation of Canada by the United States. Yet her forces have confronted Canadians and East Indians in Flanders, Boers in South Africa, Australians and New Zealanders in the Pacific and the Dardanelles. In particular, they counted upon gathering the hardy burghers of the Transvaal under the banner of "Deutschland ueber Alles." This theory, indeed, has been the mainspring of Germany's colonial development on that continent. It was part of the program devised by Bismarck in 1876, and actually started in 1884, with the acquisition of German Southwest Africa. Treitschke, the arch-crusader against Britain, always emphasized it. He wrote:

In South Africa circumstances decidedly favor us. English colonial policy has not been lucky there. The civilization is Teutonic, is Dutch. The policy of England, which vacillates between weakness and brutality, has created inex-tinguishable hatred against her among the Boers.

Germany never lost an opportunity to foment this hatred. It was her encouragement and her arms which supported the Boers in both their wars with Great Britain, and the kaiser's famous telegram to Kruger simply gave official sanction to the policy which had been uninterruptedly favored by imperial statesmen and newspapers. A secretary of foreign affairs declared that "the continued independence of the Transvaal republic is a German interest"—a statement which characteristically ignored the Boer interest; and a government organ voiced the popular view when it advised the nation, "We must constantly lay stress upon the Low German origin of the Boers, and we must, before all, stimulate their hatred against Anglo-Saxondom." Thus the German people, led by the militarists and the whole tribe of imperial professors, came to regard British South Africa as a Teutonic heritage.

The significance of what the Boers have done in this war can be understood only when one recalls what they suffered from British rapacity fifteen years ago. They won the sympathy not only of Germany, but of the whole civilized world and of a very large proportion of the British people. In this country both political parties denounced the wrong committed against the Dutch republics, and the universal feeling among American citizens was accurately expressed in the famous memorial which The North American sent by messenger to President Kruger. But the strongest witnesses against the injustice and cruelty inflicted upon the Boers were to be found in England itself. Five years after the war William T. Stead wrote:

That the Boers love the British flag no one pretends. For years it was the symbol of the most barbarous acts of devastation and the most ruthless policy of denudation that have disgraced the annals of modern war. For three long years that flag meant arson, burglary, robbery and murder.

Yet within five years of the signing of the treaty which extinguished Boer independence the people were peacefully, loyally and contentedly supporting British rule. No more remarkable political transformation ever took place. It was due to two reasons—the deep-rooted sense of justice which animates the democracy of Great Britain and the far-seeing common sense of the Boers: The war, in fact, had been the work of a Tory government, which was able to carry it through by inflammatory appeals to “patriotism.” But the relentless efforts of the sane and just-minded Britons and Irishmen, who braved calumny, abuse and even personal violence to defend the wronged republics, finally carried conviction to the national mind, the Tories were driven from power and the Liberals were returned by the largest majority recorded in seventy years. Campbell-Bannerman, the most bitterly denounced pro-Boer in England, became

prime minister, with a mandate from the people to expiate the crime of the war and do justice in South Africa. The party pledge was made good and the honor of the nation was cleansed from a black stain; for a constitution was framed for the conquered territories and the Boers were invited to govern themselves. The burghers accepted with alacrity and won with ballots what they had failed to win with bullets. The very first parliament was overwhelmingly theirs. General Botha became prime minister, and his cabinet was made up virtually of his headquarters staff during the war.

The disillusion of German statecraft should be complete when it contemplates the "Low German" burghers from South Africa fighting shoulder to shoulder with their "perfidious oppressors." It is doubtful whether the Prussian mind is capable of understanding a miracle of this kind, because the Prussian mind is shuttered against the meaning and the force of democracy. Its own conception of statesmanship was illustrated in the pitiable policy of debauchery which seduced a handful of infatuated Boer reactionaries to start a revolt which their own countrymen remorselessly crushed. Prussianism could never conceive, let alone bring itself to execute, such a program as conferring self-government upon a conquered people less than five years after they had laid down their arms. If the British empire emerges intact from the ordeal of the war, its glories will be due less to the Clives and the Wolfes of the eighteenth century and the Cecil Rhodes type of "empire-builders" of the nineteenth than to the sagacity of its twentieth-century statesmanship, which takes its inspiration from an enlightened and justice-loving democracy.

CITIZENS OR SUBJECTS ?

July 24, 1915.

AS THE great war unfolds its tragic panorama, as its horrors multiply and the waste of human life and treasure grows more staggering, mankind is appalled by the irreparable devastation and the dehumanizing savagery of it all. One may still have faith that behind the visible clashing of destructive forces there is at work some natural law of compensation; that out of the dreadful cataclysm of blood and suffering will come some lasting benefits to the race. But the recompense is hidden; it will not be for this generation to see the healing of the wounds of strife, from which the lifeblood of civilization seems to be draining away. In the very magnitude and pertinacity of the struggle there is, however, one advantageous effect: the longer it endures the clearer will become its fundamental meaning and the potentiality of its influence upon the future of this planet.

Upon this subject the controversy has been bewildering in extent and contradictions. For months the shrewdest commentators upon international affairs disputed over the relative significance of an assassination and an ultimatum, of diplomatic intrigues and dynastic ambitions, of racial animosities and territorial rivalries. It is not strange that those most nearly concerned in an upheaval which convulsed a continent and shook the foundations of government in the remotest parts of the earth should find confusing explanations for it. Yet

from the beginning the truth was discernible. In the very first week of the combat, while the German guns before Liège were thundering the opening bars in the crashing overture to the world war, the keynote sounded clear above the din. Readers of this newspaper were warned even then that, regardless of superficial indications, regardless of the protestations of official manifestoes and the special pleadings of propagandists, this was in reality a collision between rival civilizations, between irreconcilable theories of government, between monarchism and manhood, between the divine right of kings and the inalienable rights of humanity, between autocracy and democracy. Realization of this fact has resulted, we say, from the long duration and almost incredible ferocity of the conflict. It is the one point, indeed, upon which there is now no real controversy. Superficially, of course, there is hopeless divergence of opinion between Germany's advocates and her opponents; but upon the essential nature of the ordeal through which the world is passing they are agreed. It is to determine which system shall survive—the Teutonic ideal of an all-powerful state, to serve and to glorify which is the highest duty of the individual, and the democratic ideal of a state which is the servant of its people and whose function it is to promote justice, enlarge individual liberty and enhance human happiness.

In times so clamorous and amid conditions so complex as those which now confront mankind it is given to few men to see into the very heart of things. For this reason we have been deeply touched and inspired by the utterance from a distinguished Pennsylvanian upon the phases of the war we have been discussing. No deliverance that we have read will better repay thoughtful reading, by every inhabitant of this country, than an essay in the current number of the

North American Review, entitled "The Impassable Chasm." The writer is Wayne MacVeagh. Scholar, diplomat and statesman, ripe in years, tolerant in judgment, but strong in patriotic devotion to the ideals of the republic, he brings to bear upon such a question as this the illumination of wide experience and a singularly penetrating mind. For more than half a century—he is 82 years old—he has been a figure of influence in the nation's affairs, his more notable activities having been as an ambassador, as attorney general of the United States and as chief counsel for this country in the Venezuela arbitration case. But his judgment now is of peculiar value because of his retirement from the turmoil of life. Conscious that his career is drawing toward its close, he awaits the great change, he says, "with cheerfulness and hope." It is amid such surroundings of serene detachment that men of experience and deep conviction can command the most far-reaching vision. Before them events range themselves in their true perspective; beyond things trivial or non-essential they discern the fundamental truths of controversy. If, as Mr. MacVeagh tranquilly observes, this should be his last contribution to the country he has served so well, his utterance will be an honor to him while he lives and a memorial to him when he has gone.

Of his masterful discussion of the general issues of the war we need not speak, unless to say that age has not dimmed his perception nor weakened the ardor of a knightly soul for human liberty. But his greatest service, we think, is his searching discussion of the meaning, the privilege and the responsibilities of American citizenship. We select these sentences from an article that in every line breathes the purest patriotism and the clearest conception of the political ideals of democracy:

No more long-suffering executive, no more indulgent and peace-loving president, ever filled the great office. In pursuit of peace and of good relations with Germany he has, quite unwittingly, no doubt, subjected our country to such indignities as no free and high-spirited people ought to have endured. The simple truth, which he has been so unwilling to recognize, is that there exists an impassable chasm between a *citizen* of the United States and a *subject* of the German emperor; and there is no possible political alchemy whereby the political standards of the one can be transmuted into the political standards of the other.

No matter where a man is born or how he is reared, when he comes to manhood he instinctively prefers to be a *citizen* or a *subject*. Our fathers preferred, and we ourselves and our children prefer, to be free citizens, but we do not deny to anybody else the privilege of preferring to be the obedient subject of a kaiser and a military caste.

We only ask them, in all fairness to themselves and to us, to make their choice—to be loyal either to the fundamental principles of our government or those of the government of the kaiser, and to believe that they cannot be half loyal to the one and half loyal to the other. They must be wholly American or wholly German. If they propose to continue to live here, then they must be loyal to the American system; and there is no possibility for them of mistaking what that system is.

Thomas Jefferson declared it to the whole world when he said the just rights of all governments depend upon the consent of the governed; and Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, in a few simple words, stamped it forever upon the history of mankind, in his immortal aspiration that government of the people, by the people and for the people should never perish from the earth.

Whoever accepts without reservation those two principles of government is a loyal American. Whoever pretends to accept them and is at heart disloyal to them is unworthy of American citizenship and ought to be deprived of it, for there lies an impassable chasm which those honestly on one side can never pass over to the other.

There are few living men of whom it dared be said that they can add emphasis to the immortal words of Lincoln. Wayne MacVeagh is one of them, for he

learned his democracy from the lips of Lincoln himself; he was one of the companions of the president on the historic journey to Gettysburg, and he himself made, as John Hay wrote in his diary, a "touching and beautiful" speech on that occasion. No American is better qualified to address his countrymen upon the meaning of Americanism.

Sorrow for friends or kinsmen suffering by the war, pride in the valor and devotion of blood-brothers—these are sentiments which even foes must respect. But the blind racial loyalty which condones hideous crimes, which palliates dishonor and exalts autocracy and militarism from the shelter of a free republic—this is a denial of Americanism, a repudiation of the principles which gave this nation its very reason for being. Citizen or subject—that is the test. The advocates of kaiserism and the apologists for militarism in this country who protest with such volubility that they are loyal Americans cannot conceal the issue by boisterous pleas for a false "neutrality" or sentimental invocations to the fatherland. If they are true citizens of this republic, their very souls must revolt against the system of militaristic imperialism which has trampled upon the sacred rights of nations and drenched half a continent with blood. If that spectacle of remorseless aggression, of the murder of nationalities and the crushing out of human liberties seems to them just, and if the philosophy of government which inspired it evokes their loyalty, then they are at heart the subjects of an alien ruler and their American citizenship is false to its core.

THE SUBMARINE

July 30, 1915.

CERTAIN phases of the much-discussed "revolution in naval warfare" can be elucidated only by trained experts. But it presents some conditions which even the lay mind can understand. One needs no course in a war college, no familiarity with the bewildering technicalities of naval engineering and strategy, to realize that the submarine's most noted victim has been the fine old battleship *Precedent*, and that methods of war at sea have undergone radical change. As a fact, the most illuminating exposition of this naval subject that we have seen has been made by a civilian, a resident of an inland town and the editor of an agricultural journal. Herbert Quick, author of that singularly illuminating study of human society, "*Aboard the Good Ship Earth*," tells in the *American Magazine* just what the advent of the submarine portends.

Sea power, he points out, has been for 2000 years the dominant factor in shaping history, and he picturesquely summarizes for busy readers the researches of Rear Admiral Mahan, whose works on this subject are standard throughout the world. It was sea power that saved Rome from Greece and Greece from Persia; that gave the Phoenicians command of the ancient maritime world, built the far-flung commercial empire of Carthage, made Athens ruler of vast territories and Rome mistress of the earth. Sea power gave the Moslem dominion from Constantinople to Cordova, until his squad-

rons were scattered at Lepanto. Because of her sea power Spain dominated Christendom and gathered to herself the dazzling riches of Mexico and Peru. Her decline began when storms and British seamanship wrecked her great armada, and for three centuries Great Britain held the scepter of the seas. The sea power of France turned the scale for American independence, and the Union was preserved through the naval blockade of the Confederacy. And now sea power appears as the determining factor in the greatest of all wars.

For it is obvious that only her preponderating naval forces have thus far saved Great Britain from overwhelming disaster. The most dependent of all nations on sea-borne supplies, she has suffered only trifling inconvenience with a trade that reaches every considerable port in the world. She swept her enemy from the seas; there is not an ocean highway that a German warship or merchantman dare traverse, and for months the great German fleet has remained in the inglorious seclusion of its fortified base rather than risk another collision with a better-equipped foe. Moreover, it is due to the fleet that a great army has been transported to the continent without the loss of a single life and the enormous supplies necessary for its maintenance sent to the front without accident or check. As Mr. Quick says:

Sea power determines things, as of old. It saves the British isles from invasion. It keeps open the ports of the allies and feeds their armies. It supplies them with ammunition and material of war. It is seemingly as potent as ever.

Nevertheless, the change is palpable. The deadlock in trench warfare, says the writer, has its parallel in the "stalemate" at sea:

Suppose Germany had a thousand submarines—as she might have had if she had known. She could starve Great Britain and hold the British armies from the continent. On the other hand, suppose that Great Britain had a thousand

submarines, would her sea power be saved thereby? Not at all, so far as can be seen.

The submarine is the negation of sea power. It equalizes things as between nations. It creates a universal stalemate at sea. It can destroy commerce, but it cannot safeguard it. It can sink any other warship except another submarine. It fills the world with terror and calls it "war." It makes peace at sea the only practical thing. It makes real war at sea impossible—literally so, just as debating is impossible between a deaf man and a blind one.

The future history of the world will be far different from what it would otherwise have been, because of the submarine. The mastership of the seas has passed from every nation. Defense is made perfectly practicable against overseas expeditions everywhere.

Months of experience have established at least the theoretical place of the submarine; have shown its astounding possibilities and its no less remarkable restrictions. It negatives sea power, but does not destroy it. It reduces war to a system of scientific commerce-raiding; but it has no more made the battleship obsolete than the aeroplane has displaced infantry and artillery. As a writer in the *World's Work* says:

It is Britain's floating ships which guard England from invasion, insure the supply and reinforcement of the British army in France, permit the operations against the Dardanelles, bottle up the main German fleet, tie up all German merchant shipping, cut off the oversea supply of food and munitions to Germany and, despite all that the submarines will be able to do, will probably continue to keep uninterrupted the British seaborne trade.

The early submarine exploits caused the Germans to exult in the "destruction of British sea power" and to predict that German science and daring had overcome the naval predominance of the enemy. Yet what are the facts? Before Britain had adapted her strategy to the menace of the new weapon Germany won some notable triumphs, particularly in the destruction of three cruisers by a single submarine. But the great purpose of the

undersea craft was to isolate the British isles, and this has been a fantastic failure. The "war-zone" decree went into effect on February 18. During the twenty-two weeks, beginning then and ending July 22, the total losses from submarine attacks were 235 vessels and 1641 lives. These figures might be impressive were it not for the fact that during that period not fewer than 33,000 vessels arrived at or departed from British ports. The record seems to justify Premier Asquith's confident declaration in the house of commons last Wednesday:

After all, this submarine menace, serious as it has appeared to be, is not going to inflict fatal or substantial injury on British trade. The seas are clear. We have our supplies of food and raw material flowing in upon us in the same abundance and with the same freedom and, judging from the insurance rates and other matters, with the same immunity from serious hazards and risk as in times of peace.

The submarine menace is of vital interest to the world at large as well as to Great Britain, because of the contentions which Germany puts forth in behalf of the new weapon. Because she does not care to risk her powerful floating fleet against a stronger enemy, she claims special immunity from law for her underwater craft. With precisely as much logic and justice England might set her battleships and cruisers to sinking neutral merchantmen and passenger ships without warning, under the plea that they could not afford to risk attack by Germany's preponderating force of submarines. Germany boasts that her submarines give her command of the sea, insists that their full employment is justified by her "fight for existence" and demands that the world accept, therefore, her defiance of all the laws and usages of warfare. Yet what have been the achievements of her terrible weapon? By straining herself to the uttermost, in five months she has destroyed a couple of hundred cargo boats, passenger ships and fishing craft and

killed about 1600 non-combatants, including some scores of women and children. She has not reduced by one item the roster of the British fleet, nor has she diverted 1 per cent of the ocean trade of the islands she boasted she would starve into submission.

But the point of interest to the United States and other neutral nations is that she has used her new weapons against them instead of against her enemy. While her submarines have been sinking neutral ships and murdering neutral civilians, England has transported three-quarters of a million troops to France and the Dardanelles, has brought whole fleets of laden troop ships from India, Canada and Australia and maintains literally a ferry for the carrying of munitions of war to the front. Yet not one of these innumerable "floating arsenals" has been attacked. While the English channel is alive with vessels which are fair marks for torpedoes, the boasted German submarines are content with chasing fishing smacks and peaceful passenger ships. Indescribably valiant against American, Norwegian and Danish merchantmen and against unarmed ships like the Lusitania and the Orduna, they avoid operations which would really be justified by military and international law. In certain respects the submarine has revolutionized naval warfare, and does require new regulations. But its use will have to be developed and its abuse restricted by other nations than Germany, which seems incapable or unwilling to employ it except in indiscriminate terrorism.

WHERE PEACE PROMOTERS FAIL

July 31, 1915.

ONE of the singular developments of this cruelest and most destructive of wars is that none of the many peace movements originates in the countries involved, but have their rise in the chief neutral nations. It shows how deep rooted are the causes of the conflict and how determined are the convictions of the various peoples engaged in it, that those who are suffering all the loss and anguish of the war are opposed to any forced settlement, while among those least affected the propaganda of peace on any terms is busily promoted. As the largest and most populous of the neutral countries, the United States has been the most fertile field for the sprouting of these peace projects. They vary as much in importance as in purpose and method. They range from the political enterprise headed by William Jennings Bryan and the feminist movement led by America's foremost woman, Jane Addams, to the programs of special groups—those exalting universal and all-inclusive arbitration, those aiming at reduction of armaments or the dismantling of our defenses, and sectarian organizations which oppose armed resistance as an article of their religious faith. Subscribing to one or more of these movements, and morally supporting all of them, are a number of influential educators, philanthropists and publicists, whom we may call, with no offensive implication, professional pacifists. Active for years in spreading their various gospels, the peace propagandists

have naturally been most industrious since the present war began. In terms protesting, indignant, conciliatory and beseeching they have registered their demands that the conflict be brought to a close forthwith.

Surely the ambition is a beneficent one. The waste and cruelty and dehumanizing influence of war are so apparent that any rational effort to discredit and check it must enlist the admiration of thoughtful persons. But it must be obvious that the ending of armed conflict—this war or all wars—is a task of some magnitude, which requires endeavors somewhat more potent than resolutions of regret and eloquent protestations to desperate belligerents. It is fair and it is necessary to inquire what else these earnest peace propagandists have done for the cause, besides celebrating the horrors of war and the blessings of peace and adopting memorials expressive of their worthy sentiments. The first duty of Americans, in the face of the world upheaval, was unquestionably to be neutral. Not "neutral in thought," for to adopt that attitude of selfish indifference while the most cherished ideals of civilization and humanity were being destroyed would be the very antithesis of neutrality, but neutral in action. There were reasonable differences of opinion as to what constituted true neutrality; but there was one factor embraced in it concerning which there could be no real dispute, and that was the obligation to defend and maintain the sanctity of international law.

International law, that code of conduct which lies at the heart of the relationships among the peoples and governments of the earth, represents the standard of our civilization. The extent to which it is observed and its tranquillizing demands are respected is an unfailing index of the age. It is the final protection of human society. Bit by bit its structure has been built up

through the generations, each requirement representing a concession wrested from the power of the doctrine that might makes right. Without it the world would slip back to the reign of force; when it is weakened through successful or unrebuked defiance, just to the extent of its impairment does civilization suffer in stability and justice recede in power.

These concessions wrung from the doctrine of force exist wholly because they have behind them the consciences of nations. Their preservation depends upon the fidelity with which they are observed and the sternness with which infractions are condemned. When they are violated without arousing protest they lose their efficacy, become the empty husks of words that mock at the humanity which inspired them. Nations which faithfully observe these laws prepare for defense accordingly; they place themselves under the restrictions devised by common agreement. When their enemies violate the compact, therefore, the basis of faith is destroyed, and war inevitably enters upon a phase of progressive lawlessness. But the hurt injures not only the antagonist unfairly and illegally attacked; it wounds civilization itself. A state which tramples upon one treaty inflicts damage upon all treaties, and thus weakens the only foundation for orderly intercourse among governments. When a powerful belligerent declares its own interests superior to the law of nations, and evokes by that course no penalty or protest, the whole fabric of the international code is imperiled.

In the stress and fury of a great war the safeguarding of the law becomes the peculiar function of the countries not involved. Self-interest demands that they perform it vigilantly, because the belligerents can and must take care of themselves, while in its very essence international law is the protection of neutrals. Beyond

this, however, states remaining neutral are the custodians of civilization, and so much the more are obligated to safeguard the system. A neutral nation, therefore, which permits without protest flagrant violations of the code becomes morally an accomplice of the offending government. Silent acquiescence not only is not neutral, but is a definite and concrete violation of neutrality; for it gives countenance to a wrong against the nation injured, and, at the same time, it constitutes a default in the obligation to maintain unimpaired the law which is the only protection of neutrals and of civilization.

Now, where have the most active peace propagandists stood upon this issue? Their neutrality, so called, has been so intense that they have never uttered a word against the wickedest wrongs committed against neutrals since the term was brought into the language. Voluble upon every other horror of war, they have been vociferously silent upon this. But besides giving currency to an utterly false and self-contradictory conception of neutrality, they have performed the greatest possible dis-service to the cause of peace, which they sincerely believe is in their exclusive custody. For they have given tacit acquiescence to the defiance of international law, and thereby have consented to the destruction of that without which world peace is utterly impossible. The failure in duty is particularly chargeable to the president and to former Secretary of State Bryan. Conceiving that their sole function was to evade responsibility and maintain an attitude of detachment which presumably would fit this government for the work of mediation, they stifled the voice of this nation and permitted to be uttered no official protest against the tearing down of international law. And because of that policy the United States defaulted not only as one of the trustees of the code in general, but actually as a signa-

tory to some of the principal conventions violated. But in particular was action demanded from the groups which have taken it upon themselves to eradicate war. The first requisite for world peace is a system of international law, recognized and adhered to by the governments of the earth.

The ideal of universal concord can never be attained until the rights which nations now have under law are established, maintained and extended. Yet the pacifist enthusiasts think to bring the vision nearer by condoning the piecemeal destruction of the code, which is the only thing that stands between civilization and the supremacy of brute force. There is always something admirable in the devotion of sincere men and women to principle, and the peace cult in its various forms is singularly lofty in its humanitarian idealism. But the most sympathetic non-subscriber to the propaganda must be depressed by its futility under existing circumstances. Even the preoccupied statesmen of the war-torn countries of Europe were touched, we suppose, by the spectacle of noble-minded women going from capital to capital beseeching those in authority to stop the war. Yet it must have seemed to them a strange and disheartening thing that these earnest advocates had not a word to say in behalf of the integrity and sanctity of international law—a melancholy ruin which for generations to come will accuse its faithless guardians and obstruct the pathway to peace.

REVELATIONS OF A YEAR

August 3, 1915.

THE most significant thing about this war anniversary is that there should be one—that after the lapse of a full year, in the most enlightened age of the world's history, the circle of strife should be still widening, the conflict growing more relentless and more sanguinary. It is a staggering thought that man, who has subjugated nature and made a servant of the very thunderbolts, has himself loosed in the world a force which all his genius cannot curb. He can do no more than brace himself against the storm and endure until its furies are spent. He has seen ancient landmarks of civilization overthrown and the hard-won achievements of centuries of progress undone; has felt the very foundations of society rock beneath his feet. And he is helpless to avert the destruction or repair the ruin. Before the consuming blast of the world war even the highest manifestations of the human intellect seem powerless. Law is paralyzed; science is without avail; religion can offer no more than the consolation of hope. Destiny, finger on lip, broods and gives no sign.

There are those to whom this vast upheaval, even now, seems a distant and inconsequential thing; an affair of another continent—almost, as it were, of another planet. Conscious of apparent isolation, they feel or affect an indifference to the outcome. Yet there is no human being on the earth whose fate is not in some

measure wrapped up in the events in Europe, no nation whose future will not be colored by their influences. Even the surface changes are of tremendous extent and import. Vast territories have been devastated by the withering blast of war. Cities have been depopulated, fertile regions laid waste, priceless monuments of antiquity and human skill destroyed. More than 20,000,000 men are under arms, and during the year the lists of dead, wounded and missing have reached an estimated total of 9,500,000.

War itself has been disclosed as a new creation, the realization of dreadful visions which but a few years ago seemed fitted only to startle the imagination. The strategy of the past has been rendered futile by the employment of new engines of destruction. Battles are won less by human courage and endurance than by mechanical ingenuity. Military science has its beginnings in the workshop of the inventor and the laboratory of the scientist. The battle on land is directed from the clouds, the naval engagement fought from the depths of the sea. Fortresses have been made obsolete by guns that can reduce the mightiest defensive works to fragments. Soldiers must face not only blasts of death from hidden machines, but streams of liquid fire and clouds of strangling vapors. But the struggle has revealed more than the resourcefulness of man in works of destruction; it has brought to light his unknown capacities for heroism and cruelty, for good and evil. The world which is shocked by the revelation that the spirit of barbarism still exists is also inspired by manifestations of supreme devotion and sacrifice. The figures which tell of the war's extent almost benumb the understanding. While only eleven nations are involved, they represent more than half the population of the globe. The battlefronts in Europe alone cover 1700 miles, but there

have been bloody conflicts in Asia and Africa and distant seas. Every day thousands of lives and \$42,000,000 of the world's wealth are consumed.

But the physical and political effects of the war are no more startling than its revelations in the field of morals. The very structure of human faith has been shifted on its foundations. A doctrine which was outlawed nineteen hundred years ago has been revived and has become the guiding inspiration of one of the greatest peoples of the earth. Behind the defiance of law and justice, behind the practice of unrestrained savagery in war on land and sea, behind the dishonoring of obligations and the substitution of force for law, is the old doctrine that might makes right and that national self-interest justifies international crimes.

The causes of the war were so complex that it is possible to name a half dozen anniversaries, but peculiar significance attaches to this day, August 3. For it marks the date when the chart of international relationships was disfigured for all time by the red smear of repudiation. One year ago yesterday Belgium was free, Germany held in universal honor, international law was sacred. One year ago today Belgium was violated, Germany was a nation forsworn and the fatal undermining of international law had begun. A tragic day for Belgium and for the world! It was at 7 o'clock on the evening of August 2 that the kaiser's minister in Brussels, "without the least warning of such an incredible decision," handed to the Belgian government the shameless ultimatum which declared the intention to strike down the nationality of which Germany was a guarantor. That document said:

* * * The steps taken by Germany's enemies oblige her, on her side, to violate Belgian territory. * * * Should Belgium behave in a hostile manner toward German troops, Germany shall be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

And it was at 7 o'clock on the morning of that fateful day one year ago that Belgium won the deathless renown of martyrdom for civilization by her ringing reply:

Belgium has always faithfully observed her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no opportunity to maintain her neutrality and to cause it to be respected by others. The attack upon her independence with which Germany menaces her is a flagrant violation of the law of nations. The Belgian government, by accepting the propositions mentioned, would sacrifice its national honor and, at the same time, its duty toward Europe. It refuses to believe that its independence can be preserved only at the price of a violation of its neutrality. If it be disappointed in its expectations, it is resolved to repulse by every means in its power any attack upon its rights.

There has been no more dreadful spectacle in history than the revenge visited upon Belgium for her dauntless defense of national rights and public obligations. Yet the real tragedy lies not in her anguish, but in the shattering of international law; not in the systematic spoliation of an innocent people, but in the ruthless dishonoring of the code which alone could permit the orderly intercourse of nations. In all the grim record of the pregnant year this is the overshadowing accomplishment of evil. Deep are the hurts inflicted upon civilization by the devastation of peaceful lands and the sacrifice of millions of lives, the youth and strength which the world so urgently needed; but deeper and more lasting is the wound given to it by the striking down of international law. The audacious crime of Germany, condoned by the recreant silence of neutral nations, destroyed not alone the body of the law, but its very soul, which is international good faith. To that act of unforgivable treachery the world may trace every succeeding infamy, from terrorism and indiscriminate

slaughter on land and massacre at sea to the rule of international anarchy under the guise of "belligerent rights."

It is curious to recall now how imperfect was the understanding of the conflict at its beginning twelve months ago. The "world war," so long foretold and so often averted, had become to most persons a byword of incredulity. Armed strife had become "too horrible" and "too costly" to be endured. Even the opening clash, with its staggering implications and probabilities, awakened no general realization of what was impending. Those superficially familiar with world affairs regarded the upheaval lightly. Self-interest, they said, would prevent the spreading of the conflagration; the united power of statesmanship and finance would quench the leaping fires of hate and ambition. There would be a sudden onslaught on one side, a sudden collapse on the other—1870 over again—and then the Powers would wrench themselves back from the edge of the abyss and agree once more to an amicable division of the spoils. Yet the meaning of events was sufficiently plain to lead this newspaper to say one year ago today:

As striking as the fury of the storm is the swiftness with which it broke. Only a few hours ago it seemed that the great Powers would easily control the conflict that had arisen. The resources of diplomacy and the pressure of a common interest were relied upon to "teach the doubtful battle where to rage." But even while the startled leaders groped for peace the lightnings were loosed and the black cloud of a continental war enveloped them. To talk of bloodless settlement now would seem the idlest chatter of a dream. The tides of fate have overflowed the barriers set up by men against them. The world can only stand aghast at the mighty forces it has waked and brace itself for the shock of such a cataclysm as history has never recorded. * * *

What does this mean but that our boasted civilization has broken down? That there has been, at least, a reversion from

which it will climb upward again only by slow and painful degrees? At any time during the last thirty years action might conceivably have been taken to avert the disaster. Now there seems but one remedy—violence. Selfish statesmanship has stimulated national antagonisms and race prejudices to fever, and it can be allayed only by the letting of blood. How far this dreadful operation must go none can now foretell. Far-seeing men predict that the coming war will be the bloodiest in history—and the last. If the second part of this prophecy shall prove true, the price will not be too great for the world to pay.

The tragic truth that confronts mankind at the end of twelve months is that this is, indeed, the bloodiest of wars, but that there is now less promise than when it began that it will be the last. For the fury of the belligerents and the defaulting timidity of neutrals have caused the destruction of the only means of security that the world possessed. A world without law is a world that can never be free from the threat of war.

But there is one result of the prolongation of the war that might almost be regarded as compensation for its lengthening agony. This is the revelation of its true meaning. It is a collision between opposing civilizations, between two irreconcilable philosophies of government, between autocracy and democracy.

No amount of special pleading, no invocations to national aspirations or race loyalty, can obscure this foundation issue. The annihilation of time and distance by science has brought widely sundered nations in closer touch today than countries with a common frontier were a century ago, and the instinctive antagonism between the two systems of government is interminable and relentless. They cannot co-exist, for they are fundamentally at war. One or the other must pass away. And upon this truth can be founded the one safe prediction concerning the war—that Germany cannot win. Let her government be ever so adroit and resourceful;

let her armies display unheard-of heroism and her war engines develop incredible frightfulness—she cannot win. For she has launched her forces against an antagonist that might cannot subdue, whose life is indestructible and whose power grows more terrible with each check it suffers. She does not yet realize that she is making war upon an idea, upon a conviction of the human mind which has grown throughout the ages to become the dominating force in the progress of mankind—the idea which had its clearest utterance on the shores of Galilee nineteen hundred years ago, was reaffirmed in Magna Charta and the Declaration of Independence and is today the immovable cornerstone of human justice—the idea of democracy and the rights of man. Against that idea all the governments of the earth, if they suddenly united to rebuild autocracy, should not prevail; they might as well attempt to chain the winds or turn back the slow-revolving wheels of time. Much less can a group of three autocracies hope to succeed. Every day makes clearer the truth of what we said ten months ago:

If this war does nothing else, it should bring them to realize that today mankind chooses to live under a government of citizenship, not of soldiery; under the rule of law, not of fear; that the commercial and political power of a nation which rests on absolutism and force rather than on the endeavors of a free and self-reliant people is purchased at too great a cost, and that, moreover, it cannot, with any number of bayonets and howitzers, maintain itself in this age of the world.

BULGARIA HOLDS THE SCALE

August 9, 1915.

WAR discussions in these columns have never dealt with the abstruse technicalities of strategy. They have touched upon the causes, issues and effects of the conflict, but have left it to trained military experts to explain the complicated evolutions of the field. It needs no special knowledge, however, to recognize the capture of Warsaw and the virtual rout of the Russian line as a colossal achievement. Overshadowing by far the most famous campaigns of Napoleon, it marks the high tide of accomplishment even in this greatest of wars. Regardless of their sympathies, the nations of the world will pay a tribute of admiration to the fighting men of Germany and Austria for this surpassing feat of arms. But of no less importance than the immediate military effect will be the indirect political influence of the Teutonic triumph. It proves the force of what we said at the end of March, more than four months ago:

It was in the Balkans that the great war began, and there, in all likelihood, it will be decided. The battles on the plains of France and in the mountain passes of Hungary are hardly more vital than the grim struggle which diplomacy is waging for control of the little States whose explosive politics have kept Europe's nerves on edge for half a century. That side which wins the Balkans wins the war. Their action has become the prize of tremendous negotiations. Dual Alliance and Triple Entente bid furiously one against the other with loans, with promises and with threats, and the map of southeastern Europe is redrawn every day as one side or the other gains ascendancy. The Powers have

been laying siege to the governments of Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece, each of which maneuvers to get the best price for its aid or its neutrality.

Since the day that the Teutonic onslaught began every shell that thundered against the defenses of Warsaw echoed and re-echoed throughout the listening Balkans; and when the Bavarian troops marched triumphantly into the Polish capital, third city in the Russian empire, the tramp of their feet shook that whole peninsula. For the eclipse of Russian military power has laid a cold shadow of caution upon the sentimental support given by some of the Balkan peoples to the cause of the Allies. Germany has commanded by her military triumph a consideration which she had failed to win by diplomacy while she was paralyzed in France and while she and her allies were on the defensive in the east. Henceforth the envoys of the kaiser in Bucharest and Sofia and Athens will have less need to cajole and threaten; the guns of Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen have spoken for them. It must be understood that by the Balkan States this war is not regarded as a catastrophe or a world misfortune or a horror, but, rather, as an opportunity. Their peoples are of a hardy and warlike temperament; they are conscious of their importance in the world balance, and they are intent upon the realization of certain fixed aspirations and the redressing of certain real grievances. Hence they waste no time or breath in protesting that they yearn to fight for civilization and the uplift of humanity. Their motives are frankly those of national self-interest and their methods those of the oriental huckster. That side which offers the higher and surer price will enlist them under its banners.

Servia and Montenegro, of course, have been against the Teutonic alliance from the beginning. The others

have so far served Germany by remaining neutral, despite the fact that popular sympathy runs either toward Russia or toward England and France and Italy. Rumania has weighed the possibility of wresting concessions from Austria against the glittering territorial promises held out by the Triple Entente—the Rumanian parts of Austrian Transylvania and Bukowina; also she has delayed her decision until she could sell her great wheat crop to her only customer, Austria. Bulgaria's aim is to recover what she won from Turkey in the first Balkan war, only to lose it to her allies, whom she attacked, in the second Balkan war. Greece, whose sympathies are strongly with England, would have been in the fray long ago but for the failure of the Dardanelles campaign and her fear that Bulgaria might seek revenge; for she is determined to share in the partition of Turkey. By a curious turn of fate it is Bulgaria, only two years ago crushed and humiliated, that now dominates the situation. The nation so lately discredited and despoiled has become the keystone of the Balkan arch. How this has come about will be made clear by a brief review.

The easy victory of Italy over Turkey in 1911 inspired the formation a year later of the Balkan league—Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria—the purpose of which was to dismember Turkey and rescue citizens of those nations from Moslem misrule. The conflict was hopelessly one sided, and by the treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, the sultan ceded to the Balkan allies all of his territories north of a line drawn from Enos, on the Aegean sea, to Midia, on the Black sea. The triumph was so great that it caused the victors to quarrel over the spoils. Greece and Bulgaria were rivals for the Turkish coast on the Aegean, while Serbia and Bulgaria both claimed the heart of Macedonia. Serbia, however,

had agreed to waive her Macedonian ambitions in consideration of Russia's pledge that Serbia would be supported in seizing a seaport on the Adriatic. Austria persuaded the great Powers to put a veto upon Serbia's plan to open "a window on the sea." When they barred her by erecting the impossible state of Albania she repudiated her agreement to let Bulgaria have the Bulgar territory in Macedonia and induced Greece to stand with her. Thus Bulgaria, which had done most of the fighting against Turkey and lost twice as many men as her allies combined, found herself robbed of any reward. In rage and despair she made a sudden attack upon her allies. She might have won something from Serbia and Greece, but Rumania, which had remained neutral—for a price—saw her chance to break the growing power of Bulgaria once for all, and invaded the territory of her hapless neighbor. The result was inevitable. The Bulgars were crushed, as the Turks had been, and the treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, 1913, not only gave further advantages to Serbia and Greece, but transferred Bulgarian territory to Rumania. Meanwhile, the Turks had deftly recovered Adrianople, which Bulgaria had conquered at heavy cost.

For twelve months Bulgaria nursed her sullen rage. Her sympathies have lain to a certain extent with Russia, who helped to establish Bulgarian independence from the Turks in 1878, but economically she has been a satellite of the Teutonic alliance. She early declared her neutrality in the great war, and has maintained it despite pressure from the Triple Entente. And this is the reason for the hesitancy of Rumania and Greece. Many times during the last year they might have been "persuaded" to join Russia, France and England, but they could never be sure that Bulgaria would not take revenge upon them for the humiliation of the treaty

of Bucharest. Until the collapse of the Russian forces the anti-Teutonic allies were fairly confident of winning the Balkans. They were encouraged, first, by the victory at the Greek elections of Venizelos, the premier who had been ousted by the king because of his pro-ally endeavors, and, second, by the refusal of Rumania to permit German munitions of war to pass through her territory to the harassed defenders of Constantinople.

It is undoubtedly the Dardanelles deadlock that has cooled the ardor of the Hellenic supporters of the Triple Entente; while the driving of the Russians out of Bukowina has isolated Rumania and made it impossible for her to join, at least while Bulgaria is in a position to turn the scale. Thus the decision of Bulgaria will mean for one side, as a Budapest journal remarked recently, "the greatest diplomatic success of the century," and for the other an almost fatal blow. With the assistance of the Balkan States the Triple Entente could quickly overcome Turkey and close the iron ring about Germany and Austria. But the adhesion of Bulgaria and Rumania to the Teutonic cause would extend the German line unbroken from the North sea to the Bosphorus; it would crush Servia, relieve Turkey, isolate Russia and consolidate the Germanic forces in an almost impregnable position. Obviously, the German triumph in the Warsaw campaign will powerfully affect the decision. And it will be a momentous one. There could be no more vivid illustration of the interdependence of nations than the fact that the fate of Europe and the future of civilization may hang upon the nod of an autocrat in Sofia.

GERMANY IS READY FOR PEACE

August 18, 1915.

A CURIOUS phenomenon of the great war, so prolific in contrasts and contradictions, is the circumstance that peace rumors grow more vigorous as the scope of the conflict widens and its intensity increases. While the fury of the struggle in the west waxes and wanes, stupendous campaigns are under way in the east, and the operations at the Dardanelles are approaching their climax. Yet the thunder of unnumbered guns and the clamor of battlefields that stretch for hundreds of miles cannot drown the whispers of peace which speed from capital to capital and echo in every court and antechamber of diplomacy. The singular and significant thing is that these rumors and suggestions originate in Germany. It is the conqueror of Belgium, the possessor of the richest parts of France and Poland, the humbler of mighty Russia and the unbeaten antagonist of the greatest coalition in history that proffers to her enemies an olive branch—on the point of a bayonet.

Few persons realize, we think, how many demands for peace have emanated from Germany and how frank have been the discussions of terms among the people of the empire. Influential men and newspapers—and even officials—have asserted frequently in recent times that Germany is ready for settlement. Even the casual observer needs no reminder that these manifestations of German sentiment signify not weariness or despair

or distrust of the empire's powers, but, rather, a supreme confidence. The peace which Germans discuss is invariably a German peace; the terms which they debate are those of conquerors. Sharp differences of opinion have arisen, especially in the Social Democratic and National Liberal parties, as to the extent of the spoils which triumphant Germany should claim; but there is no doubt anywhere in the empire that she has achieved the power to dictate the final treaty. It would be very difficult to define the limits of "an honorable peace" according to the German view; but it will be interesting and instructive to set down some representative expressions.

Disregarding the vague intimations of Ambassador Bernstorff last August that Germany was "ready for peace at any moment," having "already won the war," the first outline of terms worthy of attention was that put forth in December by the eminent scientist, Dr. Ernst Haeckel. An absolute prerequisite to peace, he declared, was the breaking of the yoke of English tyranny through an invasion of England and the occupation of London. Then there must be a partition of Belgium—Antwerp and the coast as far as Ostend going to Germany, the northern part to Holland and the southeastern part to German Luxemburg. Germany must retain also the northeastern part of France and receive most of the British colonies, together with Belgium's Congo Free State and the Baltic provinces of Russia, while Austria took over Poland. Early in March much more comprehensive terms were put forth in a pamphlet by Rudolph Martin, a former minister of the interior. By a treaty to be signed in conquered London, an indemnity aggregating two and one-half times the cost of the war was to be exacted, and divided among Germany, Austria and Turkey, in the proportions of 16, 10

and 4 parts, respectively. Germany would hold the Channel coast of France, Alsace-Lorraine, the Baltic provinces, Poland and Belgium, all the conquered territories, including England, to defray the cost of maintaining German armies of occupation for from five to ten years, according to the docility of the inhabitants. Citizens of the absorbed districts were to be made German conscripts and serve in distant parts of the empire. Servia was to be taken by Austria, while Turkey annexed Egypt; and France's North African possessions, as well as India, were to be administered from Berlin.

It is only fair to say that such forecasts as this have been infrequent. But a very strong element in Germany is determined that Belgium, whose fate constitutes the very heart of the war issue, shall never again know independence. "Belgium is a vital question for the German future," said the *Deutsches-Tageszeitung* a few months ago. "Her coasts and harbors must never again be allowed to subserve the interests of foreign Powers." This demand was prominent in the recent manifesto issued by six great industrial and agrarian leagues, which stated that Germans demand "an extension of frontiers east and west because we are forced to recognize that only an increase of political power can safeguard our peaceful work." In April came an official although unacknowledged intimation from the German government that acceptable terms would provide for a restoration of the territorial boundaries on the continent as they were before the war, if there were a "redistribution" of colonies and adequate guarantees of "freedom of the seas" in time of war. Belgium was to be evacuated, but not compensated in any degree for her losses and sufferings. About the same time Doctor Dernburg, of pleasant memory, informed Americans of

the principal items in the arrangements Germany was pleased to suggest, as follows:

Belgium, which commands the main outlet of western German trade, is the natural foreland of the empire, and has been conquered with untold sacrifice of blood and treasure. So Belgium cannot be given up. However, these considerations would be disregarded if all the other German demands—especially a guaranteed free sea—were fully complied with and all the natural commercial relations of Belgium to Germany were considered in a just and workable form.

The general sentiment for the retention of Belgium and other occupied territory is sharply opposed by a majority of the Social Democratic party. That organization has so strongly condemned "any annexation" that its organ, *Vorwaerts*, was suppressed a few weeks ago for publishing the party's full-page appeal for a peace "which will make possible friendly relations with neighboring nations." Yet the Socialists are not one whit less confident than their compatriots of a "victorious" peace. In a subsequent statement they say:

Germany, which has defended herself victoriously against a large number of enemies, which has proved to the world that she can be crushed neither by military nor economic force, and has clearly demonstrated her superiority, should take the first step toward peace.

Leading Berlin journals a month ago warned the world that peace suggestions originate "not from a feeling of weakness, but from universal consciousness of strength," and that "Germany waits, without impatience, until her opponents draw the inevitable conclusion from her favorable situation." Dr. Edouard David, spokesman for the Social Democratic party, while urging an early peace, expressed a pained surprise that a like sentiment had not arisen among Germany's enemies. He said:

It strikes us strangely that after the proof of our military and economic strength, and in view of our favorable posi-

tion in all the theaters of war, people in hostile countries can still seriously believe that they can crush Germany, amputate her politically and strangle her economically. We hope the day is not far off when the hostile Powers will realize that their objects are unattainable and that by continuing the war against us they are damaging themselves most.

The irrepressible university professors, of course, are well to the fore in this discussion. An influential group of them declared the other day that Belgium must be subject to Germany; France must pay a huge indemnity and cede all territory north and east of a line from Belfort to the mouth of the River Somme, while Russia must surrender Poland and the Baltic provinces. Naturally, the German triumphs in Russia have stimulated German confidence of receiving an early surrender from the Allies; the imperial chancellor confessed that he saw in the fall of Warsaw promise of hastened peace. But, as intimated to the Vatican, Germany is to be the judge, not the suitor. The German conviction is absolutely clear. Government and people may have realized that some of their early expectations of overwhelming victory are impossible; but they are today more confident than ever that they are invincible and that ultimately—within a short time—their exhausted antagonists will agree to accept Berlin's terms. They are already estimating the indemnities that will restore the empire's shattered prosperity, preparing to exploit the rich resources of Belgium, northeast France and Poland, and dividing other territorial spoils between Austria and Turkey. This is the peace which Germany expectantly awaits. The reasons for her confidence we shall examine tomorrow.

WILL GERMANY DICTATE TERMS?

August 19, 1915.

A BERLIN dispatch the other day remarked that Germany's confidence of victory was justified by the lead which she has constantly maintained over her enemies. Even now, said the writer, she is so far ahead of them that while they are still preparing for war she is preparing for peace. We discussed yesterday the unanimous belief in Germany that the empire has already won the war and will be able to dictate terms to the coalition. Germans have dismissed defeat from their calculations; the only differences of opinion concern the size of the indemnities and the extent of foreign territory she will demand and what guarantees of subservience she will exact from a subjugated world. It will be worth while to examine the conditions upon which this conviction is founded.

Aside from the unity and determination of the people, there seem to be four main reasons underlying German confidence. First is the remarkable success of the imperial arms thus far. In a year of war Germany has captured more than 12,000 guns and more than 3,000,000 prisoners, and she now occupies 112,500 square miles of foreign soil—18,125 square miles in Belgium, 13,125 in France and 81,250 in Russia. And the territories she holds in the west are the richest in Europe. Behind the German lines in France are concentrated nearly one-half of the industries of the republic, 70 per cent of the coal and 90 per cent of the native iron. Moreover, the great-

est campaign of the war has produced a series of unexampled triumphs for the kaiser. The great armies of Russia have been thrust back in disorder, half a score of strong fortresses have been taken and a new Russian offensive made impossible for many months.

The second favorable condition is the holding of important strategical advantages. Germany and Austria fight, according to the military phrase, "on interior lines"; that is, their forces are concentrated and can strike in any direction at will, while their enemies are divided and must maintain longer lines. Her military organization, the product of forty years of indefatigable labor, has been perfected by experience. German ingenuity has given her in the submarine a weapon which permits her to harass the enemy while keeping her own fleet safe in harbors. Above all, she is able to make her opponents bear the most crushing burdens of the war, for, except in a small strip of lower Alsace, the battlefields are all on alien soil. While she makes use of the resources of Belgium and northeastern France, her enemies are deprived of their most valuable assets and are compelled virtually to support the invaders.

The third source of German strength lies in the marvelously efficient system which has organized every human being and every activity in the empire for the purposes of war. The problems of food and unemployment and business depression, it is declared, have been solved, science has found substitutes for unobtainable supplies and the calm declaration is made that Germany can fight "indefinitely." Finally, it is argued that the tremendous successes in the offensive, both east and west, prove beyond possibility of doubt that, should she choose to assume the defensive, Germany's lines will be found absolutely impregnable. If she could take and hold for a year great territories in Belgium and France,

and, while defending those, rout the vast armies of Russia, how can it be expected, her people ask, that any endeavors by the Allies will break down the successive lines of fortifications that now stretch from the Channel to Switzerland west of the Rhine? It all comes to this: Germany has suffered a check in her original plans, but no overwhelming defeat. Her armies are intrenched on foreign soil, while her own land, after a year of superhuman effort by her enemies, is free from invasion. She is supremely confident of holding all she has gained, hence is persuaded that her antagonists will soon see the hopelessness of their plans and seek terms.

So universal and so serene is this confidence that German writers express a plaintive bewilderment over the blind optimism of their opponents. "It strikes us strangely," said a leading member of the reichstag recently, "that people in hostile countries can still seriously believe they can crush Germany." Even in the United States this idea is promoted. A New York newspaper, which publishes an edition in German, said last week in its English-printed edition:

Poland is taken and formally occupied by the Germans. The German western front remains unbroken. The Italian advance is checked. The difficulty of "destroying Germany" must now be apparent to all the participants in this maniacal conflict. Since nothing is to be gained by further war, why not restore the common good, universal progress and prosperity by peace?

Those who accept this German view reason upon inconclusive testimony. It is true that Germany holds vast enemy territory; it is true that her military power is the greatest ever possessed by a single nation, and that the disciplined docility of her people gives the government a tremendous force to wield. But there are other weapons than cannon and submarines and there

are other factors in the problem besides German efficiency and German self-confidence. Germany has not yet felt the full force of her antagonists' power. Her blithe discussion of probable terms finds no echo in France, in Belgium, in England or even in Russia. In not one of those countries is there a sign of readiness to yield. They recognize as clearly as she does herself her remarkable military achievements; they are aware of her hordes of prisoners, and take into full account the fact that while holding a 450-mile battlefront in the west against two great Powers, in the east she has paralyzed the offensive of a third.

But they also know that their armies are still in being, with 3,000,000 British troops yet to be thrown into the scale, and that their fleets have swept her merchantmen from the seas and locked her greatest ports against all trade. A wall of steel bars her progress to the west; in the North sea only her stealthy submarines dare venture; eastward lie the inhospitable wastes of Russia, and southward hostile Italy and the distrustful Balkans. The iron ring forged around her holds relentlessly. With this situation the Germans profess to be content. They declare that their invincibility, in both a military and an economic sense, has been proved. Doctor Dernburg not long ago expressed clearly the German concept:

Germany can fight, if need be, a defensive war, and will come out victorious if she just holds on to what she has got. The Allies must then fight an offensive war, and must consider themselves beaten unless they can carry the war into Germany's own territory.

It is characteristic of the national temperament that the excellent doctor decides offhand the enemy's strategy—they "must" take the offensive and they "must consider themselves beaten" unless they drive the German armies back into their own country. No account

is taken of the possibility that the Allies also have an impregnable line and of the effect if they, too, "just hold on to what they have got." Let it be conceded that those tremendous German barricades in the west, with their miles of massive trenches backed by bristling fortifications, cannot be taken by storm except at a cost impossible to bear—what then? If the Allies continue their siege by sea and land, what then? The war becomes a test of endurance, of capacity to expend blood and money. And Germany, condemned to subsist upon her own resources, confronts nations which can draw their supplies from all the earth. How long can she resist the pressure?

Indefinitely, say her spokesmen proudly. She cannot be beaten or starved or economically strangled; she can continue to match men and munitions and food and money with England and France and Russia until those nations, lacking her scientific efficiency and reserves of devoted patriotism, collapse in exhaustion and agree to accept her decrees. This is a striking theory, and no more fantastic than the belief in Teutonic Kultur as necessary to the salvation of the world. But if the war resolves itself into a question of endurance, which will break first—Germany, not only self-sustaining but self-consuming, or Great Britain and France, with every market open to their commercial and financial operations; Germany, with every gateway barred against her, or the Allies, free to draw a support from their loyal dependencies and from all the world besides? The scientific skill with which the imperial government has conserved the public resources, enforced economy and systematized both the production and consumption of necessities, commands world-wide admiration; but there are economic laws which cannot be set aside by imperial decree, howsoever loyal the support given to it, and Ger-

many's enemies are resolved that she shall feel the full force of these laws through their blockade of her commercial activities. Given one group of countries forbidden to import or export and required to restrict their commerce within their own borders and an opposing group free to send goods to every world market and draw supplies therefrom, and the controlling factor is not military efficiency, but mathematics—the first group must break through the barrier erected around it or succumb. The logic of the situation is clearly recognized by the Allies. There will be no more glory-hunting expeditions by the French in Alsace-Lorraine, no more costly “victories” like that of the British at Neuve-chapelle. A recent authoritative statement from Paris outlined the policy which answers the German complaint that, according to all the rules, the Allies should now be imploring peace:

By continuous offensive actions from February to July the French army demoralized approximately 2,000,000 men and captured an enormous amount of material. It would be a serious mistake to measure our effort by the ground conquered. The demoralization and wearing down of the German army is the real goal.

As for Great Britain, while her own leaders deplore the fact that she has not yet exerted her full strength, that circumstance should be ominous, rather than gratifying, to intelligent Germans. British inertia is a dire thing to overcome, but once the power of that empire starts in motion it exerts an immeasurable force. It was ten years, not one, from Trafalgar to Waterloo, and the nation which for that length of time battled against Napoleon is not likely to surrender to “frightfulness” after twelve or fifteen months.

Germany's confidence that she is to dictate the terms of peace, therefore, confronts two adamantine

facts upon which the stupendous victories in Poland make no impression. One is that the seas are barred against her; the other that she is farther from Paris and the Channel ports than she was one year ago. But beyond these things lies a force no less powerful, and this is the fact that no nation would dare to yield to Germany while it had the merest fragments of defensive strength left. It needs nothing less than a Teutonic imagination to conceive of France or Great Britain or even Russia casting itself upon the mercies of a nation that glories in its own outlawry and moral isolation. Even when it seemed only a matter of hours when Paris would be in German hands, the French people exhibited a steadfastness and valor against which the German hosts hurled themselves in vain; infinitely less is the chance of their submitting now. Nor is the increase of the British armies from 200,000 men to 3,000,000 an argument for surrender. Germany seems destined to learn that the war which she considers to be ending is just beginning. The skill of her strategists and the courage and discipline of her people, whether in arms or not, command universal admiration. But if she expects her antagonists to yield while their grip upon her holds she is doomed to disappointment. Every convulsive effort that she makes drains her human and economic resources. Keen and strong are those iron teeth which she has been sharpening for forty years; but they are gnawing upon a file.

THE BALKAN BALANCE SWAYS

September 27, 1915.

ONE day last week a hawk-nosed, bearded man, sitting at a desk in an obscure city in southeastern Europe, wrote one word—his name—at the foot of a document which lay before him. The rumbling of an earthquake could hardly have been felt so far or so swiftly as the scratching of his pen; for the ink was hardly dry upon his signature before half a dozen courts were in a ferment and distant capitals were thrilling with exultation or alarm. Ferdinand I, czar of Bulgaria, had ordered mobilization. The war eagles that sprang from the Balkan heights fourteen months ago have circled back to their eyries. It was in that turbulent peninsula that the great conflict began, and there it may be decided. Who wins the Balkans, we said five months ago, wins the war. And Bulgaria has made the first move in the contest that will settle the fate of Europe and the future course of civilization. One need not be a military expert to discern the significance of the desperate diplomatic conflict in which the prize seems to have been snatched by Germany. It will be strange if the new war theater does not soon eclipse in interest the tremendous battle spectacles in the west and the east. For it is to be decided there which alliance will first reach Constantinople and victory—England, France and Italy through the Dardanelles and along the rocky heights of Gallipoli, or Germany and Austria across Servia and Bulgaria. The vital relation-

ship of the Balkans to the great upheaval is so familiar to observant readers that a very brief outline of past events will serve to recall the important facts.

In 1912 the Balkan league—Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro—conquered and wrested from Turkey the greater part of her territory in Europe. In this war Bulgaria bore the brunt of the fighting, and, by agreement with Serbia, she was to have received as her reward Macedonia, where large numbers of her people had suffered under the Moslem yoke. Serbia's ambition was an Adriatic port. When the great Powers shut her in from the sea by erecting the absurd kingdom of Albania she refused to relinquish her Macedonian conquest, and persuaded Greece, Bulgaria's rival for the Turkish coast on the Aegean sea, to stand with her. Stung to fury by her balked desire, Bulgaria suddenly attacked her allies. She might have beaten them, too, but Rumania, her northern neighbor, joined them. In a few weeks Bulgaria was crushed and compelled to relinquish not only Macedonia, but a strip of territory to Rumania and the land she had conquered direct from the Turks, who had reoccupied it. When the great war began, just twelve months later, the stage was fully set for the greatest diplomatic contest of all time. Serbia and Montenegro were already with the anti-Teutonic allies, and Turkey later joined the other group. This left Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece unattached, but each and all determined to barter their services for the highest possible price. Bulgaria's ambition, intensified by her defeat and humiliation, is to possess Macedonia, which she claims by historic and racial rights. Rumania wishes to "redeem" her people in Austrian Transylvania and Bukowina by incorporating those territories in her kingdom. Greece aims to extend her boundaries for the same reason.

To all these countries the war has spelled one word—opportunity. In a popular sense, they have their sympathies with one side or the other, but, in a governmental sense, they have candidly avowed that their sole motive is national self-interest. In all three there is conflict between the people, who lean in sentiment toward England or France or Italy or Russia, and the sovereigns, who incline toward the Teutonic alliance. Ferdinand of Bulgaria is a prince of Saxe-Coburg and an implacable foe of Russia, while his subjects feel that they owe their independence from Turkey to Slav influence. Ferdinand of Rumania imbibed his politics from his predecessor, Charles, a Hohenzollern, but his people are Italian in sympathy. Constantine of Greece is swayed by his consort, a sister of the German emperor, yet finds the premier he dismissed for anti-Teutonic policies returned triumphantly by the voters.

It would have seemed that the Allies should have found it easy to purchase Balkan support. That they have failed has not been due to lack of effort. They recognized months ago that Bulgaria, so recently beaten and humiliated, held the key to the situation, for neither Rumania nor Greece would dare to move while Bulgaria was palpably poised for a war of revenge at the first opportunity. Unremitting endeavor has been made, therefore, to placate the sullen Bulgars. Pressure was put upon Serbia and Greece to surrender the Macedonian territories they held. Greece refused; and with reason, it seemed, for mass meetings in her Macedonian province have denounced the proposal to turn those lands over to Bulgaria. Serbia, exhausted by war and the ravages of disease, was more amenable, and agreed to the sacrifice, in return for guarantees of her coveted Adriatic port. Victory for the Allies seemed assured, for on August 9 the Bulgarian premier declared:

We will fight for but one end—to extend our frontiers until they embrace the peoples of our own blood. If we are asked to fight with Greece, Servia and Rumania in a new Balkan alliance on the side of the Allies, we are ready. To the Allies we say, "Give us back Servian Macedonia, and we will fight in the way we can serve you best."

But in Ferdinand the Allies confronted a statesman whose vanity and ambition have not sapped his vigor of character. Possessed with the purpose to make his kingdom the "Prussia of the Balkans" and consumed with determination to avenge the humiliation he suffered in the second Balkan war, he prolonged the negotiations, bewildered the allied diplomats with evasions, defiances, concessions and new demands, all the while treating openly with Germany, Austria and Turkey and playing one group against the other with masterly craft. One thing is to be said in behalf of Balkan diplomacy—it is utterly without pretense of altruism. Those nations make no assertion that their arms are at the service of humanity or that they are eager to fight for the good of civilization at large. The nearest approach to moral sentiment they profess is a desire for national unity. And to attain that ideal they would deal with Beelzebub himself if he were a recognized potentate in the affairs of Europe.

For the defeat of the diplomacy of the Allies there seem to be five main reasons: First, Czar Ferdinand and his government are anti-Russian and pro-German. Second, the rout of the Russian armies has isolated Rumania and made Greece cautious. Third, Germany offered as much for Bulgarian neutrality as the Allies offered for Bulgarian participation on their side. Fourth, to accept Macedonia from the Allies would be to aid and consent to the establishment of Russia at Constantinople, which would mean the doom of Bulgarian leader-

ship in the Balkans. Fifth, and most important, is the situation described last week by Ferdinand:

The Triple Entente is not sure of winning. Nothing indicates at this moment that such will be the case. If Bulgaria's chance of obtaining Macedonia depends on the Entente, it may never be realized. My government is following a policy which is positive in action and certain of good results.

The next great move indicated in the war is a drive of the Teutonic forces to the relief of Constantinople. The Turks are in desperate straits, and, in default of assistance in men and munitions, must soon be overcome by the pressure of the Allies at the Dardanelles. There are only two routes the German hosts can follow. They can make a second Belgium of Rumania, which has maintained scrupulous neutrality; or they can fight their way across the northeastern corner of Servia—thirty or forty miles—and then march unopposed through friendly Bulgaria to the Turkish capital.

The war interest, which shifted in May from France to Russia, shifts again to the race of mighty armies toward Constantinople. Upon the result may well depend the decision that means so much to Europe and the world. If the allied forces batter their way into the Moslem capital first, they will crush Turkey, swing Rumania and Greece to their side, open the way to pour munitions into Russia and forge around Germany and Austria a fatal ring. If, before that can be accomplished, the German and Austrian hosts can force a path through Servia and join the Bulgarians, they will isolate Russia, paralyze Rumania and Greece and erect a solid rampart from the North sea to the Bosphorus that all the power of the Allies might not be able to pierce.

THE SUBMARINE FAILURE

September 30, 1915.

IT MAY seem frivolous, but we have always associated Germany's ruthless submarine policy, now happily modified, with the whiskers of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. Whenever we heard of the torpedoing of a defenseless passenger ship, we had an unpleasant vision of that monstrous forked beard wagging in cruel satisfaction. No doubt this conception was unjust, for a biographer tells us that the originator of submarine assassination has a charming personality and "presides over an ideal family life." None the less, his appearance seemed to fit his policy. The new chief of the naval general staff, Admiral von Holtzendorff, whose recent elevation was said to mark the abandonment of the system of indiscriminate slaughter, also wears an imposing beard; but it is of an honest, wholesome pattern, such as one might concede to a strategist who believes that war should be waged against the armed forces of an enemy, and not against women and children and other non-combatants. This drastic change is, of course, one of the most important developments of the war and of more vital concern than any other to the United States. There is no positive assurance as yet that through "misapprehension" or "exceeding of orders" some submarine commander will not precipitate another crisis with this country; but the new naval management is unquestionably committed to the policy of avoiding such acts.

Because the pledge to this effect was transmitted through Ambassador Bernstorff, it may be understood that the change has been dictated in part by a desire to meet the demands of the United States. But the universal contempt and hostility aroused in Germany by the American notes showed that they alone would never compel an abandonment of the murderous system. Other and far stronger considerations have operated to curb the purpose of relentless destruction. The most persuasive fact is that the Von Tirpitz submarine warfare has been a failure. It has not accomplished, and cannot accomplish, the task for which it was adopted. The grand admiral's plan to starve Great Britain by mercilessly destroying all shipping to and from the island has collapsed. Britain has more merchant vessels and Germany fewer submarines than when the terrifying "war zone" decree was promulgated. It will be interesting to glance at the history of this extraordinary attempt and the reasons for its abandonment. The purpose was explicitly stated by Von Tirpitz in his famous interview, when he startled the civilized world by the proposal to torpedo merchant ships without warning. It was a mathematical certainty, he declared, that this would soon reduce England to starvation. It was announced that considerations of law and justice and humanity must give way to the higher force of "military necessity."

The earlier achievements were hailed as evidence that the plan was feasible, while the notable exploit of destroying the *Lusitania* was "contemplated with joyful pride" as marking the doom of British sea power. "It proves two things," declared Professor Kuhnemann, of Breslau, then in St. Louis: "First, that Germany has the power to crush any nation that tries to starve her; second, that the prestige of the English navy is gone

forever." Doctor Dernburg was equally emphatic. There would be no abandonment, he said, of the relentless warfare against ships carrying contraband, whether of enemy or neutral nationality. It is clear, therefore, that Germany employed all her skill and energy in promoting this means of destruction. It was declared that she was building two or three submarines a month, and would infallibly sweep from the sea all shipping sailing to or from the ports of her enemy. After eight months it is possible to measure her success.

During the first "war zone" week eight British vessels, ranging from 337 to 5867 tons, were destroyed by mines or torpedoes. In the six weeks ending March 31 forty merchantmen were sunk, while six submarines were officially reported as destroyed. During this period 8220 British steamships arrived at ports in the United Kingdom and 7632 sailed. At the close of the eleventh week, July 22, the record showed the loss of 235 vessels, with 1641 non-combatants slain, while there had been more than 30,000 arrivals and departures. Although the submarine was accounting for such a trifling percentage of the enemy's shipping and had not been able to interfere in the slightest degree with the enormous transport of troops and supplies to the continent, the German people seemed to be satisfied with the official announcements that British sea power had been hopelessly broken. The fact was that British shipping increased faster than the undersea boats could destroy it. During the first three months of 1915, forty-eight vessels, including fishing smacks, were sunk by the Germans, the total tonnage being 130,358. During the same period 125 ships, with a tonnage of 267,612, were launched, and nearly 500 more were under construction, representing 1,587,467 tons additional. Yet it was not until July that any noteworthy suspicion of the submarine theory was

expressed. Admiral von Truppel, advocating concessions to the United States, wrote as follows:

Can we hope to force England to her knees through submarine warfare against her commerce? If the answer is in the negative, our submarines can find better employment against hostile warships.

But in August came a still more candid and more influential repudiation. Captain Persius, naval expert of the Berliner Tageblatt, warned the German people that their hopes of a triumph through submarines were shattered. He wrote:

Expectations have been exaggerated. Today it is unwise to conceal the fact that the results of our submarine warfare on commerce are to be regarded as, let us say, very modest. There were sunk up to July 25 by our submarines 229 English and 30 other hostile ships; that is to say, about 1.5 ships a day. If we consider that of 1000 ships arriving at and departing from British ports we sink ten, it is understandable that many a German will not declare himself satisfied.

Explaining that it takes a long time to build an undersea boat and that the British had devised "many measures of defense," the expert remarked plaintively that "submarine warfare is not a simple matter." Great indignation, but no effective answer, was called forth by the recent statement of Mr. Balfour, first lord of the admiralty, that the Von Tirpitz plan had been shattered. He said: "The losses inflicted upon the German submarines have been formidable, while British mercantile tonnage is at this moment greater than when the war began. Herein lies the explanation of the amazing change which had come over the diplomatic attitude of Germany toward the United States. The deeds which in May were merely crimes in September are seen to be blunders."

Not only have the submarines failed in their mission, but they have themselves suffered "formidable"

losses. Credible testimony has been repeatedly given that from forty to fifty of the huge undersea boats have been destroyed. And the loss of the vessels is not so important as the elimination of trained officers and crews, who are difficult to replace, together with the devastating effect upon the morale of the service. The methods employed against the submersible destroyers are simple, but deadly. British waters simply swarm with trawlers and other small vessels, as well as swift torpedo boats, which keep up a ceaseless patrol. A submarine sighted is virtually doomed, for it cannot dive quick enough to escape, and a single shot may sink it. Another device is dragging the waters with steel nets stretched between two patrol boats. When a submarine is caught the net is released, and the entangled craft sinks helplessly to the bottom of the sea.

It is likely that from time to time a submarine will accomplish a feat worth while, but the overshadowing menace imagined by Von Tirpitz has been dissipated. He made the common mistake of believing that invention ends with the devising of a new weapon, whereas the ingenuity of man is equal to contriving some kind of defense against the most elaborate system of destruction. Just as the terrible Zeppelins have found that they dare not approach Paris, so the British and French soldiers have been able to protect themselves against the German asphyxiating gases. And the all-conquering submarine has been paralyzed by the activities of fleets of fishing boats.

THE BALKAN CONFLAGRATION

October 8, 1915.

THOSE who have casually decided that the war in its greater aspects had a single cause—whether Russia's mobilization or Germany's support of Austria or England's regard for Belgium—would be puzzled by a passage in Herbert Adams Gibbons' illuminating book, "The New Map of Europe." Having described the first Balkan war, in 1912, when Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria stripped Turkey of most of her European dominions, he turns to the second Balkan war, when the allies quarreled over the spoils. It had been agreed that Bulgaria should have the greater part of Macedonia, while Serbia should realize her ambition for an Adriatic port. The great Powers forbade the latter design, whereupon Serbia refused to surrender Macedonia. The writer tells how Servian and Bulgarian outposts, during the ominous negotiations, fraternized and exchanged hopes of an early settlement. But he says:

Little did they realize the horrible plot that was being coolly planned at Sofia, which was to cause a new period of bloodshed and destruction in Macedonia, frustrate all the efforts of the European chancelleries and bring in its wake the world-wide war.

Thus one of the innumerable causes which converged to plunge half the population of the globe into strife was the clashing of territorial claims among the little Balkan nations. And now, after more than fourteen months of vast campaigning—in France and Belgium, in Poland and Russia, in the North sea and the

south Pacific, in the Alps and in China—the great belligerents find themselves groping for a decision in the Balkan peninsula. It falls to Bulgaria once more to force the issue. Politically and strategically, there is a curious similarity between the crisis two years ago and now. Mr. Gibbons writes:

On Sunday night, June 29, 1913, without any declaration of war or even warning, the Bulgarian commander ordered a general attack all along the Greek and Servian lines. There was no direct provocation on the part of Bulgaria's allies. The responsibility for precipitating the war which brought about her humiliation can be directly fixed. Two general orders, dated at Sofia on June 29, have been published. They set forth an amazing and devilish scheme, which stands out as a most cold and bloody calculation, even among all the horrors of Balkan history. General Sovoff stated positively that this action was not the commencement of a war. It was merely for the purpose of occupying as much territory as possible in the contested regions before the intervention of the Powers. The fighting began in the nighttime, and the Bulgarians were naturally able to advance into important positions.

Of course her perfidious act failed. Servia and Greece rallied and threw back the Bulgarian forces, and when Rumania invaded her neighbor's territory from the north the end was sure. The second Balkan war took from Bulgaria most of the spoils she had wrested from Turkey and left her to nurse the humiliation of having cast away not only her prestige, but her honor. Yet now she has decided—or Czar Ferdinand has decided for her—to risk a like adventure. And just as her historic treachery was described as a mere maneuver to "occupy contested territory," so her recent mobilization, under the guidance of German officers and following the signing of a treaty with Turkey, has been the subject of voluble protestations to the effect that her sole aim is "armed neutrality" and that no threat against her neighbors is

implied. Nothing could have been more explicit than her repeated assurances of impartiality. To Russia, to England, to France and to Italy, as well as to Servia and Greece, the Bulgarian government has declared again and again that the single purpose of the nation has been to fulfill its "national aspirations" by the possession of Macedonia. Yet the formal guarantee of that concession from Servia received no acknowledgment except the order of mobilization. While pretending to continue negotiations with the Triple Entente, Bulgaria was secretly accepting territory from her historic enemy, the Turk, and confiding direction of her mobilization to Germany.

In the titanic and ever-widening struggle that is now going on self-interest must be the guiding principle of nations in the zone of war. On this basis one must concede to Bulgaria the right to choose between the opposing groups of belligerents. If she stooped to bloody-minded treachery against her allies in 1913, she had a certain provocation in the fact that, after doing most to overwhelm Turkey, she was shut out from the territory which was to be her reward. And her one ambition now is to acquire those lands. The woes of Belgium, the rights of humanity and the progress of civilization—these are nothing to her. She has no concern except to advance her own interests, as she understands them, by enlarging her frontiers. And her Hapsburg sovereign, whose sympathies lie naturally with the Teutonic empires, has risked his throne by forcing his country into that alliance. At the same time, he has given a more bitter meaning to the old taunt against Bulgaria as being "the ungrateful nation." Without the enormous sacrifice of Russia, in 1877-78, Bulgaria would not exist; she owes her independence from Moslem rule to Russian arms, and her security since that time to Brit-

ish Liberalism, Gladstone's championship of her nationality being one of the great policies of his career.

There was, therefore, more than diplomatic verbiage in the description of Bulgaria's attitude, by the Russian foreign minister, as "unthinkable treachery," and in the twenty-four-hour ultimatum from Petrograd which Czar Ferdinand chose to ignore. A group of Bulgarians in Paris voiced a strong sentiment among their people when they telegraphed to Sofia an urgent protest against the pro-German scheme, reminding the ruler that "Russia is our liberator, England our protector, France our good friend." Far more significant, however, is the open opposition of the political groups arrayed against the government. No playwright ever conceived a more dramatic scene than the interview which took place the other day between Czar Ferdinand and the leaders of these elements, as it has been described by the Sofia correspondent of the most influential newspaper in Italy. He told how the leaders, one by one, warned the headstrong sovereign that he was defying the wishes of the people and risking the very life of the nation upon an adventure likely to be more disastrous than that of 1913:

"You alone," said Stambulivski, "are the author of this policy, and you alone will have the responsibility of it."

"It is one which I consider the best," the king coldly replied, "and most advantageous for the country."

"It is a policy which can lead only to disaster," retorted the leader of the peasant farmers; "which will compromise not only the future of the country, but your own dynasty, and which may cost you your head."

The king measured with his eyes the countryman who spoke such weighty words.

"Do not trouble yourself about my head," he said. "It is an old one. Rather think of your own."

There is little doubt that this picturesque account is approximately true. Balkan statesmen are a hardy lot,

and Ferdinand is no weakling. When he accepted the proffered crown of Bulgaria twenty-eight years ago he did it without asking permission of the great Powers, and as prince, king and czar he has lived up to the most romantic requirements of those exalted offices. An autocrat by instinct, he has pursued undeviatingly the ambition to make his nation the Prussia of the Balkans, and has staked it all upon the new alliance. It is his purpose to be czar in fact as well as in name, and there seems to be nothing short of a revolution that can break the link he has forged to join Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople. The possibility of such an uprising seems to us remote. It may be true—it probably is true—that the Bulgarian people lean in sympathy toward Russia and England. But this war has shown that the spirit of nationality is stronger than any ties of international sentiment—stronger even than the solemnly proclaimed brotherhood of world Socialism. Let a few Bulgarian soldiers be killed at the frontier, and we may expect to see the nation aflame with patriotic ardor and the czar who is now distrusted hailed as the savior of his people from foreign aggressors.

German diplomacy, then, has fashioned another difficult problem for her adversaries to solve. If she has it in her to stretch her battle front so short a distance as forty miles, she will command an unbroken line from the English Channel to the Bosphorus. The tremendous possibilities of these new war moves we shall discuss tomorrow.

GERMANY'S BALKAN DRIVE

October 9, 1915.

IN ASKING parliament, a few weeks ago, for an additional war grant of a billion or two, Premier Asquith cheered his countrymen by explaining that huge sums would soon be needed to finance the operations of "new allies." The reference was plainly to the Near East, and forthwith British optimism, like a comfortable old clucking hen, settled itself upon the doubtful eggs of a Balkan intrigue. The hatching is now in progress, and it is of a nature to astonish the patient bird—Bulgarian hostility, Rumanian neutrality and Grecian turmoil that may result in anything from a domestic revolution to a declaration for Germany. It is no exaggeration to say that the great war has entered upon a phase as distinct as that which began with the retreat of the Germans from the Marne or the sweeping of the Russians out of Poland. Until the tremendous issues now converging in the Balkans are settled and one side or the other reaches the goal of Constantinople the campaigns in France and Russia must be of minor significance.

The key-factor in the baffling puzzle of the Balkans is, of course, the overlapping of interests, racial, dynastic, political and territorial. It is this entanglement of purposes, complicated by the titanic efforts of the two groups of belligerents to control the peninsula, that produces the kaleidoscopic changes from day to day which bewilder the observer. Bulgaria, owing her very

existence as a nation to Russia and England, is ruled by a pro-Austrian autocrat and is determined to realize her ambitions at the expense of her neighbors, chiefly Servia. Rumania, ruled by a Hohenzollern, holds land which she wrested from Bulgaria two years ago; her people are sentimentally with the Allies, but she is hemmed in between Austria on the north and Bulgaria on the south, and has been isolated by the retirement of the Russian armies with which she might have united. Greece, whose queen is a sister of the kaiser, also possesses territory which Bulgaria covets; an ally of Servia, her people hate Bulgars, Turks and Teutons with impartial fervor, yet hesitate to oppose either the Teutonic alliance advancing overland or the Anglo-French-Italian alliance, which dominates the Mediterranean.

It would be impossible to imagine more fertile ground for intrigue than this turbulent corner of Europe. For months the two great groups of belligerents have been engaged in a desperate struggle for diplomatic supremacy, and, with the adhesion of Bulgaria to the German cause, the final decision is being rapidly forced. At the time of writing—one dare not prophesy Balkan events twenty-four hours ahead—the situation seems to justify the exultation of Berlin and the gloom of London. German and Austrian forces are massing for a drive against Servia's northern line, the primary aim being to reach the friendly or "benevolently neutral" territory of Bulgaria, which would give an open road to Constantinople and forestall the efforts of the Allies to reach the Turkish capital by way of Gallipoli. Rumania, held neutral by her pro-German government, despite the sympathies of her people, is in a pitiable state of uncertainty, since Russia cannot help her and she faces on the one side the demand of Austria for free passage of munitions to Turkey and on the other the ominous

preparations of Bulgaria to win back territory and prestige lost during the second Balkan war. Bulgaria, having deluded the diplomatic agents of the Allies for a year by pretending to consider offers of Servian Macedonia, finally accepted a slice of territory from her historic enemy, Turkey, and mobilized her forces so as to be ready to join the Teutonic invaders of Servia. Ignoring an ultimatum from Russia, so long her master, she is ready to take revenge for the humiliation of 1913. Russia's defeat has convinced Czar Ferdinand that his ambition to be ruler of the whole peninsula has the best chance of being fulfilled by an alliance with Germany.

The Bulgarian decision leaves Greece the present vital factor in the situation. The issue is narrowing swiftly, and the fate of Europe may be said to hang upon the turn of the conflict between King Constantine of the Hellenes, swayed by his German consort, and the popular leader, Venizelos, whom he has just dismissed from the premiership. There is no doubt whatever that Greek sentiment has been with the Allies from the beginning, or at least with England and France. But the king's determination to maintain neutrality has been successful because this sympathy has been chilled by considerations of caution. The campaign of the Allies at the Dardanelles, which seemed to promise the long-desired partition of Turkey, has lagged to apparent failure. Moreover, Grecian nationalism could not look with much enthusiasm upon the prospect of Russia in Constantinople and Italy dominant in the Adriatic. Paradoxically, the sweeping back of Russia's advance helped further to dampen the ardor for Greek intervention. Most of all, the Allies put a severe strain upon Grecian friendship when they insisted upon the surrender of Grecian Macedonia to Bulgaria, in the impossible hope of winning over that treacherous government. Vague

promises of a sphere of influence in Asia Minor seemed no compensation for delivering to a hated enemy lands populated by Hellenes. Besides, there was the obvious chance of joining a losing cause. So long as Bulgaria had her flag for sale to the highest bidder Greece dared not declare herself; and, since Bulgaria has made the barter, the issue has become more menacing than before. For the moment King Constantine and his pro-German court are in command. Venizelos, an open partisan of the Allies, resigned as premier seven months ago in order to prove that he, and not the sovereign, controlled the destinies of Greece. His audacity was justified, for at the elections he was triumphantly returned, and forthwith started to swing the nation actively to the side of England and France. He has rivaled in influence and popularity even the king—whom, by the way, he literally made the national hero. But the triumph won by his reelection was not maintained. On September 30 the premier was wildly cheered when he declared that Greece would fulfill her treaty obligations with Servia in case that country were attacked by Bulgaria. But last Monday, after it was learned that the government had protested merely formally against the landing of French and British troops on Grecian soil for the purpose of aiding Servia, the vote of confidence was carried by a vote of only 142 to 102, thirteen members not voting. This result so stiffened the resolution of the king that he dismissed his prime minister and moved to form a coalition cabinet whose policy would be the maintenance of neutrality.

Once more, therefore, Germany has scored heavily against her adversaries. With Bulgaria her ally, Rumania paralyzed and Greece divided, she sees the path to Constantinople opening before her. The strategical significance of the swiftly moving drama of nations is

plain. Turkish resistance to the Allies' assaults is failing, chiefly because of lack of ammunition, passage of which Rumania refuses to permit. Deadlocked in the west and the east, Germany's hope of decisive victory lies in "hacking her way through" to the aid of her Moslem allies. This she plans to accomplish by cutting a road across Serbia. If she could extend her line only forty miles, through the northeastern corner of that country, it would provide the necessary junction with the Bulgarian forces. But the intervening Danube at that point is not easily crossed under fire, and the Servian mountain passes offer easy means of defense. Her more likely plan will be to fight her way along the railroad which runs southward from Belgrade to Nish, from which point one line continues southward to Salonica, Greece, and another southeast through Bulgaria to Constantinople. Bulgaria's task, meanwhile, will be to hurl a force westward and cut the line between Nish and Salonica, thus isolating the Servian armies from supplies and reinforcements.

It was just across the strait which divided Europe from Asia that Alexander, according to the legend, with a sweep of his sword cut the Gordian knot and claimed mastery of the world. Now the Balkan knot, which none has been able to unloose, lies between the two mightiest coalitions of history. The blade which severs it may decide the future of civilization.

A GREAT THRUST FOR VICTORY

October 12, 1915.

DETERMINED to enjoy all the dignities of belligerency, Bulgaria announces that in due course she will issue a "green book" explaining how she "has been forced into the war." We can imagine no document less interesting—except, perhaps, to the state printer. The government's entire case was stated in a recent manifesto to the nation:

Bulgaria must fight with the victors' side. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians are victorious on all fronts. Russia will soon have collapsed entirely; then will come the turn of France, Italy and Serbia. Bulgaria would commit suicide if she did not fight on the side of the central Powers, which offers the only possibility of realizing her desire for the union of all Bulgarian peoples.

While it lacks so blunt a presentation, the attitude of the Greek government is virtually the same. King Constantine, his court and the general staff are convinced that the Teutonic alliance will be victorious, or, at least, that it can never be defeated. It was the influence of this belief, supported by recent German triumphs, that chilled the enthusiasm of the people for war to such an extent that the king was able to dismiss Premier Venizelos, who had been elected by a vote of two to one on a platform pledging aid to England, France and Serbia. And it is because of like caution that Rumania, naturally a foe of Austria, maintains an attitude of rigid neutrality. It is true that these governmental opinions are little more than guesses. But in their be-

half it may be said that the Balkan nations are practiced observers of war. "Only facts count now in the Balkans," said the *Paris Temps* the other day. And the facts are that the Russian hosts have been rolled back, that the German line in the west is unbroken and that the Allies' campaign against the Turks apparently languishes to failure. The paralysis of Germany's sea power and the blockade of her ports may impress them somewhat; but how much do those checks count when they see her still exercising the initiative, forcing the war to an absolutely new phase and preparing to thrust her line to Constantinople, the gateway to the illimitable East? Only a few months ago the Teutons were hemmed in by relentless antagonists—Britain and France on the west, Russia on the east, Italy and Serbia on the south—while a closed sea completed the iron ring that was to strangle them into subjection. But endurance, efficiency and audacity burst the bonds, one crashing blow sent Russia reeling, and now that terrible right arm is free to hew a new pathway to the open. Something like this is the conception of the intently watchful Balkans, whose senses are sharpened by self-interest and wholly unhampered by sentiment. How much of logic is there in it?

The war is by no means over, and there is room for many a battle in the 500 miles between Belgrade and Constantinople. But no profound military knowledge is necessary to convince the observer that Germany's Balkan drive is a manifestation of astounding power and that it presents a situation more ominous for her opponents than any other since her sweep through Belgium toward Paris. The most obvious fact, as significant as any military move, is that the Allies have already suffered a crushing diplomatic defeat, or series of defeats. Their failure has been monumental, and it has even

possibilities of disaster. In the earliest days of the war this newspaper pointed out that the ultimate aim of Germany lay in control of the Balkan peninsula and that in that region the final struggle for supremacy would take place. The condition which was plain even at this distance must have been apparent to every trained statesman in Europe; yet after more than fourteen months those most interested in frustrating the Teutonic ambition find themselves baffled, humiliated, hopelessly outgeneraled. It may be that they did their best and that they were overcome by duplicity and forces which they could not circumvent. But weight must be allowed to such declarations as the following, from leading London newspapers:

British diplomacy [in Greece] was again at fault. It neither foresaw the change nor was prepared for it. It has been outwitted, and its prestige has suffered grievously. * * * English diplomacy has made a ghastly failure in the Balkans. Its record has been one of dismal, tragic weakness. * * * It has been a series of blunders. We have frittered away our great prestige of power and tradition in the Near East, literally allowing them to be snatched out of our hands through optimism, carelessness and stupidity. Our failure closes a great page in history. * * * Great Britain held a unique position in the Balkans, for she alone had a reputation for complete unselfishness in Balkan politics. That priceless advantage, somehow, has been frittered away in recent months, largely as the result of inattention, half-heartedness and want of a definite policy.

It is only fair to say that Germany had the advantage of being able to offer to the huckstering governments territorial compensations to be taken from her enemies, while the Allies had to rely upon concessions obtained from their friends. But Germany successfully induced her ally, Turkey, to surrender territory to Bulgaria, while the Allies failed in a like enterprise with Greece. Germany diplomacy, which has been a ceaseless

irritant to nations like the United States, has found a fertile field in the Balkans and has cultivated it with surpassing skill. Diplomatically routed, the Allies have to face the bitter consequence, which is a strategic situation of sinister possibilities. They must guard the Servian railroad from the threatened Bulgarian thrust, and eventually must meet the German and Austrian tidal wave pouring down toward Nish. The vital factor is that the Teutons, as from the beginning of the war, operate "on interior lines." They strike from the center outward; they have behind them vast, organized railroad systems, which guarantee to them unlimited supplies. The Allies have only a single line, and its terminus is the breadth of a continent from their bases. Salonica is 3000 miles by sea from Southampton, 1500 miles from Marseilles. Germany and Austria can pour troops into Servia by the trainload, and their advance line will not be more than thirty-six hours from their main depots. The Allies must transport every soldier and every pound of supplies by a sea journey of a week or ten days.

For more than a year Germany had to exert almost superhuman strength to overcome the vital disadvantage of being compelled to divide her forces. Only her carefully planned railroads and her marvelous efficiency enabled her to resist the simultaneous pressure against her in the west and the east. By two bold strokes—the sweeping back of Russia and the onslaught toward Constantinople—she has now transferred that problem to her antagonists. She starts a new war on a third front, it is true; but she strikes from within, and it is her adversaries who must now extend their lines and stretch their resources to the uttermost to meet the blow. And it becomes more apparent every day that they will have to trust in their own might. Every mile that the

Teutonic steam roller advances will make less likely active assistance to the Allies on the part of Greece, unless Bulgarian greed should inspire a direct attack on Hellenic territory. The tremendous military, naval and economic forces arrayed against Germany have lost none of their potency, and it is impossible to figure victory for her from her brilliant successes in the east and her unbroken defense in the west. But she has suddenly created a new problem, to which the old mathematical formulae do not wholly apply. To solve it her antagonists will need sagacity and endurance far greater than they have yet been called upon to display.

GERMANY'S GOAL—THE EAST

October 19, 1915.

IF THE Germans have been able to cultivate their national sense of humor, along with efficiency and discipline and hatred and other useful qualities, it should be immensely gratified by the immediate effects of the Balkan campaign. When the originators of that audacious move contemplate the bewilderment and confusion it has already created among their antagonists, they might well consider the results worth the cost, whatever that may be. Four weeks have passed since Bulgaria's mobilization, following the signing of a treaty with Turkey, revealed the triumph of German diplomacy in the Balkans and gave the signal for the Teutonic drive toward Constantinople. Already the invaders have covered perhaps one-fourth of the 150 miles through which they must hew a path before they reach the friendly territory of Bulgaria and the open road to the Moslem capital. Yet no definite, coherent plan has been devised by their opponents to meet the crisis. For Powers engaged in colossal campaigns on three fronts suddenly to undertake a fourth is calculated to impress the lay observer as an evidence of unchecked initiative and tremendous reserve force. Regarded merely as a feat of arms, the project is of commanding interest. It is rather puzzling, therefore, to note that some experts find in the new attempt a confession of weakness. They say that Germany, blockaded by sea, deadlocked in the west and her offensive exhausted in Russia, has made

this dramatic thrust to the southeast in sheer desperation. Thus from "diplomatic and military circles" in Paris came this comment the other day:

The Austro-German drive is regarded as a sequel to the French successes in the Champagne and the manner in which the Russians have prevented envelopment of their armies. Germany and Austria are compelled to seek a new field of effort for the attempt to break through the encircling ring of the Allies. They have sought the weak spot, in the Balkans.

If the move be, in truth, an evidence of waning strength or of despair, how strange have been its effects! It has dazzled Bulgaria, the most powerful of the Balkan nations, with a conviction that Teutonic triumph is near. It has paralyzed Rumania and Greece with fear. It has created turmoil and apprehension in the capitals of the Allies. Because of it the Greek government has been overturned, the British cabinet has been assailed as the author of a "ghastly failure," the French minister of foreign affairs has been driven from office, signs of dissension in the coalition have appeared and the whole Dardanelles campaign, which has cost scores of thousands of lives, is threatened with abandonment. But no less strange than the theory that the advance on Constantinople presages collapse of the Teutonic Powers is the misconception of its purpose. Even close students of the war seem to regard the campaign as a mere military diversion, designed to counteract checks suffered in France and to compel the Allies to divide their forces. A New York newspaper which has discussed every phase of the war to a voluminous extent confesses to being mystified by the new Balkan "madness," in which blood will be spilled, it says, "for reasons baffling to human understanding."

While we lay no claim to the possession of special knowledge or insight, the spectacular dash from the Danube toward the Bosphorus seems to us the most

rational move of the war, as it is likely to be the most important. Far from being unexpected, it has been long overdue. Far from being inspired by actions elsewhere or dictated by despair, it is the working out of the basic strategy of German world policy, in which the invasion of France, the raiding of England and the hammering of Russia into helplessness have been but preliminary details. It is not strange that for more than a year the attention of the world has been concentrated upon the gigantic operations in the west and in Poland. Battles compared to which historic engagements were as skirmishes have been fought on fronts hundreds of miles long; and the immediate objectives have been plain—the conquest of Belgium, the capturing of Paris, the driving back of Russia, the invasion of England. These projects and their possible results were of such vast import that they seemed to represent the ultimate aims. Yet careful readers of this newspaper knew from the first that the goal of German might was not Paris or London or Warsaw, but Constantinople; not the absorption of neighboring territory, but the opening of a highway to the illimitable East; not the mere domination of Europe, but the carving out of a colossal empire whose shores should be washed by the North sea and the waters of the Indian ocean. So long ago as August 20, 1914—only a few days after the hostilities began—we discussed at length this fundamental inspiration of the great struggle. We said:

So far as the German empire is concerned, the real issue is defined in a single term—Pan-Germanism. Back of the racial idea, back of militarism, back of imperial unity and industrial expansion, lies this splendid vision of Teutonic domination of Europe and of the world. Pan-Germanism, the mightiest international force of modern times, is not at its heart a movement to preserve a threatened race, but to make it supreme; not to defend Germany, but to subjugate the world. To those unacquainted with the significance of German policies during the last generation these assertions

will appear fantastic. But Pan-Germanism is a tremendous reality. Its voice is the hum of German civilization, the roar of German workshops, the thunder of German cannon; its spirit is the indomitable will of a great people; its desire the conquest of the earth.

At the time this was written Belgium had been overrun and the gray hosts of the kaiser were sweeping toward Paris. The world was watching with strained attention the seemingly resistless onslaught, and was prepared to see the war brought to a close with the capture of the French capital and a compromise arranged by the contending Powers. Yet our readers were told that the vast operations in Flanders and East Prussia were but the beginnings of the world struggle; that the path of conquest patiently mapped through the years by German imperialism lay not in western Europe, but in distant Asia, and that Paris was half way to the Golden Horn. And what we wrote fourteen months ago today is finding its verification in that "baffling" onset of Teutonic armies against the Servian positions. As a fact, there never had been any secret about the tremendous design which we discussed. It had been explained, with laborious detail, in scores of German books and pamphlets during the last twenty years and in numberless newspaper articles. But we were able to quote the most lucid exposition from Dr. Roland G. Usher's "Pan-Germanism," a work which has since become widely known. Let those who conceive that Germany is frantically seeking a weak point in the enveloping ring of her enemies recall this writer's words, published eighteen months before the war:

The vital factor in the modern international situation is the aggression of Germany, her determination to expand her territories, to increase her wealth and power. * * * She has reached the boundaries of Germany; further expansion means the acquisition of what other nations now own. Every available spot is held by England, France or Russia. She

can, therefore, obtain colonies only at their expense. * * *

To secure a share of the world's trade in some fashion which will not expose her to the attacks of the English fleet and which will create an empire less vulnerable in every way than she believes the British empire to be *an overland route to the east must be found.*

The Germans consider perfectly feasible a *great confederation of states, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey*, which would control territory from the North sea to the Persian gulf. A railway from Constantinople to Bagdad would establish a shorter route to India than via Suez. Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Persia, India herself, the mother of nations, would fall into German hands. Pan-Germanism is, therefore, in the first place, a defensive movement of self-preservation, for escaping the pressure of France and Russia. It is, in the second place, an offensive movement directed against England; its object, the conquest of the English possessions in the Mediterranean and in Asia.

It is not for love of their Turkish allies that the Germans are dashing to the relief of Constantinople. Domination of the Balkan peninsula is not their ultimate aim. They are headed for Asia Minor, Egypt, Persia and India, just as they were when they invaded Belgium.

THE KEYS OF EUROPE—AND ASIA

October 20, 1915.

MILITARY experts and politicians of the nations at war with Germany continue to argue with great spirit about the meaning and possibilities of the new Balkan campaign; but the Germans seem not in the least uncertain about it. They deduce from it a triumph earlier and more complete than they had ever before dared to predict. So sensible an observer as T. P. O'Connor cables *The North American* that the advance on Constantinople "shows lack of unity and cohesion in Germany's military and political purposes." The Berliner *Tageblatt*, on the other hand, boasts that the imperial forces, "finally on the way to Constantinople and the Dardanelles," are taking "the nearest passable road" for an effective attack on England. A recent dispatch from Copenhagen more pointedly expressed the German feeling:

Nothing since the war began has conjured up so vividly the dream of world power which the Germans cherish as the capture of Belgrade. It is regarded by the German press as an extremely important step in the colossal campaign which Germany is certain will decide the war and the destinies of the world under German control.

More significant is the bold declaration of a semi-official organ of the government, that this audacious move is to prove that land power, not sea power, may be made the decisive influence in history. In plain terms, the German announcement is that the gigantic project of creating a great empire that shall stretch half way

across Europe and Asia is definitely begun. We discussed yesterday the interpretation of the Balkan drive, which sees it, not as a mere military diversion, but as the real beginning of the working out of Pan-Germanism—that daring project of a Teutonic sphere of influence stretching from the North sea to the Persian gulf. Whether Germany possesses, in herself and in her allies, sufficient power to realize the great vision time alone will show. But thus far she has moved undeviatingly toward her goal.

The essential details of Pan-Germanism are, first, the erecting of a confederation of states, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan nations and Turkey; second, a German-controlled railroad from Constantinople to Bagdad, establishing a safe, short, overland trade route from central Europe to Persia and India, and, third, the gaining of a strategic position which would enable Germany to imprison Russia, split the British empire in twain at Suez and in time absorb Egypt, Arabia, Persia and India itself. The current challenge of land power against sea power is, of course, a reflection of this regally audacious conception—an unbroken highway overland from west to east and an empire linked by bands of steel, rather than by the intangible ties of sentiment and political idealism which thus far have held the British empire together.

When the imperial map makers evolved their idea they decided that three things were vital to its realization. First was a master fleet. But, although the resources of the empire were strained to achieve the necessary sea power, the accomplishment proved impossible, and only the furtive submarine now carries the German flag abroad. The second requisite was the forcing of Great Britain to divide control of the English channel by making Belgium and Holland and northeastern France

provinces of Germany. A great part of this plan—granting German victory—has been fulfilled. But more important to the program than either of these has been domination of the Balkan peninsula—the gathering together of those turbulent states into a confederation outwardly independent but secretly responsive to German influence. Without this the whole structure of Pan-Germanism lacked a foundation; with it the ambitious empire might build in swiftness and security. For in the mountains and defiles that lie between the Danube and the Bosphorus are the keys to Europe—and to Asia.

The railroad along which the invaders of Servia are now fighting their way follows the great continental highway, trodden for centuries by Romans and barbarians, crusaders and Moslems—the ancient, everlasting path from west to east—and at its southeastern terminus lies the gateway to Asia, held by Germany's ally. Teutonic control of the Balkans would bar Russia from egress to "warm water"; it would give Germany domination of the Adriatic and the eastern Mediterranean and project the shadow of Berlin far across Asia Minor, Egypt and the richest territories of the eastern world. It was not the military power of Turkey, but her strategic position, therefore, that made Germany strive for so many years to become the guiding influence at the Golden Horn. As Herbert Adams Gibbons says:

Through allying herself with the Turk, Germany would find herself able to strike eventually at the British occupation of India and Egypt and the French occupation of Algeria and Tunis, not only by joining the interests of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Germanism, but also by winning a place in Morocco opposite Gibraltar, a place in Asia Minor opposite Egypt and a place in Mesopotamia opposite India.

If these ideas seem so vast as to be visionary, let us consider the meaning of the immediate objective. At Scutari, opposite Constantinople, begins that famous

railroad which, in the German plans, shall link Berlin to Bagdad. It was twenty-seven years ago—in the same year that the present kaiser ascended the throne—that German financiers obtained from Turkey concessions for some modest railroad lines in Asia Minor. Twelve months later the new ruler paid a state visit to his great and good friend, the sultan, and then began the project of Germanizing the government of Turkey, which, a quarter of a century later, was to bring Germany within sight of her cherished goal. In 1898 the kaiser visited Constantinople a second time, and, continuing his journey to Damascus, uttered his significant declaration that “the 300,000,000 of Mohammedans throughout the world could look to the German emperor as their friend.” One result was a concession for extending the railroad all the way across Asiatic Turkey to the Persian gulf.

The great thrust into Asia seemed to prosper amazingly, and German engineers swarmed along the route of the daring line. But Great Britain did a little better—she sent diplomatic agents; and one day Berlin awoke to the disconcerting fact that her magnificent railroad project lacked a terminus. England had made a secret treaty with the sheik ruling that territory, and, being independent of the sultan, he refused the concession desired. Germany was defeated, but not daunted. She continually strengthened her position at Constantinople, for she discerned that a Turkish alliance was vital to her great plan. Moreover, she obtained another concession—this time for a line from Aleppo, Asia Minor, westward to the bay of Alexandretta on the Mediterranean, and for a fortified port at that point—thirty-six hours from the Suez canal! Thwarted in Persia, she consolidated her influence in Turkey and laid more assiduous siege to the Balkan states, assured that when the time came

her pathway would open before her. The events of the war have thus far justified her theory and have proved that Prussian diplomacy—plus the persuasiveness of military triumphs—is the one force to sway the Balkan balance. Under German tutelage the decrepit Moslem administration has been stiffened into such a form of efficiency that against its defense the expeditions of the Allies have been powerless; and German domination of the Balkan states apparently grows stronger every day. Teutonic influence in the peninsula was almost shattered when the Balkan league overwhelmed Turkey and divided nearly all of her European territory, with the encouragement of England, France and Russia. But it has been restored by the victories of Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen—Bulgaria is a German ally and Rumania and Greece, it seems, may be lost to the Triple Entente.

“World power or downfall,” said Bernhardi, was the sum of German policy; and one or the other lies between the armies advancing through Serbia and the continental gateway which they aim to seize. “It was in the Balkans,” we said nearly seven months ago, “that the great war began, and there, in all likelihood, it will be decided.” What the decision will be any reader may judge as well as we. Yet we can discern one thing clearly—the heart of the British empire is not Trafalgar Square, but Suez. Though Zeppelins slew their hundreds in darkened London and though the British line in Flanders were to break under assault, those disasters would be less ominous for the empire than the steady advance of the Teutonic hosts through the mountain passes of Serbia toward Constantinople, Asia Minor and Egypt.

GERMANY CHALLENGES HISTORY

October 25, 1915.

THOSE who have regarded the Balkan campaign as a mere incident of the great war, or, more strangely still, as an evidence of German desperation, must be puzzled to account for the earthquake tremors which it has caused in the most distant regions of European politics. There is no longer any illusion in Petrograd or London or Paris as to the significance of the drive toward Constantinople. Already cabinet changes in England and France reveal internal conflicts among the Allies, while the startling move of Germany, backed by the prestige of victory over Russia, threatens to consolidate in her interest the whole peninsula from the Danube to the Bosphorus and to erect a bridge for her triumphant progress into Asia. There is an ominous background of fact behind such characteristic statements as these, in German newspapers:

It will be impossible to prevent the success of a plan so well prepared and carried through with such gigantic strength by the new Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria). No English, French, Russian or Italian improvisation can prevent us from performing the task which points us to the East.

The alliance stands firmly across the path longed for for a junction of the forces of Russian and British imperialism. The war appears to have reached its climax. It is a question of life or death for the nations. We are more certain today than ever that we shall win.

Today, nearly fifteen months after the war began, German armies are still deep in the enemies' lands. The Serbian

capital is in our hands; the road to Constantinople will be open before another month has passed. In India, Egypt, Persia, the whole world, the impotence of England, France and Russia is universally recognized.

Much of this may be discounted. But it is not all the rhetoric of a fanatic nationalism. Germany has morally subjugated the Balkans, and only desperate efforts can prevent their military conquest by her. And beyond them the unnumbered hosts of Asia are listening to the tramp of her legions, believing that if those armies reach the city of the sultan the scepter of eastern dominion ultimately will pass from London to Berlin. Close observers of world politics have long been familiar with the tremendous designs of Pan-Germanism, just now reaching their culminating effort—the creation of a Teutonic empire stretching across Europe and Asia; a structure built upon science, not sentiment; lasting because efficient, invulnerable because linked together by solid land instead of the uncertain sea.

Here is the arresting fact in the gigantic vision: it contemplates a world empire to be won and held by overland conquest, in defiance of rival mastery of the seas. That is to say, Germany aims by sheer might of her armies, not only to remap three continents, but to overturn a principle which has governed the development of nations for more than two thousand years and has been accepted as a law of racial evolution. The issue was clearly stated in that remarkable utterance from a leading German paper which we printed a few days ago. Boldly it declared that the "road to Calais" might well be abandoned, for the spot where a fatal blow could be most easily struck against the power of Great Britain was in the Balkans. And it revealed the heart of the German purpose in these words:

Our strength, like that of our allies, lies in land power. We must seek to deliver the decisive blow in another direc-

tion. We are finally on the way to Constantinople and the Dardanelles. With Belgrade in our hands, the first obstacle has already been overcome.

A doctrine which for decades dominated world politics is on trial; the theory that sea power is the decisive influence upon the course of history. Mahanism or Moltkeism?—that is the question!

Are essentially land powers, like ours, impotently at the mercy of England and Yankeeland, which stands behind her simply because Great Britain still commands the sea; or are these land powers strong enough to enforce their liberty and room for their future development, even against the tyrant of the sea and his slavish menials, and if need be in spite of them?—that is the question!

It will not be decided between the Danube and the Dardanelles, for behind the Dardanelles first lies Egypt; but the decision will be brought nearer.

Unquestionably this represents the governing German idea. And at once it suggests, superficially, a confession of defeat. For twenty years the creation of an overshadowing naval power has been almost a national obsession. And now the ideal of sea mastery is put aside as though its pursuit had been a mere diversion. Her ports blockaded, her commerce hunted from every ocean highway, her submarine adventure a hideous failure and her proud fleet forced to hide behind the shelter of fortified bases, Germany audaciously formulates a new challenge. She will carve out an overland dominion. Let control of the sea be where it will, her foot soldiers will take and hold an empire from the English channel to the Indian ocean, and will make a scrap of paper of the formula that for twenty centuries has guided the pen of history. "Mahanism or Moltkeism?—that is the question." The world is to see tested the daring theory that in the twentieth century a Power which rules one-fourth of the habitable surface of the globe and patrols its every sea can be destroyed by a Power operating on land alone.

Mahanism is a happy term, for the principle which Germany challenges found its ablest exponent in the scholarly American naval historian. Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan, who died a few months ago, wrote his epochal work, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History," in 1889. It passed through a score of American editions and is a textbook in every naval college. Mahan's subject, of which his is the only adequate treatment, is "the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues" in the history of mankind. In the term "sea power" he includes "not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests."

Again and again, the expert shows, sea power was the decisive element in struggles that determined the fate of the world. He cites as the first notable example the Second Punic war, fought during ten years two centuries before the birth of Christ. Because Rome was able to transport troops to and from Spain, the base of the Carthaginians, while her opponents could reach her only by the overland route through Gaul, Hannibal's magnificent invasion came to naught, and Rome, not Carthage, became mistress of the world. When the English defeated the French at the battle of the Nile they not only destroyed a fleet, but isolated Napoleon's army in Egypt and crushed his whole scheme of conquest. Again at Trafalgar, "it was not Villeneuve that failed, but Napoleon that was vanquished; not Nelson that won, but England that was saved." It was Trafalgar, rather than Waterloo, which foreshadowed St. Helena.

Sea power was the foundation of all the great colonial governments—of Venice and Genoa; of their successors, Portugal and Spain; of Holland and France and

England. In 1700 Spain held what is now Belgium, a large part of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, Cuba, Porto Rico and vast territories in the Americas—and lost them with the decline of her naval strength. In the seventeenth century Holland all but monopolized the trade between Europe and the Orient; she had colonies in South Africa, Ceylon and Java, her merchant fleet numbered 10,000 sail, and all the nations of the earth paid tribute to her carriers. When internal dissension and parsimony led the Dutch to starve their naval establishment, their supremacy slipped from them. France, fitted to gain mastery of the seas, chose to expand by land. Her naval power, neglected for a full century, was finally extinguished by England, and with it passed from her the rich territories in Asia and America which the valor of her soldiers and sailors had won. It was upon the maritime wreckage of Spain, Holland and France that England, pursuing steadily and remorselessly the policy framed by Cromwell, built up that dominion which came to girdle the earth. It was a power that gave her India, her western colonies, Australia and that amazing ring of ports and naval stations which place her flag on guard over every waterway the world around—Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, Hongkong, Halifax, Jamaica, Trinidad, Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope. "The one nation which gained in this (the Seven Years') war," says Mahan, "was that which used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its navy and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe."

Not in conquest alone has sea power proved its efficacy. It was the failure to use the French fleet that caused the overthrow of James II and permitted William of Orange to carry through the revolution of 1688. The success of the American revolution "was assured upon

the day when France devoted her sea power to the support of the colonists." It was the blockade enforced by the United States navy that crushed the Confederacy. Three hundred years ago Sir Walter Raleigh, in his cell in the Tower of London, wrote down the formula which has governed hitherto the development of nations:

For whosoever commands the sea commands the trade;
whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the
riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.

This is the principle, supported by the history of centuries, which Germany declares she will set aside, by creating and maintaining a world empire in spite of overwhelming sea power against her. No more daring conception has ever inspired a nation—to defy what seems to be a law of human progress as though it were of no more account than a treaty. Is it possible of realization? Lacking sea power, what is the prospect for Germany's tremendous world venture? Some interesting possibilities that lie in this question we shall discuss tomorrow.

A DEFIANCE OF SEA POWER

October 26, 1915.

TO NEW weapons and new methods of warfare is now added a new and startling theory of empire-building. Germany, still exercising the initiative which she seized by the violation of Belgium and her plighted faith, purposes to teach the world that she is no more subject to military laws which have governed the expansion of nations for two thousand years than she is to the principle of international morality. In her drive toward Constantinople the ultimate aim is domination of the East and the erection, upon the ruins of the British empire, of an imperial sovereignty covering the richest regions of two continents. She plans to form and to dominate a confederacy extending from Germany, through Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey, the shadow of whose power would be projected across Asia Minor, Egypt, Persia and India. And the astounding fact, as we showed yesterday by German utterances, is that this colossal enterprise is to be attempted not only without naval force, but in spite of the absolute control of the sea by her adversaries; not only in the face of overwhelming sea power, but in defiance of the principle that for centuries has made sea power the controlling factor in extending the borders of empire and in paralyzing schemes of world conquest.

When the known earth consisted of the lands bordering the Mediterranean its mistress was Rome, which ruled that sea. When discovery opened up the vast

reaches of the oceans, it was upon a foundation of sea power that Spain and Holland and France and England successively rose to the splendor of overshadowing wealth and leadership. And no feature of the present great conflict has been more impressive than the crushing weight which British sea power has put upon Germany, paralyzing her navy and her vast merchant fleet, extinguishing her foreign trade and forcing her to desperate expedients to avert absolute strangulation. Yet in set terms she declares that she will counteract that mighty force and disprove the theory that makes it supreme; she will wrest the choicest possessions from Great Britain by overland conquest and hew out a path to empire which shall be invulnerable to all the dreadnoughts her enemy can build. Having shown wherein this audacious conception runs counter to the teachings of history, we may discuss now certain factors which support it. That Germany and Austria, on the defensive on three fronts, should be making a successful offensive on a fourth, is in itself almost contrary to reason. Possibly there are elements in the idea of the grand objective which save it from being merely a fantastic vision.

Since England and Germany are the real antagonists in the war, one of which must succumb to the other, regardless of the terms which other belligerents may make, fundamental differences in their positions must be noted, because they very vitally affect the influence of the sea power which has determined so many conflicts. First, British dominion being world wide, while the power of the Teutonic alliance is concentrated, one must conceive of the former encompassing the latter. In such a situation the nation surrounded has the advantage of being able to strike from interior lines, while the encompassing Power must defend itself on a large circle. Moreover, conquest of the encircled Power must be com-

plete to be effective, while defeat of the surrounding empire at a single point—Egypt, for example—may be the prelude of disaster to the whole.

Second, Great Britain is an insular nation and Germany continental, and in this difference lie further complications. The security of an insular empire is determined not by the defense of its own shores, but by control of the external shores of the sea in which it is situated. It is this principle that makes the German occupation of Belgium and Northern France such a dire menace to England. Again, the natural and inevitable weapon of an insular Power is a great navy. Lacking preponderant force at sea, it is doomed. But the converse is not infallible; possession of an overwhelming naval strength is not in itself an assurance of safety for a far-flung empire. In a war between an insular and a continental state, if the former wins a sweeping victory at sea, it has achieved only one-half of the objective; it has averted invasion, but has not in the least affected the internal strength of its opponent nor destroyed his land power. The only result is to transfer the theater of war from the sea to the land. Japan annihilated the Russian fleet; but it was not until she had crushed the Russian armies that she forced the Muscovite to sue for peace. It is obvious that even if the British fleet were to sink or capture the kaiser's warships, Germany would be, in a direct military sense, no worse off than she is today, and her advance toward Constantinople would not be halted an hour. If, on the other hand, the fleet of the insular Power is overcome, the defeat is conclusive, for nothing can then stop an invasion by the continental enemy. The case is thus summed up in Homer Lea's illuminating work, "The Day of the Saxon," from which we have borrowed most of our comment:

Naval victory is vital only as regards the insular nation. In a war between Germany and the British empire destruction of the British fleet would be followed by a complete severance of its lines of communication and its downfall. Destruction of the German fleet results only in a return to conditions existent prior to the war, unless Britain possesses land forces capable of resuming the combat on the land theater.

Mr. Lea's book, published two years before the war began, was a striking prophecy of the collapse of the British empire under the inevitable assaults of rival Powers seeking world expansion—unless Great Britain ceased to depend upon her navy alone and built up land forces large enough to cope with a first-class nation. This able writer, therefore, presents in impressive form the case we are now discussing—the possibility of a conflict in which even overwhelming sea power might be impotent to prevent the expansion of a strong continental nation, or even to defend outlying possessions. Bearing in mind the obvious purpose of Germany's Balkan campaign and its Asiatic objective, the reader will find the following statements enlightening:

Sea power can have no salient effect upon the internal political or military growth of continental states when their development is not dependent upon oceanic control. British sea power has done nothing to retard or prevent that unification and development of European power which is to be directed to its own destruction.

When the supremacy of insular nations is alone dependent upon maritime strength it is soon destroyed. "Control of the sea" means control for the purpose of attacking or defending lands segregated by oceanic space. *When, however, an attack upon these territories is equally feasible by land frontiers, then the "control of the sea" becomes no more than a delusive phrase.*

Today European intercommunication is by land rather than by sea. Europe moves on Asia by land. Tomorrow all of Asia and Africa will be included in this alternate route *by which continental nations may extend their sovereignty*

over weaker states of their continents, indifferent to the activity of naval power as exercised by insular kingdoms.

Had not land intercommunication progressed to the point it has now attained, or were all nations insular, the supremacy of the British navy would still maintain its old mastery over the world. *The expansion of those nations whose growth can take place only at the expense or destruction of the empire is in no way concerned with the power of the British navy. If the area of combat upon which the war is to be ultimately decided is Persia and India, the inutility of the navy is apparent.*

As if in answer to the current theory that Germany is "weakening herself" by extending hostilities to the Balkans, the writer says:

The belief that the nearer the theater of war is to a base the greater its advantage must now be put aside, since it is true only so long as the means of transportation are limited. In war distance means not miles, but time and capacity. It can be considered as a military maxim that, to the nation capable of determining the theater of war and maintaining it, the chances of success, as determined by historical precedent, stand in proportion of seven to three.

Mr. Lea's main purpose was to combat the theory that sea power is inevitably and always the controlling factor in great international struggles and to show that Great Britain, in the ordeal which he saw approaching, would need land forces approximately equal to those of her adversary, no matter how complete might be her domination of the sea. No argument is needed to emphasize the proof furnished by the present war. Even with Allied land forces greater than those of the Central empires and a sea power which is all but absolute, the issue remains in doubt.

Some English and American writers see in Germany's Balkan thrust a confession of failure, if not of frantic desperation. There are those, however, who realize its ominous meaning. The sober Manchester Guardian frankly discusses the menace to the empire:

By attempting to force the Dardanelles we defend, at the same time, Egypt and the Suez canal—yes, perhaps even India. Everywhere else the fleet is our final and strongest means of defense. But it cannot save Egypt from an attack by land, which is always possible, and may even be successful in case preventive measures are not undertaken in time.

And Viscount Milner, one of the most experienced of British imperial administrators, writes this:

If Germany succeeds in joining her armies with Turkey's at the Dardanelles, she will control a dominion stretching from the North sea to the Persian gulf and the Suez canal, and she can snap her fingers at the attempts of the British fleet to starve her out, while England will have to increase enormously the garrisons in India and in Egypt. This consummation can only be prevented by beating Germany on land; and unless it can be prevented, England will be, in fact, defeated. * * * It has been said that as long as the British fleet keeps command of the sea this country cannot be conquered. But it is equally true that, as long as the German army remains unbeaten the cause of the Allies cannot prevail. The British fleet could not save Belgium from subjugation, or France from losing her richest industrial districts, or Russia from losing Poland and the Baltic provinces. How is the British fleet going to recover any of this lost ground? By starving Germany? But Germany can never be starved into submission or deprived of anything that is essential to the conduct of the war as long as she can overrun the territories of her neighbors or terrify them into submission.

“Mahanism or Moltkeism?—that is the question!” So runs the German challenge—military might, not sea power, is henceforth to be the controlling factor in the destinies of the contending Titans of empire. The world may well watch with absorbed interest the outcome of an adventure compared to which the march on Paris was a triviality and the conquest of Poland a byplay.

THE SLAIN NURSE

October 28, 1915.

IT HAD been our intention to avoid discussion of the execution of a nurse by order of a German court-martial, chiefly because it seemed to us that comment could not emphasize, and might weaken, the appalling eloquence of the facts. How feeble would appear expressions of horror and detestation in the face of the revolting record—the inhuman rigidity of the sentence, the shameless evasions and falsehoods that met those who tried to save the woman from death and Germany from infamy, and finally the stealthy, midnight killing, committed in indecent haste so that even imperial clemency should have no chance to avert the sacrifice!

But there is a perverse fate which drives the exponents of militarism to voluble explanations of their atrocities. They are never satisfied to garner the profits of a crime, but must laboriously represent it as an act of justice, if not of self-denying generosity; they must come before the court of humanity and plead, with blood-stained hands outstretched, the essential virtue of their deeds. Thus for fifteen months they have stood astride the corpse of Belgium, denouncing the murderous guilt of the victim. And thus they will not even let the brave woman they slew rest in honored peace, but must seek to extract from her death a certificate of their own innocence. It is this defense of the indefensible, together with the circumstances surrounding the furtive act of

barbarity, that makes the whole case an illuminating study of the psychology of militarism.

Edith Cavell was an English nurse, long a resident of Brussels, the director of a school of nurses and the head of a nursing home, where, ever since the war began, she had ministered to the wounded of all armies. She was not young, not beautiful, but a woman such as all normal beings honor, one whose livelihood was gained in alleviating suffering. On August 5 she was arrested and placed in a military prison. For some reason several weeks passed before the American minister was requested by the British government to inquire into her case and do what he could to insure just treatment for her. By persistent effort, he learned, on September 12, that she was accused of having assisted British and French soldiers whom she had nursed, and Belgians of military age, to escape from the country. German military law allowed her a counsel, but forbade him to confer with her, so she faced a court-martial, on October 7 and 8, without legal representation. The deprivation was not of great consequence, however, since she frankly admitted the truth of the charges and full knowledge of the significance of her acts. The justice of the verdict against her is unquestioned. Passing of the death penalty lay in the discretion of the court, and cannot be challenged. Inspired by patriotism, she knowingly violated the laws framed by the military government, and was subject to its vengeance. But the circumstances which revolt every humane instinct are that the extreme penalty for treason and spying was exacted for a lesser offense; that the ruthless sentence was carried out in brutal haste in order to prevent a commutation, and that the authorities stooped to deceit to circumvent efforts in her behalf. Two full days after sentence had been passed the governor general solemnly assured Minister Whitlock

that the case was still undetermined and that he would be kept advised of all developments. This pledge was given at 6.20 o'clock on the evening of October 11. Two hours later, alarmed by reports they had heard, the secretary of the American legation and the Spanish minister sought out the governor general again. He repeated his assurances; but, when they insisted that he make further inquiry, he did so, and he reported that what they had heard was true—Miss Cavell was to die before daylight. Until midnight they pleaded with him—not for pardon, which was beyond his power, but for delay. Nothing could move the military authorities, he said. At 2 o'clock in the morning the woman was led to a secret place in the prison, a file of soldiers lined up before her and she was shot to death.

The defense of this act, put forth by the German under secretary for foreign affairs, is a remarkable document. It expresses a pained surprise that the execution has been "severely criticised," and asserts that "no law book in the world" protects women from the consequences of "a crime against the safety of armies." This is strictly true. The American military regulations expressly provide that no distinction on account of sex shall palliate the offenses of "the spy, the war traitor or the war rebel." Only custom, only a decent sense of humanity, operate to prevent the enforcing of the extreme penalty; and a government which repudiates the dictates of international law can hardly be expected to yield to such considerations as these. "No court-martial in the world," says the stern advocate, "would have reached any other decision." And no other, he might have added, would have carried it out. But he is too profuse in his citation of authorities: for the British government during the war has dealt with German women spies and every one of them has been tried before a civil

court. One who admitted espionage compared to which Miss Cavell's offense was trivial was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. But this, says the apologist, was a "world-wide conspiracy," and he represents it as being conducted at grievous "cost to our army." How many wounded soldiers did the desperate woman nurse back to strength and assist to escape? Fifty? A hundred? Two hundred? Add these to the millions in arms against Germany, and consider how tremendous was the injury which she worked against the empire, how just is the balance between her crime and her sentence!

For this point must be borne in mind: Miss Cavell was not a spy, nor a traitor, nor a rebel. She did not convey military information to Germany's enemies; she did not practice or incite revolt; she did not betray the government, because she owed it no allegiance. The worst that she did was to help men to elude the military cordon and escape, some to rejoin their armies, some to drag their crippled bodies to their homes. Unquestionably this was a crime, and a grave one. Unquestionably she was subject to severe penalties. But none save a German military mind would hold that nothing short of death could adequately punish her acts. The hanging of Major André by the Americans and of Nathan Hale by the British were ruthless expedients, but no one challenges their justice. The killing of this woman was a revolting extravagance. If the German military code could find satisfaction only in her death, what penalty does it provide for actual spies and traitors? But the heart of the plea is that the execution was strictly "legal" and "in accordance with established regulations." As the reference to the laws and regulations of German militarism, the statement is unanswerable. In precisely the same way the destruction of Louvain was legal. Equally correct have been the massacres in Armenia, for they have

the sanction of Germany's ally, Turkey. And when Herod sent forth and slew all the children of two years and under, in Bethlehem and all the coasts thereof, he was acting in accordance with the prerogatives of his office.

The defense is a strange exhibit, viewed by itself, but what we would warn the observer against is the impression that it represents an abnormal attitude of mind. On the contrary, the entire episode is logical and consistent. Once admit the justice of the German theory of an all-powerful state, represented by a militarism that knows no law save expediency and recognizes no principle higher than self-interest, and the execution of the nurse becomes a plausible incident.

The execution was "legal," "regular," "necessary"; against these facts of what avail was it to plead for compassion, humanity, decency? When he ordered the killing, General von Bissing was true to his cult, true to the philosophy which inspires the whole system of German government, true to the teaching of Nietzsche, the interpreter of German thought:

Pity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance energy and the feelings of life. Its action is depressing. A man loses power when he pities. On the whole, sympathy thwarts the law of development, which is the law of selection.

Americans are inclined to be sentimental about women, but they are not maudlin. We have yet to hear of one who believes that this woman's act should have been condoned by the German military authorities. But it is hopeless to attempt to reconcile further the opposing views. Upon the ideals of human life and conduct, as upon the fundamental issues of government, Germany and America speak in different tongues, and it is beyond the power of man to interpret one to the other.

WAR FORECASTS AND PREDICTIONS

November 1, 1915.

IF WE were inclined to hold our war discussions in high esteem, such critics as two who have written us during the last week would discourage the feeling. Although of conflicting sympathies, the two writers seem to be agreed upon one point—that this newspaper is misled, if not intellectually bereft. Said one:

* * * You don't seem to believe your own stuff. A while ago you were telling us, with resounding phrases, why Germany could not possibly win. And now, because of a spectacular campaign in the Balkans, you swing around and foretell the downfall of the British empire and the triumph of Kultur "from Berlin to Bagdad."

Let me tell you, that British empire will take a bit of beating. The Germans will find in the end that "Britannia Rules the Waves" is a truer song than "Deutschland Ueber Alles."

The other protest runs:

Well, I see you have awakened at last to the truth that every intelligent observer realized fifteen months ago. Like the Allies, you tried to defeat Germany with words; you argued at wearisome length that she must be crushed, by numbers, by economic pressure, by England's brutal sea tyranny. And the German fist smashes them all! Yet even now you hesitate to admit the truth told by the roaring guns in Serbia. You talk timidly of "possibilities" and wonder whether Germany will accomplish her "gigantic task." Why haven't you the courage to admit that all your judgments were wrong and that the "vision" of German triumph is a mathematical certainty? How many victories will it take to make you realize it?

These writers, in their partisan zeal, do us too much honor. We have never undertaken to practice the difficult art of prophecy, and as for military strategy, we know it not. All we have attempted to do, in the two hundred or more war editorials published, has been to set down vital facts in plain terms and interpret them as ordinary observers. If later events have occasionally given to our statements the color of prediction, that merely shows that our deductions were obvious. Thus, on March 31, exactly seven months ago, we said that the decisive action in the war would probably take place in the Balkan peninsula; and during the last five weeks we have offered other interpretations which aroused sharp dissent, but which seem to be in process of verification. If we had always waited until after the event, our comments would have been accepted, perhaps, as a matter of course. The fact is, that what students of the war read in this newspaper weeks ago they can read anywhere now. They can read it in extracts from German newspapers, in the solemn discussions of military experts, in speeches by British statesmen, in the joining of the Teuton and Bulgarian armies and the opening of a road to Constantinople; above all, in the tottering of cabinets, the displacing of military leaders and the general agreement that the Germans' Balkan advance cannot be checked.

But the false deduction is that we have assumed to predict offhand the outcome of the new phase of the war; that we have conceded the collapse of Great Britain and the erection upon the ruins of her power of a Teutonic empire. We have simply faced the facts and stated their apparent implications, which are plainly favorable to German success in the present enterprise. As to the facts and their significance, the studious reader has a wide choice of information. He may learn from German

sources that complete Teutonic triumph is now assured; from a noted English expert that the importance of the campaign can be "exaggerated or underrated"; from another, that the Allies need only an expedition of 500,000 men to sweep back the invaders; from the marquis of Lansdowne that, unfortunately, nothing can be done to save Serbia and that the Gallipoli expedition may be abandoned; from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle that the entire war has been a series of "triumphant successes" for Great Britain, in which the Balkan incident is a triviality. Lacking the expert knowledge of these eminent persons, we can only form our judgment upon certain palpable conditions. These may be briefly stated.

Diplomatically, Germany's victory is virtually complete. When she persuaded Turkey to join her just twelve months ago she closed the Dardanelles, shutting Russia in from the Mediterranean and cutting the easiest communication between that nation and its allies. The British and French have lost more than 100,000 men in vain efforts to break down the barrier. Bulgaria, strongest of the Balkan countries, has become an ally of the Teutonic Powers. Greece has been forced further and further from the long-expected decision to help the anti-Teutonic group. Rumania, naturally holding like sympathies, has been completely isolated, and it is by no means impossible that she will sell her services to the seeming victors. Serbia is in process of being eliminated.

Now, what are the immediate results likely to follow? Here, again, the reader finds an embarrassing array of theories. German writers employ all the resources of their reverberating vocabulary to show that overwhelming triumph is within their grasp. On the contrary, so well equipped an expert as Hilaire Belloc concedes Constantinople to Germany, and then asks calmly, "What then?" She would still, he says, be "not within

a thousand miles" of winning the war. As to pushing the campaign into Asia, that he finds to be a fit subject only for romance. In the opinion of Doyle, it is a "megalomaniac vision." Our judgment now is exactly what it was last spring—that the Balkan result will have a tremendous weight in the final settlement, may even be decisive. The Germans in Constantinople will hold the gateway to Asia—but that vast territory will be still to conquer. Certain other facts may be stated with greater assurance. That achievement will imprison Russia. She will lose her hope of an outlet to the Mediterranean. An unbroken line from the North sea to the Dardanelles will make a strong attack on Egypt a real possibility, and the success of that would cut the British empire in twain.

Even if the decision must be in the west, as military experts insist, is it clear that Germany will have weakened her chances there by making a solid line to Constantinople, thus securing the Turks against disaster; by adding Bulgaria to the alliance; by putting Greek and Rumanian aid beyond reach of her enemies, and by demonstrating her power before the observant hordes of the eastern world? On the contrary, would it not appear that her task would be simplified? Having consolidated her position in the Balkans, she might well be able to hold firm in France and Russia and strike fiercely at Egypt, and win the western decision on the banks of the Nile, just as Nelson won it a hundred and ten years ago.

Does our adventure in this discussion of probabilities and possibilities mean that all our laborious arguments to show that Germany "cannot win" are to be abandoned? By no means. We recognize in her present position an extraordinary evidence of military power, of daring initiative, of commanding resourcefulness. But there are certain palpable forces arrayed against her which will require even vaster efforts than she has yet made if they

are to be overcome. Slow, silent and relentless, they are crushing the very life-blood out of her.

First is the loss of men. Her defense in the west and her gigantic campaigns in the east have been maintained at terrific cost. No nation, however efficient and patriotic it may be, can stand indefinitely the drain to which she is subjected. She must win soon, or succumb. Second is the economic pressure she is suffering. Her winter food supply, it is clear, will be made sufficient only by the exercise of rigid supervision. Her foreign trade has been utterly extinguished, and the whole structure of her business and industrial life rests upon the insecure foundation of trade within her own borders. Third is that tremendous element of sea power which she has had the audacity to defy. It cannot check her progress toward the Far East, but its strangling grip can, and does, force her to exist, as it were, by artificial respiration, and makes infinitely more difficult her vast project of over-land conquest.

Finally, there is in the field against Germany a force greater than armies, mightier than the most efficient militarism. She confronts an enemy whom she cannot see, an antagonist invisible but unconquerable—the spirit of democracy. It is in that, rather than in the wisdom of statesmen or the schemes of strategists, that we place our final hope that the vision of a Prussianized world will not be realized. It is this spirit, in its completest manifestation, that has made France invulnerable since the day she turned back the invading hosts; it is this, in an imperfect form, that has saved England from utter ruin and may yet restore and regenerate her enfeebled powers; it is this, unless our faith is a mockery, that will preserve mankind from the triumph of the false ideals which link Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey in a war upon civilization.

NEW LEADERS IN FRANCE

November 2, 1915.

GOVERNMENT upheavals in France may be considered in the nature of normal occurrences. No cabinet since the third republic was founded has held office, we believe, for more than three years. But for special reasons, of course, the drastic changes just completed are of world-wide interest. The immediate cause undoubtedly was the diplomatic triumph of Germany in the Balkans; the recent resignation of Foreign Minister Delcassé foreshadowed the collapse of the entire Viviani ministry under the assaults of public opinion. Responsibility for the defeat in the Near East lay far more with England and Russia than with France, but she must help to bear the cost of it, and her people held their own statesmen accountable. This, however, was merely a leading item in a general indictment. French opinion for months has been restive under the conviction that the government was permitting itself to be guided too much by British policy. There has been an undercurrent of complaint that France has been compelled to make good the military deficiencies of Great Britain. But the vital aim of the reorganization is to achieve that complete unity which is the first requirement for the successful prosecution of a great war. For the first time in the history of the republic, the cabinet actually represents every party and faction.

All of them seem to agree that in Aristide Briand they have a leader fitted for the stormy times. Fifteen

years ago an obscure country lawyer, he has risen by sheer force of character to the commanding position of France's first statesman. In his earlier days he was a propagandist of revolution, a Socialist of the extreme type represented in this country by the I. W. W. An implacable foe of the established order, he preached violence as the only recourse of the downtrodden masses. Time matured his judgment, however, and when he became a minister, in 1906, he devoted himself to radical yet rational statesmanship. The chief promoter of the separation of church and state, he carried through that project so as to minimize the enmities which it inevitably created, and he stood inflexibly against those who demanded the entire uprooting of the religious establishments. Elected first by the votes of workers committed to social revolution, he became the champion of order against the program of upheaval; and although he is an avowed Socialist, he was long ago expelled from the party organization.

The best key to his character is to be found in his settlement of the great railroad strike of 1910, when the labor organizations sought to establish their control of the republic by calling out all employés of the transportation systems, which were, of course, government enterprises. Briand, then premier, called every railroad employé to the colors for three weeks, and then ordered them, as soldiers, to run the trains. The masterstroke succeeded, and the controversy which threatened to cause civil war was ended without the shedding of a drop of blood. A man of this heroic mold is likely to prove worthy of reliance in such a critical period as the nation now confronts. He is above the weakness of a slavish consistency; that is, his judgments change when he is convinced that conditions contradict them. Thus he was always a hater of militarism and an advocate of

peace, according to the Socialist ideal. Moreover, as premier a few years ago he worked with ardor for a full year and a half to bring about real accord with Germany. It was when his efforts were defeated by the Prussian militarists that he devoted himself to national preparedness, and it was largely due to his persistence that the term of compulsory military service was raised from two years to three.

It is in war that the weaknesses of democracy are laid bare. In contrast with the solidarity and efficiency produced under a capable autocracy, there infallibly appear individual assertiveness, partisan strife and divided counsel. But the real test comes when the conflict is prolonged. Autocracy not only cannot survive defeat, but it must constantly achieve new victories. If the Germans' blind faith in the kaiser and his military advisers were to falter for an hour, their war would collapse. Democracy, on the other hand, makes and unmakes its leaders as exigencies require. Its faith is not in men, but in the common strength of all, and therefore is not to be overthrown. A single defeat is not a catastrophe, but a lesson. France is simply proving that democracy is unconquerable, because the idea that inspires it is indestructible.

BABYLON, BAGDAD AND BERLIN

November 9, 1915.

IF WE were asked to name the most interesting bit of war news during the last month—not the most important or the most dreadful, but that most stimulating to thought and imagination—we should cite three lines published October 21, as follows:

LONDON, October 20.—It is unofficially reported from Mesopotamia that the British expedition is within a few miles of Bagdad.

Three lines and nothing more—a mysterious reticence! Battles in Russia and France and Servia, political changes and cabinet crises, portents of peace and rumblings of revolution—all these are of interest to the students of the great upheaval; but none of them compares in fascination with the brief reminder that there is war, too, in far-off Asia; that armies are fighting for possession of the ancient metropolis of the Moslem world, now a sordid slum of a city, with nothing but the name and a few tawdry mosques and tombs to recall the ancient glories of the caliphate and the spacious days of Haroun Al-Raschid.

Why should any one desire to possess Bagdad? What makes that swarming desert city, unchanging in its primitive, teeming, Oriental life, a prize for which empires battle and regiments of men lay down their lives? With the fate of thrones and of peoples—of civilization itself—at issue in western and eastern Europe, why is the clamor of war waking the age-long silence

of mid-Asia, the half-forgotten, desolated birthplace of mankind? These questions are easily answered. Bagdad is potentially one of those world gateways which from time to time adventurous nations strive to have and to hold. Like Constantinople, like Suez, like Kabul, it is one of the portals set midway on the road of empire; and he who holds it—German or Briton—will take tribute of the trade of half a continent and give law to unnumbered millions. But it is not because of war strategy or projects of imperial supremacy that this news thrills the imagination. It is because of the scene of the struggle. That land of solitude and mystery was the cradle of the human race. History itself began when Mesopotamia died; beyond that remote period only questioning science can penetrate, to grope in the twilight of conjecture. There, under the dust of ages, lie buried the fragmentary ruins of civilizations that were old when the first courses of the pyramids were laid on the banks of the Nile; that had known splendor and decay before the Red sea closed over Pharaoh and his hosts; that were forgotten before Troy fell or Rome was.

"Soldiers," cried Napoleon in Egypt, "forty centuries look down upon you!" Six thousand years of human history and nature's slow decay have seamed the face of that older and emptier land. Empires rose and fell and left hardly more trace than the pulse-beats of time. Century upon century they filled the known earth with their glories—and faded away into impenetrable darkness. One reads three lines in the morning's news and peers into stupendous vistas of antiquity. A dozen words flashed over the cable stir the very deeps of history and link today with a past that seems, and is, as remote as the stars. If one would attempt to measure the age of that region in terms of human life, where would one begin? For it is the place of Beginnings. If

one puts aside the tadpole theory of existence, the mind leaps to the narrative of Genesis. And scholarship tells us that the Garden of Eden—whether an actual paradise where the first man and his mate heard the sentence of their Creator or a metaphorical scene imagined by the poets of all ages and races—lay in the heart of Mesopotamia. Herein, at least, science makes a concession to the plausibility of the ancient record, for in the second chapter we read:

And a river went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads. *

* * And the fourth river is Euphrates.

This suggests a glance at the geography of the region where machine guns are waking the echoes of dead centuries. Mesopotamia is a long, narrow strip of territory stretching southeastward from the center of Asiatic Turkey, bounded on the east by Persia, its upper extremity almost overlapping Palestine. It comprises, roughly, the country lying between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which drain a thousand miles of the continent and join to flow into the Persian gulf. It is, therefore, the natural site of a direct highway between Constantinople and the East; and to this day caravans traverse the age-old paths between Bagdad and the modern seat of the caliphate on the Bosphorus. Bagdad, built 1150 years ago, is on the Tigris, about 300 miles above the confluence of the two rivers. Fifty miles southward, on the east bank of the Euphrates, the level of the plain is broken by some mounds. Here and there the accumulated sand has been dug away from wide spaces, revealing tumbled masonry and traces of human habitation—roofless walls and shattered pillars rudely chiseled. These are the fragments that remain of Babylon, that great city, built by Nimrod, great-grandson of Noah; for eighteen centuries the capital of a mighty empire,

the seat of eight successive dynasties, a center from which a magnificent civilization radiated throughout western Asia. Two hundred miles north of Bagdad, on the east bank of the Tigris, are like mounds, from the depths of which like disordered scraps of buried race history have been exhumed. There the regal city of Nineveh reared the vast bulk of its palaces and temples from the plain; built by Asshur, son of Shem, who was son of Noah, another record in stone of the great dispersal after the Deluge; a city that was old a thousand years before Moses was born, that was the capital of the mighty Assyrian empire and that had so completely disappeared four centuries before Christ that Xenophon and his Greeks passed by the site and made no record of it.

Mesopotamia then was the region of two of the most magnificent and most powerful of the ancient empires—Assyria in the north and Babylonia in the south. And two thousand years after the remorseless desert sands swallowed up the loftiest pinnacles of their proudest cities the world sees two great new empires struggling for the mastery of the solitude once peopled by the ruling races of the earth in its far-off youth. One speaks of "antiquity" when a medieval city in Flanders is destroyed or when the heights where Troy stood echo to guns in the Dardanelles. What shall be said of fighting columns that tramp over the graves of cities entombed by time; of wireless signals thrilling beneath the sky that looked down upon the canals and hanging gardens of imperial Babylon; of trenches dug in the dust of peoples whose teeming life-story can be guessed but fragmentarily from rude scratches in tablets of clay? Consider this: the shadows of the wheeling aeroplanes that scout in advance of the columns cross and recross the path that Abraham traversed when he heard

the call in Ur of the Chaldees and set forth to claim the inheritance of Canaan, covenanted to him and to his seed forever. Or reflect upon gunboats troubling the waters of Eden, within sight of the place where Nebuchadnezzar fell from majesty to become as a beast of the field; where Belshazzar saw the livid letters of his doom start out from the wall of the banquet room; where Semiramis held her legendary court and Sennacherib led his hosts to battle: where Darius the king called "with a lamentable voice" to know whether Daniel had been delivered from the lions: where Cyrus overthrew the Babylonian dynasty and imposed upon the world the changeless laws of the Medes and Persians; where Alexander halted to contemplate the wonders of his conquests, and died, ruler of the earth, at 32.

One thinks of Assyria as ancient, yet Babylonia emerges from the mists of the past 2700 years before Assyrian influence was felt; its history, vague but traceable, begins fifteen centuries before Cheops built his pyramidal tomb. Babylonia in time developed into an empire of culture and art and peaceful commerce. From its civilization was derived that of Assyria, and, perhaps, that which gives to Chinese history an air of antiquity. But if the Assyrians lacked culture, they had warlike prowess, and for a thousand years the two empires struggled for mastery. Babylonia succumbed finally seven centuries before Christ, and Nineveh became the capital of the eastern world. Jonah, who preached its destruction, testified that it held 120,000 inhabitants. For a brief time Babylon regained its leadership. Assyria was overwhelmed by Babylonian and Scythian hordes 2500 years ago, and the oft-destroyed capital of the victorious empire was raised to new splendor by Nebuchadnezzar. But less than a century saw the end of it and of the age-long glories of Mesopotamia.

The succession foretold by Daniel to the great king, according to the chronicle, came to pass. On the ruins of Babylonian supremacy was erected the Persian empire, which would have dominated Europe but for the battle of Marathon. Next Alexander and his light-footed Greeks swept across the Hellespont and broke the Persian scepter in pieces. And at last came the Roman legions, which established the Euphrates as the eastern border of the empire ruled from the Tiber. Thirteen hundred years ago the Arabs overran Mesopotamia, and it has since been a Moslem possession; but for centuries before that all traces of its civilization had been buried deep under the drifting sands. While the world has advanced to its present state of unexampled wealth and luxury and suffering and war, that ancient land has brooded in silence and solitude, awaiting the return of the race to the place of its nativity.

That time has now come. Mesopotamia is the most coveted spot on the globe today. Now almost a desert, in olden times it was the granary of the world—wheat was first cultivated by man there—and it may be made so again. The Babylonians, by stupendous systems of canals, controlled the yearly floods of the two great rivers and made the great alluvial plain as fertile as the basin of the Nile. The engineers who irrigated Egypt have reported that by similar means Mesopotamia could be made to supply grain and cotton for half a continent. But, as everybody knows, the chief prize for which the nations are now striving is possession of the great highway from Constantinople to the East—the line of the Pan-German railroad planned to link Berlin with the Persian gulf. Great Britain, always vigilant concerning her eastern empire, was ready in at least one particular for the coming of the war. Although Turkey did not join Germany until the end of October, 1914, she was

battling with Britain in Mesopotamia early in August. This campaign is hardly noticed against the background of the stupendous fighting in Europe; but the objective is as important as that of Germany in her dash through the Balkans. When Germany holds the Berlin-Constantinople section of her Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad line she may find that her adversary holds the other end, from Bagdad to the gulf. The operations in this far-off theater of war have been even more arduous than those in France, although relatively small. The British expedition first captured Basra, the proposed terminus of the railroad, a valuable port on the Persian gulf. Against terrific obstacles of nature and climate, as well as Turkish opposition, it fought its way through swamps to the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates, where a base was established. From that point, it appears, two columns pressed northwestward toward the goal of Bagdad, one along each river, compelled to fight every mile of the advance. The latest report is that they are now converging toward the ancient Mohammedan capital.

If they capture that city, they will control the lower valleys of the region through which passes the overland highway of the future from Europe to the East. It would seem as though the great German drive toward Constantinople were an answer to the apparently insignificant drive toward Bagdad. Certainly, the war will not be won and lost there. But it is conceivable that when the terms of peace come to be written Bagdad will weigh as well as Constantinople and Brussels, and that, through the world's greatest war, a new civilization will be established in the solitary places where the stream of history had its source.

THE ORDEAL OF DEMOCRACY

November 18, 1915.

AFTER fifteen months of war, England is still "muddling through," according to the traditional formula—or muddling, anyway. To the astonishment of neutrals, the exasperation of her allies and the unrestrained exultation of her enemies, uncertainty in the prosecution of the war finds the nation entangled in controversies which might appall a more imaginative people. The country is divided into hostile camps over conscription. The cabinet that had conducted the war for a year had to be reorganized over night to avert a political upheaval; and already two of the coalition members have resigned. French and Kitchener, Asquith and Grey are assailed by a large section of the press and public as hopeless incompetents, and exalted by another section as prodigies of wisdom and efficiency. At a time when the imperative demand would seem to be for unity, an influential London newspaper publishes an article in which it says:

If the policy of drift and muddle is allowed to continue in force for a few months longer, the sun of England's glory will have set. The whole government must be reorganized without delay. Grey must go, Churchill must go, Haldane must go. Unless, here and now, we make a peaceful end of professional politicians, there will be well-known men hanging from lamp-posts before many months are past.

In any other country on earth such evidences of disunion and such violent criticism would be a certain prelude of national collapse. Yet competent observers

declare that these are the signs, not of disintegrating strength, but of a belated awakening.

It is in parliament that candid discussion and unconcealed dissension are most marked. The attorney general resigns, and signalizes his retirement by a painstaking dissection of the weaknesses of his late colleagues. Members demand an explanation of the Balkan menace, and Lord Lansdowne blandly informs them—and the Germans—that the Servians are doomed, and that, to his regret, nothing can be done to save them. With equal frankness, but with infinitely greater vigor, Winston Churchill reviewed the other day the victories and defeats of the last year, and showed how bitter had been the political strife at home during the crisis in affairs abroad. British public opinion is the most relentless in the world, and the mocking titles of "Earl of Antwerp" and "Duke of Gallipoli" that were conferred upon young Churchill by the populace expressed but feebly the disesteem in which he was held. Yet for all their imperturbability, the British are at heart an emotional people, and nothing stirs them more than the spectacle of a man fighting against odds. In an hour's speech, his last utterance before leaving to join his regiment in the field, Churchill went far to reverse the verdict rendered against him. He showed himself no ordinary man when, discredited and virtually dismissed from a position of power, he was able to stand before a critical house and hostile people and make such declarations as these:

If there has been any operation in the history of the world that, having been taken, it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigor, fury and sustained flow of reinforcements and utter disregard of life, it is that operation so daringly begun by the immortal landing at the Dardanelles. The Balkan nations do not realize the capacity of the ancient, mighty nation against which Germany is warring to endure adversity, to put up with disappointment and mismanage-

ment, to renew its strength and to go on with boundless suffering to the fulfillment of the greatest cause for which man has ever fought.

The theme we discuss, however, is not the weakness or strength of individual British leaders, but the vital characteristic of relentless self-examination which marks the national conduct of governmental affairs. In no other country in the world is a public man subject to such searching scrutiny or compelled to answer so directly for failure and errors of judgment. Here is one of those vital contrasts between autocracy and democracy which constantly challenge the thought of observers of the war. Autocracy is answerable to no one—until the final settlement, and then it stands or falls with the result. Its mistakes are covered up, its weaknesses concealed, its decisions subject to no inquiry. Set apart from its subjects, it owes them no explanations, and gives none. Their function is not to criticise, but to obey. Democracy, on the other hand, must fight out each issue as it arises. Its system of government is the creation of the common mind, and must answer to the common judgment for its delinquencies. When those charged with the administration fail, they must give way to better men, though the change shakes the very foundations of confidence and creates disunion in a critical hour. To visualize the difference one need only compare events in the four chief nations involved. For months Russia was pressed nearer and nearer to defeat, because of incompetence and graft in the bureaucratic government. The people had no voice in military affairs; they could only suffer. The remedy applied was the device of the autocracy. A ukase from the czar banished the commander-in-chief to the Caucasus, and the operations were taken over by the sovereign. During the war at least a score of German commanders have been displaced,

military plans of the general staff have been disrupted, armies have been shifted, war policies changed and the grand admiral of the fleet sent into retirement; yet no German newspaper or public leader has dared to question a single act.

Contrast these two autocracies with the democracies. When the French people find it expedient to change the government, the process is carried out in full view and after full discussion. Those who are giving their blood for the nation know what their leaders are doing, and why. The statesman or the commander who fails is set aside; and his successor must meet the same exacting requirements more successfully or join him in retirement. Great Britain, under her monarchical democracy, follows the same course. If her victories are overemphasized, her defeats are not minimized nor knowledge of her blunders suppressed. Her people, through the flexible and responsive system of government, enforce a rigid accounting from their representatives. Even though by this procedure they occasionally give comfort to the enemy, they guard themselves against disillusion and make it possible to extract useful experience from temporary defeats which would mean the utter collapse of an autocracy. It may be that democracy pays a heavy price for its privileges in the inefficiency it displays and the avoidable losses it suffers in war. But it remains, nevertheless, the highest and best type of government known to man, and it presents an ideal worth all its costs. And not the least valuable of the lessons which this nation may learn from the war may be learned from England, where even the monarchical tradition cannot delude the democratic spirit into surrendering its rights of examination, criticism and construction.

LOOK AT LUXEMBURG, THEY SAY

November 19, 1915.

THERE are still a large number of persons, of course, who contend that Germany was justified in invading and devastating Belgium; who will argue the "guilt" of that unhappy country and the contrasting innocence, forbearance and benevolence of its despoiler. As recently as October 13, for example, Foreign Minister von Jagow, in a statement issued in Berlin, expressed with gentle melancholy his afflicting sense of commiseration for the deluded victim.

Such perverted advocacy from German sources is to be expected. Much more disturbing is the fact that some Americans, who have no excuse of racial or political sympathy with Germany, condemn the Belgians rather than their oppressors and reprobate their sacrifice as an act of folly. Belgium, they say, was the victim of her own militaristic delusion. She resisted the invasion, instead of merely declaring her objection to it and then surrendering her rights and her nationality to superior force. By so doing, these curious persons argue, she would have given to the world an inspiring example of pacific heroism. If her government had accepted the purchase price offered for its sovereignty, she would have suffered no mourning or misery, her cities would not be in ruins nor her people the pitiful wards of charity.

The essential meaning of the contention is that Belgium would today be able to endure the shame of slavery, because she would be prosperous. For bartered

honor and a shriveled soul she would enjoy the compensations of tranquillity and a full belly.

It must not be supposed that the adherents of this singular view were dependent upon abstract theory alone. They could cite an actual example of their ideal neutral state; a country where the impulses of national pride and the instinct of self-defense were under the guidance of sagacious leadership and where the blessings of peace were perpetuated by the simple expedient of submission to overpowering wrong. "Look at Luxemburg," they said. So we shall look at Luxemburg.

For most of us it will require some effort to recall the circumstances. It is difficult even to realize that the violation of this tiny state was as immoral and criminal as that of Belgium; for the destruction of Belgium conferred upon that country the immortality of martyrdom, while Luxemburg passed into obscurity unwept, unhonored and unsung. But the results of the incident are of exceptional interest. It is possible now to reconstruct the story of the crime, from an impartial account recently given by the Associated Press.

Luxemburg is a little triangle of land lying southwest of the Rhine province of Germany, where the frontiers of the empire and of France and Belgium touch. Its area is about that of Lancaster county and its population of 270,000 nearly equal to that of Luzerne. In its history of more than five centuries it has belonged at various times to Burgundy, to Spain, to Austria and to France, and for several years during the nineteenth century was divided between Belgium and Holland. In 1867, by a treaty signed in London, it became a neutral state, under guarantee of the Powers, exactly as Belgium had become in 1831. Prussia, Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium signed the agreement, which provided:

The grand duchy of Luxemburg will be a state perpetually neutral. The Powers which sign the present treaty declare themselves as bound to respect this neutrality and to make it respected by others. This neutrality is placed under the guarantee of the Powers who have signed this treaty.

It was on August 1, 1914, that Germany tore up this "scrap of paper." The minister of state, who exercises executive power for the 20-year-old grand duchess, was roused at daylight by a message telling him that German forces had crossed the frontier and were marching on the capital. At once he telephoned a protest to the German minister, following it with a written communication; also, he telegraphed urgent objection to the Berlin foreign office, while the grand duchess wired an appeal to her illustrious cousin, the kaiser. Meanwhile, officers of the Luxemburg army—which numbers 150 gendarmes and 200 volunteers—were sent to present formal protests to the commanders of the invaders. That evening telegrams were received from the imperial foreign office and from the chancellor, and on August 8 the emperor replied to the grand duchess. All messages were to the same effect. Von Jagow said: "French forces are marching toward Luxemburg. * * * We guarantee Luxemburg full compensation for any damage done by us." To this the minister of state replied:

There is not one single French soldier on Luxemburg territory, nor any sign whatsoever of any threatening of Luxemburg neutrality from the French side. On the contrary, on August 1 the rails of the railroad on French territory near our frontier were torn up.

Of course, as in the case of Belgium, the German plea was a cynical invention. On August 2 the invaders posted proclamations—which had been printed in Germany in advance—stating that France was committing warlike acts against Germany "from the very territory of Luxemburg," and that therefore the kaiser, "under

the bitter compulsion of iron necessity," had ordered the occupation. The only concession the injured government could obtain was that no hostile acts against Luxemburg would be taken and that its local laws would continue to prevail. But within twenty-four hours the Prussianizing of the country under military rule began. The French minister, representing a country with which Luxemburg was at peace, was summarily expelled. The invaders took charge not only of the railroads, but the postal service and the telegraph and telephone systems. On August 3 soldiers were set to work hacking down trees and digging intrenchments, all inhabitants in the district selected for operations being driven from their homes. The parliament met on August 4 to consider the country's peril; but the grand duchess was unable to be present, because she was held in her palace by German guards. In defiance of the pledge to respect the civil laws, citizens by the score were arrested and tried by military courts. But these injuries were perhaps the least serious of those inflicted. Luxemburg, under duress, had accepted Germany's "liberal offer to spare the country the horrors of war," which Belgium had had the hardihood to reject. While protesting against her violation, she had relied upon the pledge of the imperial chancellor in his speech to the reichstag:

Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and entered Belgian territory. This is contrary to international law; but we are forced to disregard the protests of the governments. We shall try to make good the injustice we have committed as soon as our military goal has been reached.

But Luxemburg was soon to learn the worth of that grandiloquent promise. On August 4 the minister of state told the German commander that the country could not feed its own people, much less the invaders, because in normal times much of the food supply came from Antwerp, communication with which had been interrupted.

He asked that importations from Germany be permitted. This was refused. Says the Associated Press:

Cut off, wholly surrounded by the German troops and subject to their military jurisdiction, the history of Luxemburg since that day is declared to have been an accumulation of encroachments and sacrifices, which the Luxemburgers regard as tyrannies. In the spring the food supply failed. The military authorities took what little was left and put the population on bread cards, each person being entitled to seven ounces of bread daily. Slowly that amount was reduced, until in April the people were living on four ounces of bread a day. With the arrival of help from Switzerland, this was raised to a shade over six ounces, where it now stands. It is through the acquiescence and with the assistance of France that Switzerland is today providing food for the people of the grand duchy.

The conditions here described are matters of official record. On April 23 the grand duchess protested to Berlin that the German army had seized food supplies, "paying" for them in military scrip, and that only a small part of the food sent as gifts from abroad reached her people, nearly one-half of whom were on the verge of starvation.

Belgium's fate is a tragedy, but a noble one, which puts to shame those who moralize upon her sacrifice as a penalty for rejecting the revolting doctrine of submission to wrong for the sake of self-interest. Putting this aside, does it appear that, possessing means of resistance, she would have been wiser to yield, like Luxemburg, which possessed none? Had she done so, is it to be imagined that the world would have been moved to relieve the privations which would have been her portion anyway? What should it have profited her to sell her soul for bread? And what would have been the depth of her anguish and humiliation if, having made the barter, she found that she had enslaved herself for the false promise of a thrice-perjured betrayer?

SOME SUGGESTED PEACE TERMS

November 26, 1915.

THE thunder of war now reverberates from the verge of the Atlantic to the borders of the Arabian sea. It is heard in Flanders and France and the heights of Lorraine; it echoes from the Alps and encircles the Adriatic; it rolls across wide stretches of the Russian plain. The whole Balkan peninsula is shaken with it. Armies battle at the Dardanelles, in Mesopotamia and Persia. For 3000 miles there is an almost unbroken line of battle, and there rises from the earth the most stupendous clamor of conflict mankind has ever known. It is amid this titanic clash of forces, neither group of which has suffered decisive defeat nor approached conclusive victory, that the voice of a serenely confident pacifism makes itself heard. Some American men and women, big of heart and imagination, burning with hatred of war and zeal for peace, are preparing to go to Europe on a mission of conciliation. They conceive that at their summons the tumult will be stilled, the death-grip of nations will be loosened, and 22,000,000 men will lay down their arms to listen to the soothing counsel of a few earnest propagandists of non-resistance.

The idea may be dismissed as a piece of monumental folly, or hailed as a sublimely audacious project of inspired humanitarianism. It is at least profoundly sincere, and by some incredible chance might be saved from calamitous absurdity. For peace must come eventually, and even the increasing bitterness of the war cannot con-

ceal the fact that the afflicted nations are longing desperately for the return of normal existence. But the program of the pilgrims seems to lack substance. Their spokesmen scorn to take into account the convictions, ambitions and insoluble antagonisms which produced and which prolong this gigantic upheaval. They regard the war as merely a sort of exaggerated blunder, to be corrected by a cessation of hostilities without regard to the principles of justice and with no concern for the future of civilization. They see nothing incongruous in the belief that clashing territorial designs in Europe and Asia and the conflict of irreconcilable philosophies of government can be settled by the sending of some thousands of identically worded telegrams to the president of the United States. How wide is the chasm between the nations that must be bridged, how vast and how intricate are the problems to be settled by force of arms and by later negotiations, may be judged from the aims of the antagonists. Putting aside the vague governmental demands for a "lasting peace," the "crushing of militarism" and "security against attack," the varying concepts of a desirable settlement present an interesting study.

The view of Henry Ford and his associates need not be discussed. It is that peace is about to come merely because of their proclamation that war is cruel and costly—a fact which the belligerent peoples have known for fifteen months. Other Americans have presented more philosophic opinions. A year ago, when the situation was vastly different, Prof. Albert Bushnell Hart found that three results were possible. First, the warring nations might reach exhaustion simultaneously, in which event there would have to be a return to the conditions before the war. Second, the Allies might win, when Italy would take Trieste and the Trentino; Servia would realize her ambition for an Adriatic outlet by absorbing

Bosnia and Herzegovina; Russia would acquire Constantinople and part of East Prussia and France recover Alsace-Lorraine. Germany, stripped of her colonies, would be compelled to give guarantees against further attempts to dominate Europe. Teutonic victory, on the other hand, would give Serbia and Macedonia, with Saloniki, to Austria; Belgium, Holland and South Africa, with control of Asia Minor, to Germany. And Great Britain would be stripped of her chain of fortresses between Gibraltar and Hongkong. Dr. Charles W. Eliot's outline of a satisfactory adjustment embraces fundamental principles rather than territorial dispositions. He has specified seven provisions necessary to permanent peace: Abandonment of the theory that any nation should establish dominion over another; firmer securities for the independence of small states; freedom of the seas; establishment of the "open door" policy in international commerce; prohibition of the seizure of distant or adjacent territory without consent of the inhabitants; adequate compensation to Belgium, and establishment of an international tribunal for the protection of international law.

Arnold Bennett a year ago gave an English view of the settlement. He found only three matters vital. Belgium, he said, must be repaid for her wrongs, and to an indemnity must be added a public apology from Germany by means of a special diplomatic mission to Brussels and the "visible abasement" of a procession of Belgian troops down Unter den Linden. Alsace-Lorraine must be restored to France; and there must be a general agreement among the nations to disarm. Very recently, however, far different opinions have come from Great Britain. Charles R. Buxton, a leading Liberal, offers as a basis of discussion these terms: Evacuation by Germany of Belgium, France and the Baltic provinces, and by Germany and Austria of Serbia; adequate compensation to

Belgium; arbitration of claims of France against Germany; of Italy and Servia against Austria and of Russia against Turkey; Germany's right to a colonial empire to be recognized; repartition of Africa, with a view to more convenient frontiers and the interests of the native populations; the "open door" in all colonial possessions, and guarantees against future wars to be binding upon all nations. Against these moderate proposals may be put those of C. F. G. Masterman, another prominent Englishman: Belgium to be restored and fully compensated; France to extend her territory to the Rhine and receive an indemnity; all of Poland to be united under a ruler named by Russia; Denmark to receive Schleswig; Italy the Trentino and Trieste; Turkey to be confined to Anatolia, while Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia are divided among nations that will develop them; Servia to have Bosnia, Herzegovina, Servian Austria and an indemnity; the German fleet to be divided among the Allies; all her Zeppelins and their equipment to be destroyed and her colonies to be surrendered.

French aspirations seem to be embraced in the passionate desire to destroy the menace of German domination and to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine. Yves Guyot, a former minister, insists upon the special requirement that no negotiations shall be held with the Hohenzollerns, while Jean Finot, a noted writer, argues that Germany must be reduced to impotence for many years by the exaction of an indemnity of \$34,000,000,000.

General Malleterre, who was one of Joffre's lieutenants until incapacitated by wounds, insists that Germany must be "utterly crushed"—confined between the Rhine on the west and a free Poland on the east and deprived of the "predatory" Hohenzollern dynasty. Guglielmo Ferrero, the Italian historian, expresses opinions rather than hopes. If Germany wins, he says, she

will annex Belgium, northeastern France and the Baltic provinces; Austria will get Servia, the Teutonic empire will stretch from the Baltic to the Aegean and "Europe will be an enormous armory." If the Allies win he sees Alsace-Lorraine given back to France and the German empire dismembered, perhaps, although the latter result he would consider madness.

Representative Germans have put forth statements of terms which show an astonishing range of view. Powerful organizations of industrial, agricultural and commercial interests have demanded that the nation's sacrifices be repaid by the absorption of every foot of territory occupied by its troops and the exaction of huge indemnities. The Socialists, on the contrary, have begun a determined campaign against any annexation whatsoever. Finally, there is Russia. Foreign Minister Sazonoff has declared for a permanent alliance of Russia, France and Great Britain, which, he says, must say to Germany:

These are your frontiers and your limits. Work within them as you please, but out into the world you shall go no more. We have had enough of the disintegrating influence you bring to bear in every quarter of the globe. You must be content to stay quietly at home and conduct your commerce and your domestic affairs as may please you best.

One need not take seriously every fantastic demand put forth by enthusiastic patriots among the belligerents, yet it is sufficiently clear that these millions of men are fighting for reasons considerably more powerful than an imperfect understanding of the blessings of peace. It is regrettable, but it is none the less undeniable, that both sides are determined to use the ultimate resources of force before they submit to the devices of negotiation. Our good wishes, rather than our hopes, will go with the pilgrimage of the pacifists.

THE BACK YARD OF THE WAR

November 29, 1915.

IT IS far, very far, from the spectacular scenes that unroll before the world in the daily panorama of the news. It lacks the dramatic fascination, the stirring imaginative appeal, of the fighting in France and the Alps and the Macedonian defiles, where mighty guns thunder ceaselessly and vast armies meet in the resounding shock of battle. In this obscure corner of the theater of war there are no rules to be respected, no public opinion to be feared, no great principles to be upheld. No famous generals direct the operations, no literary celebrities describe them in throbbing phrases. It represents the seamy side of belligerency—a sordid, shabby drama of strife; dreary, uninspiring, remote. This is Persia, the back yard of the war, an unlovely scene. Yet battles are being fought there, soldiers are dying there, whole communities of men and women and children are steeped in terror and anguish there, and the result will have its bearing upon the fate of empires and the future of the human race. If one cannot be thrilled by a glance at the spectacle, one can be enlightened by it. All the real news that has come out of the country could be told in two inches of newspaper space. "Military necessity" required that Turkey should send her forces through northwestern Persia to strike at Russia in the Caucasus—and the region became an unpitied Belgium. Armies of the Muscovite and the Moslem have fought campaigns of months there. Towns have been bombarded, villages

burned, unnumbered thousands subjected to the ferocities of Oriental warfare.

This is the fate of a people which has been neutral even in thought. Persia has no interest in the struggle of the Powers. She has never "invited war" by preparedness. She has carried to the limit the policy of non-resistance to aggression. If she possessed one-tenth part of the vigor and valor that were hers of old, she would be free, and her neighbors would be battling on their own territory. But she is decadent, inert, helpless—and rich in possibilities; therefore she lies prone under the feet of aliens, and her independent existence terminates in humiliation and disaster. But there is a deeper reason for her fate than military feebleness. Persia is under the deadly blight of Islam, which paralyzes the human instinct of progress and atrophies national intelligence. There are today only three Mohammedan states left in the world, and all these are passing to unhonored extinction. Morocco is under the rule of France, Turkey is a bewildered satellite of Prussianism, and Persia is at the mercy of Russia and England. Bankrupt physically, politically and morally, she helplessly awaits the issue of the contest waged over her by Saxon, Teuton and Slav.

It is difficult to realize that this flabby thing was once the heart of a world empire. Persia gave to the world Cyrus, Darius and Xerxes—three of the few men whom history has surnamed the great. She imposed a government and a language upon nations from the Mediterranean to the bay of Bengal, and the genius of her people enriched art and literature for all time. But a false philosophy and a corrupting conception of human destiny could not build an enduring structure. A history covering centuries of futile strife and conquest dwindles down to the abasement of today. The mystic enchantment of an Oriental civilization, a tawdry system

at its best, fades before the searching glare of enlightenment, and its fragments of reality are to be utilized by stronger races.

Only a brief glance at the ancient story will be worth while. Persia boasts of legendary history of ages, but the first definite accounts are found in the Greek records. Media broke the Assyrian power, and her great captain, Cyrus, extended his sway from the Mediterranean to the Indus, including the regions which now are Afghanistan and Beluchistan. Cambyses added Egypt to the empire, while Darius added Thrace, which is now Turkey in Europe, and Macedonia, where German, Austrian, Servian, Bulgarian, French and British forces are battling. Darius had a dream of conquering Greece, but it was shattered at Marathon. Xerxes, gathering together the mightiest military and naval force the world had ever seen, followed the same vision, but his fleet was scattered at Salamis and his army at Plataea. And Alexander closed the brief two centuries of Persian domination when he carried his Macedonian standards of victory beyond the Euphrates. Then followed two thousand years of conquest and dispersal, the rise and fall of dynasties and kingdoms. Persia was Parthian. The Saracen wave engulfed it. It was overrun successively by the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. But the history of present interest begins early in the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great projected the policy of Russian domination, which the sleepless diplomacy of the Muscovite has carried down to this day.

It was because of the threat of a Russian advance through Persia toward India that vigilant British statesmanship began a hundred years ago to maneuver for a place of advantage in the crumbling kingdom. Now these two Powers are dividing the spoils by amicable agreement. It is as if the history of Persia, woven

through the centuries into a rich fabric like one of her gorgeous carpets, had been trampled under the feet of nations, until all the glowing pattern has been ground out and only the ragged threads of dull reality remain. The explanation of the present fate of the country lies chiefly in geography. Persia is bounded on the west by Turkey, on the north by Russia, on the south by the Persian gulf and the Arabian sea. Just over her border, on the southwest, is Bagdad, terminus of Germany's projected railroad from Berlin and Constantinople. The country has about one-fifth the area of the United States and one-tenth the population, 2,000,000 of them, perhaps, being nomadic tribes. The prevailing religion is Moham-medanism, but of a sect at bitter enmity with that of the Turks. The government is a despotism. In no country in the world is there a more singular contrast in human life—in the cities and towns a meager form of civilization, and beyond them roaming bands of tent-dwellers, following a pastoral existence as primitive as that of Abraham. But Persia is in the war because across her lands pass the ancient highways to the East, the caravan routes that have been traveled from the earliest times, and which are to be the railroad surveys of the future. In her nerveless fingers are the keys to Asia; and it is these for which the contending empires strive. Germany in Persia would be knocking at the gateways of India and threatening Russia from the rear. Held by Russia and England, the country flanks the projected German sphere of influence in Asia Minor and throws a menacing shadow on the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad.

In searching out the causes of the world war, a fact not to be ignored is that less than ten years ago Russia and England were in deadly rivalry over Persia. The Muscovite advance through the dominions of the shah

was a nightmare to the rulers of India. Although a treaty of 1809 provided that Persia should not permit any European force to pass that way, the guarantee was a slender one, for Russian diplomacy and gold had reduced the corrupt occupant of the peacock throne to a mere puppet. The Russian system was simplicity itself—the pressing of huge loans upon the shah, secured by the customs receipts of specified territories—a device which required close control and sometimes military occupation. England adopted the same serviceable method. When the shah, under Russian instigation, canceled a British tobacco monopoly in 1892 there was an instant demand for compensation. As Persia had no money, English banking interests obligingly advanced a \$2,500,000 loan—secured by the customs receipts of the busy ports on the Persian gulf—and principal and interest now amount to a formidable mortgage, which is ready for foreclosure by British occupation of the southern part of the country. And upon that project, it is to be understood, Russia will look benevolently. In 1907 the great rivals decided to make a friendly division of the Persian treasure. Russia's sphere of influence was to extend to a line drawn just north of Ispahan; England's interests were to predominate south of a line drawn below Teheran, the capital. And in making this arrangement both countries announced with solemnity that they thereby guaranteed the integrity and independence of Persia! Germany, balked in her design for a railroad terminus on the Persian gulf, found herself shut out of another "place in the sun."

A queer interlude must here be mentioned. Four years after the amicable partition of the country an American expert was engaged by the Persian government to disentangle its corrupt and incompetent financial system. He succeeded so well that within nine months he

transformed a deficit into an appreciable surplus. Unfortunately, he was a "shirt-sleeve" diplomatist and did not realize that the Russo-British arrangement was a very real and powerful factor in the country's affairs. Those countries wanted anything rather than a financially independent Persia, and the American expert was finally dismissed. One other occurrence is of interest. In 1906 a Young Persian movement, similar to those which have failed in India and Egypt and succeeded in Turkey, extorted from the dying shah a constitution. But the new ruler was a violent reactionary. His decrees started a revolution; his grand vizier was assassinated; anarchy and pillage devastated the country. The people, burdened with taxes which went to pay interest on loans squandered by the court, were desperate. Meanwhile, the parliament was a pitiable farce—a very bear den of mouthing orators, with not an intelligent leader or statesman among them. The experiment of endowing an Oriental people with western self-governing institutions had produced one more failure. But the disorder hastened the inevitable intervention. After two years of calamitous strife the despotic shah fled, and his son, a boy of 11, was elevated to the tottering throne. Russian troops settled themselves in Tabriz and other important cities in the Russian sphere, while England redoubled her watchfulness in the south, and the ministers from Petrograd and London took charge of all but the outward forms of government.

The subjugation of Persia is as sordid a story as the annals of international intrigue can show. But it is doubtful whether much regret need be expended upon the collapse of the attempt to clothe a hopelessly eastern nation in the habiliments of democracy. The great mass of the Persian people are absolutely unfitted for self-government; they are incapable of understanding the elemen-

tary principles of autonomy. They had enough fiber to revolt against a worthless despotism, but they had not the historical background, the inspiration of centuries of education and upward striving, to lead them to grasp the privileges and obligations of the ideal which they tried to achieve over night. So passes Persia, enfeebled by Islamism, crushed under the weight of dynastic superstition, foredoomed prey of the strong. A recent picture of her degradation comes vividly to mind. One month before the great war began the boy shah, having reached the age of 17, was enthroned with Oriental pomp and ceremony in the palace at Teheran. Guns thundered salutes, flags waved, Moslem priests chanted the praises of the Prophet and his anointed vicegerent. And the cost of the glittering celebration of a triumphant nationalism was defrayed by the Russian and British governments, whose ministers gravely bowed before the sovereign as though his regal authority were an actuality instead of a tinsel sham.

But what, it may be asked, is the bearing of all these distant maneuvers upon the conflict in Europe? Just this: it was in Persia that Russia and England discovered common ground of agreement; there they compromised their Asiatic rivalries, delimited their spheres of exploitation and determined upon a wise division rather than a costly contest. It was when the Russian menace against India was lifted that the first move was made toward the accord which united British democracy and Russian autocracy against the rising power of Germany. When we read, therefore, of fighting in Kermanshah and Ispahan and Urumiah, we may discern in those far-off regions the working of the same forces that have clashed at Liège and Lemberg, at Mons and Monastir.

THE MARTYRDOM OF POLAND

December 7, 1915.

THE heroism of the Belgians has won for them a deathless renown; for all time they will be honored as the bravest defenders of the faith of nations. It is the general impression, too, that their sufferings have been greater than those of any other victims of the war. Yet what they have endured has been visited four-fold upon another people—a people with no world adulation to uplift them, no spirit of national unity to inspire them, no government to speak for them. Imagine a Belgium of seven times the area, with three times the population; picture it devastated by war, not for a few weeks, but for sixteen months—the storm of battle sweeping now this way, now that; vast armies advancing in triumph, then retreating in sullen disorder; cities captured by one invader, then wrested from him by another; towns without number leveled to the ground, whole clusters of villages reduced to ruins, tens of thousands of families shelterless; want in the cities, famine in the wasted countryside, pestilence and terror everywhere. This is Poland, the battlefield of three nations, the Golgotha of Europe. And by the monstrous irony of fate, the people have not even the solace of suffering in a common cause. In the armies of Russia, Germany and Austria are 1,500,000 Polish soldiers, battling in fratricidal strife. The tragedy is the more appalling because it is the culmination of generations of cruelty and injustice. For 150 years Poland has existed in living fragments

that bled and bled but would not die. The three great Powers vivisected the nation, severed limb from limb; but its soul they could not kill, and after a century and a half the crime is extorting its own vengeance. For the last martyrdom of Poland will drag at least one of her despoilers to ruin with her.

There is no more striking passage in history than the record of this nation. Once a great and prosperous kingdom, it fell a victim to the ruthless ambitions of its neighbors. Stripped of its sovereignty, deprived of its liberties, divided among three autocracies, subjected to every device of pressure, coercion and violence, its very language proscribed, it has preserved its identity and kept alive its spirit of nationalism. The ancient story of Poland emerges from romance in the tenth century, when the ruler of the turbulent region embraced Christianity, the gospel of the sword being carried later by the converts to the pagan Prussians. Submerged for a time under the wave of Mongol invasion, the country regained its position in the fourteenth century, when the instinct of the people for liberalism showed itself in the foundation of a great university and the granting of freedom to the Jews, then persecuted savagely in other European countries. Just 500 years ago the Poles broke the power of the Teutonic knights at Tannenburg and added West Prussia to their territory. In the sixteenth century Poland dominated central Europe, its rule extending from the Baltic and the gulf of Riga to Moldavia and nearly to the Crimea, and from Brandenburg to the basin of the Dnieper. On the west the frontier was only 90 miles from Berlin; on the east, only 150 miles from Moscow. The region embraced an area more than eight times the size of Pennsylvania, with 15,000,000 inhabitants. A vague forecast of the modern Polish spirit of democracy was the nation's adoption of an elective kingship. For

exactly two hundred years, from 1572 to 1772, the Poles chose their own rulers, although toward the end of that period the selections were dictated by other Powers. At no time, however, was there a semblance of real popular government. The military aristocracy was the most arrogant in Europe, and the so-called legislature was controlled by the nobles and the clergy.

The principal event of these two centuries was the turning back of the Moslem invasion by John Sobieski, who defeated the Turks before the walls of Vienna in 1683. Early in the eighteenth century Russia began her relentless aggressions, and the doom of free Poland was sounded. Catherine II forced the election of Poniatowski, one of her former lovers, as king of Poland in 1764; the people resisted, and Russia prepared to seize coveted parts of the kingdom. Frederick the Great of Prussia, founder of the political philosophy which dictated the violation of Belgium sixteen months ago, saw an opportunity to enlarge his own power, and proposed a partition of the helpless nation. It was made by a secret treaty signed at St. Petersburg in 1772. Russia took 42,000 square miles of Poland, with 1,800,000 population; Prussia seized West Prussia, 13,000 square miles, and Austria absorbed Galicia and adjoining territory, 27,000 square miles, with 2,700,000 inhabitants. The diet of Polish nobles was won by bribery to consent to the dismemberment. The revolution in America and the ferment in France inspired an outburst of liberalism in 1791, in support of a constitutional government. Once more the adroit Catherine induced the nobility to spring to the defense of the country's "ancient liberties," and for this high cause she sent a huge army of invasion. The immortal Kosciusko won one battle, but Catherine's puppet king deserted the people, the Prussians poured into the country, and the second partition was arranged. Rus-

sia this time took 96,000 square miles and Prussia 22,000 square miles, under a treaty of 1793. But the example of the French revolution, then at its height, provoked another uprising. Kosciusko, as dictator, succeeded in driving the Russians out of Warsaw, but the movement was wrecked by dissensions, and in 1795 the three Powers divided the remaining spoils—Russia, 45,000 square miles; Prussia, 21,000, and Austria, 18,000, with an aggregate population of more than 3,000,000.

At the congress of Vienna, just a century ago, the work of partition was ratified. Prussia retained West Prussia and took part of the duchy of Warsaw, which became Posen; Austria recovered Galicia, and Russia renewed her title to all she had stolen, making of the remnant of the duchy of Warsaw a kingdom of Poland, which was to have an independent government under the Russian crown. Cracow was to be the center of a small republic. The final division of Polish territory gave Russia 220,500 square miles; Prussia, 26,000, and Austria, 35,500. Russia at first granted a liberal constitution; but the general European upheaval of 1830 was felt in Poland, and the nobility attempted a revolution. It was crushed by the merciless methods of Muscovite reprisal. Thousands were imprisoned and banished, the constitution was abrogated, the press gagged, the nation's art treasures looted and a system of enforced Russianizing of the people begun. This year saw the final extinction of even the forms of self-government in Poland. The next great democratic year, 1848, brought sanguinary but futile revolt, this time in Posen. Plots and counter-plots produced anarchy in the early sixties, and for the first time a really popular uprising against Russian autocracy took place. Polish exiles in western Europe had stirred up widespread sympathy for the revolutionists, but nothing tangible was done to stay the

czar's vengeance, and wholesale executions and the transportation of vast numbers of patriots to Siberia crushed the movement. In 1868 an imperial ukase made Russian Poland a part of the empire.

The bewilderingly complex history of the divided nation cannot be understood without a glance at the fate of the three parts. It should be understood that, while the sentimental demand of Polish nationalism is for restoration of its original identity as a free kingdom, its strongest inspiration has been a passionate desire for autonomy, a hatred of absolutism. Resistance to the eighteenth-century partitions, brutal as they were, was not due to the existence of a national consciousness. The inhabitants were then divided into two classes, separated by a great gulf—a feudal nobility and an ignorant peasantry—and the latter were indifferent to the political strivings of the arrogant ruling class. But the late nineteenth century saw the rise of industrialism and the consequent massing of population in cities, with its ready interchange of ideas. In 1864 the czar had emancipated the peasants, thereby hoping to win their support against the aristocracy. But emancipation meant schools and newspapers and the spread of education, and these forces produced democrats. Thus during the last generation the movement for freedom in Russian Poland has become really formidable; it has had behind it not only nobility and clergy, but the people of the fields and the workshops. Even so, it is democratic rather than anti-Russian. That autonomy, rather than the restoration of ancient independence, is the essential aim of Polish patriotism is shown by the history of Galicia, Austria's share of the spoils at the partitions. There are no more ardent adherents of the Hapsburgs than the Poles of that region.

The story of German Poland, on the contrary, is the story of Russian Poland and of Alsace-Lorraine. For a half century after the congress of Vienna, Prussia was content to strengthen her sway over the Polish territory by natural methods, and succeeded so well that a large part of the alien population became German in all save the family names. But Bismarck's war against their religion revived the sense of Polish nationality, and the anti-Prussian feeling has been intensified by persecutions in the schools, in the army and the church.

This, then, is the fate of 20,000,000 Poles. More conscious of their national identity today than ever before, they are divided as the subjects of three autocracies, alien to them in language, character and ideals. They have neither religious, educational nor political freedom, save in Galicia. And while their manhood is drafted by wholesale into the opposing armies, the land they inherited is made the battlefield of their oppressors, and the very lifeblood of the race is being drained by war, famine and disease. Assuredly, a peace which does not liberate the Poles would be an indictment of the great Powers, which one and all declare that they are fighting for the rights of lesser nations as well as for their own security. And it would be one of the great compensations for the dreadful war if the nationality of this brave people should emerge alive from the sepulcher in which it was walled up a century and a half ago.

TIMOROUS GREECE

December 14, 1915.

CONSTANTINE I, king of the Hellenes, was born in Athens of a Danish father and a Russian mother; he was educated in Berlin and Leipsic, married a sister of the German kaiser, spends his holidays in Paris and talks like an American congressman. A cosmopolitan monarch, idolized by his people as a great soldier, which he is not, and revered as a patriot, which he probably is, after the Balkan fashion, he is just now a figure of towering importance in the world, because it lies with him to save or destroy the military power of France and Great Britain in the peninsula. There has been no more interesting political episode in the war than the complicated evolutions of Greece during the last ten months, by which she has been transformed from an almost certain ally of the Entente Powers to a sullen neutral, of a temper which may flame at any moment into hostility. It would be easy to justify or condemn her course by offhand comment, but it would be illogical and unfair. According to the suave Constantine, who made and enforces the national policy, it is a masterpiece of sagacity and justice; according to his critics, it is a compound of base ingratitude, shuffling cowardice and shameful treachery.

By a characteristic paradox of Balkan affairs, it may be said that both estimates are essentially true and grotesquely false. For the government of Greece to pretend to be inspired by virtue and courage is a mani-

fest absurdity; for the Allies to heap upon it the odium for their own incompetence and trifling is ungenerous and unwise. If Greece has not won the world's admiration, she has earned its compassion; for she is that most pitiable of victims, the hunted quarry of her own fears. The fundamental error of the Allies' policy has been in treating the Balkan situation as a political problem, when it was always a military problem. They tried to win the wavering states by diplomacy, and discovered too late that nothing save force counts in that distracted region. For months the people of Greece were ready to commit their fortunes to an alliance with the Entente group. All they asked was that Great Britain and France and Russia put adequate armies in the field to oppose the Teutonic march southward. The belated and feeble aid sent to Servia was an object lesson more powerful than all the promises of London and Paris and Petrograd. And it is not unnatural that the Greeks, as they watch the Saloniki expedition driven back in hopeless defeat, should give shivering thanks for even the scanty covering of the "benevolent neutrality" which is their imperfect protection against the wintry blasts of war.

Until midsummer it was the general belief—based largely upon the infatuated confidence of the Entente governments—that they dominated the Balkan situation. They believed that they had placated Bulgaria's resentment, dating from the second Balkan war, by persuading Servia to agree upon territorial concessions. Rumania's government seemed safely pro-Russian; and it was argued that the Teutons were as completely shut off from their ally, Turkey, as they were from the sea. About Greece, in particular, there was no apprehension whatever. The premier, Eleutherios Venizelos, was openly an advocate of intervention on behalf of the

Allies, and his popularity was counted upon to paralyze the pro-German impulses of the king. This extraordinary man, who had created the Balkan League and added large territories to the kingdom, had inspired the timorous nation with a belief in its own powers; and if the Dardanelles operations had been carried out with convincing force, Greece probably would have joined in the enterprise. The king, however, was an insuperable obstacle. Aside from his relationship to the kaiser, he is an experienced soldier, if not a brilliant one, and he doubted from the first the ability of the Allies to check the German advance. Venizelos boldly challenged his sovereign last March by resigning. When he was returned to power by a large majority the hopes of the Entente soared still higher. In July Premier Asquith, asking parliament for a new grant of £750,000,000, said blandly that heavy payments would be necessary to finance the operations of states about to come forward as participants in the war.

But it became apparent that the diplomacy of the Allies had been fatally defective. They had tried to win both Bulgaria and Greece, promising the former concessions in Grecian Macedonia. The project of uniting those implacably hostile nations was hopeless. Bulgaria, having decided that Germany was the rising power, merely kept the Entente agents busy with her false proposals and counter-proposals until her military arrangements were complete. And Greece, her ardor chilled by the failure of the Dardanelles campaign and the assumption of the Allies that her territory could be used to buy Bulgarian support, began to see unsuspected attractions in neutrality. The contest between the king and his premier came to a head when Germany, Austria and Bulgaria made their simultaneous assaults on Servia. Under a treaty, Greece was bound to aid Servia if she

were attacked by Bulgaria. National safety, as well as honor, said Venizelos, demanded that this compact be observed. But Constantine held that it was not meant to apply to a general war, and forbade its fulfillment. On September 28 the British and French landed a force at Saloniki. Venizelos made a formal protest, but as he had invited the "invasion" and as the Greek people welcomed the "invasion" with unconcealed satisfaction, the German denunciation of the Allies for making Greece "another Belgium" created no profound impression.

King Constantine, however, loaded the premier with reproaches, and on October 5 Venizelos resigned. A coalition cabinet three days later declared a policy of "benevolent neutrality" toward the Allies, whose forces have since used the Greek port as a base for their futile expedition to save Servia. Early in November the Venizelos party, still in control of parliament, threatened to vote the government out of power, whereupon the king, in defiance of the constitution—or, as he says, rightly applying the constitution—dissolved the legislature. The new election is set for December 19, but as the army is still mobilized, the great mass of the voters will not be able to cast ballots, and the king is for the time being a czar. Ever since his audacious action the crisis has grown more acute. The Anglo-French expedition was too weak in numbers and too late in arriving to do more than create a temporary diversion. The Servian army has been crushed and the Allies driven in retreat back into Greece. The king in his remarkable interview the other day complained bitterly that the Entente Powers suspected that "Greece is ready to betray them to Germany at the first opportunity." It may hurt him, but it should not surprise him, that nations which have had their experience in Balkan affairs should want some exceptional guarantees from a government

which deserted its ally in an hour of peril. A month ago Dr. E. J. Dillon, the best informed writer on European politics, gave this warning:

The assurances of benevolent neutrality lavished by Premier Skouloudis are less solemn and less binding than the formal treaty obligations assumed by Greece toward Servia. They are far less solid than the promises of Venizelos, who was backed by the king, the cabinet, parliament and the nation at the time, but who is now being systematically disavowed. Skouloudis is not the spokesman of parliament or of the nation. He is the mere nominee of a field marshal of the Prussian army (the king), who is doing violence to Greece's constitution and sacrificing her national honor in order to redeem his promise to his Prussian brother-in-law.

Constantine and his supporters, on the other side, declare that Greece will be courting the fate of Belgium if she permits the retreating Allies and the pursuing Germans, Austrians and Bulgarians to make a battlefield of her territory. Three facts, then, are revealed by the dramatic unfolding of this phase of the war: First, the defection of Greece from the Entente cause is due not so much to the pro-German sympathies of the king and his court as to their absolute conviction that the Teuton progress cannot be stayed. Second, it is less an evidence of Greece's "treachery" than of weakness on the part of those who accuse her. Germany won Bulgaria by marshaling an army of 300,000 men instead of a group of whispering diplomatic agents. England and France could have assured the adhesion of Greece on the same terms. Having failed to make the requisite show of force, whether through incompetence or inability, they are reduced to the expedient of threatening and coercing Greece into saving them from utter disaster. The third disclosure is that the ruling factor in Greek policy is the emotion of fear. A writer in the *New Republic* strikingly emphasizes this curious circumstance. For centuries the Greeks feared the Turks; since the second

Balkan war they have lived in constant dread of a vengeful move by Bulgaria; they have watched in distracted terror the remorseless advance of the Teutonic hosts, and they have cold sweats at the thought of the Anglo-French fleets that can devastate their unprotected coasts.

Ten years ago Venizelos brought over from Crete some of the ancient spirit of Marathon and Thermopylae, made Greece the leader in the Balkan peninsula and awakened the nation to new ambitions. But fear has reasserted itself. Partly because of the Allies' weakness, partly because of a timidity which led her even to let her Servian allies be overwhelmed without striking a blow, Greece has subsided again into cowering apprehension. She may suffer some of Belgium's woes, but she will never share Belgium's renown.

EUROPE'S "CONTEMPT" FOR US

December 16, 1915.

IT BECAME apparent when the war was still young that the United States had suffered a serious loss of prestige among the nations of the world, particularly those which were belligerents. This disesteem, manifested in European newspapers and public opinion, and sometimes even in official utterances, guarded as they were, was, in part, unavoidable. Peoples engaged in desperate struggles for existence might concede our right to remain aloof, but they could not help holding us to a rigid accountability. Comparing our peace and prosperity with their own misery, their judgments upon our every act were implacable. If they did not actually envy our good fortune, because of it they were more exacting in measuring our responsibilities and obligations. Each warring nation, inspired by a conviction of its own righteousness and self-sacrificing devotion, looked at first to this country for active assistance, or, at least, for sympathy and moral support, as against its antagonists. Germans were bitterly incensed because Americans did not join them in denouncing Russia's "Pan-Slavic ambitions," France's "spirit of revenge" and England's "greed and hypocrisy." Frenchmen were astounded that the great western republic did not declare against their aggressive enemy. Britons took no pains to conceal their feeling of scorn for a country that could proclaim neutrality when "Anglo-Saxon civilization" was imperiled. As long ago as last

January an able American correspondent wrote from London:

The United States is making no real friends in this war. The general charge is that we are displaying a shameless lack of idealism, chivalry, magnanimity and courage. Britons, Frenchmen, Russians and Italians blame America for ignoring the invasion of Belgium and the violation of the conventions of The Hague, and then springing into the international arena with a protest relating exclusively to matters of trade. * * * Influential Germans are also inclined to speak of us with scorn. It seems that the whole of Europe is hardening against America.

Recently the sentiment has grown more hostile, particularly among the people of Great Britain and France. The Germans from the beginning have been resentful. Now their enemies display similar feelings of aversion, not only for the policy of the government in Washington, but for the people of this nation—for all things American. In those countries we are held in contempt by a large part of the population. Testimony to this effect is to be found in countless European journals, which never tire of ringing the changes upon President Wilson's appalling indiscretions—his admonition that Americans should be "neutral even in thought," his boasts of our "self-possession," his predictions that Europe would some day take pattern by our virtues, his intimation that we are "too proud to fight." Scores of cartoons in European papers represent Uncle Sam as a dollar-grabbing miscreant who is growing fat upon the misfortunes of his neighbors. The Germans, who can get no American munitions, are hardly more bitter about this than the English and French, who depend very largely upon American industries for their supplies. It cannot be denied that much of the criticism leveled against the policy of the United States is justified. Our official silence when the first great infraction of inter-

national law was committed exposed us to condemnation. As we said many months ago:

It is our proud boast as a nation that our power is not that of armaments, but of moral dignity and national honor; the world, shaken by the storm of a great war, looked to us to keep alight the lamp of progress, to stand firmly and impartially for the principles which must be re-established in the end if civilization is to endure. Yet when a right which we had pledged ourselves to sustain is flagrantly defied we do not so much as express an opinion, and the sacred cause of which we were one of the trustees is allowed to go by default.

Yet Britons and Frenchmen, if they were in a position to view the matter calmly, would perhaps hesitate to express their lofty scorn of a nation which has earned denunciation even more bitter among their adversaries. They would recognize that the United States in its population represents all of the belligerents, not one group. And if they could not condone the failure of the American government to fulfill its great duty to civilization and humanity, they could, at least, recognize the invaluable aid they have received from this country, in the sympathy of public opinion, in financial accommodation, in supplies, without which they would have been overwhelmed in humiliating defeat. Incidentally, expressions of contempt come with bad grace from nations which themselves have persistently defied international law, to the injury of the very country which they profess to hold in such low esteem.

But America is "not losing anything," they say. This, of course, is a gratuitous assumption. For many months the people of the United States suffered severely from the effects of a war with which they had nothing to do, and a large part of the population still feels the economic reaction which it produced here. Even if this were not so, by what system of logic is it considered just to complain that loans and supplies are furnished to the

belligerents only upon ample security and at a profit? Is it seriously believed in England and France that America should not only give those countries the fullest benefits of an open neutral market, but should do so at a loss? Will it be contended that the people of the United States owe it to civilization to finance and arm one group of nations at their own cost? Do our critics demand that we assume the burdens of an alliance while renouncing its possible advantages and maintaining a pretense of neutrality? But, aside from these considerations, Europeans display peculiarly bad taste when they assume the right to look down upon the nation that has done more than any other to repair the ravages of the war. If Americans have "lost nothing" by their legitimate war traffic, they have made excellent use of their gains. When Great Britain and France were unable to succor the famine-stricken Belgians, it was this country that sent scores and hundreds of shiploads of supplies to the suffering people. It is American money and American skill and service that maintain the most efficient war hospitals in France, Belgium, Serbia and Poland. It has been the scorned American dollars, which give prosperity to millions of Europeans in times of peace, that have carried to them the means of life in a time of war. The world even now is witnessing the hopeless failure of Britain and France to save Serbia from extermination. But when that nation was prostrate under an epidemic of typhus fever it was American doctors and nurses, backed by American contributions, who gave their services—many of them their lives—to fight an enemy more to be dreaded than an invading army. Britons and Frenchmen who affect to despise this country might read with profit the just and generous words of Viscount Bryce:

By American munificence Red Cross hospitals and motor ambulances and equipments of various kinds have been provided and run with the greatest efficiency. Besides all the gifts dispatched to Belgium, France, Poland and Servia for the wounded, large sums were sent to Palestine for relief; other sums for sufferers at Tabriz, Persia, and even more to Beirut for the Armenian refugees. As for Belgium, it is the contributions and work of Americans that are saving her people from starvation and recalling the invaders to some slight regard for the elementary duties of humanity. Never before has so much voluntary work been done to relieve suffering caused in war and by war. No people exceeds, if, indeed, any people quite equals, the people of America in compassionate sensitiveness for suffering and in the open-handed generosity with which they hasten to relieve it. Their love of liberty is equaled only by their sense of human brotherhood.

With criticisms of some features of the United States' foreign policy many Americans who cherish high ideals of international duty must agree. But they can endure with serenity the ill-advised contempt of peoples swayed by the passions of a desperate war rather than by rational understanding. They can await with confidence the calmer judgments of peace, because they know that, while their government may have failed in its obligations, their own sympathies have been just and their own conduct generous. The scorn of overwrought Europeans for America just now is to be regretted, but it is not insupportable.

THE LONG ARM OF GERMANY

December 17, 1915.

WINTER has now halted the operations in France and Russia, while the second phase of the Balkan campaign has been brought to a close with the expulsion of the Anglo-French forces from Serbia and their retirement upon Saloniki. In Europe the war has reached a pause. But in a remote part of Asia another conflict is raging, the result of which will compare in importance with the struggle for Constantinople. A few weeks ago it was announced that a British expedition, which for a year or more had been fighting its way northward from the Persian gulf, was within a few miles of Bagdad and was about to capture the ancient capital of the Moslem world, thereby shattering the great German project of an overland trade route from Berlin to the East and a Teutonic empire stretching from the North sea to the Indian ocean. Now it is known that the invaders, when victory was almost in their grasp, were suddenly overwhelmed and driven back in disorder. Under galling pursuit they have retreated more than a hundred miles, and are fighting desperately to hold the ground they occupied last September. Thus one of the most difficult, daring and dramatic efforts of the whole war has come to naught. Germany has scored another victory, and one of the few successes won by Great Britain has been turned into a defeat that may be disastrous to her Asiatic prestige.

If for no other reason, this campaign would have exceptional interest, because it has been an example of the stirring, adventurous kind of fighting which made war picturesque before science reduced it largely to a contest of soulless machinery. The dominating features of the struggle in Europe are huge guns, concrete trenches, elaborate railroad and motor transports, incredibly powerful devices of mechanical destruction. All parts of the great fields of operations are connected by roads and by telegraph, telephone and wireless systems. The first-line trenches are but a few miles from inexhaustible depots of food and ammunition, and an advance made by one side or the other depends merely upon the hurling of a certain number of tons of devastating explosives. In Mesopotamia conditions are vastly different. The territory conquered and then lost by the British was empty and inhospitable. They cut their way through deadly swamps and traversed burning deserts, where even water had to be transported. They endured wasting disease, the torments of swarming insects and the consuming heat of desolate sands, while during almost every day and night of their advance, as in their retreat, they were harassed by a resourceful enemy and the treacherous attacks of warlike nomads. The contest has not been one of machines, but of adroit strategy and human endurance, with forced marches, swift surprises and unsleeping vigilance. Yet because the campaign has been remote and the policy of the contending governments secretive, the news from the scene has been fragmentary and obscure. It is only by piecing together the brief, colorless official dispatches that one may discern the outlines of an isolated struggle which will exert a tremendous influence on the course of the war and on the terms of peace.

The first definite news from Mesopotamia was contained in a few words cabled from London on October 2: "It is unofficially reported that the British expedition is within a few miles of Bagdad." This force, made up of Australians, New Zealanders and British and native troops from India, began its carefully secreted operations soon after the war started. Basra, an important town on the river channel through which the Tigris and Euphrates reach the Persian gulf, was captured, and thence the troops, supported by armed river boats, toiled through fifty miles of swamps to the confluence of the two great rivers. Here a base was established, and two columns started northward, one following the Euphrates and the other the Tigris. Two hundred miles up the latter stream a second base was made at Kut-el-Amara, and the Euphrates column, after passing the ruins of Babylon, struck northeastward and made a junction with the other force. A published letter from an officer of the expedition gives some vivid glimpses of the march:

We cannot carry nearly enough water, and one's tongue soon swells when the sun is up. * * * This was a bad camp, on burning sand, and a hot, damp wind blew off the marsh all day. The temperature was 110 degrees, and that, for a damp heat, is about the limit of human endurance. A great many men went sick. We moved on again at 6 P. M., but had to stop at dark. No water here, so after resting till 3.30 A. M. we moved off again to the next camp, eight miles. The water there proved to be like Epsom salts, with a good deal of table salt added. The heat was awful; in the hospital tents it was 130 degrees. The suffering of the wounded and sick was distressing to contemplate. We were living on tea, sugar, hard cheese, tinned beef and hard biscuit. During the march my goggles were so hot they blistered where they touched my face, even under the shade of the helmet.

From Kut-el-Amara began the final stage of the advance toward Bagdad, a little more than 100 miles distant. This took place, as noted, during September

and October, but it was weeks later before detailed information began to reach the outer world. On November 24 London announced that the British had captured Ctesiphon on the 19th; beyond that point an alluvial plain, incapable of defense, presented an open road to Bagdad, only eighteen miles distant. Ctesiphon, however, was not a war prize; it was a mere geographical expression. Two thousand years ago a splendid city stood there, a metropolis of the Parthian empire, which once extended from the Euphrates to the Indus, and later the capital of one of the Persian dynasties. On the opposite bank was Seleucia, another rich and populous community. Both were often destroyed and rebuilt during the centuries of strife when Romans, Greeks and Asiatics struggled for dominion. Thirteen hundred years ago the Arab wave engulfed them. The two proud cities were destroyed, the stone and marble being utilized in the building of Bagdad, seat of the caliphate. Now there is nothing left of them but scanty ruins. Where the British forces camped the only structure in sight is a tumbled heap of masonry, which twenty-four centuries ago was a palace of the Parthian kings. But the success over the Turks at Ctesiphon was short lived. Five days after occupying the ruins the British had to retire four miles in order to avoid being cut off from water; and on November 29 came the admission that the retirement had continued "further down the river," because of ceaseless attacks by the Turks, who had been heavily reinforced. It is curious to reflect that in this fighting, concerning which we have had only a few lines of news, more men were engaged than fought at Antietam. The Turks, it was reported, had 80,000 men; the British, more than half as many. London announces that reinforcements are being hastened to the beleaguered expedition. Quick

relief is imperative, because the tireless Turks are endeavoring to circle around Kut-el-Amara and cut off the British retreat down the Tigris.

The significance of this dramatic episode in the war is twofold. In the first place, it reveals once more the astounding efficiency and tireless initiative of the Germans. For, of course, the rout of the British on the eve of what seemed certain victory was due to Berlin rather than Constantinople. The Turks were able to turn against their opponents when they received reinforcements, supplies and German officers. These were transported over the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad to the end of the line, 150 miles north of Mosul, which is near the ruins of Nineveh. Thence they went by road 300 miles to Samarra, 50 miles north of Bagdad, where another section of the uncompleted railroad begins, and a few hours brought them to the battlefront. There have been few incidents in the war more impressive than the ease with which the Teutons, while defending two immense fronts in France and Russia and conducting an aggressive campaign in the Balkans, reached across two continents and thrust back a formidable invading force. The second important consideration, of course, is the effect which the failure of the drive to Bagdad will have upon the fortunes of the rival empires in the East. Capture of the Moslem stronghold would have given the British command of the entire lower valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates and would have ended the German plan of linking Berlin with the Persian gulf. If the expedition, on the other hand, cannot renew its advance soon and achieve its objective, the Pan-German project will have become almost a reality and British domination in Asia will suffer a staggering blow.

GALLIPOLI

December 28, 1915.

ALMOST worthy to be counted among the atrocities of the war was a remark made the other day by the parliamentary secretary of the war office in the house of commons. Replying to a complaint that the government had given out no adequate news of the Dardanelles campaign, he said that Sir Ian Hamilton's report had just been received. "The general," he added, gravely, "is a writer of distinction and has taken time to polish his periods." A cruel epitaph upon the grave of a brave soldier's reputation. In it one may read all the pent-up anger and disillusionment of the nation that has seen one of its most hopeful and most costly military efforts collapse in humiliating defeat. On the rocky shores of Gallipoli lie entombed more than 50,000 men and the prestige of the empire, and the final confession of failure is a bitter experience.

This campaign is of far-reaching importance and absorbing interest. Not only does it mark the only decisive and acknowledged defeat suffered by either group of belligerents, but its effects will be felt on every front, and may profoundly influence the course of the whole struggle. From its very inception the attempt to force the Dardanelles revealed tremendous possibilities. When Turkey allied herself with Germany and Austria a year ago last October the seriousness of the great project of a Teutonic thrust toward the East, long foretold by competent observers, seemed to be realized

for the first time by the Entente Powers. It was not until the spring of this year, however, that actual measures were undertaken to meet the menacing move. Elementary considerations of strategy required that Turkish power should be crushed before an actual linking up of the Teutonic and Moslem forces could be achieved. Another impelling reason was the distress of Russia. Already battling with the Turks in the Caucasus, she was beginning to feel the pressure of German onslaughts in Poland, and asked her allies to make a diversion by a drive toward Constantinople. Reduction of the Turkish capital would not only shatter the Moslem power and deprive Germany of vital support in her eastern designs, but would open for Russia a channel of communication with the West by which she might receive urgently needed war munitions and export her agricultural products.

Most of the odium for the disastrous result of the campaign has fallen upon Winston Churchill, then first lord of the British admiralty; but history will not withhold from him the credit for conceiving the idea, which was fundamentally sound and which failed only because of blundering for which he was not wholly responsible. Even lay critics recognize now that the attempt to force the strait by means of naval bombardment alone was a preposterous enterprise; but Churchill was rebuffed when he asked for a land force of 40,000 men. Moreover, his daring plan of battering a way past the forts with unsupported ships was approved by the premier and high naval authority. His answer to his critics was conclusive:

This enterprise was profoundly, elaborately, considered; there was a great volume of expert opinion behind it; it was framed entirely by expert and technical minds, and in no circumstances can it be regarded as having been undertaken

with carelessness or levity. If there has been any operation in the history of the world that, having been undertaken, it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigor, fury and sustained flow of reinforcements and utter disregard for life, it is that operation so daringly begun by the immortal landing at the Dardanelles.

Yet vigor, fury and utter disregard of life, together with such desperate gallantry as has not been exceeded on any battlefield of the war, could not overcome the handicap of a fatal defect in strategy. When the armies were finally flung ashore it was like trying to erect a rampart of flesh against cannon. The naval campaign, which opened in February, thrilled the world with its picturesque daring. But the further the attacking vessels proceeded the more formidable became the resistance. No fewer than six large warships were sunk, with heavy loss of life. Far more serious, however, was the fact that the bombardment warned the Turks and their German advisers and gave them opportunity to perfect their defenses. Most military experts agree that had an army of 100,000 been landed on the neck of the peninsula at the same time as the Allied fleet was hammering at the entrance forts Constantinople would have been taken within a month. But by the time the forces were sent ashore the machinery of slaughter was ready for them. The campaign which required secrecy and swiftness was stretched out into several complicated and inadequate operations. It was the end of April before the Anglo-French expedition landed on the tip of the peninsula; two months later a corps of Australians and New Zealanders established themselves, in the face of murderous fire, at Anzac, fifteen miles nearer the capital; and in the middle of August a third detachment disembarked at Suvla bay, five miles beyond. As the Turks occupied strongly fortified positions along the ridge which forms the backbone of the peninsula, their

advantage was apparent; but that might have been overcome, in part, by an effective movement to cut their line of communication with the capital. Yet it was not until August that the Suvla bay landing gave notice of this attempt, and by that time the defenses could not be carried.

These operations, nevertheless, will furnish a stirring chapter in British military annals. Eyewitnesses of the landing at Anzac and Suvla bay declare that the waves were literally stained with blood as the Turkish fire from the heights raked the boats from the transports and the landing stages by which the troops gained the beach; and for eight long months the Australians and New Zealanders clung to their exposed position, making, meanwhile, desperate assaults against the hill-top trenches which dominated their camp. Once they actually carried the crest, but the attack was not adequately supported, and the survivors were compelled to fall back. This was in August, and since that time the Dardanelles campaign has languished, ending in the withdrawal which took place last week.

To estimate the vital bearing of this episode upon the war as a whole one need only consider the possible results of victory and of defeat. Had the Allies, by proper and determined use of their resources, forced their way to Constantinople they would have paralyzed the power of Turkey; they would have won to their side Greece, Rumania and probably Bulgaria; they would have saved Servia from extinction, and, above all, they would have erected an insuperable barrier against the Teutonic advance into Egypt and Asia. The defeat has been no less decisive than success would have been. It has invigorated the declining power of the Turks; it has extinguished the last hope that Greece and Rumania will dare to oppose the Teutonic designs, and it has given

Germany an unbroken front from Belgium to Asia Minor. A secondary effect not to be overlooked is the influence which the Anglo-French disaster will have upon the vast Mohammedan populations in the British and French colonies. War is a test of force, and the Oriental world will infallibly be swayed by the demonstration that German military genius still triumphs over its antagonists. Even more powerful, in all likelihood, will be the reawakened spirit of Islamism. Never has the kaiser been nearer than now to realizing the vision which moved him to lay a wreath on the tomb of Saladin and earn the title of Muhib ul Islam—the friend of Mohammedanism and protector of the faithful.

THE STRUGGLE FOR EGYPT

January 4, 1916.

THE most significant bit of war news of the last week did not come from a battle front or the office of a ministry. It was the appearance of a brief notice on the bulletin board at Lloyd's exchange, in London, to the effect that the insurance rates on cargoes passing through the Suez canal had been trebled. If the British line in Flanders had been broken and the kaiser's forces were surging toward Calais, the country would hardly have greater reason for perturbation. That simple announcement of a change in insurance premiums meant that the threat of a campaign against Egypt was about to become a grim reality; that the enemy was about to strike at the chief link in the world-girdling chain of empire; that already the Suez canal, the most vital part of the nation's lines of communication, has been closed—for the increased rates are as prohibitive to commerce as would be an order in council. As a fact, several shipping companies had previously announced that their vessels would no longer use the waterway.

Those who imagined the proposed Egyptian campaign to be of recent design must ignore all of the vast literature in which Germany's imperialistic plans were frankly discussed, while the world was building peace palaces and preparing to send delegates to the parliament of man. One quotation will suffice, because it is characteristic of many. In "Deutschland unter den

Weltvolkern," edition of 1911, Doctor Rohrbach, a leading exponent of the imperial policy, wrote:

England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for her not only the end of her dominion over the Suez canal and of her connections with India and the far East, but would probably entail the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no object but to effect an insurance against the dangers of a war with England.

Three facts stand out as we read this passage in a book published four years ago: First, that Germany was perfectly aware that she could not withstand England on the sea, and had already selected Egypt as the one region in which she might strike direct at the heart of the British empire. Second, that it was planned for the conquest to be undertaken by Turkey, in order to conserve German resources and, at the same time, arouse the Mohammedan world to revolt against British domination—and the forthcoming invasion is to be made by Moslem armies officered by Germans. The third prophetic suggestion is that concerning the need for railways. Already we have seen the fulfillment of one part, in the crushing defeat inflicted by the Turks upon the British in Mesopotamia; and the latest dispatches declare that even now a double-tracked railroad extends from Damascus—where it is linked with Aleppo and

with Scutari, opposite Constantinople—almost to the frontier of Egypt, only eighty miles from the canal.

Just as it is necessary to know something of the racial complications in the Balkans to explain the violation of Belgium, so one must glance into history to understand how it is that Great Britain is called upon to defend India by resisting a Turkish invasion of a Turkish province. Of the ancient record of Egypt, whose civilization was antedated only by that of Babylon, it is unnecessary to speak. The country has been a tributary of the sultan of Turkey since 1517. A century ago a new era was begun by Mehemet Ali, a remorseless tyrant, but a brilliant soldier and able administrator, who founded a dynasty on the strength of an appointment as viceroy of the sultan. By 1840 his conquests had made him so powerful that the European governments intervened and compelled him to renew his allegiance to the Sublime Porte. His most noted successor was Ismail Pasha, who promoted the construction of the Suez canal by De Lesseps, but loaded the country with a mountainous debt by his extravagances. He changed the course of world history, however, when, in 1875, he sold his stock in the canal, 176,602 shares, to Great Britain. This investment, about \$20,000,000, made England the largest owner of the waterway and mistress of the shortest route to the Orient and gave her an interest in Egyptian affairs which was eventually to make the country virtually a part of the empire.

Egypt as a factor in the Eastern Question and in world politics came into view, therefore, just forty years ago. It was then sunk in utter poverty and neglect. Three centuries of Turkish rule had reduced the nation to hopeless penury, from which the tyrannical government extorted the crushing taxes only by merciless pressure. A people submerged in ignorance and squalor

and a government as incompetent as it was rapacious—this was the fate of the land that had given to the world one of its earliest civilizations and still had in its soil the potentialities of vast wealth. The national debt—which between 1863 and 1879 had leaped from \$16,000,000 to \$500,000,000—was held chiefly by British and French banking houses, and in 1876 these interests had the Egyptian finances placed under management of European commissioners. Three years later, when Ismail refused payment of interest, he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, and soon afterward dual Anglo-French control was established. This led to the great nationalist revolt which began in 1881, headed by Arabi Pasha. The khedive, a timorous ruler, placated the revolutionists by making their leader secretary of war; but this only postponed the clash with the British and French interests. In June, 1882, a riot in Alexandria developed into a native uprising against Europeans. England and France sent squadrons to the scene and vainly urged Constantinople to uphold the authority of the Turkish viceroy. France was unwilling to act further; but the English admiral bombarded the city and drove the revolutionists out. Three months later a British army under Wolseley crossed the isthmus and scattered the insurgents at Tel-el-Kebir. That victory effectually “restored the power of the khedive”—and began the British “occupation” which culminated a year ago in the establishment of a protectorate.

England's pledge that her occupation of Egypt was only temporary was often repeated, but, in fact, there has never been a chance of its termination. Repeated outbreaks by Sudanese Arabs, together with the feebleness of the khedival government, made it necessary to continue the supervision, which became obviously permanent after the conquest of the Sudan by Kitchener in

1898. There is no more interesting political episode in modern history than this "occupation." It has, indeed, no parallel. For more than thirty years Egypt has been virtually a dependency of Great Britain, yet has maintained all the outward forms of autonomy as a province of the Ottoman empire. The army—until a year ago—was theoretically a part of the sultan's forces; the English officers wore the Turkish badge on their helmets, the regiments carried the crescent standard and the generals received their commissions from Constantinople. Yet actually the military establishment was directed from London. In administrative affairs the fiction of Turkish suzerainty was maintained with equal solemnity. But the sultan's control was limited to the appointment of a high commissioner in Cairo—a personage who was treated with ceremonious respect, but who performed no functions whatever except to draw his princely salary. The khedive, too, while nominally the sovereign ruler of an autonomous province of Turkey, was subject to the guidance of English "advisers"; the remnants of the army of occupation, after thirty years, were still "restoring his authority" and helping him to preserve order. Administrative and financial affairs have been conducted by Egyptian ministers ostensibly, but in reality by their English subordinates.

There is no record of anything quite resembling this system. England has found it inexpedient to retire from Egypt; but she has studiously avoided annexing it. Characteristically, she compromised. Forbidden by her pledge to govern the country, she undertook to govern those who governed it. The actual administration remained in native hands, but a few British experts were supplied to superintend the proceedings. "According to every canon of political thought," said Lord

Cromer, one of the three men who made modern Egypt—the others being Sir Eldon Gorst and Lord Kitchener—"the system was unworkable"; but he and his countrymen made it work, as the lifting of Egypt from the depths of poverty and misrule to solvency and virtual self-government abundantly testifies. No doubt the suggestion is a challenge to the theory that all people—Chinese, Egyptians, Filipinos—are fit for democracy; but it is not dishonored by the record of England in Egypt. We shall cite just two witnesses, and they are enough unlike to make their testimony valuable. The New York Sun said a few months ago:

Since the day of Tel-el-Kebir to the present, Egypt and its people have prospered and advanced in well being. The history of these thirty-two years is a tale of undeviating progress. Debt has been reduced and new loans raised for great public works, taxes have been reduced, agriculture restored and industry stimulated, the wealth of the country quintupled. Education is spreading among the people and justice prevails through the land. Would any civilized mind tolerate the undoing all that has been done since 1882? Is it thinkable that for the enlightened, just and steady-going administration of England there should be substituted the capricious barbarism of Turco-Arabian rule? Could any greater crime be thought of than a return from the smiling plenty, the security, the spiritual awakening of today to the hunger, the hazard, the cruelty, the dull hopelessness of the old régime?

The other comment we quote is from a man whose devotion to democracy will hardly be questioned—Theodore Roosevelt. In that famous speech in London, five years ago, in which he startled the British nation by telling it how to deal with the sanguinary "nationalist" movement in Egypt, he said these things:

You have given Egypt the best government it has had for at least 2000 years. Never in history has the poor man of that country been treated with as much justice and mercy under a rule as free from corruption and brutality as during the last twenty-eight years. * * * You are in Egypt for

several purposes, and one of the greatest is the benefit of the Egyptian people. You saved them from ruin; and if they are not governed from the outside, they will again sink into a welter of chaos. Some nation must govern Egypt. I hope and believe you will decide that it is your duty to continue to be that nation.

The world war, with its revelation of Germany's design to rebuild the crumbling power of the Moslem empire in order to further her own ambitions, brought about the settlement which Roosevelt held to be just. On December 18, 1914, a British protectorate over Egypt was proclaimed. The khedive, who had gone to Vienna to declare his allegiance to the Turco-German alliance, was deposed, and his uncle, Prince Hussein Kemal, was proclaimed sultan, free and independent of all Turkish control. It was characteristic of the strange system that this proclamation, changing the government of a nation of 14,000,000 people and wresting from Turkey her last foothold in Africa, was not promulgated by King George from Buckingham Palace or by a general at the head of a great army, but was made known in a polite letter to the new ruler, signed by an English civilian, with no other title than "Mr." and "acting high commissioner." Yet it could not have been more effective if it had been echoed by the guns of a conquering host. The Egyptian people, remembering the miseries of Turkish misrule, welcomed the change with such tranquil confidence that even when the Turks, last January, penetrated to within a few miles of the canal there was not a sign of unrest. If Germany succeeds in her design of restoring Ottoman power in Egypt, England will not be the only sufferer; the Egyptians themselves will be thrust again under a yoke which they learned through bitter centuries to abhor.

MONTENEGRO AND ALBANIA

January 14, 1916.

IN RESPONSE to questions the other day about the status of the Servian army which was driven by the Germans into Albania and about Montenegro's resistance to the Austrian invasion, the British secretary for foreign affairs made the following curious statement:

I regret to say that it is impossible to speak of Albania as an entity at present. In the central area, over which Essad Pasha's authority extends, the relations between the Servian soldiers and the population have been friendly, and Essad Pasha has rendered them valuable assistance. The northern tribes, among whom the enemy has conducted a considerable propaganda, are hostile to the Servians and Montenegrins.

To the casual reader this explanation will not be enlightening, nor even very interesting. Yet the conditions described will help to determine the political fate of all southeastern Europe and to make the new world map. For to this obscure region—a country without a railroad, a real government or a national existence—may be traced one of the causes of the great war. It is one of the places where Italian and Austrian ambitions clash and where Teutonic and Slavic interests converge. Moreover, its impossible status is a product of the wisest European statesmanship, a remarkable evidence of the futility of a makeshift diplomacy which imposed the will of strong nations upon the weak. The under secretary's remark that Albania cannot be said to have an entity "at present" might have been made stronger. Nomi-

nally under foreign rule for two thousand years, it has never been wholly subjugated, nor has it ever become a nation. Isolated, unmarked by trade routes, primitive and inhospitable, it has never known civilization, and in the rugged mountains and deeply cleft valleys life today is medieval in its simplicity and rigor.

Albania, comprising the western part of the Balkan peninsula, is now a strip of territory about 150 miles from north to south and from 60 to 80 miles wide, bounded by Montenegro, Servia, Greece and the Adriatic. Before the Balkan wars it was a Turkish dependency and much larger in extent. Its strategic value lies in its coast line, where the ports of Avlona and Durazzo dominate the straits of Otranto, leading from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean. It was here that Servia, in the first Balkan war, won her "window on the sea," only to be thrust back by the great Powers, which thereby unconsciously hastened the world war; and it is here that Austria, Italy and Greece are rivals. The inhabitants are descendants of the ancient Illyrians, famed in antiquity for their piratical prowess, and have inherited from their ancestors a hardy and warlike nature. The Romans exhausted many a region in trying to tame the fierce mountaineers; Byzantium and Venice never wholly subdued them, and Turkish rule, which lasted for more than four centuries, was tolerated only when it made no pretense to being anything more than a form. In the days when small armies could maintain themselves indefinitely the turbulent tribes of Albania left their mark deep on the memory of their foes. Scanderbeg, a fifteenth-century ruler, defeated the Turks in no fewer than twenty-two pitched battles, and from 1807 to 1822 the region was virtually independent, under the blood-thirsty but efficient despotism of Ali Pasha, the "Lion of Janina." The implacable spirit of independence among

the people and their intolerance of Turkish interference are the more curious, because nine-tenths of the 2,000,000 inhabitants are Mohammedans, the others being about equally divided between the Roman and Greek Catholic churches.

It was with the unification of Italy, in 1870, and the birth of her expansionist policy that Albania became an international problem. Italy and Austria have both been determined to control the eastern shore of the Adriatic, and have intrigued desperately to obtain an ascendancy among the Albanians. But the rivals agreed on one point—they would unitedly oppose the efforts of Servia and the South Slavs to reach the sea. Therefore, throughout all the crises preceding the great war they insisted that, whatever division should be made of Turkey's European dominions, Albania must become and remain an independent state. The other Powers agreed, because any other disposition of the country meant war between Austria and Russia and a general conflict—as time was to prove. Thus it was that when Greece, Servia, Montenegro and Bulgaria overwhelmed Turkey notice was served upon them that the Powers reserved to themselves the decision as to what should become of the Albanian part of the former Ottoman territory. Meanwhile, the Young Turk revolution of 1908 had completely changed the relations between the Sublime Porte and its Albanian subjects. The sultans had always recognized that the Albanians were unconquerable as well as intensely loyal and had respected their violent prejudices against anything approaching dictation. The mountaineers paid only such taxes as they thought fair and rendered only such military service as suited their convenience. But they were patriotic, and all of them, Christian and Moslem alike, resisted the efforts of neighboring nations to seduce them from their allegiance to Constantinople. It

is a noteworthy fact that Turkey's ablest statesmen and soldiers have been Albanians. The Young Turks attempted to change this agreeable system over night. They decreed that the Albanians must pay their taxes promptly and in full, must send specified quotas of recruits to the Ottoman armies and must submit to "civilization." But the civilizing agents they used were not schools and railroads and industries, but guns. When the Albanians resisted the new order, armies were sent to teach them the blessings of the Young Turk movement. From that time forward an Albanian revolutionary uprising was an annual event. Four years in succession the Turks had to send punitive expeditions into the mountains, where they destroyed settlements and executed the inhabitants in squads as arguments for disarmament according to law. But as an Albanian deprived of his rifle would preferably be dead, the persuasion was not very effective.

This was the situation when the Balkan allies attacked Turkey in 1912, and the result was that the Albanians did virtually nothing to help their Moslem brethren. Their only contribution to the cause was a stubborn defense of Scutari against Servians and Montenegrins. And even this act was deprived of the nature of a service to Turkey; for Essad Pasha—mentioned the other day in parliament—caused the assassination of the commander of the defending forces and took charge himself, making the campaign purely an Albanian affair. The deadlock threatened to precipitate the long-dreaded European war, for Austria mobilized several army corps and gave notice that she would put them in motion within twenty-four hours after Scutari had fallen into the hands of Servia. The Powers brought pressure to bear upon Servia, and it was finally agreed that she should abandon her ambition to reach the Adriatic,

receiving compensation elsewhere. But Serbia, balked of her desire for a seaport, repudiated her treaty with Bulgaria, made before they attacked Turkey, as to the division of Macedonia. The inevitable sequel was the second Balkan war—Serbia and Greece, and finally Rumania, against Bulgaria. And almost as inevitable was the intensifying of the hatred between Austria and Serbia, which finally brought upon Europe the war of nations, with its present features of Serbia conquered and the Teutons pressing onward to the Adriatic. Montenegro had refused at first to raise the siege of Scutari, and after all the other belligerents had quit Europe was startled by the news that the town had been surrendered. Once again world peace was in danger, but at last Montenegro agreed to deliver the prize to the Powers.

The problem was what to do with a turbulent country with no secure boundaries, no government and greedy neighbors. The wise statesmen decided to erect an independent state. The history of twenty centuries testified that the half-civilized Albanians, divided into jealous tribes and clans, were utterly incapable of thinking, let alone acting, in national terms. But it was solemnly decreed that they constituted a nation; and in due course their representatives elected a ruler from among several candidates suggested by the Powers. He was William of Wied, a German princeling, and was regarded as a happy choice, because as a Protestant he would not be suspected of favoring any one of the three religions and because he would naturally resist Slavic pressure. A better man than he might have failed to establish himself as ruler of these "new-caught, sullen peoples, half devil and half child"; but the young man from Wied—the whole episode suggests a limerick—was hopeless from the start. Bewildered in the mazes of

interminable intrigue, he lost first his prestige, then his authority and finally his dignity. In the spring of 1914 the usual Albanian revolution began, this time against the anointed of the Powers. One trifling compensation for the coming of the great war in August was that it enabled them to withdraw their occupying forces from Albania without confessing that their attempt to make a nation out of a cluster of medieval tribes had failed. Prince William also departed, not too gracefully, joined his regiment fighting in France and mailed a notice of his abdication to Durazzo. With Europe engaged elsewhere, Essad Pasha had the opportunity for which he had long waited. By characteristic Oriental methods he had himself elected head of a provisional government and proclaimed Albania a free state, subject, in a religious sense, to the sultan and friendly, in a political sense, to Italy, but otherwise independent. He is an able, if unscrupulous, leader, but how far even he has failed in realizing the impossible dream of Albanian unity is shown in the parliamentary statement we first quoted. Soon, it is to be expected, the matter will be taken out of his hands. Austria is rapidly subjugating Montenegro. With Bulgaria and Turkey already allies of the central Powers and Servia conquered, the addition of Montenegro will mean the extension of authority over Albania. And Austria in Durazzo will complete the establishment of Teutonic supremacy from the Danube to the Aegean sea and the Bosphorus and from the Black sea to the Adriatic, and will make possible the Pan-Germanic project of a confederation of states extending from the North sea to the borders of Persia.

A RECORD TO BE STUDIED

January 21, 1916.

DURING the last eleven months the honor and security of the United States and its status among the nations of the world have been affected in the most vital manner by a series of war incidents and by official utterances relating thereto. Generations from now historians will examine curiously, if not reverently, this notable chapter in international affairs, and will find in it, perhaps, the beginnings of troublous events which no human mind can now foresee. Yet most of us who are spectators of events which are to shape the future of the nation are only vaguely familiar with them. For the benefit of busy readers, therefore, we have made a rough but serviceable outline of the chief incidents in their order of occurrence. The purpose is neither to defend nor to attack, but, rather, to illuminate, the president's course in this particular conflict. In the following review the reader may trace, step by step, the development of the submarine dispute and may decide for himself just how effective the policy has been in restoring the shattered structure of international law and upbuilding American prestige.

A. On February 4, 1915, Germany gave notice that, as a reprisal against Great Britain, "all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland" would be considered, after February 18, as "an area of war," in which she would endeavor "to destroy every enemy merchant ship, without its always being possible to avert

the peril that thus threatens persons and cargoes." She also gave special warning to neutrals against sending their own vessels through the designated area.

B. On February 10 President Wilson, through Secretary Bryan, sent a stern warning in response to this defiant repudiation of established principles of warfare. The sole right of a belligerent, he said, was limited to visit and search, unless an effective blockade were maintained, and this government would regard as "an indefensible violation of neutral rights" the destruction on the high seas of an American vessel or American lives. He said further:

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the government of the United States would be constrained to hold the imperial German government to a strict accountability for such acts and take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property.

C. The German government's answer, dated February 18, asserted that "until now" she had observed international law, but would do so no longer unless neutral nations forced England to abandon her efforts to stop neutral commerce with Germany. Neutral vessels entering the war area would do so at their own risk.

D. Three succeeding incidents may be grouped here. On March 28 the British steamship *Falaba* was torpedoed without warning, 111 passengers and other non-combatants, including an American, being slain. On April 28 the American ship *Cushing* was attacked by a German aeroplane, and three days later the American tanker *Gulflight* was torpedoed, three being killed.

E. On May 1 Ambassador Bernstorff published an advertisement warning Americans that if they exercised their right to travel on British or French passenger ships they would run the risk of being killed.

F. On May 7 the British steamship *Lusitania* was torpedoed without warning, and 1250 passengers and

seamen, with many women and children, were drowned. Among the victims were 115 Americans.

G. Germany, on May 10, sent to Washington a dispatch expressing the "deepest sympathy" at the loss of life, but put the blame on England and upon the Americans who had "felt inclined to trust to English promises rather than to pay attention to warnings from the German side."

H. Another German note, the next day, said the government had given strict orders that neutral ships should be spared, and in case they were attacked would "unreservedly recognize its responsibility."

I. President Wilson's second note, May 13, praised "the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by Germany" and that country's "influence upon the side of justice and humanity," but rejected the idea that any German decree could abbreviate the rights of Americans at sea. "Strict accountability" was once more demanded. It was urged that the use being made of submarines violated "rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity" and that the United States would expect disavowal of the lawless acts, reparation for the injuries and "immediate steps to prevent" their repetition. The final paragraph read:

The imperial German government will not expect the government of the United States to omit any word or act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens.

J. On May 25 the American steamship Nebraskan was torpedoed without warning.

K. On May 31 Germany replied that the Lusitania was an auxiliary cruiser and carried mounted cannon, as well as a consignment of small arms ammunition, hence was not "undefended." "German commanders," said the note, "are no longer able to observe the customary

regulations of the prize law, which require that no peaceful ship shall be sunk until the occupants have been safely removed." The statement that the vessel was armed was proved to be false.

L. William J. Bryan, secretary of state, who had signed the Wilson notes demanding "strict accountability" and announcing that "no word or act would be omitted" to maintain American rights, resigned on June 8, alleging that a note the president was about to send to Germany might provoke war.

M. The third Wilson note, dated June 10, argued that efforts of a vessel to escape attack did not alter the "principles of humanity," which require the rescue of passengers and crew. The vital fact, said the note, was that a passenger steamer "was sunk without challenge or warning, and that men, women and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare." Furthermore:

The government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere right of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity. * * * It cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone may be made to operate in any degree as an abbreviation of the rights of either American shipmasters or American citizens bound on lawful errands on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. * * * It therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the German government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice, and asks for assurance that this will be done.

N. Germany's third note, dated July 8, returned to the position that the entire responsibility for the murder of Americans rested upon Great Britain, holding that the submarine campaign was a just reprisal against British interference with neutral shipments of goods to Germany. "The case of the *Lusitania*," it said, "shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human

lives the manner of conducting war employed by our adversaries leads" and "the imperial government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board." American ships, however, would be spared, provided they were made recognizable by special markings, their sailing dates being made known to Germany and the American government guaranteeing that they carried no contraband. The offer was made to "permit" safe passage to a reasonable number of neutral or enemy vessels under the American flag, with these restrictions.

O. The fourth Wilson note, dated July 21, characterized this proposed settlement as "very unsatisfactory," in that it failed to meet the "real differences" and indicated "no way in which the accepted principles of law" might be applied, and added:

Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights. * * * The practice (endangering neutrals) if persisted in would constitute an unpardonable offense against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected. * * *

* The United States government cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people. The rights of neutrals in war are based upon principles, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt new circumstances to them.

Disavowal of the "wanton act" of sinking the *Lusitania* was again demanded, and the offer of free passage to certain designated vessels, under restrictions, was rejected, because it would constitute "an abandonment of the principles for which this government contends." Repetition of acts in contravention of American rights, it was finally stated, "must be regarded by the government of the United States as deliberately unfriendly."

P. On July 25 the American steamship *Leelanaw* was torpedoed.

Q. On August 19 the British steamship *Arabic*—westbound, and therefore carrying no contraband—was torpedoed, two Americans being killed.

R. On September 1 Ambassador Bernstorff handed this written pledge to the state department:

Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.

S. On September 7, however, the German government's complete declaration set up the claim that the submarine commander feared the *Arabic* was about to ram his vessel. While expressing regret for the killing of non-combatants, Germany made plain that she was "unable to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the *Arabic*."

T. After a month of negotiations, Ambassador Bernstorff on October 5 gave notice that more stringent orders had been issued to German submarines; that Germany "regrets and disavows" the sinking of the *Arabic*, and that indemnity would be paid for American lives lost.

U. On November 7 the Italian passenger steamship *Ancona* was sunk in the Mediterranean by a submarine flying the Austrian flag, among the victims being Americans. The ship was shelled and torpedoed while the passengers were trying to take to the lifeboats.

V. On December 6 the fifth Wilson note (published December 12) was sent to Vienna. Austria was reminded of the demands made upon Germany, her ally, and the conduct of the submarine commander was characterized as "wanton slaughter." It was demanded that Austria denounce the act as illegal and indefensible;

that the commander be punished and that due reparation be made for Americans slain.

W. Austria, on December 15, sent a flippant and ironical reply, expressing doubt as to the American statement of facts and declining to be bound by the correspondence with Germany.

X. The sixth Wilson note, December 19, pointed out that the Ancona admittedly was torpedoed after it had stopped and while passengers were still on board, and that "the rules of international law and the principles of humanity thus willfully violated" were so universally recognized that they would not be debated. The demands of December 6 were therefore repeated.

Y. On December 31 Austria explained that ample time had been given to the Ancona passengers to escape and that the vessel was torpedoed only after the lowering of boats had ceased and when a strange craft was seen approaching. The loss of life, it was said, was due to the inefficiency of the steamship crew. While the attack was not disavowed, punishment of the submarine commander was announced and indemnity promised.

Z. During these interchanges the Japanese steamship *Yasaka Maru* and the French steamship *Ville de la Ciotat*, both unarmed passenger vessels, were torpedoed without warning. (The alphabet having been exhausted in designating the various incidents, it is necessary to devise a new notation.)

A1. On January 2 it became known that on December 30 the British passenger liner *Persia* had been torpedoed without warning, with the loss of more than 150 non-combatants, including an American consul.

B1. The seventh Wilson note is understood to be in preparation. Meanwhile, on January 7 Ambassador Bernstorff handed to the secretary of state a new set of guarantees from Germany, explaining that her subma-

rine activities in the Mediterranean are conducted according to international law, the "war-zone" methods being excluded. But no settlement has been made for any violation of American rights, nor is there any indication that the demand for "strict accountability," set forth on February 10, 1915, and several times repeated, will ever be enforced.

As stated in the beginning, we present this record without comment. But we find three characterizations of it which the reader may wish to compare. By the New York Times:

The triumph of President Wilson's peaceful, patient and reasonable diplomacy seems to be near at hand.

By the New York Tribune:

To say that the country has served humanity, has sought to maintain neutral rights, or even to defend American lives, is to say what is utterly false, a plain, undisguised lie. Only so far as words could do these things have we ventured to do them, and our president and secretary of state told the Germans and Austrians in advance that the words were harmless. The whole episode has been humiliating, saddening, sickening.

By Gustave Hervé, noted French scholar, historian and publicist:

President Wilson begins his protest with a compliment to Germany on her services to humanity. Does the good man suppose that Kant or Goethe or Beethoven launched the torpedoes? * * * And so it goes from note to note in an endless symphony of ineffectual bleats.

GREECE AND BELGIUM

January 25, 1916.

THE following letter was received several weeks ago, but none of its warmth has disappeared because of delayed publication:

To the Editor of The North American.

I have waited in vain for a series of savage editorials from you on the criminal violation of Greek neutrality by England, the "champion of international honor," and France, the "heroine of nations." But it's too much to expect decency from the Anglomaniac press. When Germany marched through Belgium to forestall a treacherous attack you foamed with rage over "broken pledges" and "Belgian martyrdom." But when England and France, to cover their humiliating defeat at the Dardanelles, seize Grecian territory, in defiance of law and protests, you are complacently silent. No wonder the Germans despise the hypocrisy of England and the moral abasement of America!

NO HYPHEN.

Philadelphia, October 23.

It is now possible to present our indignant correspondent's case in even more convincing terms. These were King Constantine's striking words the other day:

It is the merest cant for Great Britain and France to talk about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg after what they themselves have done and are doing here. Look at the territory occupied by their troops—Lemnos, Imbros, Mytilene, Corfu, Saloniki and a large part of Macedonia—and not so much as "by your leave." It is no good claiming that the neutrality of Greece was not guaranteed, as was the case in Belgium, for the neutrality of Corfu is guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, yet that has not made any difference in their action.

The indictment is a serious one. Naturally, it has been efficiently presented by Germany, as in this semi-official statement of October 11:

England has torn from her own face the mask of hypocrisy with which she has exploited the violation of Belgian neutrality in order to create antipathy against Germany. But how different are the circumstances! Germany's procedure was founded upon the threatened advance of France. It was a question of self-defense. The violation of Greece is a breach of international law, wholly in defense of the egoistic interests of England and France.

"We were forced to enter Belgium," said Foreign Minister von Jagow. "But England and France have violated Greek neutrality in the most needless and brutal manner." The charge is, then, that the occupation by the Allies of Saloniki and various Greek islands is legally and morally a crime more hideous than the rape of Belgium; that the latter, while regrettable, was necessary, while the former was utterly selfish, ruthless and indefensible. Before examining the case it will be enlightening to recall the conditions that led to the act.

Having united to withstand Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, in 1913, Greece and Servia emerged from that conflict formally allied for self-defense. When the great war began this fact and her geographical position put Greece in a perilous situation. It was inevitable that eventually the struggle would involve the whole Balkan peninsula and that Greece would be caught between the terrible land power of the Teutons and the irresistible sea power of England and France. To join one side or the other involved desperate risk, while to remain neutral was no guarantee of safety. Historically and sentimentally the people were linked to England and France, and an alliance with those countries seemed certain. The premier, Venizelos, openly advocated it, and, when the king interposed his veto, sought

a popular verdict by resigning. Triumphant returned, he continued his preparations for fulfilling the country's treaty obligations with Servia. More than that, he planned active participation in the Anglo-French campaign at the Dardanelles, and the people eagerly awaited the signal that should start their army marching toward Constantinople. But Greek enthusiasm evaporated upon the discovery that the kingdom was expected to surrender to its bitterest enemy territory its soldiers had won. The Teuton-Bulgar attack on Servia brought the crisis to a head. Venizelos, declaring that national safety, as well as honor, dictated fulfillment of the treaty with Servia, mobilized the army. But the king held that the treaty did not apply to a general war. The premier then asked England and France whether they would not send an expedition to Servia's aid. They thereupon began landing troops at Saloniki. Venizelos sent a formal protest against the violation of neutrality, but it was ignored. Two days later he was dismissed by the king, although he had received a vote of confidence in the parliament. The new cabinet ultimately proclaimed a neutrality "benevolent" toward England and France; in fact, as Constantine said a month ago, "Greece's neutrality has been stretched to the utmost to accommodate the Entente Powers."

These are the vital facts in the record. On its face it shows an absolute violation of the neutrality and the sovereignty of Greece. In the court of international law England and France are convicted by a mere statement of the case. But does this make Greece another Belgium? Are England and France as guilty morally as they undoubtedly are technically? Is their action stamped with the ineffaceable stigma of dishonor, like that of Germany in August, 1914? Certain conditions and utterances have a bearing upon these questions.

First, the neutrality of Greece was not guaranteed, as was that of Belgium. When Germany sent her armies across her western border she betrayed her own solemn pledge. When England and France landed troops at Saloniki they wronged Greece, but they did not perjure themselves. A corollary to this is that Belgium was obliged by the treaty to resist violation of her neutrality; Greece was under no such compulsion and was answerable to no one for permitting the landing. Turning now from the abstract to the concrete, Belgium heroically refused to countenance the German invasion, and her people sacrificed themselves to maintain their neutrality. Greece, through her premier—who had the support of parliament and the nation—virtually invited Allied occupation, while the people welcomed the “invaders” with unconcealed satisfaction. An instructive contrast will be found in the official documents. Germany, about to hurl an army of conquest into Belgium, sent this ultimatum:

* * * Should Belgium behave in a hostile manner, Germany shall be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

To this Belgium answered that surrender would “sacrifice national honor and betray Belgium’s duty toward Europe,” and that she would “resist by every means in her power.” The French minister’s note to Greece told of the first Saloniki landing, and continued:

France and England, allied to Servia, send their troops to help the latter, as well as to maintain their communications with her; and they count upon Greece not to oppose measures taken in the interest of Servia, of whom she is also the ally.

The Greek government replied that it “could not possibly authorize” the landing, “for it constitutes a breach of Greece’s neutrality,” and therefore entered protest, adding that, in any event, the “invasion” was premature, since Servia had not been actually attacked

so as to bring into operation her treaty with Greece. That the protest was perfunctory has been repeatedly shown. Premier Venizelos publicly declared that he and the nation were gratified by the "invasion." In parliament he announced that England and France had offered to "Servia, Greece's ally, succor in the event of circumstances which would require of Greece herself to give Servia aid." The Greek minister in London remarked: "Naturally, some formality must be gone through. The Greeks are glad that the troops have landed." How far from parallel are the cases of Belgium and Greece is shown in the fact that Belgium, determined to resist, appealed to England and France for aid against the other guarantor of her neutrality, Germany. Greece, whose neutrality was voluntary, not imposed upon her by treaty, chose to modify it in order that others might fulfill the obligations to Servia which she, from motives of self-interest, repudiated. And in answer to the king's ingenious plea that Premier Venizelos invited the occupation "as a private citizen" it must be pointed out that his successor, Skouloudis, on November 9 telegraphed to the French government assurances of Greece's "neutrality with the character of the sincerest benevolence toward the Entente Powers" and her "friendly attitude as to the Allied troops at Saloniki," which represented, he said, "the Powers which are protecting Greece." In the face of this record it is not necessary to cite the facts that not a Greek has lost his life through the "brutal invasion"; no civilians have been shot or held as hostages; no towns have been destroyed. Every commodity used by the occupying forces, including transportation, is paid for at full rates; and only a few weeks ago it was announced that at the close of her first year in Belgium, Germany had decreed that the monthly tribute of \$8,000,000 from the helpless

people, who are still dependent for their very existence upon American charity, shall be continued indefinitely.

Finally, it puts an excessive strain upon the imagination to consider Greece the victim of merciless outrage when her "neutrality" was of the nature so candidly described by Premier Skouloudis as recently as December 20:

If Greece is not fighting on the Allies' side, it is because their statesmen and diplomatists failed in their duty. The Allies have flouted us instead of placating us; they coquetted with Bulgaria while treating us disdainfully. If they had come to us and said, "We want your aid, and you may count upon clearly defined recompenses," Greece, I affirm, would not have hesitated for a single minute.

No fair-minded observer can fail to sympathize with the distracted Greeks, who have been the victims of their own uncertain ambitions and of the diplomatic and military inefficiency of the Allies. They have suffered, partly by their own consent, an undoubted trespass; but unless the intruder who tramples upon a householder's flower beds is as desperate a criminal as the burglarious assassin who smashes down his front door and beats him with a blackjack, Constantine and his people are not quite Belgians.

SWEDEN AND THE WAR

January 29, 1916.

WAR complications in the southeastern part of Europe now have their counterpart in the opposite corner of the continent. The problems, unlike those in the Balkans, are not territorial nor racial. But there is a similar division of sentiment among rulers and people, the same desperate contest of diplomacy, the same resentment of distracted neutrals against the aggressions of belligerents. Norway and Denmark are tractable enough; it is Sweden, the most powerful of the group, which is dangerously restive. If a hot-headed minority had its way, she would declare for Germany tomorrow. Less than a fortnight ago King Gustav complained bitterly of the "ever-increasing" invasion of the country's rights and demanded extensive preparations on land and sea "to maintain neutrality and the sovereignty of Sweden." A week later the premier gave this more explicit warning:

There is the risk that dangerous restrictions of our rights and liberty, should we submit to them, will remain in force in a more acute form until the end of the war, and even subsequently. We repudiate the idea that our policy means we will not abandon neutrality under any conditions. It is our fervent desire to keep peace, but we must also reckon with eventualities in which maintenance of peace, in spite of all our efforts, would no longer be profitable.

Behind these declarations, denoting a willingness to contemplate bloody war rather than submission to objectionable conditions, there is an interesting back-

ground of historical, political and economic influences. The general attitude of the three countries may be summed up in a few words. Denmark, well disposed toward Great Britain, her most profitable customer, is relentlessly anti-German—she has not forgotten the Prussian seizure of Schleswig-Holstein fifty years ago. Norway—which seceded from Sweden in 1905—is frankly pro-British, for reasons of sentiment and trade; in the music halls “Tipperary” is greeted with rapturous cheers. Sweden has been implacably anti-Russian ever since the czar took Finland, a century ago; and the feeling has been intensified by the persistent policy of Russia to acquire an ice-free Atlantic port from Scandinavia. And to this has now been added hostility toward England, because Sweden’s “malevolent neutrality,” as it might be called, has clashed with the Anglo-French purpose to restrict trade with Germany. Despite the striking differences in sentiment, the three countries are officially allied—or, at least, they have adopted a common policy during the war. At the very beginning of the conflict they recognized that their geographical position involved peril. Not only were they close to Germany and were her natural sources of supply, but they controlled the approaches to the Baltic sea, and were, moreover, situated between Russia and her western allies and would be able to hamper or facilitate communications.

It was natural and proper, therefore, for the Scandinavian nations to agree upon measures of harmony and mutual support in a difficult situation. The most important move was on December 19, 1914, when, upon initiative of the Swedish king, the three sovereigns formally conferred and arranged for continued co-operation with the Scandinavian governments. It has been denied that this agreement constituted an actual alliance;

but it was very nearly that, the fundamental purposes being defense of neutral rights and the averting of the possibility of any one of the countries being drawn into the war. Sweden, nevertheless, gradually developed a spirit of determined insistence upon her remotest rights and privileges, which steadily urged her toward controversy with the belligerents. When Germany declared lumber contraband the Swedes entered such a savage protest that the order was modified; and when the Anglo-French restrictions upon neutral traffic with Germany became severe they resisted vigorously, and have not conceded the right of the Allies to interfere in any degree with enemy trade. Moreover, Swedish sentiment has been strongly pro-German. For this there are several reasons. King Gustav's mother was a German princess and his wife is a cousin of the kaiser. Although the dynasty was founded by a Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals and the son of a French attorney, a century of intermarriage has saturated it with Teutonic traditions and sympathies. The Swedish aristocracy is likewise pro-German.

So strong are these currents of thought that ever since the war began an influential minority has tried to line Sweden up on the side of Germany. There were even violent advocates of a "strong foreign policy," who urged that Finland should be "redeemed"—although nearly nine-tenths of the 3,000,000 inhabitants of that region are Finns, not Swedes, and are pro-Russian, despite the flagrant injustices inflicted by the czar's autocratic bureaucracy. All these sources of German sentiment have been industriously worked by Berlin. Recognizing that Sweden was virtually her only available market for supplies, Germany has taken pains to settle amicably all causes of dispute, and has maintained throughout the kingdom a tremendous propaganda, in

which such well-known men as Sven Hedin have assisted. Actual war sentiment, however, has been kept in check by a realization, on the part of most of the people, that a campaign in Finland would be impossible, and still more by the passion of the business interests for a "neutrality" which they found immensely profitable. No other country, unless it be the United States, has extracted more profit from the war than has Sweden. Her imports have grown enormously, and a large part of the goods have found their way into neighboring belligerent countries. Stockholm, indeed, has been a clearing house for illicit trade among the warring nations, Russian firms sending grain through Sweden to Germany, while German manufacturers send their products to Russia by the same route—both elements, of course, evading the laws of their respective countries in carrying on such traffic with enemies.

With this traffic unchecked, of course, the Allies' plan to crush Germany economically must come to naught. England and France, therefore, have used pressure of all kinds to compel Sweden to put her import business in charge of an "overseas trust," such as exists in Denmark, Norway and Holland, by means of which adequate guarantees are given against re-export to Germany. But the Swedish traders were in no mind to surrender the vast profits they were enjoying, and they have insisted that the government should reject every proposal which would restrict freedom of Swedish commerce. Thus the business interests, which so long counteracted the pro-German sympathies of the court and the aristocracy, have recently swung around toward those elements, and the king and premier have virtually unanimous support in their declaration that Sweden will not tolerate further interference with her trading rights. During the last few weeks the crisis has been made more

acute by Great Britain's wholesale seizure of mails from Swedish ships. The American note on this question, dated January 4, but published only last Friday, cites the detention of nine Scandinavian vessels, from which thousands of bags of mail were taken, in order that letters and parcels intended for Germany might be seized. But the spectacle of John Bull with his hand in a mail pouch did not cow the Swedes. They retaliated promptly by holding up mails between England and Russia.

The conflict affords further proof that sentiments of national gratitude do not survive the depressing influence of interference with commercial prosperity. In 1855, and again fifteen years later, England intervened to prevent Russian aggression against Sweden; the country, as a fact, owes its territorial integrity to the British fleet. But that does not make the present operations of that fleet any more pleasing to the businesslike Swedes. War, as the premier intimated the other day, is not impossible; but it seems unlikely. Swedish statesmen doubtless realize that Great Britain and France would find Sweden rather more welcome as an enemy than as an unfriendly neutral, for then they would be able to choke off her sea trade entirely. And Germany probably would be sorry to have her useful neighbor adopt a course which would make "starvation" of the empire a real possibility.

IMPRESSING THE BALKANS

February 1, 1916.

AT 8 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, January 15, a gayly decorated train glided out of the Friedrichstrasse station in Berlin and rolled away to the southeast, followed by the exultant cheers of a great crowd. The event could not have been more brilliant if the kaiser himself had been starting on a tour of triumph. The locomotive, glistening with polish and paint, was half hidden by flags and bunting. From trucks to ventilators the carriages were new—the best that German manufacturing genius could produce. The furnishings were richly luxurious; the carpets and upholstery were specially woven for the occasion; flowers bloomed in the staterooms. All day long the train sped across the fertile plains of Brandenburg and Silesia, the people cheering in every town and hamlet through which it passed. It was hailed by a throng in Breslau. On again it went over the mountains into Hungary, and at midnight drew half the population of Budapest to a patriotic outburst at the station. Three hundred miles more, across the flat, snow-covered plains of southern Hungary, and it crept over the Danube and at dawn passed through Belgrade, capital of the Serbia that was. Then on through the lonely defiles of the Balkan mountains to Nish and across the old frontier of Bulgaria, to Sofia, where Czar Ferdinand and his retinue came to the station, at 10 o'clock on Sunday night, to pay honor to the special train and its passengers. Then on again,

through the tumbled wastes of mountains, lifeless except for the scattered outposts of the army, and so, at dawn, down with a dizzy swoop to the sunlit plains of Rumelia and Turkey. At 8 o'clock on Monday evening the train rolled into the terminus at Constantinople, to be greeted with Oriental ceremony by high officials of the Moslem government.

This was the first trip of the Balkan express, which travels two thousand miles across Europe in sixty hours, but has already become more famous than trains which make twice the speed. For it links the capitals of the kaiser and the sultan more dramatically than do the far-extended lines of their armies, and to millions it signifies the creation of a confederacy which is to change the destinies of the world. Very curious to observe is the combination of scientific efficiency, minute economy, audacious display and subtle diplomacy manifested by the Germans in this enterprise. The Balkan express is the handsomest train in Europe. Traversing some of the most impoverished territory on the continent, it has appointments which make those of the old Riviera flyers from Paris look tawdry by comparison. Every outward detail is designed to attract attention and leave an indelible impression on the minds of beholders. The locomotive and every carriage bear the name blazoned upon them in letters three feet high. And as it speeds across Germany, Austria, Servia, Bulgaria and Turkey twice a week the peasants and townsfolk who see it will exult, if they are Teutons, in this demonstration of imperial power, and will marvel, if they are Bulgarians or Turks, at the terrible energy and efficiency of their German masters. This is more than a train, therefore; it is an achievement in diplomacy, the last artistic touch in the subjugation of the Balkans. The economy we mentioned is a trifling thing, but suggestive of the

national genius that has coined gold out of waste products. Paper is scarce in Germany. So the tickets for the gilded Oriental flyer are old sleeping-car tickets printed in French, with the words "Balkan Express" printed across them in English.

It was no startling feat of railroad transportation to put on a weekly train each way between Berlin and Constantinople, but politically it is of tremendous import. The Balkan express is a symbol. From the Danube to the Bosphorus it will be recognized by the inhabitants as an emblem of the might of Germany. As the glittering train thunders past they will be reminded of the like force, infinitely multiplied, that drove a path through hostile territory and opened a highway from the North sea to the Golden Horn—and beyond. Powerful, efficient, moving with relentless precision on its appointed way, it will typify to them the imperial policy that has crushed Servia, lifted Bulgaria from the depths of humiliation to the heights of conquest and saved the crumbling Ottoman rule from final overthrow.

The military history of the last four months forms a striking chapter in the record of the war and is well worth study. The world has not had time to measure the full meaning of the achievements signalized by the establishment of the Berlin-Constantinople train on regular schedule.

It was late in September that Bulgaria's mobilization gave notice that the diplomacy of the Entente Powers had collapsed in defeat and that Germany was about to make her great thrust toward the East. There had been months of ominously indecisive negotiations, and it was supposed that adequate preparations had been made to forestall the move; but those who had expected a stubborn conflict were quickly undeceived. On October 6 began the fourth and final invasion of

Servia, although Belgrade, on the southern bank of the Danube, had been under bombardment for several days previously. German and Austro-Hungarian armies, under the supreme command of Field Marshal von Mackensen, simultaneously crossed the Save and Danube rivers, on the north, and the Drina, on the west. Belgrade was occupied on October 9. The Bulgarians poured over the eastern frontier at three points on October 11, one army striking at Nish, the others at points on the railroad north and south of that important junction, where the main line swings eastward to Sofia, while a branch extends southward to Saloniki. The Teutons numbered 450,000, the Bulgarians about half as many. The object was to crush the Servians between the two assaults, and at the same time to cut the Saloniki line, by which alone Great Britain and France could send aid.

The Servians managed to hold back the Teuton invaders in the northern mountains for three weeks, but they were steadily pushed back. The Bulgars cut the Nish-Saloniki line on October 19, and five days later occupied Uskub, fifty miles further south. Nish, which had been the Servian capital after the capture of Belgrade, fell on November 6. By that time the Teutons, pressing down from the north, were less than forty miles distant. The two forces joined a few miles northwest of the city. In order to cut the Servians off from retreat into Montenegro an Austrian army was rushed down the western part of the country. By November 24 the Teutons and Bulgars had swept the Servians from the entire plain north of Monastir, gallant efforts by the French army to reach the harried defenders having failed. On November 28 it was announced in Berlin that the operations were over, "the object having been accomplished." While conducting defensive campaigns

on three fronts, against Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, the Teutons had conquered Serbia, joined forces with Bulgaria and Turkey and paralyzed the efforts of England and France in the Balkans—all in fifty-two days.

After Serbia had been subdued the Austrians took up in earnest the settlement with Montenegro. Within a few weeks King Nicholas had fled and the Austrians were disarming his scattered forces. Not only that, but they are driving southward into Albania at such a rate that Durazzo will soon be taken, while the Italian government is threatened with the bitter necessity of evacuating Avlona. There are military experts who argue with plausible detail that these achievements really amount to nothing; that the decision of the war will be in the west and on the sea; that victories without number in the Balkans will not save Germany from being crushed by the strangling pressure of an enveloping blockade on land and sea. But the events have led others to offer different surmises. Professor Aulard, an eminent French historian, warns his countrymen that economic pressure alone will not avail. He writes:

It is a most dangerous illusion to believe that Germany will declare herself vanquished for lack of food, arms or men. What sort of peace could we impose upon a nation whose victorious armies are masters of Russian territory, of French territory, of almost all of Belgium, of all Serbia and all Montenegro? Genuine victory can be won only by beating the Teuton armies.

And to these words comes a baffling echo—the rumble of the Balkan express, speeding to and fro between Berlin and Constantinople.

WHY GERMANY WANTS PEACE

February 4, 1916.

A GOOD many persons, no doubt, read with considerable skepticism our recent dispatch from Washington outlining the general terms upon which Germany would be willing to end the war, and which she will endeavor to bring under consideration during the spring. They regard such news as in the nature of ingenious speculation, without any solid basis of fact, particularly because the terms are much more moderate than those discussed before Germany had won her important victories in the eastern field. The surmise is quite erroneous. It is true that none of the belligerents has officially declared its aims in detail, and is unlikely to disclose them until the negotiations begin. But it would be a mistake to discredit or ignore these periodical statements. Naturally, they are unofficial, and it would be impossible to get any German representative to stand for them. Yet they promote discussion and serve to create throughout the world a more or less definite impression, while not committing the government to any line of action; and this is exactly their purpose. Our readers may take it, therefore, that the statement of tentative terms, although not formal, is authentic.

On several occasions we have printed in these columns representative expressions of the German peace idea. An influential element in Germany insists that national safety demands extension of the frontier both east and west; on the other hand, there is strong

sentiment, led by the Socialist Democratic party, against any annexation of conquered territory. Early in April an "unauthorized" statement similar to that of a few days ago represented Germany as willing to consider the settlement:

No extension of territory for any belligerent; Belgium to be evacuated, but not indemnified; her Congo colony to be purchased by Germany; redistribution of colonies; an international agreement establishing freedom of the seas and immunity of commerce from attack in time of war.

A fortnight later Dr. Bernhard Dernburg made his famous declaration that "freedom of the seas" was the paramount demand and that Belgium would be held until it was enforced. The latest summary from Washington is as follows:

Evacuation of Belgium, without indemnity or transfer of the Congo Free State.

Restoration to France of occupied territory, without indemnity on either side.

Partition of Servia, Montenegro and Albania among Austria, Bulgaria and Greece.

Cession of part of the Russian Baltic provinces to Germany and erection of a Polish kingdom under a German prince.

Strengthening of Rumania by cessions of territory from both Russia and Austria.

Relinquishment of all German claim to her former possessions in China and the Pacific.

Restoration to Germany of part of her former African colonies or their equivalent.

Recognition of a German protectorate over the Turkish empire which would carry with it full opportunity for development of a German commercial "sphere of influence" in Asia Minor and Arabia.

Examination of the later "offer" shows four notable features: First, Belgian and French territory is to be given up; the best leaders of German thought are agreed that annexation, even if it could be enforced, would

create endless difficulties for the empire—they want no more problems like that of Alsace-Lorraine. Second, the demand for “freedom of the seas in time of war” has been put aside. This is rational, for it never had any logic behind it. Germany has enjoyed absolute freedom of the seas in time of peace, and her demand that she should be permitted to erect an overwhelming military power, while her antagonists should be forbidden to utilize their naval power, was impressive only because of its audacity. Third, there is no reference to indemnity. There is in Germany a determined belief that the enemies of the empire will be compelled to pay her a colossal sum, but the idea is visionary. Finally, there is a marked recession in the extent of the German demands. This, perhaps, is the most striking feature, and one which leads some observers to doubt whether the terms suggested are authentic. It seems to them illogical to suppose that the Teutonic alliance, which has given such astounding proof of its military power, should be ready to modify its demands rather than to increase them.

There are, however, two sides of the account. Germany's gains in the war make an imposing array. She holds in Belgium 18,000 square miles of territory; in France, 13,000 square miles; in Russia, 81,000; in Servia and Montenegro, about 19,000. She has broken, for the time being, the offensive power of Russia. She has established on foreign soil in the west a defensive line on which the most desperate onsets of her adversaries have made little impression, and only recently she has retaken important positions which she had lost in that region. Through her ally, Austria, she has checked Italy in the Alps and established Teutonic influence on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. In the south-eastern theater of war she has revitalized Turkish power

so that it withstood a tremendous assault; she has added Bulgaria to her alliance, isolated Rumania and paralyzed Greece with fear. The result of these operations is that she has extended her political and military influence from the North sea to Asia Minor and the borders of Persia and Egypt, and has correspondingly reduced the prestige of England, France and Russia. Moreover, she still retains the military advantage of fighting on interior lines, and still holds the initiative, so that her antagonists cannot tell whether her next thrust will be made in France, in Russia, in Egypt or in Mesopotamia.

Against this record, nevertheless, are to be put defeats of impressive magnitude. Germany has failed to take Paris, Calais or Dunkirk, and so cripple France and break the cordon of the English channel. She has failed to crush the French or Russian armies, and has not even inflicted a serious wound on England. Her fleet is imprisoned, her ports relentlessly blockaded, her supplies so restricted, that she sustains herself only by minute economy and the practice of an extraordinary genius for conservation. Her effectives for the fighting lines are being used up; her Zeppelins have proved of indifferent value, and her submarine campaign has collapsed. But the most important failure is that she has not yet put into the minds of her enemies the first germ of an inclination to surrender.

The essential facts, then, are these: Germany has made three stupendous efforts to force a decision—in France, in Russia and in the Balkans; in all three regions, particularly in the last, she has won brilliant victories, has proved conclusively her military superiority. But she is no nearer final triumph than she was a year ago—not so near as she was in September, 1914. So far as her original design was concerned, Germany has been a defeated nation ever since the battle of the

Marne, when her terrific onslaught on Paris shattered itself against the French line. Yet by unexampled audacity, efficiency and power she has buried that defeat under a pyramid of victories elsewhere, and today faces her foes unbroken, undaunted and still the dictator of battles. While it is true, therefore, that Germany must continue to suffer the economic pressure exerted by enemy sea power, it would be a fatal error to regard her unofficial peace proposals as signs of weakening will. She wants peace, not because she is losing, but because she is winning; not because she fears defeat, but because she desires to capitalize her victories.

We are now discussing, not the actual conditions, but the plausible German conception of them; and that embraces no vision of defeat. Those familiar with a popular American pastime will understand her position. In a serious poker game, we are credibly informed, there eventually comes a time when a certain player—usually the most enthusiastic in the early stages of the contest—begins to show signs of restiveness. He becomes taciturn, yawns without concealment and often ostentatiously consults his watch, occasionally offering an impatient suggestion that it is time to quit. Invariably, our recollection is, such a player will be found to have in front of him most of the chips, and he is inclined to resent the useless waste of continuing. Germany unquestionably has accumulated, up to this time, great winnings, and she wants to “cash in.” If the rules of “freeze out” were capable of enforcement, perhaps she could compel an adjournment. But her opponents seem able to buy unlimited chips, and the only answer to her proposal is the grim rejoinder: “The game is young yet—go ahead and deal!”

EVERYTHING WON BUT PEACE

February 8, 1916.

THAT was a rather searching observation made the other day by Herr Adolf Wermuth, mayor of Berlin. "Our country," he said, "does not talk of peace, does not yearn for peace, but fights for peace." Possibly there was an oblique reference in this to the professional pacifists; but the remark was interesting chiefly because it was wholly sincere and one-third true. It would have been more accurate to say that Germany not only talks and yearns for peace, but fights for it. And here is the grim paradox which taunts the victorious but desperate empire: it can win battles, it can conquer territories and subjugate peoples, but it cannot compel peace. The German people are sated with victories. A year ago there was a thrill in the capture of an important hill or the triumph of a diplomatic maneuver; today such news is received without enthusiasm. German military genius has been so often demonstrated that it no longer evokes exultation; it merely intensifies the eagerness for a settlement worthy of the sacrifices made.

It is quite obvious that Germany's desire to end the war is not a sign of fear or exhaustion, but of confidence. Conscious of the stupendous achievements of her armies and persuaded that she can maintain the struggle indefinitely, she is the more anxious that her antagonists should accept the inevitable, in order that she may reap the rewards. What good are further victories, her

people say, if they do not force her enemies to sue? The richest regions of France are occupied, but the nation is not defeated or discouraged. Russia's power has been checked, but not crushed. English ships have been sunk, English towns bombarded from the air, English prestige wounded, but the British fleet holds the sea and new British armies are forming for the fighting line. Moreover, the curious situation is that each fresh victory makes peace more difficult. Possession of Belgium, every German recognizes, is not an argument for peace; it is an obstacle to its consummation. The occupation of Poland and part of Russia has solidified Russian sentiment for relentless prosecution of the war. The Allies' disasters at the Dardanelles and in Servia have hardened their resolve, not weakened it. The capture of Egypt might make the reputation of another Von Hindenburg or Von Mackensen, but Britain would be still to conquer, France and Russia to overcome. So, while military Germany presses on from victory to victory, civil Germany looks wistfully for a way to turn the stupendous winnings to profit.

There are three reasons for this sentiment: First, the dream of dominating Europe by one quick, smashing assault has been shattered. Second, the empire possesses now its greatest aggregate of military and diplomatic advantages—it could confidently face negotiations while holding Belgium and parts of France and Russia, together with control of the Balkans and Turkey. Third, experts agree that within a very few months the nation will reach the highest limit of its offensive power, and thereafter must decline. There is no German living, we suppose, who believes it to be within the remotest range of possibility that Germany can be "crushed"; but there are many who recognize the existence of the three conditions we have named. And while they have no fear

of defeat, they want to collect the gains of victory without further sacrifice.

Now what are the terms which appear to them to be logical? They were outlined in our Washington dispatch last week: Evacuation of Belgium and France, without indemnities; partition of Servia, Montenegro and Albania; erection of an independent Poland under a German prince and annexation of Russian Courland; abandonment of German territorial claims in the far East, but an arrangement for adequate colonial possessions in Africa, and recognition of a German protectorate over Turkey, with full opportunity for German expansion in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. If these terms were final and official, it would be possible to assail them vigorously in behalf of martyred Belgium, and also on the ground that they would leave untouched the vital issues of militarism and international law. But if those considerations are put aside, does it seem that the settlement would be unreasonable? Would it be just to denounce it as a scheme of insatiable conquest—an attempt to destroy human liberty? All factors save one have to do with settlement—from the German point of view—of problems created by the war; these need no present discussion. The real heart of the matter is that Germany demands recognition of her political supremacy over Servia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Turkey, with the right to extend her commercial domains through Asia Minor, with Turkish consent.

We have no mind just now to resume examination of the remote possibilities of Pan-Germanism, which involve the creation of an Eastern empire by brute force. But, considering the demand as it is presumed to be presented, who is to say that the great German nation, as powerful and efficient in the arts of peace as in the dreadful enterprise of war, is to be forbidden to develop

rich and primitive regions of the earth? But reason and justice and generous recognition of German genius are crowded aside. It is not Germany's ambition to expand toward the East that arouses the world's condemnation, but her method of forwarding it. Men would be readier to applaud her design for the peaceful penetration of Asia Minor if she had not begun it by trampling upon a harmless neighbor. The corpse of Belgium lies in her path. And there are even more powerful reasons why her most moderate demands will bring no present response. Not one of her great enemies is beaten. Is France to consent even to a "reasonable" peace which leaves her fearful losses uncompensated and her heroic dead unavenged? Let President Poincaré's New Year message to the army answer:

Any peace which came to us with suspicious form and equivocal purpose would bring us only dishonor, ruin and servitude. Who would, by impatience or lassitude, thus sell to Germany the past and future of France? The war is long, it is rigorous and bloody, but how much future anguish are we spared by our present suffering? To permit ourselves to falter even momentarily would be to be ungrateful to our dead and to betray posterity.

Is Russia to surrender, while she has armies for the field and while 80,000 square miles of her territories are occupied? Is Great Britain to yield, when she has 3,000,000 new troops in training, when her supplies of munitions are piling up, when her fleet holds control of every sea? Disregarding all else, consider the demand for political suzerainty over Turkey. It is easy for neutrals to argue that Germany has earned this and would benefit humanity by civilizing the neglected forces of Islamism. But what would Teutonic possession of Constantinople mean to Russia? It would shut against her the one gateway to the world's highways; for all time her vast resources would be imprisoned and

her economic developments paralyzed, once her implacable enemy was seated at the Golden Horn. And for England it would mean extinction. As to this, the most convincing testimony is German. For a quarter of a century the ablest statesmen and publicists of the empire have expounded with minute detail the theory that when Germany began her predestined movement toward the East the downfall of British world power would begin. Each campaign in the war has fulfilled some part in the long-heralded program of conquest. Long ago it was proclaimed that domination of the Balkans would be but the first step toward subjugation of Egypt and India and the wresting of the scepter of Asia from the nerveless grasp of degenerate England. It is useless to argue that Great Britain's claim to her eastern possessions rests upon no higher moral grounds; it would even be illogical to do so, for if all the wrongs and aggressions of past centuries are to be remedied by war, the world surely will never know another day's tranquillity.

We are discussing, not ethics, but present facts and their influence toward hastening peace; and, in our judgment, their most clamorous teaching is that Germany's Balkan victories and her virtual absorption of Turkey make it utterly impossible for Great Britain to stop while she has a battleship or an army corps left. With Germany intrenched between Egypt and India the British empire would be doomed. But there are reasons of sentiment, as well as reasons of state, why German moderation leaves her enemies untouched. They are fighting not only with set purpose, but in hot anger. They declare, and they believe, that Germany has slain chivalry, murdered honor, degraded war to the level of barbarism. Short of being overwhelmed, they would spurn a peace with a government which they deem a betrayer and assassin. They are fighting now, not on

account of logic, but on account of Louvain and the Lusitania; not so much to establish rights as to avenge wrongs and to curb the perpetrator of them. And, finally, they are utterly convinced that that peace would be a mockery which hung upon the dishonored signature which pledged protection to Belgium.

All surveys of this kind, too, must take into account the fact that with Great Britain, by reason of her geographical isolation and her sea power, rests the decision. It is no derogation of her allies to state the palpable fact that peace will be made when she has either attained her end or has acknowledged defeat. If she were to withdraw, it would be impossible for the others long to resist; but it is conceivable that with France, Russia and Italy beaten into submission, the Teutonic alliance would still have to reckon with England. Lest it be supposed that we are giving pro-British arguments, we may cite as a witness the editor of Hearst's German newspaper in New York, who has just returned from Berlin. He writes:

"Great Britain is the obstacle to peace. She hopes to starve Germany into submission." Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg made this statement recently to party leaders in the reichstag. He said that all the warring nations would be willing to enter into negotiations except England. A high military official said to me later:

"We could take Paris; it would only be a question of how many men we were willing to sacrifice. But that wouldn't bring England to terms. We could take Petrograd; but suppose we drove the czar out of his capital, England would not care. We could drive the Italian army into the sea; it would make no difference to England.

"The more territory we occupy, the thinner our lines and the greater our difficulty in supplying them. Going ahead on such lines would help England more than us."

These two statements accurately reflect German sentiment. The people want peace. I do not mean they are will-

ing to surrender. Far from that. But they are in a reasonable spirit.

Despite Germany's brilliant achievements, the issue between her and England is no nearer settlement than when the war began. Her first plan, to conquer Great Britain by way of Antwerp and Calais, failed; her second attempt, by way of Suez, is yet to be made. Until it has succeeded or collapsed there is no more chance of Britain's yielding than of Servia's resurrection. This is why the imperial chancellor said, as quoted by the German-American editor: "There will be no more extensive field operations for the present—unless a campaign be embarked upon that will strike a vital blow at England"—a statement which "a member of the general staff" elucidated by saying:

When she occupies Egypt and controls the canal, Germany will be in a good tactical position for peace negotiations. She will have something to trade upon.

Finally, we may quote three sentences from one more competent observer, Hudson Maxim:

Even if it were to be granted that the English are whipped today, it would take two years before they would find it out, and the war would have to last two years longer for that reason alone. * * * All the talk about starving out the Germans and cutting off their supplies is empty vamping; they cannot be starved out. * * * It is my prediction that the war will last from three to five years yet, and that it is more likely to be seven years longer than three.

A WORLD WITHOUT LEADERS

February 23, 1916.

IN THIS dark hour of human history the insistent, universal demand among the peoples is for the light of leadership. Groping in the murk of war or the shadow of it, they feel the need for far-seeing, sagacious, constructive statesmanship, which would make plain the path and in the end would save the shattered fabric of civilization from complete overthrow. Yet where is there promise that the need will be met? Look the world over, and where will one see in the seats of the mighty any save men of mediocrity? It may be that the colossal magnitude of the problems and dangers confronting humanity create this impression—against such a background the most titanic figure might well seem dwarfed. Yet, making allowances for the extraordinary emergency, there is, as a noted French writer recently observed, “a dearth of great men among the very large number dedicated to statecraft.”

There is a belief, which has come to possess almost the sanctity of a demonstrated principle, that in a great crisis nature or providence infallibly produces the man equipped to cope with it. Americans, in particular, have come to accept the theory as an article of faith. When the time came to give the world democracy a Washington appeared to personify the cause and carry it to victory. When, nearly a century later, the system was imperiled by a new phase of the age-old conflict between the rights of property and the rights of man, a Lincoln

was given to us, that "government of the people, by the people, for the people, should not perish from the earth." Thus, as Carlyle has shown us, the history of mankind is, in large measure, a succession of biographies of great men. On every page of the record there are names that start forth as pictures of their time. The rise of France in the seventeenth century to the position of the first Power in Europe, with an English king as her pensioner, was but the reflection of the genius of Richelieu. Adroit, unscrupulous and a determined promoter of autocratic kingcraft, he is to us a sinister figure; yet none can deny that as a churchman, soldier, administrator and diplomatist he was France at the summit of her glory.

England produced through the centuries a roll of resounding names in statesmanship—Elizabeth's Burghley, the Puritans' Cromwell, the Hanoverian Pitts and Walpoles and Cannings and Foxes, the Victorian Palmerston, Peel, Disraeli, Salisbury and Gladstone. When Stuart absolutism became unendurable there came up from the people a leader whose patriotism and energy destroyed in that country the superstition of divine right, created the British navy and laid the foundations of the world power that is now meeting its supreme test. Under the elder Pitt British arms were triumphant in India, in Africa, in Canada and on the Rhine, and British warships swept the French from the seas. His services were great enough to earn for him two titles of honor—earl of Chatham from his sovereign and "The Great Commoner" from the nation. He was big enough to champion the rights of the American colonists against the tyranny of unjust taxation. Yet his fame is overshadowed by that of his son—chancellor of the exchequer at 23 and prime minister at 25, the favorite of king and parliament and people, the greatest English premier of all time and the man who united Europe

against the all-conquering Napoleon. Even in the multitude of great figures in French history from the period of the revolution to the overthrow of the first empire that of Talleyrand stands forth. The ablest adviser and ally of Napoleon during the Corsican's rise, he aided in his deposition, and by his consummate skill saved France from dismemberment by her foes. Churchman and conspirator, a skeptic in religion and a cynic in morals, he was, still, a leader of men, and left his imprint deep upon the history of his country and of the world.

"Roll up the map of Europe," said Pitt after Austerlitz. "It will not be needed these ten years." And it was just ten years later that the congress of Vienna met to redraft the frontiers of the bedeviled continent. At that historic gathering the chief figure was Metternich, and to his surpassing genius in statecraft Austria owed her dominance in European affairs for half a century. To the more enlightened views of modern times the policies of this implacable foe of liberalism are abhorrent, and many of the causes of the war that now afflicts the world may be traced to his intrigues. Yet he towers over most of his contemporaries and remains one of the great figures of his century. But who would call him the greatest? There were men to come after him whose names were to shadow his forever—Cavour, the state-builder, champion of civil liberty and constitutional government, creator of united Italy; Thiers, first president of the French republic and the brains of that nation's rehabilitation after the disaster of Sedan; Disraeli, son of a Jewish bookworm and antiquary, who was to become the leader of the proudest aristocracy in Europe and the inspiration of British imperialism; Bismarck, the titanic architect of the German empire, and above all, the incomparable Lincoln.

No one can read these names without marveling that the present upheaval has not yet produced a master mind. Nowhere in the troubled world has there arisen a dominating figure—a leader with breadth of intelligence and vigor of mind, with keenness of vision and greatness of soul—to whom his countrymen might look confidently for wise counsel and courageous action. Where would such a leader be expected so logically as in England, with her glorious traditions, her great achievements, her vast wealth and power, her empire that circles the earth? Yet he is not there. Asquith is scholarly, sincere and broadminded; Grey is well-meaning and industrious; Balfour, Carson, Bonar Law, Lansdowne—there is no inspiration in the list of well-known mediocrities. Kitchener showed tremendous skill and energy in creating armies, but statesmanship is utterly beyond him. He did not even master the military problems of the war, for he neglected to mobilize the nation's industries behind its soldiers, and tried to drive the Germans out of France with shrapnel. Viscount French is a brave and affable commander, but without a spark of genius. The biggest man in the country is Lloyd George, but he is no world figure yet. Russia's might is the power of brute strength, of masses of men. She has produced one great military commander, but no statesmen. Italy is beset by policies of narrowness and indecision. The Balkans have never had and never can have a statesman bigger than their wrangling politics; Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Constantine of Greece are nothing more than clever royal manipulators. Venizelos has been submerged.

Germany alone has real leadership, in her emperor. He was great enough to survive the dismissal of Bismarck; it was his restless genius that put power behind the great forward movement of the Germans in

industry, commerce and maritime affairs; he had the vision and ability to buttress his autocracy by taking from socialism its principal projects. Yet even the kaiser and the extraordinarily able organizers who surrounded him failed in the great test. They have tried to maintain in the twentieth century the medieval philosophy of divine right, to establish the doctrine of force above the principles of justice. And so we see Germany, bereft of true statesmanship, her manhood being sacrificed in a vain enterprise, her future mortgaged, reduced to the extremity of looking for salvation to her Von Hindenburgs and her Moslem allies and her stealthy submarines.

And when we turn to the neutral nations the lack of effective statesmanship is no less apparent. In the United States it is melancholy—has almost become tragic. When the republic was founded and when it was saved from disintegration, leaders mighty of mind and serene of soul were found who embodied the aspirations of the hour; in the third great crisis of its history the government is a discredit abroad and a disappointment at home; its policies are clouded by political self-interest, timid vacillation and feeble compromise. This is more astonishing, and the more deplorable, because no nation ever had so great an opportunity for service to mankind. As we said many months ago, the United States was fitted by circumstance to be the controlling factor in the world's disordered affairs, the chief guardian of international law and the rights of humanity. It was the logical champion of the fundamentals of civilization because of its political ideals, because of its freedom from all foreign entanglements and ambitions, because of its economic leadership. The whole world looked to us for help and guidance, but looked in vain. "Our government," Elihu Root truly said, "lost the

opportunity for leadership of the moral sense of the American people, and it lost the power which a knowledge of that leadership and a sympathetic response from the moral sense of the world would have given to our diplomacy."

Whence came this lamentable failure? From lack of statesmanship; from an unintelligent and wavering foreign policy; from an administration whose boast has been that it drifts with the current of public feeling and whose practice has been to act only when compelled by overpowering sentiment. President Wilson himself holds that he has no obligations of leadership—is to be but a pale reflection of the average mind of the country as he conceives it, and is to make "safety first" the ideal of a nation dedicated to truth and justice. The war will disclose—has already disclosed—colossal failures in all countries, but there will be none comparable to that of the United States, because, in the face of matchless opportunity, it has defaulted in duty. And this has not been because the people lack courage or patriotism or humanity, but solely because there has been an absence of leadership; because there has not been in Washington a man of virile intelligence and keen vision, strong of heart and high of soul—a man whose instincts and convictions would make his voice the voice of justice-loving America.

RUSSIA'S GREAT BLOW

February 24, 1916.

IN THE northern part of that old, old land in Asia where the human race was cradled, and at the point where the frontiers of Turkey and Russia and Persia meet, there stands amid the desolation of bleak mountains and forbidding gorges a snow-capped height that lifts its huge bulk 17,000 feet into the clouds. This is the loftiest of "the mountains of Ararat," where, the record says, the ark rested after the Deluge; whence the dove twice went forth, and when she returned the second time "in her mouth was an olive leaf pluckt off," a token that the time of destruction had passed and that the survivors should "be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth." A strange emblem is this to be associated with the scenes now being enacted almost within sight of the solitary peak. For, if the aged builder of the ark could stand today upon that gloomy pinnacle, he would see spread about him in an encircling panorama one of the greatest theaters of the bloodiest conflict in all history. North, east, south and west he would look down upon regions filled with the tumult of war, and the winter winds whirling up the heights would bring to him the distant echoes of battling armies.

There is a very practical reason for beginning at this point a brief survey of the operations which reached their first climax in the capture of the Turkish fortress of Erzerum by the Russians; for an understanding of the geography of the field is essential to comprehension

of what the struggle means, and the observer can best picture the relation of the various actions by imagining himself a spectator on the summit of Mount Ararat. A circle with a radius of 150 miles from that center passes through four vital points. Almost due north at that distance is Tiflis, midway on the railroad between Batum, on the Black sea, and Baku, on the Caspian. Here Grand Duke Nicholas, supposed to have been "exiled" after his masterly conduct of the retreat from Poland and Galicia, has been directing Russia's great thrust into Armenia, which has shattered the Turks' Asiatic line. Almost due west of Ararat, on the same circle, lies Erzerum, forty miles inside the Turkish border—an ancient and primitive city, but converted by a double ring of eighteen forts into a formidable stronghold, and one of the chief strategic centers of the war, because it was the only Moslem citadel in that region and because it commands highways to Constantinople and to the east. Southwest, beyond Lake Van, are Mush and Bitlis, the former now in Russian hands and the latter threatened. Only 125 miles further on is the line of the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad, absolutely vital to the communications of the Germans and Turks with their forces in Mesopotamia. On the southeast, the 150-mile circle touches Tabriz, in Persia, for more than a year in the possession of the Russians, and a base for their operations southward toward Bagdad and westward into Turkey.

A fundamental fact to be remembered is that the three great campaigns in the Caucasus, in Persia and in Mesopotamia are essentially one. The fall of Erzerum will profoundly affect the Russian operations that have been going on for months in Persia, and also the stubborn conflict between the Turks and the British below Bagdad. By his smashing blow in Armenia, the grand duke has helped immeasurably the Muscovite troops who

are deadlocked near Kermanshah and also the Britons beleaguered in Kut-el-Amara, 500 miles from the scene of his victory. The Russo-Turkish frontier in Armenia was an inevitable field of conflict, for at that point alone the two countries are in contact. Late in 1914 the Turks, under German direction, undertook an invasion of Transcaucasia, but their army was cut to pieces in the storm-swept passes of the mountains around Ardahan. Russia, however, was at that time involved in huge operations in East Prussia, and could not follow up her victory by a frontal attack; she, therefore, began a flanking movement through northern Persia, and within a few months her forces were pressing into Turkey from Tabriz. Her main objective in the war is Constantinople. Shut off from that goal by neutral Rumania and Germanized Bulgaria, she was compelled to strike for the Moslem capital by the laborious method of passing around the Black sea. But the north Persian campaign was only a preliminary to the main thrust at Erzerum. This vital enterprise was intrusted to Grand Duke Nicholas. After months of preparation, he had his armies concentrated on the Batum-Baku line, and in January ordered the great advance.

This campaign, conducted amid the rigors of an almost Arctic winter, has been one of the most daring and spectacular efforts of the war. Wholly unlike the dogged trench fighting of the other fields, it is war of the old-fashioned kind, with shifting strategy, rapid movements, desperate artillery encounters in the snow and grim bayonet work when the contending squadrons come to grips. Steadily the Turks were driven back from range to range, and at last the invaders confronted the outer ring of Erzerum's forts, armed with big guns and strengthened by the skillful work of German engineers. Here the grand duke pushed home an attack almost

without parallel for audacity. Simultaneous demonstrations from the north, the east and the southeast compelled the Turks to thin their line; then, after persuading his opponents that the main drive was from the southeast, the Russian commander suddenly drove straight at the center. A terrific bombardment broke down the Turkish defense, and the central forts were actually carried by infantry assault, an almost unheard-of achievement. Within five days this great fortress, which in 1878 had resisted a siege of six months, was captured, and the garrison was in disorderly flight toward the west. Swift developments since the fall of the city have shown that the Russians were well prepared to follow up their triumph. The forces of their right wing are close to Trebizond, on the Black sea, while far to the southward their left wing, joining the expedition from Tabriz, has enveloped the Lake Van region, occupying Mush and approaching Bitlis. The next objective, Diarbekr, is only a march of two or three days from the Bagdad railroad.

As was to be expected, the storming of Erzerum is hailed in Petrograd and London and Paris as the most important achievement of the war, and quite naturally it is minimized in Berlin and ignored in Constantinople, where the official communications still gravely announce that "in the Caucasus operations there is nothing to report." But certain effects are obvious. The Russians have undeniably broken the Turkish line at a crucial point, for Erzerum was the principal and the strongest Moslem outpost in the east. All Armenia—all Asia Minor, in fact—lies open to the invaders; while it is true that the rugged nature of the country assists the defenders, they have no fortified places at which to make a stand, and their communications are hopelessly inferior to those of the Russians, who command the

Black sea. Moreover, there is a strong prospect that the Turkish forces in Persia and Mesopotamia will be completely cut off from their source of supplies; meanwhile, the Russians can, if they choose, develop a serious movement toward Constantinople, although that would mean traversing 600 miles of extremely difficult country, or they can send a strong expedition southeast against Bagdad.

Two vital things have been accomplished: First, the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad and the whole scheme of German domination in Asiatic Turkey have been imperiled; and, second, the threatened invasion of Egypt has been made impossible for the time being, for the Turks cannot undertake that huge enterprise while half of their armies are in flight before the Russians. Politically, the results are likely to be no less important. The demonstration of Russian military power and efficiency will have a tremendous influence upon Rumania and Greece and upon the Asiatic peoples. It will relieve the pressure upon the allies at Saloniki, as well as in Mesopotamia. It will go far to wipe out the humiliation suffered at Gallipoli and to nullify the German conquests in the Balkans. Long ago the antagonists of the Teutons boasted that an "iron ring" had been closed around the Central Powers, but it was broken by the drive through Servia. Now it seems likely to be forged anew. It is even possible that Turkey will be compelled to sue for a separate peace and that Russia will be found to have struck the decisive blow of the war.

BELGIUM STANDS FAST

February 29, 1916.

THE whole world listens with strained attention to the thunders of the colossal conflict which rages in France, where for eight days and nights, without an instant's pause, huge forces of men and machinery have been battling for supremacy. But nowhere—not even in France—is the result awaited with more anguishing suspense than in Belgium. The fate of that nation is in the balance. If the terrible onslaughts of the Germans exhaust themselves against the defenses of Verdun, Belgium's deliverance is sure; if the invaders crash through that heroic line, France may be condemned to humiliation and Belgium to enslavement. Yet only a few weeks ago there were persistent reports—not only in London and Washington, but in German newspapers—that Germany was making subtle suggestions to Belgium for a separate peace upon the basis of a complete restoration of her independence, and perhaps an indemnity disguised as a loan.

These offers, of course, were not official nor authenticated, but that they should have been made, in a manner to avoid responsibility in case of rejection, would not be surprising. Success of the negotiations would be advantageous to the Germans. If Belgium could be detached from the Entente by diplomacy, it would be a far more effective stroke than the elimination of Serbia by force of arms. It would have the practical advantage of releasing the immense German garrison for active

service elsewhere. Moreover, it would be a distinct gain to Germany if she could unload, before the peace parleys begin, one of the principal issues raised against her by her enemies. Above all, it would in some degree placate the neutral opinion of the world. Having extracted all possible advantage from the violation of Belgium by establishing her armies in France, Germany would benefit immeasurably if she could free herself from a little of the infamy of that crime by a belated offer of restitution.

The offer, then, was not surprising. The striking thing is that it was refused. Compared to the desperate battles which have raged throughout Europe and Asia, this negative event has little of thrilling interest; yet nothing in the whole war has been more truly dramatic. If ever a nation were justified in making any barter for peace, it is Belgium at this hour. For nineteen months the land has been a place of mourning and anguish. It has been plundered, impoverished, reduced to hateful servitude; those of its people who have not been hunted into graves have been scattered into exile or condemned to privation. The nation has been drained of its wealth, its strength, its very lifeblood. And besides all the miseries of hunger and penury and humiliation, how profound must be the weariness of the people! The world is impressed by the iron fortitude of the Germans, by the splendid heroism of the French, by the dogged courage of the British; but none of these can overshadow the martyrdom of Belgium, that land of sorrow and suffering and sacrifice.

One cannot ignore the fact that very able and very reputable writers describe Belgium as a favorite of fortune in having come under the stimulating influence of German culture. In the beginning German advocates were ready to admit that a serious wrong had been done to her, and they deplored the contumacious spirit which

made severe measures necessary. But lately they have inclined rather to take credit for the civilizing efforts of the invaders. Germany, they patiently argue, was not an assassin but an emancipator, not a burglar but a benefactor. Professor McClellan, of Princeton, made a Belgian tour in charge of high German officials, and wrote enthusiastically of the regenerative effect of the military occupation. He found no evidence of atrocities; "only one-sixth" of Louvain was destroyed—although that was the sixth containing the finest buildings and richest treasures; and if industry and commerce were prostrated, that was due to the flight of the wealthier Belgians rather than to the invasion, the seizure of factories and supplies and the requisitioning of every means of production and transportation. Professor Eugen Kuehnemann, of Breslau, now in the United States, modestly recites some of the benefits of the invasion to which these benighted folk are still unreconciled. He writes:

Germany is putting the whole social life of Belgium in order again, and in better order than it was before the war. The fields yield good crops, the factories are working, the industrial life is restored. In fact, everything would return to normal if England did not make the export of Belgian products impossible, and so hinder the resurrection of the friend she shamefully sacrificed. * * * Germany does all this without a single word of praise or encouragement from abroad. She is creating a better world. That is the German way. It rebuilds and does not tolerate devastation of any sort. It creates a new and better life where a life was destroyed.

Unfortunately for this agreeable picture of Belgian felicity, the world is aware that for nineteen months the people, the most industrious and self-reliant on earth, have existed only by grace of the charity of Americans and other neutrals; that even now thousands of Belgian officials and private citizens are held as hostages, while thousands more have been transported to Germany as

prisoners; that in 1915 the Germans extorted \$96,000,000 in tribute from the stricken country, in addition to the ordinary taxes, and have ordered a like levy for this year, and that the people are subjected to the inflexible rigors of a foreign military despotism which has utterly extinguished not only all semblance of freedom, but any possibility of self-support. The Belgian minister in Washington thus sums up the system of "veritable spoliation":

The German occupation has entirely prevented all foreign trade, has paralyzed industrial activity and has reduced the majority of the laboring classes to enforced idleness. And upon the impoverished population whom she unjustly attacked, upon whom she has brought want and distress, who have been barely saved from starvation by importations of food which Germany should have provided, she now imposes a new tax, equal to the enormous tax she already exacted.

It is from beneath this burden of injustice and suffering that Belgium has returned her answer. "There is not a shadow of truth," said the minister of war, "in the evil-minded rumors in regard to the conclusion of a separate peace between Belgium and Germany." So for a time—perhaps for a long time—Belgium will stand fast. She has schooled herself to endure. The cause she took up first among the nations she will maintain. The first reason for her decision is that she is faithful to her allies and they have declared anew their faith with her. On February 23 the British premier reiterated the pledge he had made on November 9, 1914: "We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than she has sacrificed"; and Britain, France and Russia have united in this formal assurance:

The allied and guaranteeing Powers declare that when the moment comes the Belgian government will be called upon

to take part in the peace negotiations, and they will not end hostilities without Belgium having re-established its political and economical independence.

But behind the resolve of the Belgians there is something more powerful than confidence in their allies, and that is the dauntless spirit of honor and independence, the soul of the intrepid nation. And the striking fact is that this is just what the Germans are incapable of understanding. Their logic is subject to the most curious "blind spots." The most intensely patriotic people on earth themselves, they are utterly unable to conceive that the Belgians should be inspired by a like sentiment and should prefer their own to German institutions. Aside from the relentless extortion of tribute, the German administration is honest, and it is scientifically efficient; and it seems to them that the Belgians are ungrateful as well as foolish not to submit to the necessary but benevolent processes of regeneration. But the fire that flamed up at Liège has been only subdued, not quenched. All of Belgium is conquered except a few pitiful miles of arid dunes; yet her soul is still free. So much the more are those nations which remained faithful to their guardianship of her rights bound to maintain them to the end and at any cost. When the war began they proclaimed to the world—and it was true—that they fought for her. They fight now for their own lives, but they fight for Belgium's, too, and it is to their highest credit that they have renewed their allegiance to that cause. For any faltering in that purpose or any indifference to its sacred obligations would be a dishonor comparable only to the infamous act of the invader.

THE PERILS OF "SAFETY FIRST"

March 9, 1916.

IT WAS not by accident or coincidence, but by deliberate purpose, that the policies which will govern the coming presidential campaign were announced at the New York state conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties. Senator Root, the chief oracle of Republicanism, outlined in his masterly speech the platform upon which his party will stand, making the paramount plank therein the maintenance of Americanism and national honor and the upholding of international law. The convention gave its approval to the utterance, and that declaration has been received virtually without dissent by Republicans throughout the nation. Mr. Root did more than state the principal issue of the party, for he thereby indorsed the position taken by a large majority of the Progressives, and, as a fact, his statement was only a vigorous reassertion of the platform of Theodore Roosevelt. The Democrats a fortnight later followed the precedent set by the Republicans. At their state convention, held at Syracuse on March 1, former Governor Glynn, speaking in behalf of the national administration, outlined the Democratic platform for the approaching contest. His speech was an unequivocal, even violent, defense and indorsement of the administration's foreign policy, which had been denounced by Mr. Root as futile, un-American and dangerous. The convention, as in the other case, heartily approved the "keynote" utterance, and the party in

general has virtually accepted it as embodying the chief issues of the ensuing campaign.

In one respect the parallel between the two gatherings fails. The Democrats adopted a notable innovation by epitomizing their platform in the brief and striking phrase, "Safety First." The convention, however, did not originate this inspiriting battle cry; it had been heard previously at gatherings of the faithful. Not long ago a quite impressive movement among administration supporters in Washington caused them to break out in a sort of rash with campaign buttons inscribed "Wilson and Safety First." The neatly descriptive phrase serves a twofold purpose: it declares concisely the position of the Democratic party and it furnishes a key to the otherwise baffling course of President Wilson. The second accomplishment is the more interesting. Some such analytical definition was really needed to make clear the president's purpose.

At no time could it fairly be said that President Wilson sought to dishonor and debase the country by craven abandonment of right and justice. However disappointing his program may have been at times to stalwart patriotism, it never was tainted with cowardice. On the contrary, those who have understood its desperate expedients and have foreseen its dreadful possibilities must admit that to frame and follow it really requiring a sort of audacity, a kind of self-confident daring. Superficially, it has often created the impression of a total lack of moral, intellectual and spiritual courage. The reasons for this have been its bewildering vacillations, its alternation of uncompromising demands and enfeebling interpretation, its conflicting advocacy of calculating self-interest and lofty idealism, its irreconcilable aims of making America an indifferent spectator of international crimes, and at the same time

a robust champion of law and humanity. But no just view would see in these contradictions evidences of a pusillanimous spirit. President Wilson is a man of worthy intentions, high purpose and ardent patriotism. The failures of his policy have been due to the fact that it has not been based upon fixed principles, but has been adapted and adjusted and modified to meet events as they arose. It has been essentially of a barometric nature—responding to rather than guiding the forces of circumstance.

Right here we may pay a tribute of thanks to the originators of the new party war cry. Illuminated by the conception expressed in that thrilling summons, "Wilson and Safety First," the administration's policy becomes intelligible; it reveals at least a vague intent of patriotism, albeit it is marked by narrowness of vision and a lamentably low estimate of national duty. We shall not attempt to recite again the amazing shifts and changes of the policy, but shall attempt merely a hasty analysis of its significance. It is a trite observation that nations are governed by the same laws of conduct as are individuals. The same instincts, acts and tendencies which exalt or demean the character of the latter react upon the former. Every observer knows individuals who are not vicious—who are, in many respects, worthy of admiration—who are still bad citizens. This is because they are actuated by no considerations save their personal comfort and welfare; in their code of conduct the supreme law is self-interest; they recognize no serious obligation to uphold the system which gives them security and to serve the needs of society or their fellows. In a word, they are guided by circumstances instead of by fixed principles, by solicitude for their own well-being instead of by concern for the institutions from which they benefit. They are the individual

exponents of that elevating party platform, "Safety First." No more admirable, surely, would be the nation which inscribed this motto upon its banners. Such an act might temporarily appeal to the self-centered and the short-sighted; it might create a specious appearance of regard for national interests. But it would be an appalling confession of moral obliquity and cowardice. Those who advocate it are the most impassioned eulogists of America's greatness, her magnificent achievements, her nobility of character. Yet if this had been the ideal of the nation's builders, how meager would be the accomplishments for these orators to celebrate!

Fame has reserved no laurels, history no pages, for the devotees of "Safety First." Such a doctrine would have paralyzed progress, enervated humanity, kept the world in the shuttered places of ignorance and sloth. We need not explore the remote regions of antiquity for our examples—let us apply the test to the figures and the times concerned with the creation and upbuilding of this republic. If Columbus had fixed his gaze upon such a motto, instead of upon the mystery-hidden horizon, he would never have braved the wastes of the Atlantic with his tiny caravels nor given to the skeptic world a new continent. Was it "Safety First" that inspired the Pilgrim Fathers to defy a relentless autocracy for the sake of principle—to abandon homes and friends and tranquillity and face the perils of an inhospitable wilderness? The rebels against kingly tyranny and political enslavement in 1776 knew that their action menaced them with ostracism, ruin and death. Every instinct toward personal comfort and security suggested that they compromise with injustice, and leave it to posterity to meet the issue. But the ideal of "liberty first" burned in their breasts, and they sacrificed safety,

prosperity, life itself, to the establishment of a principle whose beneficent sway unnumbered generations were to enjoy.

There came a time when economic pressure and the human spirit of adventure sent the pioneers on their hazardous quests. If they had timidly weighed the dangers of the work, if there had not been men of hardy courage and penetrating vision to answer the challenge of the unknown, the frontier of the nation would never have been pushed westward. But achievement, not safety, was the star they followed, and by their skill and address and indomitable will they conquered for us a continental empire. Of all the figures in American history, the greatest and the noblest is that of Abraham Lincoln. The things he wrought and suffered, the defeats he survived and the triumphs he won—these have furnished inexhaustible themes for the contemplation and panegyric of his countrymen. No leader of a nation ever faced problems more threatening or was subjected to more desperate pressure in behalf of purchasing safety at the price of principle. He remains for all time the human symbol of national security and righteousness, because to his great soul safety was not first; because he held the preservation of democracy to be worth any sacrifice; because he would not abandon the rights of humanity to avert even those dreadful ordeals which he well knew would be the alternative.

One might traverse every field of human endeavor and find instances of this kind—the business man whose courage develops new and helpful methods of economic progress; the inventor whose daring gives to humanity dominion of the air and of the destructive forces of nature; the scientist who braves even death to prove a theory that will provide a defense against disease. Nay, one might consider the fact that Christianity

itself, the greatest force in civilization, was born not of compromise, but of a spirit of audacious revolt against implacable wrong, and that it was bequeathed to us by a great company of martyrs, among them its Founder, who chose service above safety and scorned to prosper at the cost of principle. The whole story of the race teaches us that the doctrine of "Safety First," whether for an individual or a nation, is a doctrine of degeneracy. If safety be the ultimate goal of man's endeavor, there is an end of justice, progress, righteousness, idealism. It is the negation of his highest impulses, a blight upon his very soul.

This would be sufficient condemnation even if the doctrine were effective in the purpose which it proclaims. But all history shows that therein its failure is infallible. The nation which brands itself with the stigma of seeking safety first—of preferring prosperity to honor and of rejecting duty for the sake of ease—is as false to itself as to humanity. Such a policy not only debases character; it inflames those whom it seeks to conciliate. The nation which exalts a desire for safety as its guiding principle pleads a moral bankruptcy to which its material well-being is an added offense. It awakens contempt, invites humiliation and courts the very destruction which it has bartered its soul to avert.

VERDUN AND ITS COST

March 14, 1916.

THE battle of Blenheim, which broke the power of Louis XIV, lasted hardly half a day. The American revolution was won at Saratoga in a few hours. At Waterloo Napoleon ordered the first assault at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and before night fell he was in flight to abdication and exile. Gettysburg, which settled the fate of this republic, was fought to a decision in parts of three days. The battle around Verdun began on the morning of February 21, and after three weeks its titanic clamors have not ceased. In the size of the forces engaged this will rank with the greatest struggles of history, and in the extent of the destructive forces loosed it exceeds all others. Yet it will not be known as one of the decisive battles of the world. It has revealed anew the almost superhuman valor that inspires the Germans and the French; it has shattered some confident theories of military experts, and it has littered the riven soil of a wide region with corpses. But it has not given victory to the side which won ground nor inflicted defeat upon that which lost it. All the carnage and heroism and hellish fury of unparalleled conflict leave unsolved the dreadful problem that confronts Europe and civilization.

It is not surprising that the mind of the untrained observer becomes confused in trying to search out the meaning and measure the effects of this appalling encounter, for experts themselves do not agree. Some of

them hold that the fall of Verdun would mark the crumbling of the French defense and would be the prelude for an irresistible onslaught toward Paris. Others count the French retreat, considering the losses of the assailants, as a virtual triumph, and marvel that any one should imagine the stronghold important or its capture worth the sacrifice required. The German staff has exhibited profound sagacity or insane folly and recklessness, according to the predilections of this or that writer. And the official reports, with their conflicting claims, are hardly more illuminating. It is possible, however, to understand some of the simpler factors and results from a study of known conditions. The first fact to be grasped is that Verdun, in a military sense, is not a single fort, but a whole fortified district. The town lies in the valley of the Meuse, flanked on the side of the enemy by ranges of hills, and was encircled by twenty forts and unnumbered trenches, entanglements, gun emplacements and all the elaborate works which modern military engineering could devise.

Here, in an area twenty or twenty-five miles wide and from two to five miles deep, nearly three-quarters of a million men have been battling for three weeks. The cannon employed number in the thousands. In the first four days, it is estimated, 2,000,000 big shells were fired; the roar of the guns could be heard at Marburg, 188 miles from the scene. The Germans say they have taken more than 20,000 prisoners; they declare they have put out of action not fewer than 100,000 French, while their own losses in killed alone, their opponents say, have been as many. Of the horrors of that vast battlefield no one except the survivors can have any conception. Before each assault the Germans poured upon the chosen ground a ceaseless cataract of huge shells that literally churned up the earth, the trenches,

the entanglements. Woods of great trees were leveled by the fire as grain falls before the scythe; massive structures of granite and steel and concrete were reduced to fragments; the tops of hills were blown off; streams were dammed and turned from their courses. On one section of the works measuring 300 by 150 feet 1000 devastating missiles fell between daybreak and noon. With equal fury the French guns battered at the German positions. And then, at intervals, came the infantry attacks. The German hosts advanced over the shaking earth wave on wave, "like a great gray carpet unrolling"; as one broke and melted under the murderous fire of the French guns another swept over it, and then another, until by sheer weight of human flesh the defensive line was pressed back. There were scores of assaults and counter-assaults desperate enough to make any battle memorable. Shattered forts and ruined villages were taken and retaken again and again. Prisoners could only babble of the terrors which they had endured in the furious bayonet charges, of masked men struggling amid the fumes of poisonous gases, of hordes of creatures armed with machines shooting jets of flaming oil. Visualized even feebly in the meager dispatches, the spectacle is one that almost dazes the mind by its misery. What inspired this frightful and inconclusive combat? The German staff declares calmly that it is satisfied with the results and the prospects. But upon what strange system of estimating values do they count it worth while to sacrifice 100,000 men to advance a half dozen miles?

The military expert, if he does not make it all clear to the lay mind, clears away some misconceptions. The one thing sure about a great movement of this kind, he says, is that the advantage to be gained and the price to be paid are worked out in advance with mathematical

exactitude. For a certain desired end a certain number of lives would not be too much to give. This being settled, the rest is a matter of preparation and action, according to scientific rules. Thus the German staff, writes an editor of the Army and Navy Journal, would estimate that "the winning of a hill south of Ypres might be worth 1000 men; an improved position on the Somme cheap at 2000; a farm stronghold not too dear at 5000; Verdun a bargain at 300,000." This writer explains that its capture, aside from the moral effect, would threaten to sever the French line at a vital point and drive a wedge between the southern French armies and the British. If it cost 300,000 men, to these great returns might be added the elimination of at least half as many French soldiers. And, in addition, the straightening of the German line by the crushing in of the advanced semicircle would reduce it by fifteen miles, releasing for other sections 175,000 German troops.

There is no doubt that arithmetical calculations of this kind helped to dictate the stupendous operation, but the reasons given do not seem sufficient. Verdun has confronted the Germans for eighteen months, and the strategic value of its capture would have been higher a year ago than now. Yet the invaders postponed their final effort until their forces had been reduced by a year and a half of desperate fighting and until the French had perfected defenses which infinitely increased the cost. Something more compelling than a conjectural military opportunity must be behind this gigantic thrust at the strongest section of the line between the North sea and the Swiss frontier. The French declare that it is a sign of desperation. "The kaiser seeks a definite victory," writes Senator Humber. "Time presses. Either Germany slays France or she falls—this is the alternative."

Making allowances for natural prejudice, this opinion is plausible, at least in its implication of a relentless determination to achieve victory at any cost. Germany is besieged; the implacable pressure of her foes is slowly strangling her; she knows full well that the implacable program of her encircling enemies is to wear down her resistance, to keep her armies ceaselessly employed and at the same time squeeze the strength out of her by economic envelopment. She cannot afford to let them choose the time for thrusting at her heart; to retain the initiative, to practice audacity in attack, to strike with all her strength and fury—these are her only hopes. As between waiting for her antagonists to fall upon her with all their hoarded forces of men and munitions and seeking a decision before her own strength failed, her choice was plain. Maximilian Harden recently made clear the desperate dilemma:

Germany has heaped victory on victory. Upon her, therefore, devolves the duty of making an offer of peace. It would be proof of her strength, not weakness. She must propose peace because she is in need of it. Victorious in the field, internally she is beset with difficulties. If she waits much longer, she will find herself reduced to obeying the will of her enemies.

Verdun might fall, but behind it Germany would find resistance as desperate. This is the tragic paradox that confronts her—she can win battles and campaigns, but she cannot command the peace she craves.

THE COMING SEA BATTLE

March 17, 1916.

FRENCH writers who have described the German campaign against Verdun as "a last, desperate gambler's throw" would not, upon reflection, insist upon the comparison. Germany has still another cast to make. She has her fleet, and on a day not far distant, it is to be expected, she will hurl that mighty javelin of power at her enemies. For nearly twenty months, except for minor expeditions, the great gray ships that were built "to put the sea trident in the kaiser's fist" have lurked behind the guns of Heligoland or in the inglorious security of the Kiel canal. No one imagines that this inaction has been due to lack of valor. The fleet has been held in reserve to administer the death stroke to enemies reeling from the blows of Teuton armies—or else to be used in a final effort to win the decision which arduous land campaigns have not been able to command.

A battle in the North sea is now confidently expected. Any day may see the most tremendous naval conflict in history—a clash so titanic that it will provide a fitting climax to the world war. England awaits it; Germany is ready for it. And recent activities show that what may be the final grip of the two great antagonists is not long to be delayed. A week ago Rotterdam fishermen sighted through the mists a German flotilla of fifty warships. There were dreadnoughts, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and above them hovered

two monster airships, searching the horizon for the smoke of the enemy. This is not the first demonstration of the kind, but it is not likely to be often repeated. The North sea is comparatively a small area—an irregular space, roughly, 400 miles square. Vast shallows that skirt the coasts of England, France, Belgium, Holland and Germany greatly reduce the extent navigable by big modern fighting ships. With darting aircraft on scout duty, making their reports by wireless, it is needless for hostile forces to waste much time in searching for each other. When both sides make up their minds to accept the ordeal of sea battle the collision will come swiftly. A war fleet that once frankly takes to the open will not be able to elude a willing opponent in those waters for more than forty-eight hours. Why, then, have these naval forces not long ago met? The explanation is simple; neither Great Britain nor Germany—during the last year, at least—has considered a big naval encounter desirable, for reasons easily to be understood.

Britain's naval strategy in this war has been based, of course, upon the fundamental fact that her very life depends upon maintaining overwhelming domination of the sea. At first she sent squadrons of her secondary fighting craft on patrol of German waters, and had the satisfaction of winning a skirmish off Heligoland. But when three of her big cruisers fell victim to a single submarine she learned wisdom, and has used her sea power almost wholly in guarding her communications and exerting the silent pressure of a blockade. A direct attack upon Germany by sea is impossible—her coast is protected by interminable shoals, among which strange warships dare not venture, while the great sea fortress of Heligoland provides a secure shelter for the kaiser's craft and bars the way to his naval bases on the main-

land. For a year, therefore, the British fleet, from its hidden lair, has been conducting that "invisible invasion" which is more deadly to Germany than the most spectacular bombardments. The policy of the Allies is to strangle her, to compress the forces of her life with such relentless power that she must in desperation exhaust herself by furious attacks, as in Russia, in Serbia and now at Verdun. Thus Russia has kept her Baltic fleet in reserve, while using her Black sea forces to harass the Turks. England's task, having cleared the seas of German ships of war and commerce, is to keep shut and barred the gates of the North sea, while a consolidation of British, French and Italian naval strength imprisons the Austrian fleet and guards the crowded transport routes of the Mediterranean.

German naval policy, on the other hand, has been dictated by two factors; first, the comparative weakness of her fleet, and, second, the necessity of keeping control of the Baltic, both to insure her supplies from Scandinavia and to prevent activity by the Russian fleet, which might otherwise cover an expedition striking in the rear of the Teutons' eastern line. No living person knows the exact condition of both the British and German naval forces now, but it is unlikely that the preponderance in England's favor has decreased since the war began. At that time she had sixty battleships to Germany's thirty-three; twelve battle cruisers to Germany's nine; fifty-four light cruisers to twenty-four; 184 destroyers to 170. Her losses about balance those of her opponent. The fighting craft of Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan—without Italy—then had a combined tonnage of more than 5,000,000, against 1,600,000 for Germany and Austria. For nineteen months the two great opponents have strained every nerve to build up their naval forces. Mr. Balfour an-

nounced a few days ago that in that period Great Britain had added no less than 1,000,000 tons to her battle fleet and had doubled the number of men at sea. Germany, with no hope of overtaking her rival, certainly has exerted herself to the limit of her power. And she will use the weapon she has forged not only because she must, but because to her a victory on land would be empty and defeat dishonor if she had not struck with her fleet, even against hopeless odds. More than a year ago Grand Admiral von Koester frankly explained the policy of caution which Germany's enemies have derided, but which was sound and necessary. He said:

We know that a sea battle means death or victory and that a destroyed fleet cannot be replaced in the course of the war, even if it lasts for years. We must, therefore, under all conditions, be cautious in our procedure. What would be the situation if in battle tomorrow each one of our ships took a hostile ship to the bottom with it, and perhaps some others? Then we should be without a fleet, and England could proceed gradually in her attack against our coasts. Our fleet must protect us, and may accept battle only when it can reckon on victory.

The torpedoing of the Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue within a single hour filled the empire with the hope that the Von Tirpitz policy of "whittling down" the British fleet would soon make a general engagement on hopeful terms possible. But that exploit could not be repeated, and when the German squadrons do steam out from their shelter it will be to meet desperate odds. This will not deter them, for the kaiser's seamen are as courageous and efficient as his soldiers. But, aside from this, the adventure is imperative. Russia's thrust in Asia Minor has shattered the project for an eastern campaign; the French line remains unbroken even by the inhuman battering it has received at Verdun, and the suffocating pressure of the blockade is becoming

unendurable. A decision must be sought at sea. A Rotterdam correspondent vividly outlined the condition the other day:

Without acting on the theory that if she loses the war Germany will lose her fleet, German statesmen take the view that if the fleet is lost its destruction must first cause the enemy enormous sacrifices. "No German ship shall surrender," is the unwritten order. But they will not send their ships to destruction merely to save themselves the humiliation of seeing them towed out of the Kiel canal. The naval staff is about to challenge Great Britain's sea supremacy, because they think they can deal it a severe if not a deadly blow.

Predictions as to the result of the impending struggle would be of slight value, because no one knows accurately the factors in the problem. The British are supremely confident. "If the fleets of this country," said Mr. Balfour, "are insufficient to secure safety, then in the whole history of Great Britain they have never been." Yet the answered warning of his predecessor at the head of the admiralty, Winston Spencer Churchill, was sound in substance:

That the Germany navy is remaining idle without supreme effort for its development is unthinkable. We should assume that Germany has completed her program. The submarine menace may present new and grave dangers. A negative strategic policy, or a program of pure passivity, such as that of 1915, may lead to disaster.

In courage and audacity the antagonists are evenly matched, and by all the logic of mathematics victory should rest with the more powerful fleet. But who can foretell the result when overmastering dominion of the sea faces a foe whose legions command the deeps and give battle from the clouds? The one thing that seems sure is that the curtain will not fall upon the world tragedy of the war until this scene of unimaginable destruction has been enacted, in a place no man yet knows, "somewhere in the North sea."

HAVE WE KEPT THE FAITH?

March 22, 1916.

WE READ the other day a four-column political speech by a distinguished member of the United States senate. It was an adroit and scholarly presentation of partisan issues, and on this account alone repaid a discriminating perusal. But there was just one sentence which made the reading really worth while. "The question that will be asked us," said the speaker, "will not be, 'Have you kept the peace?' but, 'Have you kept the faith?'" It is obviously unwise to accept every well-turned phrase as a statement of fact or a sound declaration of principle; the facility of President Wilson in this exercise might well make one cautious. But in the expression we have quoted there is a convincing substance of logic. America is at the cross-roads of decision. Her spirit and her institutions are on trial; she is to reveal the thought that is in her, the value of her ideals and the depth of her devotion to them. What is the heart of her purpose? To live tranquilly or worthily? To avoid difficulty or promote justice? To keep the peace or keep the faith? Above all other nations in the world, this is the custodian of the hopes of man. It was born of a supreme endeavor to establish a new and better order of life. Its founders had vision, courage, an exacting sense of duty, a lofty conception of the needs of their time and of the future. They and those who came after them created for us and for mankind an ideal which might well inspire any effort, justify any sacrifice.

What is this faith which the makers of America committed to the care of posterity—the faith which has expanded with the years in clearer truth and more compelling grandeur? Some of it was declared from the old state house, and made good at Lexington and Valley Forge and Yorktown—the doctrine of the rights of man, of democracy, of law and liberty, the inspiration of the greatest and noblest experiment in human history. Some of it was written in blood on the battlefields of civil war. Some of it lies imbedded in the words and acts of the leaders who in times of stress spoke the high resolve of free America to exact the just treatment which she practiced, to denounce wrong and resist aggression. It is that faith which stands for justice among men and among nations, for the maintenance of rights and the preservation of law. But it is not to be defined in words. Let the American who would know the meaning of the trust he has inherited turn to the records of his country's history. He will find that the doctrine which was to become Americanism had its very birth in strife, was nurtured by sacrifice and invigorated by uncompromising assertion; that again and again it was challenged, often by overwhelming force, yet always there was a voice to give it commanding utterance and a national spirit to guarantee its enforcement. Seldom was the purpose without the opposition of the selfish and the faint-hearted. There were those in 1776 to whom the summit of ambition and the whole duty of patriotism was to keep the peace; but America lives because there were more who were willing to risk their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor to keep the faith. Thomas Jefferson spoke with more ringing clearness, perhaps, than any other American, the mind of this nation, as when, in the face of European threats and cajolements, he declared, "We owe gratitude to France,

justice to England, good will to all and subservience to none"; or when he wrote, as though foreseeing events a century away:

That the persons of our citizens shall be safe in freely traversing the ocean; that the transportation of our own produce, in our own vessels, to the market of our choice, and the return to us of the articles we want for our own use, shall be unmolested, I hold to be fundamental, and the gauntlet must be forever hurled at him who questions it.

So, too, did John Adams keep the faith in a stormy time, when in a message to congress he gave notice to aggressive nations:

In demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. An efficient preparation for war can alone secure peace.

When an American commissioner to France was told by Talleyrand he might choose between war and the paying of a bribe, he answered instantly, "War be it, then; millions for defense, sir, but not one cent for tribute!" And this answer, of the very essence of the faith then new and friendless in the world, was not the least of the influences that averted a conflict between the two republics. A hundred years ago, when the interests of the United States, as now, were battered about by contending European Powers, it would have been possible for the American government to "keep the peace" by surrendering its rights or modifying their assertion. But it chose, rather, to "keep the faith," even at heavy cost; and out of the wreck of law it saved principles which withstood a century of war. John Calhoun then stated the issue in memorable terms:

Which shall we do, abandon or defend our commercial and maritime rights and the personal liberties of our citizens? Which alternative this house ought to sustain is not

for me to say. It is not for the human tongue to instill the sense of independence and honor. This is the work of nature—a generous nature that disdains tame submission to wrongs.

And Henry Clay, equally true to the traditions of his country, demanded: "When did submission to one wrong induce an adversary to cease his encroachments upon the party submitting?" James Monroe might have found many policies less provocative than that which bears his name; but he is a great figure in American history because he reaffirmed and strengthened the position of the republic. He discerned something more vital than keeping the peace; yet no man can say how much of this country's tranquillity it has owed to his declaration:

The American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers. * * * We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

It was this same president who, when an issue arose abroad between right and wrong, between liberty and oppression, was so little "neutral in thought" that he dared to address congress upon the heroic struggle of Greece for independence and to express the hope that Turkish tyranny would be extinguished. Daniel Webster, too, was an American who counted the keeping of the faith a greater thing than the avoidance of controversy. He said:

We stand as an equal among nations, claiming the full benefit of established international law; and it is our duty to oppose from the earliest to the latest moment any innovation upon that code which shall bring into doubt or question our own equal and independent rights.

Half a century ago the imperious alternative confronted the American people once more. Should they

compromise with injustice for the sake of averting a terrible conflict—should they keep the peace or keep the faith? Happily for the nation and for humanity, the man who guided the destinies of the republic founded his judgment upon the rock of principle. From Abraham Lincoln there could be but one answer. Through four years of agony he stood immovable for the faith committed to him; and to that great decision, the most terrible a leader was ever called upon to make, we owe all we have and are.

Keeping the faith! That way lies the straightest road to immortality and the surest path to peace. Most of the things that Grover Cleveland did and said are but vaguely remembered, but his countrymen will never forget that he interposed in behalf of a weak nation and of Americanism against the aggressive designs of a Tory English government. It is the habit of small minds to characterize Theodore Roosevelt as a leader who is dangerous because he threatens peace. Yet during his term as president there was not one hour when this country was in peril of war, for the reason that there was not one hour when it failed to exact respect. The tributes which history will pay to this man may all be summed up in the words, "He kept the faith"; and it is this record of undeviating fidelity which makes him today the one private citizen in the world who commands universal confidence and admiration.

The third great crisis of the country's history is now upon us, and many earnest souls take profound comfort in the conviction that we have met it well. We are still apart from the war; we are prosperous and contented and not without virtue, for we have "kept the peace." But the inexorable question remains—have we kept the faith? Have we sacrificed righteousness to peace, justice to self-interest? Have we been true to

the principles upon which this nation was founded and the obligations we owe to humanity? Have we been the resolute champions of democracy, the faithful guardians of international law, without the help of which world peace can never be established nor civilization endure? Yes, we have kept the peace. But let us hope that impartial history will not be moved to indorse the startling judgment of an American writer of today:

If one has heard it once, one has heard it a thousand times, that President Wilson has deserved well of the republic because "he has kept the nation out of war." And those who say this do not for a moment suspect how ignoble a view it is. Liberty and justice will be preserved to mankind—by the victory of the Allies; therefore, let us be thankful that our own skins are safe! * * *

It is true that we succor the wounded and help the suffering. It is true that we provide supplies and munitions of war. But, in the last analysis, this is what women are doing in France and England—not what is being done by men. In the greatest fight for liberty the world has ever seen the world's greatest republic, the vast nation founded on declarations of liberty, is playing the part not of the warrior, but of the squaw.

A GLIMPSE OF PACIFISM

March 31, 1916.

FEW Americans of the normal sort, we find, have a clear realization of the meaning and implication of the doctrine known as pacifism. They think of it vaguely as a kind of patriotism—mistaken, perhaps, but sincere, humane and admirably idealistic. The very word has a plausible sound of virtue in it. Opposed to such terms as militarism and war, for example, it suggests order, tranquillity, the enthronement of wisdom and the subjugation of brute force by moral power and the higher instincts of man. These conceptions are quite inaccurate. Pacifism in different manifestations and with different exponents has divergent meanings. But in all its aspects it is hopelessly unsound and essentially vicious. It is at enmity not alone with loyalty and patriotism and the ideals of this republic, but with justice itself. Assuming to represent reason, it invokes folly and confusion. Exploited as the one force that can eradicate war, it is a serious obstacle to that achievement; for it is the one thing in this world that tends to make peace unattractive and could conceivably make it revolting. We have already discussed the strange philosophy as expounded by noted advocates—Mr. Bryan, Mr. Carnegie, Dr. David Starr Jordan, Mr. Ford and others. Today we present the conception of a typical adherent to the cult. That we cite a private person, in no way concerned with the propaganda, does not mean that the example is unimportant. On the con-

trary, we consider it of the highest significance, because this witness is a representative of part of the public opinion which in the end guides the course of the nation.

This person is a woman, educated, refined, intelligent, interested in charity and other good works, a devoted wife and mother, unspoiled by wealth and untainted by the shallow cynicism of the society in which she moves. Connected by birth and marriage with Philadelphia families of distinction, she considers herself, and is, a well-bred, conscientious American. A convinced and enthusiastic pacifist, she was led, at a social gathering the other night, to assert and defend her opinions. She declared with such uncompromising vigor against war for any cause, against armament, against defensive preparedness, even against resistance to aggression, that an astonished listener thought to startle her by exhibiting her theories confronted by conceivable facts. Suppose, he said, that a foreign Power—Germany, for example—should be impelled to seek deliberately or in an unjust quarrel the conquest of the United States; suppose that the kaiser and his invading forces should effect a landing and threaten to place the American government and its people in subjection to the empire—what would be the attitude of this American woman? Would she still be for “peace at any price”? Would she hold that resistance to such incredible wrong was as unjustifiable as the prosecution of an aggressive war? Without hesitation and with a heightened color which showed deep and sincere feeling, she made this remarkable answer:

I should hope and pray for peace. You know that I have three sons. They are more to me than life itself. But I would turn them over to the kaiser gladly, proudly, rather than that they should degrade themselves and help to debase humanity by taking part in the supreme iniquity and folly

of war. They might be Germanized, but they would not be dehumanized, and our country would by so much, at least, be saved from shame.

Before the reactions from the European war had become manifest we could not have conceived that such monstrous sentiments could emanate from any human being of sound faculties, least of all from an American man or woman. We were familiar with the principles of pacifism in the abstract, and were, indeed, not unsympathetic with some of its aspirations. But the storm that burst upon the world revealed to every intelligent observer that humanity, in so far as it trusted to the theories of pacifism, was living in a fool's paradise. When events proved that law and justice were not sufficient protection for the weak against the strong; when all the endeavors of conciliation were futile; when innocence and honor and established rights were trampled down by brute force; when even peace societies and the great international organization of Socialism, which is devoted to the ideal of world concord, found themselves compelled to recognize conditions as they were—when these things revealed the truth to which so many of us had been hopefully blind, we supposed that the visionary propaganda of pacifism would dwindle and disappear. Thus it was with a profound shock that we heard the same high-strung and repellent sentiments reiterated a full six months after the war began, and by an exceptionally brilliant American woman, foremost in activities worthy of the best traditions of a democratic nation.

She declared—we heard this personally—that the United States should forthwith dismantle its navy, in proof to the world of its peaceful intentions. But, supposing that sublime act of virtue should not be effective and a ruthless invader should come—what then? The American flag, she answered calmly, should be pulled

down; the government, if summoned to do so, should surrender its sovereignty; the country, rather than defile humanity by forcible resistance, should submit to be made a dependency of the foreign Power. The immediate experience, she admitted, might be painful; but this was unimportant in comparison with the great opportunity to serve the race. For if the American people voluntarily gave to mankind that supreme manifestation of self-surrender, the example would infallibly hasten universal peace. America, she declared, was fitted to be the greatest exponent of Christian nationhood; and it could not more sublimely carry out the work of the Master than following Him in vicarious sacrifice for humanity.

But suppose, it was suggested, that the invader should be the representative of a religion at absolute war with Christianity; suppose, for example, that the emperor of Japan or the chief of all Islam sent armed hosts here to extinguish the heresies of the Galilean and plant the banners of Buddhism or Mohammedanism amid the ruins of our Christian civilization? Unmoved, she replied that the obligation would be the same; the Founder of Christianity had in a like crisis delivered Himself to death for the sake of principle, and America's duty would be plain. This nation, she insisted, would best serve its faith by deserting it at the demand of its enemies, would spread the influence of democracy and peace by submitting to the imposition of autocracy and militarism. This conversation was for us a saddening but enlightening experience; it prepared us for the knowledge that this perverted doctrine has its devotees among Americans who in all other respects are capable of connected and rational thought. Thus we were not greatly shocked by hearing of the sentiments expressed by the Philadelphia woman we mentioned in the begin-

ning. It would be unjust, of course, to charge them to feebleness of intellect or willful treason to this government and its institutions. They can be understood only by an inductive study of the mental processes which gave them utterance.

This woman thrills at the thought of surrendering her cherished sons to the invader. One can only imagine the picture which dazzles her, but it must be something like this: A staff officer of his majesty appears at her home and in stern but ceremonious terms demands her boys for the imperial service. He would, of course, regard them with all her admiration; they would be taken from her, but it would be to become part of the new imperial system, to rise to stations for which they are fitted by birth, breeding and education. A grievous fate, but not insupportable! Observe how the pacifist mind shuts itself against the actualities of existence, the ugly facts of the time. If an autocratic invader had the power to command those three young men, is it to be believed that they would be reserved for positions of honor? Nothing is more certain than that the sons of such a mother, delivered on such terms, would be fortunate if they were permitted to become the humblest atoms in that system of militarism which she abhors—if they were not put to digging trenches or paring potatoes in a camp kitchen, as examples alike to the conquerors and the conquered. Are we employing extravagances to fashion an argument? Why, we have not begun to penetrate the folly which envelops such fantastic theories. This woman seriously imagines that she and thousands of sincere, devoted peace-lovers like her would merely have to await, in mental and domestic tranquillity, the opportunity to prove their faith and earn the gratitude of mankind by betraying their country and its institutions to its enemies.

Contemplating the ecstasy of suffering, in a not unpleasant way, for principle, facts have no meaning for her, the implacable sequence of events in such a crisis does not reach her understanding. She does not realize that long before the emissary of the kaiser could arrive upon his fancied errand she would probably be bereft of half her fortune and family; that all the comforts and refining influences of her gracious home would be clouded by terror and despair, and that those three boys, if they had not been driven to their duty by some uninherited urge of manhood and decency, would long before have been ignominiously dragged forth and sent, untrained and undisciplined, into the dreadful ordeal of a war invited by the very teachings which she now promotes.

Our observation is that in the ordinary activities and relationships of life pacifists of this possessed type are not abnormal; many of them are men and women of achievement and have a genuine feeling for democracy and humanity. But in respect to this passion they are impervious to facts; they live in a world of exalted and baseless visions; they pursue distorted ideals through a phantasmagoria of perverted sentiments. They conceive that the liberties and the rights painfully created through centuries of travail are not worth preserving at the cost of sacrifice; they imagine that strife is to be stilled by self-betrayal and wrong paralyzed by submission. And they seem incapable of realizing that at this moment they threaten the peace and the very existence of this nation more than do all the armies of a war-chastened autocracy.

THE TWO MONTHS' BATTLE

April 6, 1916.

THE non-military observer of war events has certain advantages over the trained expert. He has no preconceived notions to unlearn; he is not hampered by familiar acquaintance with the intricacies of strategy and tactics, and he has no reputation to maintain for scientific accuracy of prediction. When viewing such a great operation as the campaign around Verdun, therefore, he is not bound to explain the principles of attack and defense, nor to expound the errors of one side or the other, but may express his own judgment as he would upon any unfolding series of events in any normal department of life. Experts told us that the elaborately fortified region around Verdun was impregnable to assault, and we have seen the mighty defenses stormed one by one with relentless certainty. At each pause in the tremendous succession of battles they have announced that the climax had been passed and the struggle must subside; yet after nearly seven weeks the combat rages with unabated fury. Finally they said—most of them—that Verdun would never be taken. We do not know that it will. But if it is not in German possession before the end of this month, the logic of current events is strangely obscure.

This matter is of great interest and importance because it involves so many factors of military, economic and psychological significance. If the campaign against Verdun is, as French writers insist, an act of unbalanced

rage and despair, it spells ultimate defeat for Germany, whether she wins or loses it. In any case, it is a supreme test of her mastery of military science, of her resources in men, guns, munitions and supplies, of the fighting spirit of her soldiers and the endurance of her people. Let us inquire, in a modest, civilian way, what light the facts shed upon these questions. One must first examine the problem which the German staff confronted. The wavy line of the 400-mile battlefront which extends from the coast of Belgium to the Swiss frontier runs in a generally easterly direction from Rheims, curves northeastward around the Verdun region and then southward and eastward again. For reasons which we discussed three weeks ago, the German higher command determined to crush in this Verdun salient. The achievement would be a blow to French prestige; it would increase the extent of captured territory, giving an additional advantage in the peace negotiations; it would shorten the German line, thereby reducing the drain upon available men, and it would compel the French to withdraw from a wide district by cutting the communications between Paris and their southern armies.

The battle began on February 21; that is, the serious bombardment opened then, but the preliminaries had been under way for many weeks. To launch such a campaign with any prospect of success requires enormous preparations. Vast numbers of troops have to be concentrated; new railroad spurs built and rolling stock collected; thousands of cannon placed, in spite of the vigilance of enemy airmen; mountains of ammunition assembled within easy transportation distance; arrangements made for hurling troops into the front line and for removing the wounded to the rear. The chosen battlefield presented a problem that might appall the most resolute assailants. The line was, roughly, the

arc of a circle, twenty-five miles in length. Between that and Verdun lay a series of scattered hills, some bare, some wooded, with rolling plains between. But the entire surface, levels and declivities alike, was seamed with trenches, pits, entanglements and every ingenious obstruction known to the twentieth-century tactician. Each height was crowned by a fortress; each wood and depression concealed deadly batteries; mines were planted in every path by which the assailants might advance; there was not a square yard in all that region which was not a pitfall, to be raked at an instant's notice by hidden guns. The venture of an assault would have seemed to be madness itself. Yet that thing the Germans did. The story has become so familiar that daily actions which in another war would have been considered great battles are described in a few perfunctory phrases. Before each advance the guns, literally by thousands, pour upon the chosen spot a torrent of explosives which reduce earthworks, entanglements and trenches to utter chaos. Then the infantry, flung in headlong waves against the fire of the French artillery, storms the shattered defenses. At first the advances were by miles, but, naturally, the resistance became more formidable as the main obstructions were approached, and it was necessary for the assailants at each main point to pause from time to time to consolidate their positions, bring up reserves and move the batteries of gigantic guns to new emplacements. But the oft-predicted cessation of the conflict has not come, and the relentless progress of the besiegers indicates that there will be no permanent relaxing of the effort until Verdun itself is taken.

German strategy in this campaign turns upon the simple but costly expedient of enveloping the enemy. The arc of the line has been pressed against the foe, and

at the same time the two ends have begun to curve inward; one is to imagine the line taking the form of a colossal pair of ice tongs, the purpose of the Germans being to snap the points together, either capturing the inclosed forces or compelling them to evacuate the region occupied. Some experts have offered the opinion that progress has been too slow to indicate success. But the line has been carried forward from five to eight miles along almost the whole arc; one fortified place after another has been battered to pieces and stormed—Douaumont, Beaumont, Pepper Hill, Forges; now on the east, now on the west, now in the center, the remorseless guns and the following infantry have had their way; while the experts are complacently telling of the collapse of the movement, Melancourt falls, and the next day "impregnable" Vaux succumbs. A week ago part of Verdun itself was in flames from the rain of incendiary shells, and German batteries near Dead Man hill are within five miles of the railroad to Paris, the lifeline of the southeastern forces of the republic. In the face of these facts, it is frequently asserted that the campaign against Verdun is a "failure." When the gain is measured against the loss, that estimate may be justified; but, viewed as an isolated effort, the exact cost of which, no doubt, was calculated in advance, it apparently is moving steadily toward success. The strangest fallacy is the declaration that the project has failed because its achievement depended upon "surprise." Nothing could be more contrary to known facts. Every bit of available evidence points to a methodical purpose upon the part of the Germans to do just what they have done and in about the way they have done it. As to the supposed element of surprise, it would have been utterly impossible to conceal the vast preparations necessary for this enterprise; and the truth is that the French were

never better prepared. For many days prior to the first assault their air scouts had reported great troop movements which presaged the big drive. Military historians for generations will be drawing lessons from this titanic series of engagements, but there are at least three revelations which are plain even now. First is the proof that such a thing as an "impregnable" position no longer exists. The modern fortress, no matter how massively constructed, became obsolete on the day Liège fell, and, as a fact, the forts around Verdun have been subordinate in importance to the field works. If the French strategists and engineers, after eighteen months, could not construct defenses tenable under modern artillery fire, that feat is beyond human ingenuity. Another important disclosure is that all the plausible calculations about Germany's being "on the verge of exhaustion" must be revised. Innumerable times during the last few months the world has been informed that she had reached the limit of her effectives and that her supplies of ammunition were becoming meager; yet each of her capital moves seems more audacious and more vigorous than the one preceding it. Such demonstrations of power obviously cannot be repeated indefinitely; but it would be folly to believe that the last one has been made. Finally, it has been shown that up to this time the Germans still are the masters of their antagonists in military science, in efficiency, in equipment and in striking force.

When one considers the nature and extent of the Verdun fortifications, together with the skill and dauntless valor of the French defenders, the German achievement stands forth as the greatest feat of arms on such a scale ever accomplished. The British, despite their gallantry and endurance, would be incapable of such sustained fury of assault. And the fact that the French

could not withstand it, with all the advantage of elaborate defenses, indicates that it would be beyond their power also. This does not mean, of course, that the fall of Verdun would make Germany victorious in the war. It would be, as former Premier Clémenceau has said, a severe "moral check"; but one cannot read German triumph even in the brilliant record written in blood on that battle-scarred field. Behind Verdun have been created new defenses just as formidable. The line of the heroic French bends, but it does not break. If the war could have been won with soldiers and cannon alone, Germany would long ago have dictated the terms of peace. But in the midst of her almost spectacular assaults at Verdun the leaders of the Allies held a tranquil meeting in Paris and ratified in detail their agreed plan to strangle into submission the enemy they cannot slay. It seems not unlikely that some day soon Berlin will be decked with flags in celebration of the fall of the great French fortress, and that would be a victory memorable in the annals of military achievement. But though it might put fire in the hearts of the besieged people, it would not put bread in their mouths; it would not shatter the hostile squadrons that hold the gates of the sea; it would not ease the slow, suffocating pressure of economic imprisonment; it would not bring the peace without which Germany, this year or next or at some time, must sink to her knees.

GERMANY'S STRANGE TERMS

April 11, 1916.

A WAR picture familiar to most newspaper readers is a photograph of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German chancellor. He appears clad in an officer's uniform; his legs are incased in riding boots; a formidable sword hangs at his side, and his melancholy, scholarly face is surmounted by a spiked helmet. Von Hindenburg in a kimono would hardly look more incongruous than this learned doctor in the accoutrements of the battlefield. This strange apparition, however, has in it a serious suggestion. It is deemed necessary that the chancellor of Germany should be at least considered a soldier; a mere statesman could not adequately represent the power of the empire. As a fact, of the five holders of the office, Caprivi alone, we believe, was actually a soldier; but Bismarck and von Buelow were created generals in order that they might be fitted to guide the state; Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's military status is that of an officer of reserves. To the discriminating reader of the chancellor's speech on Wednesday these trivial facts will have a subtle significance. The utterance was a remarkable compound of vigor and feebleness, of violence and pleading, of vehement accusation and plaintive defense. At times his tones reverberated with true imperial thunder, and again they sank to sentimental appeal. Some passages were calculated to stir the pulses of the most enthusiastic militarist, while others would be likely to dampen the courage of the most conscientious civilian.

It is as a formal statement of Germany's war aims, however, that the address is notable. As distinctly as the battle of the Marne and the conquest of Servia were milestones in the progress of the war, it marks a new phase of German thought—open acceptance of the fact that the dazzling ideal of domination has been shattered and that the grim task of the nation is to save what it may from the devastation invoked by a policy of madness. In discussing the frequent ebullitions of peace sentiment in Germany we have always remarked that those suggestions were based, not upon a fear of defeat, but upon a consciousness of victory; government and people have impatiently desired peace only because they wanted to reap the rewards which they were confident they had earned. But in this speech appears evidence of a complete transformation, a fundamental change in conception. The statesman who a year ago, or six months ago, would have presented the empire's case as the chancellor now presents it would have sacrificed his career. Today there is hardly a murmur of dissent when he solemnly abjures the ambitions which sent the nation headlong toward disaster. What! he says, Germany make war for territory, for dominion, for world power? Monstrous calumny! She is but defending her altars and her firesides from impious invaders. "We wage this war," he cried a year ago, "in holy anger"; but now it is with regret, with anguish for the inevitable suffering, with astonishment that our enemies should be so barbarous as to prolong a struggle which they could end at any time by submission. Americans who have followed with attention the many expressions of Germany's terms of peace, some of them put forth anonymously and some by leading publicists, will be struck by these extraordinary contrasts. "We fight for our existence," says the chancellor. "For Germany, and not

for space in a foreign country, are Germany's sons bleeding and dying. Every one among us knows this."

Since that is now the official view, it no doubt is universally held throughout the country. But the world cannot so readily forget the teachings of a generation. What becomes, then, of the "place in the sun" that was to be won by force of arms? Of the project of a far-reaching empire to replace systems of inferior Kultur? Of the demand that the trident of sea power should be "in our fist"? Of the proclaimed policy that "without the consent of Germany nothing must happen in any part of the world"? Of the doctrine that "it is necessary for the salvation of the world that it be Germanized"? Of the philosophy taught by Treitschke, upheld by the dominating classes of the empire and expounded in Belgium? Of the national ideal of "world power or downfall"? The discipline of public opinion in Germany is amazing, but surely it was never subjected to a more drastic test than in being directed to abandon all the ideas inculcated by years of rigorous training, and to conceive that Germany invaded Servia, Belgium, Luxemburg, Poland and France in order to defend her hearth and home. But the chancellor is faithful to one principle of the imperial cult—he would enter no negotiations which aimed at "destruction of Prussia's military power." In other words, he offers to discuss peace with the proviso that nothing be said about the very cause over which all Europe has been fighting for twenty months. Whatever influence commercial rivalries and jealousies may have had in stimulating the war spirit, German militarism has been for a generation, and is now, the overshadowing terror of the continent; and his suggestion is that nations which have seen that force carry out its ultimate threats of ruthlessness and devastation shall condone its crimes and sanctify its existence.

Two dire penalties, he declares, will be imposed for non-compliance. To a demand for the ending of militarism "only one answer would be left, and this answer our sword must give." Maximilian Harden has been more explicit. If Germany's proposals are refused, he said the other day, she "will have paid the last debt she owed to the world and to humanity, and can proceed to be more frightful than ever, with complete indifference to the views of neutrals." But after Louvain and the Lusitania, it is to be imagined, the threat of "the sword" can have no unforeseen terrors for Germany's antagonists, and is not likely to induce them to abandon the fundamental purpose of their grim resolve. The other penalty is moral disapprobation. "If our adversaries," says the chancellor, "want to continue the slaughter and devastation, theirs will be the guilt." The implication seems to be that the violation of Belgium was an act of virtue, the invasion of France a neighborly attention and the indiscriminate destruction of peaceful vessels a procedure of innocent routine. Guilt begins when Germany is sated with military successes and anxious to capitalize the products of her crimes. Up to that point slaughter and devastation are regrettable necessities; thereafter they are deplorable and indefensible. There is no doubt that some neutral sentiment will be swayed by the constant reiteration of the plea that Germany is generously willing to make peace, while her enemies, inspired by greed and savagery, deliberately "prolong the war." But it is difficult to see how this reasoning can greatly influence those who are battling against her. They recall that she found Servia guilty of trying to destroy Austria; Belgium guilty of resisting invasion; England guilty of fortifying Scarborough; the Lusitania guilty of carrying guns, and Americans guilty of traveling on that ship in defiance of imperial

orders. Her verdict is therefore not beyond appeal. And her adversaries are likely to survive any sense of guilt derived from the consciousness that they are fighting to regain ravaged territory, to preserve their existence and to free themselves from the intolerable burden of living armed against perpetual threats of aggression.

Viewed as a whole, the outline of Germany's terms will appeal to many persons as admirably moderate; the disavowal of schemes of conquest and of world domination is complete. But the weakness of the proposal is its date. If such a policy had been held in July, 1914, there would have been no war; Europe would be still "a land of peaceful labor"; Belgium would be free and tranquil; Germany herself, as of old, would be the world's teacher in science, in education and in industry, instead of a nation isolated by distrust and fear. No grimmer fate ever overtook a nation than the realization, which sounds in every sentence of the imperial chancellor, that the militarism to which it desperately clings has failed. In material things the foresight of militarism was superhuman; it counted cannon and men with minute accuracy, and planned every battle movement with scientific precision. But it was blind to forces more powerful than these. It could not discern that the mightiest armies, the most destructive engines of war, cannot slay an idea nor crush the soul of man.

The time has passed when militarism might be destroyed by reason or endured as a lesser evil than resistance. Either it will impose itself upon mankind by the force which it worships, or, having taken the sword, it shall perish with the sword.

REAL DUTCH COURAGE

April 14, 1916.

AFTER withstanding the shocks of twenty months of war, the non-belligerent world, naturally, was only mildly agitated by the drum-beats of martial preparation which recently sounded in Holland. There seemed to be an impression that one small nation more or less in the mighty conflict would not add greatly to its horrors nor tend to hasten the decision. Concern in Europe, nevertheless, was real. For geographical and strategical reasons, the participation of Holland upon either side would have an effect out of all proportion to the size and population of the country. It is as a study in neutrality, however, that the course of the Netherlands since August, 1914, should be enlightening and interesting to Americans. No nation has confronted more delicate or more dangerous problems, and none has maintained its poise and its rights more successfully under circumstances singularly trying. A year or so ago President Wilson was mysteriously moved to compliment his countrymen upon their "self-possession," as though their freedom from the war was a providential reward of virtue. If he had sought a genuine manifestation of this quality, he might have found it in Holland. A nation with only one-fourth the area of Pennsylvania and hardly three-fourths of this state's population, it is hemmed in on the north and west by the sea, with its threatening squadrons; on the east by the bristling bayonets of Prussia and on the south by Germanized and terrorized Belgium.

Fortunately for Holland, "military necessity" did not require a German invasion; otherwise Amsterdam and Rotterdam would assuredly have met the fate of Brussels and Antwerp. The German pledge to respect the neutrality of the Netherlands, given at the opening of the war, has been kept with scrupulous fidelity and fortified by many polite assurances. How much more Germany desired the friendship of the Dutch than their territory will appear from a glance at the map. The province of Limburg extends in a narrow strip southward between Belgium and the Rhenish provinces; for some distance it is less than ten miles wide, and has no strong defenses. Yet in their eager dash into Belgium the German armies were careful not to trespass upon this district, although by crossing it they could have dealt the Belgians a deadly flank blow. Despite this, the cautious Hollanders took no chances. When the war began they instantly mobilized their forces; not for one hour have they relaxed their vigilance, and they have added greatly to their military equipment. The capture of Antwerp, in October, 1914, showed vividly the value of these precautions. The great Belgian port, in which Napoleon saw "a dagger ever pointing at the heart of England," gave Germany an invaluable base for her naval operations—except for the fact that from a point ten or fifteen miles below that city the River Scheldt is Dutch, and no belligerent vessel might use that passage to or from the North Sea. With the fall of Antwerp, therefore, Holland found herself caught between the two great antagonists. England was in a tremor lest the Dutch should surrender control of the waterway under a threat of suffering Belgium's fate, and Germany was equally disturbed by the possibility that the menace of England's "sea tyranny" would force the Dutch to permit use of the river in the Allies' naval

operations. Holland's answer, in words and acts, was explicit. She gave notice to both sides that she knew precisely what her neutrality meant, and that she had about 500,000 soldiers ready to uphold that conception against any government which challenged it. From that time violation of the Dutch reaches of the Scheldt has not been seriously discussed. As a fact, Germany has found Holland infinitely more useful as a neutral neighbor than she would be as a subjugated victim. Dutch neutrality and independence are even more vital to Great Britain. To maintain her integrity, therefore, the little kingdom needed only a firm will to assert her rights and an efficient force to maintain them; and these she took occasion to develop.

It is curious to recall now the predictions, early in the war, that Holland was about to take part. In September, 1914, Germany was said to be strengthening the fortifications of her border cities, and emphasis was given to "the prevalent belief that Holland will join the Allies once the German retreat to their own territory has begun." What would have been the effect of that "retreat," which is still indefinitely postponed, no one can say; but, otherwise, there never was the slightest chance that Holland would let her sentiments, whatever they might be, overcome her determination to preserve peace at any cost, save her honor or the surrender of her rights. She knew that if she joined Germany she would be helplessly blockaded, and, worse than that, she would lose her chief treasures, her East Indian possessions, which have sixty times the area and seven times the population of the Netherlands and have produced nine-tenths of the country's prosperity. Lacking coal and iron and other natural resources, Holland has depended for her existence upon her maritime carrying trade and her fabulously rich colonies, and both of these

would be doomed the instant she declared for the central Powers. If she joined England and France, on the other hand, her territory would be overrun by Germany within a week, and she could hope for no more aid from her allies than they were able to give to Belgium or Servia.

Neutrality, armed, uncompromising and ceaselessly vigilant, was the obvious policy for Holland, and she has maintained it with signal success, although at heavy cost. Her trade, while greatly stimulated in some directions, has suffered inevitably in others; taxes have been increased from 10 to 20 per cent, and in the first year the war expenses of this peaceful nation reached the huge total of \$100,000,000. Of course, the Hollanders have sympathies. But, as a Berlin paper remarked the other day, "they have held their trade aloof from sympathies and antipathies alike." Before the war the people were naturally pro-Germans, by reason of association and from business instinct. Now, according to the editor of the *Amsterdam Telegraaf*, nine out of ten of them are for the Allies. The material reasons are obvious. Despite discontent with the operation of the blockade and British interference with her commerce, Holland realizes that she dare not risk her maritime trade and her precious colonies. Resentment against England over the South African war disappeared when the Boers declared for the empire. And the loss of several ships by German torpedo attacks has created deep bitterness against the promoters of "frightfulness." But, above all, Holland has witnessed the martyrdom of Belgium, and is profoundly sensible that a victorious Germany would mean the end of Dutch independence. The case was stated by a representative Hollander:

The real character of German domination comes out now. The repeated breaking of the word once given, the bullying of people who cannot defend themselves, the forcing against

all conventions of the inhabitants to work for the enemy, and now this dastardly execution of the nurse. * * * Feeling against England is growing bitter, while the Germans are obliging, businesslike and use abject flattery to win our favor. Yet I do hope and trust from the bottom of my heart that the Entente will win. This is the curious part of it, but it is because I believe in democracy, limited powers of sovereigns, responsible ministers, respect for individual freedom. If Germany, as it is now, should become predominant in Europe, then woe to it and to the whole world.

But it is the spirit of the nation, rather than its special judgment on the war, that is important. Most of us think of the Dutchman as a placid citizen in wooden shoes and baggy trousers, contented with an existence as flat as his country and as primitive as his windmills. As a fact, he is aggressive in business, independent in politics, a daring and efficient seaman and a great colonizer, and his flag is respected in every corner of the world. Moreover, he has traditions as proud as any of his great neighbors—of a sea power that humbled even England's might, of the desperate heroism that broke Spanish tyranny, of statesmen and soldiers whose names shine in history, of the only foreign guns that ever sounded in the Thames. This is the spirit that has made the great belligerents so solicitous of Holland's rights and that made her recent demonstration of force so impressive. Because she has been resolute, prepared and unafraid, her integrity has been respected and her favor courted by nations which, had she been submissive or defenseless, would long ago have ground her to powder.

SOWING THE WIND

April 25, 1916.

ONLY inveterate students of the war news gave more than casual attention to this recent dispatch:

BERLIN, April 8.—Negotiations between Rumania and the Central Powers concerning the sale of manufactured goods by the Central Powers to Rumania are nearing completion. The negotiations resulted from the sale of Rumanian corn, flour and vegetables to the Central Powers in March.

On its face, this indicated another Balkan diplomatic victory for Germany and a refutation of the threadbare predictions about Rumania's "imminent" intervention on behalf of the Entente; and the addition of 40,000 carloads of foodstuffs to the supplies of the beleaguered nations has also a military significance. But the real importance of the incident lies deeper. In re-establishing commercial relations with Rumania, Germany has once more seized the initiative in the face of her enemies' united purpose. With characteristic audacity, she has struck the first blow in the greater war that will begin on the day the present conflict ends—the war for economic ascendancy, for trade domination. Rumania seems likely to become one of the Central European group of nations, against which the encircling Allies are preparing to declare a lasting siege.

This project will take shape at a conference in Paris, the participants being delegates to the Interparliamentary Committee of the Entente Allies. The declared purpose will be to "discuss mutual interchange of com-

modities (after the war) under a tariff system favorable to the allied nations." The historic conference of the leaders of these countries, held three weeks ago, not only arranged for unity of action in military and diplomatic affairs, but made this formal declaration:

The allied governments decide to put into practice in the economic domain their solidarity of views and interests. They charge the economic conference, which will be held shortly in Paris, to propose to them measures adapted to realize this solidarity.

In plain terms, this denotes a purpose to make the present alliance lasting and to inaugurate a policy of relentless commercial antagonism toward Germany and her associated Powers. It means that if the tremendous project should be carried out upon the lines proposed Europe will be divided into two groups for a war that may last for decades, in which the weapons will be tariffs and commercial treaties and boycotts instead of howitzers and submarines, and in which the prize will be the commercial dominion of the world. That the nations involved in the present struggle have striven with all their energy to capture trade from embarrassed enemies does not imply hypocrisy in their protestations that they went to war for "humanity" or "civilization." Great Britain is spending \$25,000,000 a day, France and Germany \$15,000,000 each; and for them to utilize every advantage they possess, in order to extend their commercial activities, is not only legitimate, but absolutely vital to their continuance in the conflict. Shallow critics sneer that England has forgotten her boasted idealism and is fighting merely to cripple Germany as a trading nation and to seize her markets. But in war, trade is an invaluable weapon both for offense and defense; and it can hardly be considered more odious to capture an enemy's market than it is to bombard his cities. The

policy becomes of grave international concern, however, when it is proposed to extend it indefinitely. The aim is to form a coalition to wage implacable economic war against the Teutonic Powers in order that they may be weakened beyond the possibility of again becoming a military menace.

It was natural, perhaps, in view of the inhuman methods employed in the war, that the idea of a long and satisfying revenge should have found crude expression. A year ago some little stir was created in England by the formation of an "Anti-German League," which sought signers to a pledge against employing German labor or using German-made goods after the war, and for a "secondary" boycott against shops, banks or hotels which offended in those particulars. To the credit of the British people, this fantastic scheme was soon laughed into oblivion. But the plan to be discussed in Paris is serious, and has behind it a tremendous force of public opinion in the countries concerned. The idea originated with the Russian government, but officially the initiative was taken by France, through her minister of commerce. The British government has approached the subject with great caution, and has informed the nation that the conference will be "only deliberative," and that the traditional policy of free trade will not be abandoned without consulting the electorate. A glimpse of the thought that has been crystallizing for months is afforded by recent utterances from Walter Runciman, president of the British Board of Trade, which is, of course, a department of the government:

So far as commerce is concerned, Germany is a beaten nation, and it is for us to see that she does not recover. There is no peace to which we could be a party if it would in any way conflict with the interests of the Entente allies. Nothing in commercial life will be in the same condition

when the war is over as when it began, and in everything the Central Powers' Zollverein is bound to conflict with our interests. * * * While the war is on we must do everything in our power to cripple German finance, credit and trade, at the same time building up our own and our allies', and laying the foundation for future action when peace comes.

* * * We and our allies will know how to meet an aggressive economic war as we have met hostile action for the last twenty months. The coming conference in Paris will deal with these questions. We are all determined to resist Germany wherever we find her trying to establish political predominance in foreign countries by commercial means.

It is only fair to say that Germany's adversaries may well have taken their project from her policy, long ago proclaimed, of making the Central European nations economically self-sufficient, exclusive and predominant by means of tariffs and preferential agreements. The striking novelty in the Allies' project is that it would make an alliance based upon a common economic policy as well as upon unity in international political aims. It would mean a revolution not only in British policy, but in European relationships, for alliances hitherto have not modified in any degree the severity of tariff restrictions, such as those, for instance, between France and Russia and between Germany and Austria. A change so momentous has naturally occasioned vigorous dissent. Mr. Runciman himself was careful to repudiate the demands of extremists, for in stating that after the war it would be the duty of Great Britain, as the country which would recover most quickly, to aid her allies, he continued: "I would even add Germany, at the bottom of the list, for no man would wish to see a period of prolonged poverty in Germany." David Lloyd George has been impatient of the propaganda of a trade war. "We must not subordinate human liberty and honor and civilization," he declared recently, "to any trade policy.

When we consider trade, the first thing to be done is to obliterate any idea of revenge."

The terrific sweep of passion created by a war so vast and so remorseless has naturally created impulses toward inflicting hurt upon the enemy even after the conflict is ended; it would be too much to hope that nations which have lost hundreds of thousands of lives and have been burdened with colossal debts should be eager to resume relations of amity with those which they hold responsible. Yet the proposed trade war, in the more radical forms suggested, would be economically unsound, as well as unjust and immoral. It would make the signing of peace a mockery. It would keep open and bleeding the wounds of war. It would infallibly sow the seeds of conflict worse than that which has filled Europe with hatred and woe. The blood-soaked trenches might melt into tilled fields, but the frontiers of the rival nations would become bristling barriers, and every activity of commerce, upon which the orderly progress of the world depends, would become a provocation. And no country would be free from the irritating effects. The nations now neutral would be compelled to choose between the hostile groups overshadowing them, and there would swiftly be built up a new "balance of power" more dangerous than that which crashed down in this war. Jealousies, hatreds, huge armaments, universal conscription—these would be the fruits of the sowing; and it would be only a question of time when some trifling incident would precipitate a new catastrophe. If there should be reached a deliberate decision to make the signing of peace the prelude to a new war, then millions of men have died in vain and the world faces a future black with menace.

THE MESOPOTAMIAN MUDDLE

May 2, 1916.

IT WAS rather a shabby trick of fate which struck down Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz a few days ago. He was in Bagdad, the ancient capital of Islam and the projected outpost of Germany's Asiatic empire, directing the operation of the Turkish armies against the British forces beleaguered in Kut-el-Amara, a hundred miles away, and against the relief expedition sent up from the Persian gulf. And with a brilliant triumph almost in sight the baton fell from his grasp. The survivor of many sanguinary battles, he died of an Oriental fever. It was the military genius of this 73-year-old warrior that had made the Turkish army. For twelve years he labored to fashion a powerful fighting force from the brave but disorganized troops of Abdul Hamid, only to lose most of his prestige when they were overwhelmed by the Balkan League. But he never lost faith in their capacities, and one may feel a sentimental regret that he did not live to witness their signal victory. From the German point of view, it was eminently worth living for. Under German tutelage the Turks have inflicted a second crushing defeat upon the empire's most implacable foe, with the exceptional climax of forcing the surrender of a complete and considerable force. And the triumph is of double value, because it marks the overthrow not only of the original campaign of the invaders, but of their second effort. The British expedition which advanced almost to the gates of Bagdad

has been destroyed, and the relief army has been definitely checked. It is only a little more than four months since Great Britain suffered humiliating defeat at the Dardanelles, and now another great campaign has collapsed.

Of the almost innumerable campaigns of the war, this has been one of the most significant and most fascinating, not only because its clamor has awakened echoes, silent for ages, in the solitary places where the human race had its beginnings, but because here, far from the glare of the main stage of the war, in a remote and almost inaccessible region, the two great rival empires were fighting for the domination of Asia. To attentive readers of this newspaper the causes and factors of the seemingly isolated struggle are familiar—Pan-Germanism's audacious project of carving out an eastern dominion by means of an overland route to India, through the Balkans, Turkey, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia; the scheme of the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad, steadily being pushed to completion; the ultimate aim of linking the German capital with the Persian gulf and establishing a trade highway across Europe and Asia in defiance of England's sea power; the menace of these plans to British control of Egypt and India and the Russo-British spheres of influence in Persia. Thus it was that the war in Europe was not many days old before the British government prepared to strike direct at the great enterprise of her adversary. The authorities in India undertook to cut the taproot of German expansion in Asia by seizing control of the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates and of the ancient city of the caliphs, the capture of which would signalize to all the waiting East that the Moslem power had been extinguished and that the kaiser's plan to dominate the

Mohammedan world had been shattered. For many months it seemed as if the enterprise would proceed without check to a decisive victory. The country of the delta was easily occupied, and in midsummer of last year the invading forces were more than 300 miles up the Tigris, the Turks having been driven before them. On September 29 Kut-el-Amara, a primitive village on a tongue of land formed by a bend in the river, was captured, and two months later the dashing advance had carried the expedition to Ctesiphon, where 2400 years ago the Parthian kings lived in barbaric splendor. Bagdad and victory were only eighteen miles distant. But here, amid the ruins of the ancient city, the tide of battle suddenly changed. Reinforcements of men and munitions, which for months had been laboriously transported by rail and river and caravan from Turkey, poured out from Bagdad. The British, exhausted by more than a year of arduous campaigning in a difficult country, against deadly disease as well as against a resolute enemy, found themselves confronting overwhelming odds. In constantly increasing numbers fresh troops were hurled against them, and the artillery fire, in accuracy and volume, showed that further advance against the stiffened resistance was hopeless. Moreover, the scanty water supply was failing, and the desert was alive with bands of hostile tribesmen.

Five days after their victory at Ctesiphon the invaders began the retreat that was to end in surrender. By early December they had been swept back to Kut-el-Amara, more than a hundred miles. The long arm of Germany had reached across two continents to strike. Unless the objective of the campaign were to be utterly abandoned, the river town had to be held until reinforcements could be sent up from the gulf. General

Townshend, therefore, made his stand there with about 10,000 troops, while the shattered remnants of the main expedition continued the retreat down the Tigris. The rest of the story is in the recent news dispatches. A relief force, fighting with almost superhuman courage and audacity, toiled up the river, and by January 21 was within eight miles of the besieged garrison. But it got no farther. Driven back by battering blows from the Turks, now inspired with the prospects of victory, it reformed and cut its way northward again; but this time the task was still harder, and a month ago the nearest approach to Kut-el-Amara in the second attempt—twenty-two miles—was reached. A ring had been forged around the imprisoned forces, and it could not be broken from within or from without. Thus for the second time Great Britain found victory snatched from her grasp. Her troops had once been almost within sight of Bagdad; and at Kut-el-Amara they fought for days with the sound of the guns of the relief in their ears. But gradually the echoes died away as the second expedition was hurled back; and after nearly five months of brave resistance to the besiegers, to disease and, finally, to hunger, the little army was forced to capitulate. Just two weeks ago it was announced from Berlin that the end was inevitable, and this was, indeed, obvious. So long ago as December 17 we pointed out how desperate was the position of the invaders, and gave the opinion that "one of the most difficult, daring and dramatic efforts of the whole war has come to naught."

What does it all mean? The disclosure made by the collapse which swiftly followed the victory at Ctesiphon has been emphasized by the calamitous failure to redeem that defeat. Great Britain, after the traditional manner of democracies in war, tried to "muddle through," and

muddled into disaster. The story of the Bagdad expeditions will furnish poets with inspiring themes. The troops overcame the difficulties of operating in the most inhospitable region on the globe. They fought their way across burning deserts, through miasmatic swamps, amid desolating sandstorms and treacherous floods. They endured terrific hardships, withstood the ravages of disease, beat back the attacks of treacherous Arabs and stormed the trenches of the enemy with incomparable intrepidity. Great Britain will never suffer humiliation over the deeds of these men. But she will feel lasting chagrin over her failure to realize soon enough that campaigns in this war are won by science, by preparation, by efficiency, and are not to be won by any amount of gallantry unsupported by those requisites. However gratifying it may be to her pride that new chapters of heroism have been added to her military annals, she has learned that success depends, not upon audacity and the performance of countless deeds worthy of the Victoria Cross, but upon the elementary principle of strategy, which is to strike the enemy at a selected spot with overwhelming force. Great Britain started upon this vital quest with a force utterly insufficient and hopelessly ill equipped. She undertook to penetrate a desert and hold a line of communication nearly 400 miles long with an expedition such as might have been sent against a tribe of rebellious hillmen in India. The event showed that there were not enough guns, not enough ammunition, not enough men, not enough supplies of any kind. The lesson of the sacrifice of Gordon at Khartum, only thirty years ago, has already been forgotten.

WHAT IS GREAT BRITAIN DOING?

May 5, 1916.

WHAT has the British empire done in the war? All the world knows what the German forces have done. The work of the Russian empire is equally palpable. The world also is in no manner of doubt as to the brilliant and sustained heroism of the French nation. It regards, and justly, the recovery of France after the first reverses as one of the most signal moral triumphs recorded in history. In comparison with these resounding achievements, what has the British empire to show for its great wealth, its wide territories and teeming population? The British fleet is the first in the world in point of size and reputation, yet it has bombarded no German town, landed no force on German soil, has brought on no general engagement. The British army has fought well and gallantly; but the question is not whether it has done well, but whether it is doing enough. Do its achievements, measured by the scale of the present war, constitute a contribution to the Allied cause proportionate to the strength of so great an empire?

Such questions as these are frequently heard. The "failure" of the British nation in the war is a subject of widespread comment and criticism. As a fact, the first paragraphs in this article are quoted word for word from an English writer. Britons are well aware of the

world's unfavorable judgment upon the empire, and are their own relentless critics. The subject is well worth study, particularly by Americans. We purpose to discuss the record quite impartially, without raising any question of right or wrong touching the war.

As a matter of plain fact, has Great Britain contributed insignificantly to the cause of the Allies? Has she shown indifference and selfishness, as well as lack of successful military strategy? Has she refused or failed to assume her just share of the burden? The first thing to consider is that she entered the war unprepared. Aside from the inveterate national prejudice against a large military establishment there had always been agreement that in the event of a European war her sea power would be her sufficient weapon. She had, therefore, neither an army of a size commensurate with the need, nor the means of equipping and feeding it. The terrific onslaught of the Germans created overnight problems of stupendous extent and complexity. Great Britain was called upon not only to hold the sea for herself and her allies, but to enlist, train and arm a vast land force; to defend possessions in every quarter of the globe, while attacking those of her enemies; to finance the operations of the empire and of half a dozen nations besides, and, above all, to revolutionize her industries so as to provide inexhaustible supplies of war materials, for she lacked not only arms, but the means of making them. How has she met these demands?

Her most obvious accomplishment has been to establish control of the ocean. There are, experts find, seven functions which a fleet can perform: It may drive the enemy's commerce from the sea; protect its own commerce; render the enemy's fleet impotent; prevent the transfer of enemy troops by sea, either for

attack or defense; transport its own troops and supplies at will, and, in certain circumstances, assist their operations. Had it not been for British sea power the German navy, superior to that of France, would have bombarded French coast towns, scattered the French fleet, intercepted French commerce and prevented the transport of the republic's troops from Africa. While the British fleet has lost more capital ships than the enemy, it could afford to do so, and meanwhile it has destroyed scores of enemy war vessels, besides utterly extinguishing Germany's foreign trade, except in the Baltic. It has kept both the British and French coasts from serious attack. It has safeguarded the transport of immense forces from India, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to Europe, and of expeditions to Egypt and the Dardanelles. During the first year of the conflict no fewer than 2,500,000 troops were transferred to and from the various theaters of war without a casualty, together with 2,500,000 tons of supplies. It has been the British fleet that has enabled Britain and France to draw war supplies from all parts of the world without which they would be helpless. "Loss of the command of the sea by England," said a French writer, "would involve more than her own capitulation; France and Italy would soon be at the mercy of their adversaries." Likewise, the fleet has protected the oversea commerce of both countries, so that they have not only had abundant supplies, but have been enabled to continue their foreign trade. Through lack of foresight, British sea power suffered one reverse in the loss of Craddock's squadron off the coast of Chile, but in three other engagements—in the bight of Heligoland, off the Falkland islands and on the Dogger Bank—it maintained decisive superiority. With such a clear preponderance of strength, it is sometimes asked, why has not the British

fleet sought out the German naval forces and destroyed them? "The spirit of Drake and Nelson is dead," the Germans have tauntingly cried. The answer is that the function of a fleet is to command the seas in exactly the manner we have outlined. So long as it can do that without forcing a general engagement, with the risk of heavy losses, undertaking the offensive for its own sake would be mere blustering folly.

But, even granting that the British fleet has been successful, critics say, what about the failure of the empire on land? Where is the British army? Why is it holding only forty miles of trenches, while the French hold more than four hundred? We have already spoken of Britain's military unpreparedness. When the war began her army consisted of only 233,000 men, with 203,000 reserves and a militia force—for home defense only—of 263,000. It had been the understanding that in the event of German aggression Russia and France would bear the brunt of the land fighting; France asked for a British force of 150,000, and got them promptly. Such colossal miscalculation looks almost criminal now. But the marvel is not that the British held so little of the line in the beginning as that they actually created a real continental army during the war. Within six months they added 1,000,000 men to their forces; within a year the number under training was 3,000,000; and a few days ago the premier announced that no fewer than 5,000,000 had been enlisted for the army and navy, every one a volunteer. There has been no achievement like this in history. During the American civil war the federal force aggregated fewer than 3,000,000, and this total was not reached without drafts and vast expenditure for bounties. The British campaign for compulsion, now approaching success, has created an ugly

impression of national indifference, but the fact is that more than 80 per cent of the available men have enlisted voluntarily, and only a few hundred thousand will be forced into the ranks. There remains, however, the fact that for many months the British held only two-score miles of trenches, and this has unquestionably occasioned criticism in France. Yet the world-wide extent of the British operations should be considered. The empire has not only assumed responsibility for control of the sea, but has had forces aggregating hundreds of thousands of men in Belgium and Flanders, at the Dardanelles and in the Balkans, in Egypt and Arabia, in China and the islands of the Pacific, in Southwestern, Eastern and Western Africa, in Persia and Mesopotamia. Consider what any one of these campaigns would mean to the United States, for example, whose resources are strained by a bit of police work in neighboring territory! But, regardless of this, the reproach is no longer true. There are now 1,500,000 troops in France—ten times the number originally demanded—and they are holding 150 miles of the line. With the exception of about twenty miles manned by the Belgians, the trenches from the North Sea to Soissons, including the most vital part of the western defense, are guarded exclusively by the British.

No less striking than the creation of a vast army has been the tremendous accomplishment of organizing the country's industries for war. Lacking workshops, machinery and adequate supplies of war material in the beginning, Great Britain has become the chief reliance of her allies for munitions. And there is, in addition, the colossal task of financing the war. Belgium, France, Russia, Servia and other nations in the alliance have received no less than \$2,000,000,000 from Great Britain.

The empire at this time is spending \$25,000,000 a day—more than seven times the cost of our civil war. After all, a fairly effective answer to the question, What has Britain done? would be a counter-query, What would have been the course of the war if she had not joined? Obviously, the result would have been the annihilation not only of Belgium, but of France; for without the support of British sea power, British wealth and even British soldiers, Paris and the Channel coast of France would have been in German possession within a few weeks and Russia would have been reduced to impotence. There are just criticisms that can be made of Great Britain's policies and methods; her diplomacy in the war has been lamentable; she has made ghastly failures at Gallipoli, in the Balkans and in Mesopotamia; her people have been slow to devote all their energies to the great task, and her military strategists have revealed appalling conceit and incompetence. But Americans who recall the blunders and scandals of the little war with Spain, and who have before their eyes the present conditions in Mexico, should hesitate to assume an air of superiority. Great Britain's contribution to the cause of the Allies, far from being negligible, has been enormous, is steadily increasing, and we believe will be decisive.

GERMANY'S LATEST PLEDGE

May 8, 1916.

HOW tangled is the web of diplomatic negotiations in which this nation has become involved is shown in the fact that Germany's reply to President Wilson's ultimatum has created a hopeless conflict of opinion. From one group we learn that the note "embodies the essential concession," "puts Germany in the right," "practically complies with the American demands," is "satisfactory" and "all that could be expected." The other group condemns and rejects as "evasive," "arrogant, insolent and insulting," "disappointing," "uncandid" and "a brutal mockery of our wounds." That fifteen months of correspondence should produce a result apparently so inconclusive is in itself a singular commentary upon the theory glibly urged that any and all international issues can be settled readily by negotiation. Mr. Bryan's panacea for war is, we believe, diplomatic conversations covering at least a year; yet a great many Americans feel that after a still longer period devoted to this method the country is no nearer a permanent settlement and no further from the dreadful alternative of armed conflict.

It would be only making confusion worse confounded to recount the events which led to the present situation; but Americans will be wise to study attentively the final interchange. After a long, futile and humiliating correspondence, President Wilson gave notice that "unless the German government should now immediately

declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels," diplomatic relations would be severed by the United States. In her reply, Germany "repudiates the assertion" that she has deliberately and systematically destroyed vessels "of all sorts, nationalities and destinations," and avers that on the contrary she has imposed strict restraints upon her use of the submarine. She pleads that errors are inevitable in a desperate war; declares herself devoted to the "sacred principles of humanity" and anxious to preserve the friendship of the United States, and interpolates a slur upon the long-settled issue over the supplying of war material to her enemies. But the greater part of the note, like its predecessors, is devoted to complaint against the British blockade, the aim of which it says, "according to the avowed intention of the British government," is that "many millions of women and children shall be starved." There is in Berlin a persistent belief, or delusion, that the reiteration of this charge, unsubstantiated either as to the purpose or the effect described, is sufficient answer to the undeniable and repeated killing of American citizens. Three-fourths of the document, therefore, has no real bearing upon the actual issue involved. The vital part consists of these paragraphs:

The German government notifies the government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following order:

"In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance."

On its face, this is a substantial compliance with the American demand. Standing alone, dissociated from

preceding pledges and incidents, it would admit of no attitude except unqualified acceptance. Even though it be urged that an engagement equally explicit was made last September—"Liners will not be sunk," etc.—only to be followed by the unwarned destruction of the passenger ships Ancona, Persia and Sussex, the United States could not pick flaws in a declaration so clear and unequivocal. The German government adheres to the restrictions laid down by the United States. The declaration is followed, however, by further pregnant remarks. Neutrals cannot expect, it is urged, that Germany shall limit the use of the submarine—that is, shall obey international law—"if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating" those regulations. The German government "is confident" and "does not doubt" that the American government "will now demand and insist that the British government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law," etc.; and it significantly adds:

Should steps taken by the government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision.

All the matter thus interpolated is, in the legal phrase, "irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial." Its surface meaning is that Germany, either distraught by the pressure of her adversaries or willfully insolent toward the United States, is minded to justify outrages against a neutral and friendly nation by citing alleged injuries she has suffered from an armed enemy. This is an intolerable assumption, opportunity for which was afforded by President Wilson's unfortunate departure from exclusive insistence upon American and other neutral rights. The German government pretends not to

discern that this nation is contending for the lives of its own citizens, rather than for those of Germany's enemies. The United States has denounced and protested against certain illegalities in the British blockade; but if it has not severed relations with Great Britain because that device hurts Germany, neither has it dismissed the German ambassador because Zeppelin bombs, in defiance of laws, have mangled women and children in English towns. Germany may rest assured that for every wrong done to American commercial rights by the British blockade full reparation will be exacted. But a demand from her that this country purchase immunity for its citizens from assassination by forcing the lifting of the blockade against herself would be preposterous as well as insulting. If Great Britain were to announce that every American ship bound to a non-British port would hereafter be sunk or seized, until such time as the United States compelled Germany to abandon the flinging of bombs upon sleeping cities or the torpedoing of passenger ships, the world would consider that Britain was governed by madmen. Yet the German government almost makes a proposal identical in nature. It is most important to observe, however, that she does not quite do so. A considerable number of commentators leap to the conclusion that Germany makes a reservation fatal to the good faith of her declaration—that she announces her intention to stop killing Americans only upon condition that this government successfully apply coercion to Great Britain in Germany's behalf. This opinion is due in part, no doubt, to the fact that on previous occasions Germany has made exactly that infamous proposal. But in the present instance such meaning cannot justly be read into her utterance. The orders to submarine com-

manders have actually been issued and published to the world. That fact and the change of policy which it implies are not in any degree conditional; they are definite, accomplished. As to her reservation of "complete liberty of decision" in the event that the United States declines to carry out her extravagant wish, or fails in the accomplishment, that is, we are inclined to believe, an expression which any government would be likely to offer when abandoning a course of action which it had repeatedly defended and insisted upon continuing. It may mean everything, it may mean nothing; whatever its significance, it does not alter the fact that for the time being, by formal and unreserved acknowledgment, the German government pledges itself to the use of submarines according to law. Germany has publicly agreed to suspend her practice of submarine "frightfulness." If the latter part of her note conveys a veiled threat, we shall learn about it through the commission of a new outrage; the initiative is still hers, the issue of peace or war still at her command.

These obvious facts show the futility of all the celebrations during the last year of "diplomatic victories." The truth is that Germany has outmaneuvered the United States in every single encounter. A year ago today the whole country was ablaze with just anger over the Lusitania horror. A severance of diplomatic relations then would have been an act of moment, would have shocked even Germany into realization of the perfidy and the peril of her course. But her statesmen carried the issue along with masterly and merciless skill. They started a debate as to whether the ship was armed; they opened the question of the export of munitions of war; they challenged the right of Americans to travel on belligerent vessels; they directed attention to real and

fabled infractions of laws by the empire's antagonists; they offered to arbitrate the killing of women and children. It was the same with every like incident. The Arabic crime was juggled for weeks. The attack on the *Orduna* and the sinking of the *Persia* and all the others were discussed with varying degrees of conciliation and acerbity, with interpolations as to contraband, munitions of war, armed merchantmen, the defensive weakness of submarines and every possible irrelevancy. Then came the sinking of the *Sussex*, a passenger-laden, unarmed ferryboat. This was an irredeemable atrocity, the fabricated defense was too transparent to be effective, and some definite action was necessary to avert an uncomfortable controversy. Hence the new pledge, which is little more than an amended form of that issued just eight months ago. What is the result? Among all the murderous outrages there are just two—the sinking of the *Lusitania* and of the *Sussex*—that are burned into the American mind, because both were so utterly heartless and inexcusable. The first was “faded out,” as the saying is, by means of complicated discussion; and now the second has been eliminated by a new pledge. Germany may not be an absolved penitent, but she has maneuvered herself into the position of a high-minded offender who needs only a helping hand to become a harmless and really helpful member of society.

Her pledge, as it stands, is explicit, and its force for the time being is not abated by the suggestion of an American ultimatum to Great Britain. An immediate severance of diplomatic relations, as a retort to the note from Berlin, would be absurd and unjust. But the latest “diplomatic victory” affords no guarantee that sooner or later another “incident” will not revive the whole problem in a more acute form.

SIGNS OF COMING PEACE

May 18, 1916.

ONCE more the whisper of peace is speeding from capital to capital throughout the world. Desperate campaigns are still being waged on three continents, new millions of troops are being made ready for the battle line, implacable assertions are still being put forth by each side that the other must be utterly destroyed; but not all the tumult of cannon and the declamations of statesmen can drown the voices for peace, raised in wonderment, in appealing uncertainty, but still in hope. This is by no means the first time that the progress of the war has been displaced as a topic by its probable cessation. Discussion of peace has manifested a sort of tidal movement; from no apparent cause a wave of rumor appears, surges forward for a time and then recedes, leaving no visible trace. But each time it advances a little further, and just now it is at the height of its flow. Privately, in the confidential intercourse of financial and commercial interests, and publicly, in the carefully framed utterances of statesmen, the idea of a settlement is coming into view. Two events, not generally associated in the public mind, give substance now to the persistent and ever-strengthening report. One was the recent summoning of Prince von Buelow, former imperial chancellor, to confer with the kaiser at military headquarters. The other, significantly coincident therewith, was a strange passage in the German note to the government of the United States. That document was

said to have been dictated by the emperor himself, and it was dispatched soon after he had consulted with the diplomat whose mysterious activities in Switzerland during the last half year have been the basis of innumerable rumors of compromise. There was nothing whatever in the controversy between the United States and Germany which called for such a statement, yet the note deplored the prolongation of "the cruel and sanguinary war," and contained this curious interpolation:

The German government, conscious of Germany's strength, twice within the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from Europe.

The language of diplomacy is not to be translated always in terms of common speech, but the significance of this utterance, and of the occasion selected for making it, is manifest. Belligerent governments do not lightly proclaim their readiness to make peace nor accuse their adversaries of being the more willing to pursue the conflict. Germany the proud, Germany the strong, Germany the victorious on a hundred battlefields, yearns for peace. That is the meaning of her yielding to the United States, and certain knowledge of her thought is at the bottom of the world-wide expectancy of a termination of the struggle. This fact is a grim commentary upon the boast made a few months ago that Germany was so far ahead of her antagonists that while they were still preparing for war she was preparing for peace. Her preparations then were confident; now they are impatient. For peace is still laggard. The vast forces set in motion when this war began, reaching to the very foundations of civilization, are not readily to be stayed and turned back. Nevertheless, one can discern in the present situation a brighter gleam of hope than has appeared at any

other time. This is not due wholly to the obvious fact that every day must bring peace nearer, but to the converging of decisive factors in the conflict. For the first time the opponents of Germany have found themselves in possession of superior forces; for the first time the succession of German triumphs has been definitely interrupted; for the first time Germany has come face to face with the hopelessness of her task.

The invasion of Belgium and the overrunning of France did not win the war; the rolling back of the Russian hosts did not win it; the Balkan triumphs and the Turkish military renaissance did not win it; and the capture of Verdun, if that spectacular feat should be accomplished, will not win it. Meanwhile Germany suffers and bleeds. Victories here and there, however brilliant, cannot stanch her wounds nor break the suffocating pressure which she endures. That she can win battles and campaigns, but not peace, has become a familiar observation. The decision in the field is hers; in the final settlement, it is her enemies'. This does not mean that Germany is prostrate, nor that presently she may be expected to sue for terms. But it means that the end, which a few months ago none could plausibly forecast, despite the confident assertions of partisans, is in sight.

Germany has not broken through, cannot break through. And with increasing frequency the world is catching glimpses of the result—the relentless supervision of supplies, dire scarcity, even food riots in the streets of the capital. The leaders of the empire long ago foresaw the peril, as was shown by their employment of the desperate expedient of submarine warfare and by the ceaseless complaints to neutrals against the deadly blockade. Sea power is likely to prove itself once more the decisive factor in shaping history. There is a

belief in Germany and elsewhere that the traditional tenacity of Great Britain is the most serious obstacle to an early settlement. But the retort of the president of the French republic to the intimation in the German note to Washington shows that France is as little ready as her ally to entertain a set of Berlin terms. "Neither directly nor indirectly," he said, "have our enemies offered us peace. But we do not want them to offer it to us; we want them to ask it of us. We do not want to submit to their conditions; we want to impose ours on them." While such sentiment, in England and France and Russia, is powerful and sincere, its persistence does not necessarily mean that the war must continue until its utmost desires are satisfied. Germany long ago disavowed her early ambitions for world dominance; she has proclaimed with increasing fervor that she fights only in defense of her existence; she has brought herself to the point of officially and explicitly expressing a desire to make peace; and it is but one more step to the asking for negotiations. A nation which has given such signal proofs of its valor, endurance and patriotism would not demean itself by such action, and, if it suggested terms indicating a rational and humane spirit, opposing governments might find it difficult to justify to their people a peremptory rejection. The forces engaged are too vast, and the conflicting international interests too complicated, to make an early agreement probable. But for the first time since the conflict began there has appeared a real break in the black night of implacable war, and the world may hope at last for the return of day.

“SOMEWHERE IN MESOPOTAMIA”

May 23, 1916.

WHOEVER chose the bear as the pictorial representation of Russia made a singularly apt selection. In peace and in war, the character of the mighty empire is suggestive of that of the shaggy quadruped. Clumsy yet cunning, grotesque yet impressive, deceptively slow in movement yet capable of swift action, amusing when at play yet terrible when aroused; tireless, strong, voracious, the only four-footed animal that possesses the human quality of a sense of humor, the bear is a strikingly appropriate symbol for the colossus of nations. Kipling's grisly picture of "the bear that walks like a man" had in it vivid truth as well as poetic brutality. And now the bear, beaten and buffeted earlier in the war, is taking a leisurely revenge. While the great action at Verdun waxes and wanes, while diplomatists fence and hopeful peace promoters rehearse the parleys, Russia's power, as patient and as resistless as a glacier, is spreading across Asia Minor, Persia and Mesopotamia and creating a new, great problem for the statesmen of Europe to solve when they set themselves to remake the map of the eastern world.

The incursion of Russia into Mesopotamia is a complication that the wisest of them had not foreseen. That ancient region, it had been understood, was the final battleground of contending British and German imperial ambitions. The British expedition that almost reached the gates of Bagdad was intended to shatter irrevocably

the project of a Teutonic empire from the North sea to the Persian gulf, but the surrender at Kut-el-Amara ended that campaign. Meanwhile the bear, prowling contentedly through Persia, sniffed the desert winds from the west and was moved to follow the alluring scent of spoils. So now three or four new campaigns have developed, and Bagdad, whose minarets mocked the retreating British, may yet fall to Britain's ancient rival.

It will be recalled that Russia, barred by Rumania and Bulgaria from a direct advance toward her historic goal, Constantinople, undertook to attack Turkey by passing eastward around the Black sea. German-inspired revolts in Persia against the Muscovite domination of the northern part of that country furnished a pretext for an occupation, and more than a year ago Turkey was threatened by a Russian advance westward from Tabriz. It was not until last January, however, that the tremendous campaign began in earnest, with the thrust made by Grand Duke Nicholas from the Caucasus. Conquering formidable mountains and winter storms as well as Turkish resistance, his forces within a few weeks stormed the stronghold of Erzerum, the chief Moslem citadel in Armenia. The impetus behind this movement was so great that the most desperate resistance by the Turks could not check it; Trebizond, a great Black sea port, fell in the middle of April, and the Russian advance is now within striking distance of Erzingan, an important point on the Constantinople highway a hundred miles west of Erzerum. Meanwhile, the left wing, joining the expedition from Tabriz, had enveloped the region around Lake Van. It captured Mush in February and Bitlis early in March. The present objective of this army is Diarbekr, not far from the headwaters of the Tigris river and less than eighty miles from the com-

pleted portion of the Bagdad railroad. Little regarded by the world, operations in central Persia had been going on for many months, and it is these that have now become of such interest and moment. In pursuance of her policy to hasten her absorption of the northern part of the shah's dominions, Russia has been methodically subduing the region. Kashan, whence the three Wise Men, according to legend, started on their pilgrimage to Bethlehem in Judea 1900 years ago, has had a Russian garrison for months. Hamadan, built by a wife of Harun al Raschid, was duly "tranquilized," and finally Kermanshah, a hundred miles nearer the Turkish border, was occupied.

During the development of these operations the British had made their spectacular advance toward Bagdad and had fallen back in their fatal retreat, and their military experts hopefully speculated upon the possibility that the Russians would be able to effect a junction with the beleaguered expedition and save it from surrender. The intervening country was too difficult, however, and it is by no means sure that either the Russians or the British were eager for the co-operation. The former were not necessarily enthusiastic over the prospect of seeing the great Moslem city of Bagdad a British prize, while the prestige of Great Britain would have suffered almost as much if her defeated forces had been relieved by Russia as it did when they surrendered to the Turks. The junction has now actually been made, and the two nations will co-operate in future action.

In any event, the Kut-el-Amara disaster stirred Russia to adopt a new purpose on her own behalf, and she began a direct advance into Mesopotamia. Thus her great Asiatic operations are divided into four distinct but co-ordinating campaigns. The main Caucasus armies

are pressing westward and southward from the Trebizond-Erzerum line, the immediate intent being to conquer all of Armenia, with, perhaps, the ultimate idea of gaining the coveted sea outlet at Alexandretta, the nearest Mediterranean port. The forces based upon Mush and Bitlis are moving slowly but surely toward Diarbekr and the Bagdad railroad. An army which, after occupying the region of Lake Urumiah, in Persia, was not mentioned for many months, has recently become active. It has taken Rowandiz, a few miles over the Turkish border, and is aiming at Mosul, the main depot on the projected Bagdad railroad line between Bagdad and Aleppo. To capture it the Russians must cross the Tigris near the buried ruins of Nineveh. The fourth campaign is that recently undertaken from Kermanshah. The Russian advance is now threatening Khanikin, just beyond the frontier. If they take that town they will be within a hundred miles of Bagdad.

A dispatch from Petrograd just a week ago openly expressed the hope of the government that the campaign would bring "not only Bagdad, but the entire historic country lying between the Tigris and the Euphrates, under Russian domination." This is one of the strange results of the war—that Russia, whose century-old purpose to control Central Asia was until ten years ago the hobgoblin of Great Britain's foreign office, should be within measurable distance of establishing control not only of upper Persia, but of the valley of the great rivers which inclose the highway to the Indian ocean. Her fundamental purpose is known to all the world. It was frankly stated the other day by the leader of the Constitutional Democrats. "In this conflict," he said, "the interest of Russia can be briefly defined: We need an outlet to the sea. It was not for this we went to war,

yet without it we cannot end the war." This unchanging aim has been at the heart of Russia's policy in all the wars she has made for a hundred years. It has made her the remorseless economic enemy of the Turks, possessors of Constantinople; it sent her legions across Asia to battle with the Japanese. Until Russia has an ice-free port she will never rest, and the world will never know enduring peace.

For generations the bear that walks like a man has looked from his wintry lair with ursine longing upon the sunlit outlet to the Mediterranean. Now another vision entrances him, and there are more remote possibilities of the war than that he should dabble his chilblained paws in the warm waters of the Persian gulf.

THE NORTH SEA BATTLE

June 6, 1916.

ONE of the most curious news stories of the war was an American correspondent's account of a visit to the German high sea fleet last October, when he described officers and men as demanding impatiently, "Will the English fleet come out? Do you think they will ever come out?" For more than a year, he said, the Germans had been "alert, hoping and waiting to accept the challenge of Britain's grand fleet," and were inclined to be contemptuous over the enemy's caution. These taunts were not quite worthy of men so courageous as the kaiser's seamen. The engagement so ardently longed for could have been had at any time through the simple expedient of sending the fleet out into blue water. The navigable parts of the North sea are not of vast area. As we said on March 17, predicting that a great naval encounter would soon take place:

With darting aircraft on scout duty, making their reports by wireless, it is needless for hostile forces to waste much time in searching for each other. When both sides make up their minds to accept the ordeal of sea battle the collision will come swiftly. A war fleet that once frankly takes the open will not be able to elude a willing opponent in those waters for more than forty-eight hours.

The obvious truth of this observation was shown last Wednesday, when the great German fleet, sweeping in battle order through the mists off the coast of Denmark, found the action it coveted hardly a hundred miles from its base and nearly 500 miles from the British base. It is

rather a pity that a fight which really was brilliantly creditable to both the forces engaged should have been followed by disputes as to which derived the greater advantage. The truth, as the British admiralty plaintively said of the German fleet, has been obscured by "low visibility," and it has taken several days for the encounter, the most stupendous ever fought upon the waters of the earth, to reveal its main features and effects. The framework facts are that "the full German high sea fleet," engaged on "an enterprise directed to the north" from Wilhelmshaven, met a British cruiser squadron on the afternoon of May 31 and inflicted upon it shattering punishment. The main British battleship squadron, summoned by wireless, reached the scene six or seven hours later, and a series of detached engagements were fought during the night, the Germans finally eluding the reinforced enemy and retiring to their own waters. The British losses were three first-class battle cruisers, three armored cruisers and eight destroyers, with a total tonnage of 114,000. The Germans certainly lost one 13,000-ton battleship, three light cruisers, six destroyers and a submarine, with a total tonnage of 32,500—and the British authorities insist that the aggregate was much greater.

Upon the basis of these facts, Germany's exultation over her first great naval adventure is abundantly justified. The tonnage figures, unless greatly revised by later information, and the character of the ships destroyed, tell the tale. There was, moreover, a decisive demonstration that in courage, seamanship and gunnery the kaiser's fighters—men and ships—are the equals of the traditional rulers of the waves. But far more significant than these items was the revelation of superior strategy and tactical efficiency. The Germans won

their advantage by skillful disposition of their forces—by striking one part of the enemy's fleet with preponderant strength and evading a counter-blow by withdrawing after having inflicted a maximum amount of damage. It is to be observed that each side asserts that it met a stronger force. Both statements are true. In the earlier stages of the battle the German fleet far outnumbered and outweighed the British force; later it was itself threatened by overwhelming attack, and very properly retreated. It had done exactly what it had set out to do—delivered a swift and profitable blow—and thereupon returned to its base to await another like opportunity.

“The retirement of the enemy immediately after the opening of a general engagement,” King George telegraphed to his admiral, “robbed us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory.” The British admiralty likewise remarked that the Germans “avoided a prolonged action with our main forces; as soon as these appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships.” Such regrets are natural, but they really constitute a tribute to German strategy. Although the imperial government stirs its people with intimations that “the main part of the English fighting fleet” was sought out and overcome, such an enterprise was no part of the plan or the result. The victory of the Germans lay in outmaneuvering the foe, partially crippling one of his divisions, and extricating themselves before he could bring his full pressure to bear. When Vice Admiral Beatty dashed in against the German advance ships with his cruiser squadron he honored the finest traditions of the British navy. His purpose was to get between the enemy and his base and drive him toward the open sea

to meet the main British force. But behind the German destroyers and cruisers lay hidden the kaiser's battle-ships, and six of Beatty's finest cruisers were the price paid for his daring. The vital matter is not that he made a gallant and audacious assault, but that British strategy was at fault in allowing his subsidiary force to bear so long the brunt of battle.

Viewing the battle as a contest in fighting power, regardless of inequalities that developed, the result should dissipate the opinion formerly widely held in Great Britain that the Germans were deficient in seamanship. Only a few months ago Fred T. Jane, the ablest naval writer in England, rashly predicted an easy victory over the kaiser's sea forces. He wrote:

If his ships go out to meet the British fleet their destruction is certain. It is more certain now than it was a year ago. Then the German fleet was in a state of high efficiency, due to long practice at sea. Only at sea can a sailor be kept in training. If allowed ashore, love and liquor appeal to him more than battle and bloodshed. If kept on board in harbor he grows flatter still, and as like as not more or less mutinous. In any case he realizes, and has plenty of time to realize, that his superior officers keep him inside because they fear death outside. And he, too, learns to fear it. And the longer he hides in safety the more he comes to fear the ordeal of battle. Ever and always the sailor who acted on the defensive and kept in harbor has been defeated when driven to come out and try conclusions with his offensive adversary.

This reckless critic failed to take into account two factors—first, German discipline and patriotism, and second, German maneuvering at sea. Incidentally, the manner in which the Germans met their first serious sea test makes more inexplicable than ever their hideous satisfaction in the murderous work of their submarines as commerce destroyers. It seems incredible now that the sinking of the *Lusitania*, with its slaughter of 1200

non-combatants, including women and children, was hailed throughout the empire "with joyful pride," and that the torpedoing of scores of unarmed passenger and freight vessels has been celebrated as a splendid demonstration of naval power. It would be an inestimable gain for Germany if the achievement of her fleet in the North sea the other day should cause her government and people to realize that the legitimate work of a navy is to fight an armed enemy, not to slay helpless civilians.

After full credit has been given to the Germans for their achievement the fact remains, of course, that ultimate victory remained with the British. It is now asserted in London that the losses of the Germans were "absolutely," as well as relatively, greater than they inflicted. Whether this be true or not, the action has changed only in an infinitesimal degree the comparative strength of the empires in the sea. "There has been no disaster at all," was the declaration of one British official; "there has been a brilliant victory. When you drive the enemy into port with loss, that constitutes a victory." While the Germans justly celebrate the skill and valor of their seamen, the essential fact is that their fleet was driven back to shelter and the efficacy of the enemy's sea command acknowledged. The barrier of steel that shuts the empire in from the world remains unbroken, and the suffocating pressure of the blockade unrelieved. The battle of Jutland, despite its dramatic accomplishments, was not more decisive in its ultimate results than the capture by the Germans of a few hundred yards of trenches in France.

THE TRIBULATIONS OF GREECE

June 12, 1916.

FOR a practiced essayist with a turn for satire no more fruitful subject could be imagined than the story of Greece during the present war. In the record of that distracted country he would find sagacity and folly, fidelity and betrayal, magnanimity and meanness, tragedy and farce, all inextricably involved with lofty patriotism, sordid intrigue and the clashing forces of belligerency. In the main, however, his theme would be the difficulties and dangers of neutrality. That policy, so often pictured as the summit of national wisdom and felicity, has produced varying manifestations in Belgium, in Luxemburg and in Greece, and the last is by no means the least interesting.

No one can say what gains or miseries would have come to the Hellenes if they had courageously fulfilled their pledge to Servia and joined her against the invading Teutons and Bulgars. But the products of a calculated repudiation of the treaty are hardly of a nature to justify it. An indecisive, timorous and falsified neutrality has resulted in national bankruptcy, a menace of revolution, a strangling blockade by one set of belligerents and an invasion by the other. The present crisis is both political and military. King Constantine has autocratically enforced a foreign policy which in its main features—desertion of Servia and a secret agreement with the nation's historic enemy, Bulgaria—defies the sentiment of a majority of the people. And to carry

through his purpose he has used means so despotic that an uprising against him is not impossible. The struggle, indeed, has gone far beyond the original issue of neutrality versus belligerency. In a statement intended for the American people Venizelos declared a few weeks ago:

Here in Greece we are confronted by the question whether we are to have a democracy presided over by a king, or whether, at this hour in our history, we must accept the doctrine of the divine right of kings. The moment has come when the position of the sovereign must be so strictly defined that it will forever be impossible to raise again the question of the divine right of kings in Greece.

It should be understood that this able politician and statesman—one of the most remarkable public men modern Europe has produced—is not an advocate of an Hellenic republic. He saved the dynasty in the revolution of 1909, and probably would defend it again. Greece, he says, needs a king “for a generation or two,” an expression of modified enthusiasm which has not narrowed the breach between the masterful monarch and his most powerful subject. The military situation, meanwhile, is desperate. British, French and Servian troops to the number of perhaps 500,000 are intrenched around Saloniki. The principal Greek islands in the Aegean and Ionian seas have been likewise occupied. In order to coerce the government and compel a general election which would return Venizelos to power, the Allies are enforcing a rigid blockade, and Greek shipping, without free movement of which the country must suffer privation, is paralyzed. The army, kept under mobilization for many months at a cost of \$200,000 a day, is being disbanded and the soldiers, unpaid and discontented, are carrying their grievances to their homes. Worst of all, Bulgarian forces have seized strategic points in Greek Macedonia. And

the fact which maddens patriotic Hellenes is that this territory, wrested from Bulgaria in a costly struggle three years ago, was yielded without resistance. The Greek garrisons, upon orders from Athens, evacuated the forts. The net result of the government's policy of "keeping the country out of war," is, therefore, the prospect that the region will be the scene of a sanguinary campaign in which the helpless inhabitants will suffer. For every indication points to a titanic clash of the two alliances in the near future to decide the question of supremacy in the Balkans.

Four months ago a correspondent of the Associated Press described the tremendous preparations and predicted a great offensive during the early summer. The placid calculations of the Allies have been upset once more, however. Germany and her subordinates retain the initiative. The great spring offensive against the Central Powers, which was to be conducted simultaneously in France, Russia, the Trentino and the Balkans, has been forestalled by the tremendous assaults against Verdun and the Austrian drive into Italy. Russia is making startling progress with her part of the plan, but in Greece the strategic lead has been snatched from Entente commanders. There were two lines of advance from which they might choose—northward along the Saloniki-Nish railroad, by which they retreated from their ill-starred effort to save Servia last fall, or eastward into Bulgaria. In the first instance they would have to conquer defiles which German military engineers have had months to fortify; and the other alternative has become infinitely less attractive through Bulgaria's audacious seizure of Greek territory. It is because of these circumstances that the Germans openly boast their intention to "drive the Allies into the Aegean sea." Their

aggressive diplomacy and their Servian conquest kept Greece quaking with fear, and now, they say, they no longer fear the sentiment or the arms of that country. It is probable, indeed, that if the Allies delay much longer their projected advance they will find themselves on the defensive.

We are discussing, however, the fate of Greece rather than of the armies about to battle on her soil. The main events which produced her present calamitous situation are familiar to most students of the war. When Greece and Servia, with Rumania's aid, overwhelmed Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, the Hellenic frontier was moved eastward, inclosing Macedonian territory which Bulgaria had marked as her part of the spoils taken from Turkey. This settlement intensified the long-existing antagonism between Greece and Bulgaria, so the former thought it prudent to make a defensive alliance with Servia. Each was to help the other in the event of any future Bulgar assault. Venizelos, premier during the early months of the war, was from the first, and still is, a determined advocate of intervention on the side of the Entente. In February, 1915, he resigned because the king blocked this policy. Returned at the June election by a convincing majority, he regained the premiership, and once more denounced as "infamous" the suggestion that Servia should not be supported against the attack which even then was foreshadowed. In September, when Bulgaria began her menacing mobilization, he induced the king to order a like move. But he could get no further, and on October 7 resigned once more.

But even as a dismissed premier, Venizelos held control of parliament, so the king dissolved that body. The election, because most of the voters were in the army, was a farce, and has been denounced as uncon-

stitutional. However, it enabled Constantine to name a pliant cabinet, which lasted until May 26, the day when the sovereignty over eastern Macedonia was surrendered to the invading Bulgars. A popular notion is that the king is influenced by the fact that his consort is a sister of the German kaiser. But Balkan politics is not so simple a matter as this theory would indicate. The policy of the royal house is really a family affair. Constantine has three brothers, all of whom are as implacably opposed as he is himself to the boldly avowed democratic doctrines of Venizelos. And the curious thing is that one of them is married to a Frenchwoman, a Bonaparte; another to a Russian grand duchess, and the third to an English princess of Battenberg.

Suffering a blockade from one side and an invasion from the other, and threatened with a political revolution, Greece will soon have to make some sort of decision. It is impossible not to sympathize in some degree with this unhappy nation, caught in the grinding cogs of the stupendous war machine; yet the feeling must be modified by study of the facts. Greek neutrality, based upon principle and resolutely and impartially maintained, would have commanded admiration. But a neutrality which betrayed the popular will, which violated a solemn pledge, which has been compromised by concessions to one side and secret deals with the other, has lost much of its appeal and most of its virtue.

THE LAWLESS WAR

June 20, 1916.

AMONG intelligent American observers of the war there must be a good many who feel the same desire for information that led a Philadelphia business man to send us the following letter:

To the Editor of The North American:

There seems to be a lack of understanding on the part of most of us in regard to the merits of the controversy between England and Germany over the blockading of neutral ports.

Will you not kindly take this subject up in one of your interesting editorials, elucidating the contentions of the opposing sides and giving your opinion as to the extent to which international law has been violated?

E. B. C.

We take it that by the phrase, "the blockading of neutral ports," the writer refers to the entire system of interference, on the part of the Entente Allies, with neutral and other commerce, whether destined to or from neutral or belligerent ports. He inquires as to its causes, its effects and its legal justification, if any exists.

One of the outstanding facts concerning this struggle is that it is a lawless war. From the day that Germany tore up a treaty and struck down the nationality of Belgium there has been a succession of "illegal" acts by all of the belligerents, until "the rights of neutrals," a term which once seemed to express adamant reality, has come to signify in practice an attenuated fiction. The whole case turns, of course, upon the interpretation and application of what is known as international law;

and it is because this system, accurately speaking, is not law at all that we qualified the word "illegal" with quotation marks. International law is a general term for the code governing the relations and intercourse of states one with the other. It is really inter-state in its scope, for the parties are states and not nations; and it is not really law, for it has no existence in the sense in which that term is usually understood. Modern writers for the most part agree that the expression is inexact, since law implies a system clearly defined and capable of enforcement, whereas there is no common lawgiver for the states of the world and no tribunal having the power to compel obedience or coerce or punish transgressors.

International law, in fact, consists merely of a great body of precedents established at different times by different nations, many of the requirements being in conflict. It is a collection of usages which civilized nations have agreed to observe in their dealings with one another. Its creation and growth have been ascribed to many forces—to the evidence as to customs and usages which is supplied by commentators; the ordinances of states; the history of wars; the opinions of jurists; the decisions of prize courts and international tribunals, and treaties of peace, alliance and commerce. Its definitions and prohibitions are set forth, with varying interpretations, in the text-books of writers whose judgments carry weight and who have endeavored to fashion a coherent system from the mass of historical record. In addition, the world theoretically possesses in the conventions adopted at the various Hague conferences a code of written and ratified rules concerning important usages of war on land and sea. But the efficacy of these, as stated, has already been destroyed by the excesses

of belligerents. Two vital facts to be grasped are, therefore, that international law as yet has by no means the vigor which lies in legislative enactments; and second, that it has behind it no power except international morality, or the opinion of mankind. And the history of the last twenty-two months has shown the world that international law is as ineffective without force to back it as a nation's laws would be without police and courts to compel obedience. None the less, public opinion is potent in giving substance to such international law as we have. The very fact that some usages established by common consent are observed, and that infractions are followed by elaborate explanations on the part of the offending states, shows that the impalpable system is not without effect. Indeed, those governments which most flagrantly violate recognized rules and regulations are the most eager in asserting that they are really devout champions of international law, and that they disregard it in unimportant particulars only in order to overcome its betrayers, their antagonists.

But more vital than the limitations of the code is its essential purpose. The requirements of international law were not framed, as one might deduce from the charges and counter-charges of hostile governments, for the benefit of nations at war, but for the benefit of nations at peace. It is the heritage of neutrals, not of belligerents. It represents the efforts of an advancing civilization, not merely to regulate and give sanction to the usages of armed conflict, but to preserve and enlarge the rights of peoples not involved. Much as it has accomplished toward mitigating the horrors of war, its chief inspiration has been the safeguarding of those nations which remain neutral. It is this fact which makes so deplorable and so dangerous the infrac-

tions committed in this twentieth-century struggle. The violation of Belgium was a blow not alone at that country and at France, but at all the nations of the world. The steady encroachment upon the rights of neutral commerce has injured not Germany alone, but all mankind. And, conversely, in permitting these offenses to pass without effective resistance, the neutral nations have compromised the future of civilization as a whole, since the present belligerents will be neutrals in wars to come, and infallibly will suffer by reason of the lawless precedents they are now making. The purpose of international law, its very reason for being, is to protect those regions and those people outside the circle of strife. War is a test of force, a competitive struggle in destruction, and its effects, despite all ameliorating efforts, are to destroy not only life, but the products of human genius and the achievements of progress. While some nations are at war, therefore, it is the more important, for them and for the race, that those carrying on the peaceful processes of the world's life should be secured against invasions, menaces and harassments on the part of belligerents. They are at once the beneficiaries and the custodians of the common rights of humanity, and every wrongful interference with their exercise of those rights tears down part of the fabric of international law, which is the sole guarantee of a stable civilization.

Herein lies the gravity of the present reign of international disorder. After centuries of endeavor and of growing enlightenment, during which increased rights and protections for neutrals have been painfully built up, the world finds them one by one overthrown. It was reserved for a war in the second decade of the twentieth century of the Christian era to reveal bar-

barities undreamed of in medieval times and aggressions which had been outlawed by ruder generations. Not alone have the miseries of war itself been intensified, but the injuries inflicted upon peaceable countries have been augmented. The latest of wars, prosecuted by the most enlightened of nations, has achieved a sinister supremacy in defiances of the code. Clearly, the general faith in the efficacy of public opinion for the enforcement of international law was misplaced. More and more statesmen and publicists are coming to agree that after the war there must be established a tribunal competent to execute the decrees of the law of nations. But meanwhile the meager safeguards which in theory we now possess are being steadily broken down, and the prospect is that at the close of the conflict there will be an almost total lack not only of recognized international law, but of respect for its traditional prohibitions and admonitions. The precedents laboriously wrested by neutrals from belligerents during past centuries will be no more powerful, it is to be feared, than the precedents created during the last year to supplant them.

Responsibility for the deplorable condition will be apportioned by individuals very largely in accordance with their personal sympathies. But the writer of the above letter—whose predilections we do not know—raises directly the question as to what proportion of the evil result is due to the naval and commercial policies of the Entente Powers. This subject, which we have introduced with a somewhat rambling but necessary discussion of international law, we purpose to treat tomorrow.

THE WAR ON NEUTRAL RIGHTS

June 21, 1916.

THE inquiry of a business man as to the "blockade" controversy, upon which we made some preliminary comment yesterday, presented substantially these two questions: What are the facts as to interference with neutral commerce? and, To what extent has international law been violated? Although international law inspired a voluminous literature following the epochal work of Grotius in 1625, it was more than two centuries before there was formal enactment of important rules. The Declaration of Paris, 1856, adopted by Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey—not by the United States—contained these four provisions:

1. Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, except contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is, maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

More important was the codification of rules effected at the conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. But the merits of the present controversy may be determined upon the basis of the most recent agreement, the Declaration of London. There are, of course, certain principles which may be termed axiomatic. By universal consent, the seas are regarded as public highways. Their rightful users are vessels of peaceful commerce; ships of belligerents have no lawful control over these waters.

Belligerent rights are confined to the capture or destruction of enemy ships, the preventing of contraband from reaching the enemy in any vessels and the imposition of blockades meeting recognized requirements. The conference of 1909 which adopted the Declaration of London was called by Great Britain to codify the laws of the sea, and all participants formally agreed that the rules accepted "correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law." The Declaration was signed by representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, Holland and Spain, and therefore has been held to be morally binding, even though some of the governments omitted formal ratification.

At the beginning of the war the United States suggested that all belligerents adopt the Declaration of London as their code of action toward neutrals. Germany and Austria agreed. Great Britain, Russia and France accepted it as modified by a British order in council dated August 20, 1914. The modifications, extended by later orders, virtually destroyed the efficacy of the whole agreement. The most important provisions as affecting the present controversy were those classifying goods liable to seizure. The Declaration of London designated as absolute contraband only weapons, ammunition and other actual tools of warfare. The list of conditional contraband included such merchandise as clothing, coal, food, wire, harness, etc.; these, which might be used by armed forces, were to be held as contraband only if the captor could prove that they were destined for use in the field. Finally, there was a list of goods not to be interfered with, such as cotton, rubber, wool and leather. Absolute contraband was subject to capture if in transit to an enemy, either direct or through neutral countries.

Conditional contraband might be seized only if moving direct to the enemy and clearly destined for his armed forces; if passing to him through a neutral country, it was to be immune. "Free" goods might not be touched under any circumstances, while an enemy's exports were to be stopped only by an effective blockade. "Acceptance" of the Declaration of London by Britain, France and Russia proved to be in practice, through successive changes, a nullification of that instrument. The British order in council of August 20, 1914, for example, transferred the conditional contraband list of goods to the absolute contraband classification by announcing that conditional contraband—food, clothing, etc.—would be presumed to be for a hostile army, and liable to capture, if the shipments "were consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state, or to or for a merchant or other person under control of the authorities of the enemy state." Since every German "merchant or other person" is "under control" of the German government this meant that such goods might not be shipped to that country at all. This proclamation, backed by the British fleet, extinguished direct American trade with Germany. But the order went further, for it condemned conditional contraband in transit to Germany, even through neutral ports, a still more drastic "modification" of the agreement of 1909; and it "presumed" a military destination of such goods as food, which might be for the civilian population. Meanwhile, extensions of the contraband lists were so radical that the Entente imposed a blockade in effect without complying with the requirements.

A protest by the United States resulted in a new order, dated October 29, 1914. This was represented as embodying concessions, but in fact it gave no relief whatever; on the contrary, it placed a new restriction by

forbidding shipments even to neutral countries consigned "to order." Answering later protests, Great Britain urged that the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, and between shipments to Germany direct and through neutral countries, had been destroyed, because the German government absolutely controlled all supplies, even foodstuffs, and these must therefore be considered as employed for war purposes. It was not until late in January, 1915, however, that the imperial government took this action, while the British order of August 20, 1914, began the making of the Declaration of London "a scrap of paper." Early in February came the notorious "war zone" decree, Berlin's answer to her enemies' campaign of economic strangulation, and the German policy reached its atrocious climax in the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Soon after this decree Great Britain retaliated with a novel form of "blockade." An order in council of March 11 proclaimed that all vessels which sailed after March 1 to or from a German port would be halted, and compelled to discharge their cargoes—if not contraband—at a neutral or Allied port; in the latter case, the goods might be requisitioned or sold under direction of a prize court. Like rules were applied to ships and cargoes sailing even from neutral ports, if the goods were enemy property, or of enemy origin, or destined to the enemy. Thus, step by step—by ordering to British ports ships with neutral cargoes, by extending the list of contraband, by making conditional contraband absolute, by proclaiming presumptions as to the destination of shipments, and finally by making liable to capture shipments between neutral countries—Great Britain and her allies destroyed the efficacy of the Declaration of London, which they had helped to frame.

The purpose was to utilize economic pressure to counterbalance the excessive military strength of Germany. But in this process economic war was made against neutrals as well as against the enemy. Not only has American trade with the Central Powers been extinguished, but American trade with Holland and Scandinavia has been interrupted and diminished, despite the fact that those countries were coerced into laying embargoes upon the re-export to Germany of American supplies. And a vital fact is that the Allies' "blockade" has never been genuine. Unable to close the ports of Germany, because of the submarine menace, British warships intercept traffic in the English Channel and north of Scotland; it would not be a great extension of the policy if they were to hold up and divert ships in mid-Atlantic or just outside the three-mile limit from Sandy Hook. Moreover, the "blockade" is fatally illegal in that it is discriminatory. It has never been applied in the Baltic sea, and the Scandinavian countries have been able to trade almost uninterruptedly with Germany, while the United States is barred. Repeated protests from Washington have resulted in no substantial relief, while the records are clogged with cases of seizure, detention, confiscation and harassing delay. During the first year of the war more than 2000 vessels with American cargoes for Europe were held up. The case is thus summed up by Prof. Edwin J. Clapp, of New York University, in his enlightening work, "Economic Aspects of the War":

The matter of the right to ship food and other non-contraband to Germany is the crux of the whole situation. Once insist upon that, and the whole structure of interference with our neutral commerce tumbles like a house of cards. Once admit, even tacitly, the right to interfere with food to Germany, and the whole structure of British interference is

the logical law of the sea. If the British blockade of Germany be admitted as valid, the entire law of blockade as evolved from centuries of experience will be abolished, and the possibilities of the future contain endless menace.

As a fact, the American contention is supported by utterances antedating the Declaration of London. In a war between France and China, in 1885, Great Britain successfully resisted France's proclamation of rice as contraband. In the Boer war the British government took the same position, and in the Russo-Japanese war co-operated with the United States to block seizure by Russia of conditional contraband destined to private firms in Japan. At that time Secretary of State Hay resolutely withstood the attempted subversion of neutral rights. Of the policy underlying the seizure he wrote:

It obviates the necessity of blockades; it obliterates all distinction between commerce in contraband and non-contraband goods, and is in effect a declaration of war against commerce of every description between the people of a neutral and those of a belligerent state.

Precisely this "declaration of war" against neutral rights is now in effect in the policy enforced by Great Britain and her allies. Because it affects American property rights and does not endanger American lives, the system has occasioned infinitely less resentment than the barbarities of the German submarine war. A rather widely held conception is that we cannot feel so bitter against a footpad as against an assassin; that trespass is not comparable in atrocity to murder. Yet, considered in the light of the international code, the methodical destruction of neutral rights built up by arduous effort throughout the centuries is as lawless and as subversive of civilization as the sinking of passenger ships. Aside from technicalities, Great Britain offers two pleas in justification—first, that Germany's inhuman methods of making war required the fullest employment of the

Allies' weapon of economic pressure, and second, that the "equities" of their case in the war overshadowed considerations of law. The obvious answer to both arguments is that in letter and spirit international law makes neutral rights paramount to belligerent rights; that "military necessity" is no better justification for lawless aggressions against neutral property than it is for murderous attacks upon neutral persons, and that the deliberate destruction of international law raises a worldwide issue in "equity" quite as important as that presented by the Entente alliance. Moreover, those nations which are committing this crime are wounding the civilization which they profess to champion. A time will come when they, too, will be neutrals; when they will suffer, with the United States and all other countries, from the condition we outlined yesterday:

The meager safeguards which in theory we now possess are being steadily broken down, and the prospect is that at the close of the conflict there will be an almost total lack, not only of recognized international law, but of respect for its traditional prohibitions and admonitions. The precedents laboriously wrested by neutrals from belligerents during past centuries will be no more powerful, it is to be feared, than the precedents created during the last year to supplant them.

WHAT VERDUN MEANS

June 27, 1916.

IT IS somewhat curious that the Russian operations, despite their vast scope and stupendous results, fail to stir the world like the restricted, slow-moving campaign in France. The roll of Austrian prisoners may mount by tens of thousands and the captured territory expand into whole provinces, but attention for the most part remains concentrated upon that incomparably fierce and bloody struggle around Verdun. The battle, or the unending succession of battles, has raged now for 127 days; at times the fury of it has subsided, but for more than four months there has been no complete cessation. In expenditure of life and ammunition, in remorselessness of attack and heroic stubbornness of defense, this combat dwarfs to insignificance the greatest campaigns in history. It seems not so much a clash of armies as a death struggle of nations; it is less like a test of human valor and endurance than like the shock of contending forces of nature. But it is the meaning of the conflict, rather than its magnitude, that challenges interest.

Why did Germany, after eighteen months of war, center her grand attack against the most formidable fortified sector of the French line? By what method of calculation does she consider, as an American military writer has said, that "Verdun would be cheap at the cost of 300,000 men"? Ingenious explanations have been offered by expert commentators. One has said that the crushing in of the huge French salient would be worth

the sacrifice, because it would simplify the problems of German defense, and, by shortening the line, release nearly 200,000 troops for service elsewhere. Others insist that the prime object is political—to discourage the enemy and impress neutrals by an overwhelming demonstration of power, at the same time putting fresh courage and resolution into the German people. The elimination of France by one smashing, fatal blow has been suggested as the main reason. Other confidently expressed theories are that an adequate reward for the Germans is the preventing of the long-predicted offensive by the Allies, or that the purpose is to strengthen the Teutonic line against that contingency. Some experts of repute confess they are quite baffled by the problem. It is even urged that men are being flung to death in great masses for the sake of tradition and national sentiment. It was at Verdun, in 843, that a treaty was signed which marked the beginning of Germany as a distinct entity in the world, and from the tenth to the sixteenth century the region was German-owned. In 1552 it was seized by Henry II of France, and French possession was confirmed by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; but German patriotism still insists that it is an “unredeemed” territory. Only a few weeks ago a noted public speaker, in Cologne, aroused enthusiasm when he said:

More than a thousand years have elapsed since a true German empire was born at Verdun; and now, in front of this same Verdun, our arms display anew a power which will, we are sure, bring success. The districts which our troops hold firmly in Flanders and in France correspond almost precisely to the frontiers of the ancient German empire.

Yet none of these explanations is completely satisfying; all of them combined would hardly make logical the stupefying sacrifices which the German general staff has imposed upon its devoted troops. There is behind

the Verdun operations, according to competent witnesses, a plan vastly more important and far-reaching than the military reasons suggested and infinitely more vital than sentimental imperial ambitions. That plan, they say, is the securing to Germany of control of the richest iron fields in Europe, which lie between Verdun and Metz.

Iron is the ruler in this world war; it dominates the operations on land and sea; without it strategy would be vain, and vast armies but so many puppets. It means cannon, shells, machine guns, locomotives, rails, battle-ships, submarines; deprived of it, the bravest and most resourceful nation must be at the mercy of its foes. It is a familiar fact that in seizing Belgium and north-eastern France, Germany added immeasurably to her metal resources and at the same time stripped her enemies of their most valuable supplies. But it is not generally known that in the basin of Briey, behind the German lines now relentlessly closing in upon Verdun, lies the chief iron treasure of the whole continent. More than a year ago the six great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany presented to the chancellor a statement of acceptable peace terms, which included annexation of conquered territories. And they said:

If the production of pig iron and steel had not been doubled since August, 1914, the continuation of the war would have been impossible. At present the mineral of Briey furnishes from 60 to 80 per cent of the appliances made from iron and steel. If this production be disturbed, the war will be virtually lost.

Recently a member of the French senate made this convincing survey of the situation:

From the beginning of the war Germany has sought to maintain possession of the basin of Briey, which represented 90 per cent of our iron production, and the attack on Verdun has been for the purpose of confirming and perpetuating this

possession. The basin of Briey lies between Verdun and Metz, like a gigantic key of the war thrown at equal distance from these two fortresses of the Lorraine frontier. From this fact may not one perceive the interest which the Germans have in taking Verdun? Before the war, Germany produced annually 28,000,000 tons of iron, of which 21,000,000 tons came from the part of the basin of Briey which had been annexed to Germany since 1870. France produced annually 22,000,000 tons of iron, of which 15,000,000 tons came from that part of the basin of Briey which had remained French. Since the war began France, having lost the basin through invasion, has been almost exclusively furnished with iron from England and the United States. Germany, on the contrary, having occupied the basin of Briey in France and in Luxemburg, has added 21,000,000 tons to her production, a total of 49,000,000 tons, which means 45,000,000 tons of steel. These facts suffice to explain the prolonged fierceness of the attacks on Verdun. Once masters of Verdun, the Germans will be able to believe themselves masters of the indefinite continuation of the war, because the basin of Briey incloses in the totality of its subsoil more than 3,000,000,000 tons of iron.

The overshadowing feature of the Verdun campaign has been the stupendous expenditure of ammunition; for four months an almost unceasing torrent of metal has been pouring upon the French defenses. Without the supplies lying in the French territory she occupies, Germany would be unable to conduct such a colossal offensive, or to resist a prolonged attack. "Deprived of iron," says the senator, "she would be strangled by the absence of those very munitions which up to now have been her power in the east and west." More than a year ago, in fact, the keen judgment of Guglielmo Ferrero, the eminent Italian historian, emphasized this very point. Discussing the probable exactions of Germany in case she were victorious, he foresaw a demand for "rectification" of the frontier by the inclusion in the empire of the Briey region. The extent of the territory, he remarked, would

make the demand seem modest, but would really be revolutionary:

This slight enlargement would be enough, in fact, to turn upside down from top to bottom the whole balance of the old world. It would reduce all continental Europe to vassalage under a protectorate of Germany, and would put England and her empire in the greatest danger that she has run in all her history. Now, if we understand that the territory of Briey in French Lorraine contains, perhaps, the most colossal and the richest layers of iron in all Europe; that Luxemburg also is very rich in iron; that in the French territory now occupied by the Germans near Belgium there are the richest mines of coal in France, some of them being among the richest in the world, the conclusion is clear. If Germany could succeed in getting possession of Belgium and Luxemburg and in swelling her boundary to the disadvantage of France, she would be gaining possession of almost all the mines of fossil coal and of iron in Europe. Exception being made of Russia, she would have almost a monopoly on the continent of metallurgical industries.

In our judgment these facts, and these facts alone, make intelligible the implacable purpose of the Germans to possess Verdun. The general staff is not carpeting those hillsides with corpses for reasons of sentiment, or in order to gain a tactical advantage, or to impress either the German people or the world at large. Verdun means iron; iron is the fundamental need for either victory or a resistance that will extort favorable terms; and it is iron, not glory, that Germany is purchasing with the blood of her troops.

THE FATE OF VERDUN

June 30, 1916.

ONE of the ablest American commentators on the war wrote four weeks ago that "if the German attack at Verdun ever becomes too threatening," it might readily be checked by offensive operations at other points on the western, eastern and Tyrolean fronts. Dispatches of the last twenty-four hours show that the writer was well informed. The German advance posts on the north are within three-quarters of a mile of the French line immediately in front of the city, and exceptional activity is reported on the part of the British, Italian and Russian armies. The acute observer, however, made these singular assertions in the same article:

The Germans have made no real progress since March in the taking of Verdun. * * * In three months they have advanced about four miles; virtually the whole advance was made in the first fortnight. Their losses have been colossal; there is as yet not the smallest prospect that they can get Verdun.

He might now add another striking fact in depreciation—it took the Germans four months to advance from Douaumont to Fleury, a distance of only a mile and a quarter. But this would not alter the circumstance that they are within 1500 yards of the so-called citadel, and that the counter-moves will need to be of exceptional force and celerity to avert capture of the position. One of the most curious features of expert comment upon this campaign has been the determined representation of the fortified region of Verdun as "impregnable." If any

military principle has been completely demonstrated in this war it is that there is no such thing as an "impregnable" defense. It has been shown again and again—not only by the Germans, but by their adversaries—that the most elaborately prepared position must fall before an adequate concentration of men and metal efficiently employed. Yet trained critics have persistently discussed the "failure" of the German plan and have described minutely how Verdun was "saved."

Readers who have followed this newspaper's comment are familiar with the main factors of the mighty problems which the Germans set themselves to work out in blood upon the slopes leading to the famous fortress—the carrying of a curving sector of the French line twenty-five miles in length and from three to six miles deep, every elevation crowned with a formidable system of defense, every depression commanded by murderous artillery and literally honeycombed with labyrinthine trenches and pitfalls. Months of preparation enabled the assailants during the first few days to make such progress that the capture of Verdun itself seemed imminent. Indeed, it has become known that General Joffre and his associates had decided to relinquish the dangerous salient without serious resistance, and changed their plan only upon imperative representations from the government. The result was a sudden checking of the German onslaught after the storming of Douaumont, and there followed the four months of stupendous campaigning east and west of the Meuse, with its ferocious intensity and its swift swinging of the attack. Any one even slightly acquainted with the colossal difficulties of the task would have realized, it might be supposed, that after every mighty bombardment and its succeeding infantry assault there must be a pause, either to consoli-

date the captured position and bring up the gigantic guns for a fresh advance, or else, if the attack had failed, to assemble the forces for a renewed drive. But in four months' study the experts never seemed to absorb this elementary fact. Every check to the Germans was called a defeat, every temporary abatement of the fury of their onslaughts was described as a precursor of collapse; the theory that the Verdun defenses were "impregnable" was maintained in the face of the record, which showed a methodical and absolutely relentless progress toward the goal. As early as the middle of March the New York World quoted "a military expert of national reputation," in Washington, as follows:

The attack on Verdun has failed. In all probability this means that the kaiser has reached the zenith of his military power. The French line is intact.

Another newspaper strategist wrote about the same time:

German progress has been grossly disproportionate to the effort put forth. The characterization failure may now be applied conservatively, for whatever yet may happen it is evident that on the lines of first projection the undertaking has fallen through. Fighting might continue for several weeks more, with occasional fits of extreme violence, but for no other purpose really than to "settle the line."

It was argued that the enterprise had failed because the "element of surprise" had disappeared; a surprise attack which extends over two or three months, remarked a caustic writer, is "rather damp lightning." Our deduction, on the contrary, would be that an attack sustained with commanding vigor for such a period was obviously planned as a siege operation and not as a surprise at all. The shifting of the German onsets from one point to another suggested to ordinary observers that the aim was systematic, well-balanced progress toward inclosing that area selected for conquest. But this

strategy appeared to the experts to denote "the disturbance of mind of the German general staff"!

But the most amazing example of misread facts was the bland assertion in a New York newspaper only six days ago, that "success (for the Germans) seems less likely on the 122d day of the battle than on the 5th." It is only fair to say that the French themselves have been as conservative in their predictions as they have been valorous in the field. Early in March former Premier Clemenceau expressed confidence in victory, but admitted the possibility of defeat; and three weeks ago a censored dispatch from Paris declared that "even if the capture of Fort Vaux means the crown prince's entry into Verdun it does not mean the loss of the French army north of the Meuse, as preparations have long been completed for holding a new line." Equally significant, however, has been the confidence of the German general staff, expressed in a deadly continuity of attacks as merciless upon the assailants as upon the defenders. At the end of May a Berlin writer expressed the national view:

This is not a struggle for a fortress or a town, but the life, strength, bones and blood of two great nations. We have every respect for the patriotic spirit and soldierly discipline of the French, but for them to call it a victory because they still hold Verdun is nothing but tragic, grotesque and unworthy. Verdun will be the grave of France.

The last sentence is the expression of a baseless hope. Verdun has not slain France; it has proved that she lives; a nation which could survive the test she has endured during the last four months is not to be consigned to the tomb by a phrase. Perhaps the most interesting recent dispatch, however, was that which, on June 10, conveyed the Berlin prediction of Verdun's fall "by July 1." The announcement was ominous, because the imperial government is usually careful to withhold such

opinions until their fulfillment is certain, as was shown by the advance notice of the British surrender at Kut-el-Amara. One may be permitted to doubt that "the plan of the general staff provided for the capture of Verdun by July 21"; even German efficiency is not capable of forecasting with such exactitude the events of a five months' campaign. But this harmless bit of vanity was less important than the positive assertion that the fortress would soon be in German control. In expressing our own judgment, some twelve weeks ago, we remarked that the non-military observer, not being hampered by an overload of technical knowledge, was sometimes better able to estimate the broad meaning of events than was the trained critic. Noting that the experts had said that "Verdun would never be taken," we admitted we did not know that it would, and added, "But if it is not in German possession before the end of this month, the logic of current events is strangely obscure." Our expedition into the unfamiliar field of military prophecy was not particularly brilliant; yet it compared rather favorably with others, in that its general course was in the right direction.

Verdun has not yet fallen. It took four months for the Germans to advance a mile and a quarter, and it may take weeks to cover the last few furlongs. But it seems clear that only one thing—strong, sustained and carefully co-ordinated offensives on the three fronts—can save the fortress which was so impressively represented as never being in danger.

THE TESTING OF GERMANY

July 18, 1916.

TECHNICAL expositions of the present great campaign in France are rather confusing to the uninitiated, and the general disposition, we think, is to let the experts fight it out, while the public forms its judgment from such understandable details as the extent of territory conquered or the numbers of prisoners reported taken. There are, however, certain broad impressions which the civilian observer will derive, and these suggest some interesting possibilities. The conflict between the two mighty groups of belligerents is approaching its climax, and while a sudden decision is beyond imagining, it seems clear that the next few weeks or months will disclose which group is to achieve the ascendancy in the supreme test of force. The field of conflict extends north and south about sixty miles, from the Belgian border almost to the "elbow" where the trenches turn sharply to the east. The center of the offensive by the British and French is where their armies join, near the Somme river; the main attack, where bombardment has been followed by infantry assaults, covers a front of about twenty-five miles, and has resulted in an Allied advance of from three to five miles. It need not be said that in twenty months German efficiency and military science had made that region one vast fortress. There are ordinarily three lines of defense. That nearest the enemy consists of deep trenches protected with entanglements of barbed wire and marked at intervals

by massive blockhouses, from which devastating fire can be poured into the flanks of advancing infantry. The second line is similar, but with deeper dugouts and caverns; in both lines the deadly machine gun is the principal weapon. Then there is the third line, the strongest of all, whence the reserves are hurled in furious counter-attacks against the exhausted troops that have penetrated the front position. And back of that, where the artillery lies hidden, begins another zone equally formidable. All of the so-called "lines" are but parts of vast and intricate systems with elaborate inter-communication, the whole comprising a monstrous maze of pitfalls and deathtraps several miles deep. Hence, even the breaking of the first, second and third lines along a considerable front may be a victory that is a prelude to disaster, unless the advantage gained is made secure before the defenders can organize their full powers of resistance and counter-attack.

One of the most striking things about this "grand offensive" was its belated undertaking. It suggests how imperfect was the realization of what twentieth-century warfare means that the great action was planned originally for the spring of 1915; it was more than a year later before the colossal preparations necessary for such an enterprise had been completed. The delay imposed by events put upon France the most searching test a nation ever endured. Germany determined to forestall her adversaries and, if possible, to force them into their long-expected assault before they were ready. On February 21 she began at Verdun that terrific thrust which she hoped would reach the very vitals of the republic—France was to be "bled to death" before her laggard allies could deliver an effective blow. As the Verdun campaign became more furious there arose wonderment

throughout the world that the great new armies of Great Britain were inactive. French publicists began to complain. Praise was gratifying, they said, but the nation needed aid more substantial. Even in England there was a feeling of restiveness; why was nothing done to relieve the pressure at Verdun, where the French had been suffering incredible horrors for four months? It has now been revealed by authority that the delay was dictated by Joffre himself. He wanted no repetition of the costly "victories" of Loos and Neuve Chapelle and Champagne; France could hold Verdun safe at least until the end of June; let the British pile up guns and ammunition until then. That his judgment was sound has been shown in the result. Kitchener, too, has been vindicated. He held from the beginning that a vast British army—then non-existent and seemingly impossible of creation—would be the decisive factor, and that it must be kept in reserve until the last safe moment, in order to insure adequate training, equipment and artillery support.

In estimating the general significance of the tremendous movement, one is struck by the demonstration of sounder tactics than were used in earlier offensives. The lesson that an intrenched and resourceful enemy can be forced back only by overwhelming artillery fire has been well learned. The former device of trying to thrust an existing wedge deeper into his lines has been abandoned; the present system is to drive a new wedge, then use it to flank his positions. But the stratagems of caution and conservation of lives are no less important. The British invented the novel expedient of following their terrific artillery preparation of the selected ground with "observation raids" at night, the purpose of which is to learn precisely the effect of the high explosives.

One machine gun left undestroyed in a shelter might crumple an infantry attack, and the aim is to take no chances. A singular revelation, by the way, is that the proverbially audacious French have shown better judgment than their allies in shunning movements of spectacular daring.

More vital than the matter of field tactics, however, is the great fact of co-operation among the sundered allies. The battle of the Somme alone might be a problem for Germany; associated with the Russian and Italian campaigns of offense it becomes a serious enterprise. A uniform and sustained pressure on three fronts, even though the progress be slow, must have a greater effect than any conceivable force exerted on one. And to the tremendous weight of co-ordinated strategy must be added the immeasurable influence of a transferred initiative. David Lloyd George has justly emphasized this factor. "The combined offensive," he says, "has wrenched the initiative out of the hands of the enemy—never, I trust, to return to his grasp." For the present Germany's antagonists, not Germany herself, are the dictators of battles, masters of the times and places in the unfolding struggle.

To achieve this was not a matter of will, but of work. Americans, who have been instructed from high places that in case of need "a million men would spring to arms between sunset and sunrise," and that "we have always found the means to defend ourselves," might profitably study some of the things France and Britain had to do before they launched their attack. Behind the selected battlefield they built hundreds of miles of railroads for the rapid transportation of troops and munitions and wounded. They rebuilt hundreds of miles of roads, scores of bridges, vast networks of telegraph and tele-

phone lines. They concentrated within a few miles 1,200,000 soldiers and half as many workers for tasks of transportation, supply, construction and repair. They built innumerable emplacements for heavy artillery, with every needed arrangement for advancing the guns quickly as the first defenses of the enemy were reduced. They fitted out enormous hospital bases, collected mountainous stores of food, buried great supplies of ammunition at points far ahead of the guns, so that they would be available instantly in the forward movement. And all these stupendous movements were concealed from the Germans—so far as was possible—by the aggressive work of clouds of aeroplanes.


Although the offensive has lasted for more than two weeks, modern battles are too vast in scope to make possible now any rational estimate of the probable results. The Germans, while acknowledging the force of the blow, make light of the damage inflicted; the British, after so many months of inertia, are naturally encouraged by initial successes and impatient for greater things; the French, in line with the strong, new spirit that animates the nation, are calmly confident, neither overestimating the gains nor underestimating the cost of what they hope to do. But one thing is clear: Both the British and French have done a workmanlike job. They have done more than admire German efficiency; they have equaled, if they have not surpassed it. It means something when Lloyd George is able to say that Great Britain is producing twice as much ammunition in a week as was used during the offensive last September—and in that operation more shells were fired in one battle than were used during the entire Boer war. It means something when Premier Asquith declares that the attacks, "if necessary, will be continued with the present intensity indefinitely."


Yet, in our judgment, the result does not depend wholly upon masses of men and metal. Proof that any position, however strong, can be taken is not new—the Germans have given it a dozen times around Verdun. The vital fact is that Germany's enemies have seized the initiative, have put her at last, after nearly two years, definitely on the defensive. Whether they can do more—whether “the big push,” as the English affectionately call it, can eject the Germans from Belgium and France by sheer driving force—is, we think, open to doubt. But there is another factor which the experts seem to ignore. It is a matter of psychology rather than military science and power. It is the effect of the changed situation upon the German soldiers and the German people. For two years they have been on the advance. During the early months of the war the program was carried out with a precision that seemed miraculous. Belgium was conquered, the richest parts of France seized, Russia hammered into helplessness. At the appointed time and according to schedule Serbia was crushed and the Anglo-French expedition against Constantinople shattered. Here and there a local defeat was suffered, but it was quickly buried under a pyramid of victories, until Germany, justly proud of her triumphs asked in amazement and scorn why her deluded adversaries did not sue for peace. During all this time she dominated the strategy in all fields. Her only tactics were the tactics of offense. Thus the stupendous assault at Verdun sent a new thrill through the empire, not only because of the magnitude of the prize sought, but because it proved that the kaiser's generals still held the power of decision.


Now, for the first time, the condition is reversed. German power is no longer the hammer; it is the anvil.


Germany must wait until her enemies strike and then meet the blow. Co-ordination of the attacks nullifies, in part, her great advantage of fighting from interior lines; that wonderful network of railroads, for the quick transfer of troops from one front to another, is now an instrument of defense, not of attack. And the change is not stimulating. It is one thing for an army corps, flushed with victory in France, to be flung across the empire to thrust deep into the flank of Russia; it is another thing for an army corps, shaken by an indecisive battle on one front, to be shuttled hurriedly to another, not to join in a triumphant advance, but to avert or make safe an ominous retreat. In a word, the heart of the problem is not how gallantly and how forcefully the assailants will deliver their strokes, but how the German armies and people will endure a prolonged defensive war. They have shown almost superhuman valor and precision in the tactics of offense; will the same qualities be revealed if they are called upon to meet the frightful experience of the last two weeks, "continued indefinitely"? And the question is one that the whole German nation, not its troops alone, must answer.


The French and British victories thus far are of comparatively small moment; if the final result depended upon their making only consistent progress, it would be years before they would be fighting on German soil. If Germany shows a spiritual endurance in defense equal to her audacity in attack, the offensive means merely a colossal test in the capacity of the belligerents to lose blood. It will approach decisiveness if, and when, the spirit of her soldiers and people succumbs to the sensation of a definitely halted advance and a vanished hope of victory.














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